MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHISM

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The present work is the revised edition of my earlier publication entitled *Aspects of Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism*. In this edition matters relating to Hinayana have been retained only where these became necessary for the sake of comparison and contrast with Mahayana.

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INTRODUCTION

The question that naturally arises in our minds, why the omniscient Bhagavān Buddha preached two religious systems: one lower (Hīnayāna) and the other higher (Mahāyāna) or two Truths, one conventional (Saṃvriti-satya) and the other real (Paramārtha-satya). The answer to this question is given in the Saddharma-puṇḍarika,¹ one of the nine canonical texts of the Mahāyānists. It is as follows:

Bhagavān Śākyasimha, rising from his deep meditation, regained his normal mental state and then addressed Śāriputra with these words: “Very deep and extremely difficult it is for the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas to comprehend the truth attained by the Tathāgatas, who had struggled for it for several aeons. Equally difficult it is for them to penetrate into the meaning of the terse expressions (sandhābhāṣā) used by the Tathāgatas.” Śākyasimha also before his attainment of bodhi at Gaya busied himself with the acquisition of the āvēnika-dharmas (eighteen dharmas leading to Buddhahood) and it was after realising the Truth that he became convinced that it could not be imparted by one to another by means of words. Though aware of the futility of the āvēnika-dharmas,² he had to instruct the Śrāvakas to acquire them only as an expedient because he realised that these āvēnika-dharmas only could appeal to them. He admitted that by acquiring these dharmas the perfect Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas could become free from impurities and would not have any more rebirth but still they would not be capable of realising the highest Truth visualised by the Tathāgatas. Not to speak of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, even Bodhisattvas of the highest rank, i.e. the Avavarttikas (lit. non-receding from the goal) were far away from the realisation of the Truth. Śāriputra was asked to rely on

¹. Edited by the present writer and published by the Asiatic Society in 1954. In 1934 was published an edition of this text by two Japanese savants Profs. Wogihara and Tsuchida.
². See Mahāvyutpatti.
Bhagavān Śākyasimha’s words that the three yānas were mere expedients resorted to by Buddhas for imparting training to beings, who clung to different types of practices for spiritual progress.

Thereupon Sariputra solicited Buddha to explain why he said that the Truth was too deep and subtle to be comprehended by Śrāvakas and why the terse sayings of Buddhas were also unintelligible to them. At the repeated request of Sariputra, Buddha agreed to explain the real aim of the Tathāgatas only to those who had implicit faith in him and not to those who were still conceited (ābhimanika). He said that the Truth could not be the subject-matter of discussion (atarko’tarkāvacarāh) and could be realised by the Tathāgatas within themselves. The Buddhas appear in the world only to help beings to attain the Tathāgata-knowledge and insight (tathāgata-jñāna-darsana), which may be equated to omniscience (sarvajñatā) and for this, there is really one yāna called Buddhayāna and not a second or a third, though they take recourse to many forms of exposition to suit the different classes of beings whose mental inclinations and mental developments vary on account of their appearance in the world at a time when there are one or more of the five shortcomings (kaśāyas) due to the Kalpa (time), sattva (type of beings), kleśa (impurities), dṛṣṭi (wrong views) and āyus (length of life).

The above topic is repeated in further details in the gāthās. Buddha said that for those beings, who believed in the existence of the world and its sufferings, he preached his dharma giving reasons and examples, in nine aṅgas, viz., sūtra, gāthā, itivṛttaka, jātaka, adbhuta, nidāna and various geyya replete with similies. He held up before them the summum bonum of Nirvāṇa and not Buddhahood. Similarly, he preached the Vaipulyasūtras to those who had accumulated merits through several existences and were pure, learned and well-behaved, and to them he held out the goal of Buddhahood.

There was one yāna and not three and if Buddha had preached only Hinayāna (p. 35, v. 57) then he would have been charged with miserliness (mātsayya), envy (trīyā) and attachment (chanda-rāga). If he had straightway asked everybody to seek bodhi, then many would not have taken his advice
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seriously, and would have suffered for that reason longer in the worlds of existence and got entangled in one or more of the sixtytwo heretical views.¹

Buddha assured Buddhahood not only to those, who perfected themselves in the six pāramitās but also to those, who worshipped the relics of Buddha or erected thereon stūpas of any material, be it of jewel or sand, or made images (bimba) of Buddha with any metal or even clay, or drew sketches of the figure of Buddha on paper, wall, etc. or even offered flowers or played musical instruments or sang songs in adoration of Buddha's images or just uttered the words "Namo'stu Buddhāya".

There is only one dharma, which is refulgent by nature (prakṛti ca dharmaśa sadā prabhāṣvarā) and which is eternal, unshakeable and has a law of itself (dharma-niyamatā). Realising the eternal dharma, Śākyasimha stayed at the Bodhimanda for three weeks and felt pity for the suffering beings. He wanted to enter into parinirvāṇa then and there, but at the intervention of Brahmā and also remembering what the previous Buddhas had done, he made up his mind to propagate his dharma in three ways (yāna) so that it could be intelligible to the beings at large. He then proceeded to Benares and preached his dharma to the five bhikṣus in a modified form using for the first time the words nirvāṇa, arhanta, dharma and saṅgha. At the same time, he initiated the Bodhisattvas, who approached him, into the highest truth. It is this higher teaching that he was going to impart now to Śāriputra and asked him to have implicit faith in his words and assured him that he as well as many other Arhats would ultimately attain Buddhahood.

After listening to the above mentioned words of Buddha, Śāriputra regretted that he and his fellow-brethren were satisfied with the superficial aspect of the teaching and did not exert to dive deep into its inner meaning, which is pure, subtle and beyond discussion, and thereby missed to attain Buddhahood with all its attributes (see ch. III. vs. 5-6). He felt that as he was previously a heretical parivrajaka, he was taught only nirvṛti (quietude) by realising the non-existence of any substance (soul) in phenomena but it was not real nirvṛti attainable

¹. Vide Brahmajāla-sutta of the Dīgha-Nikāya.
only by Buddhas. He was elated at the hope held out by Buddha Śākyasimha that he would also in due course become a Buddha. He had no more doubt about the truth and solemnity of the words of Buddha, and he would never mistake those as the beguiles of Mara. He was reminded by Buddha that he had forgotten the Bodhisattva vow taken by him long long ago and that he had received training from Śākyasimha in Bodhisattva secrets and that he, being forgetful of his long past, felt that he had attained Nirvāṇa. This text, Saddharmapundarika, was delivered by Śākyasimha particularly to revive the memory of the Bodhisattva vows taken by the Śrāvakas.

After countless aeons Śāriputra will become the Buddha Padmaprabha and his Buddhakṣetra will be called Viraja and will be full of Bodhisattvas. This prophecy about Śāriputra was applauded by the assemblage of gods and men, who expressed their appreciation of Buddha’s sandhyābhāsa (enigmatic sayings) by saying that at Benares the doctrine of origin and decay of skandhas (constituents of a being) was explained while the same teacher was now giving an exposition of a subtle inconceivable dharma.

Though Śāriputra had implicit faith in Buddha’s prophecy, still he requested Śākyasimha to explain why formerly he imparted at all the teaching of anātman (selflessness) and nirvāṇa to his disciples like him.

Buddha removed his doubts by telling him a parable, which is as follows:

There was a fabulously rich man, who had a very large house, which, however, was very old, full of refuses and was the haunt of birds, dogs, worms, reptiles, pretas, yakṣas and piśācas. It had a tottering roof of straw, and had only one door for exit. The house suddenly caught fire. The owner of the house had a number of children playing within the house. He was very much frightened on account of the fire as also of the venomous man-killing beings existing in the house and thought of carrying the children out by his strong arms but the difficulty was that the boys were unmindful of the fire and were going hither and thither and could not be brought together and would not even listen to their father’s warning about the raging fire. The father knew his children’s inclinations and so he came out of
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the house and collected beautiful toy-carts drawn by bull, goat and deer and tempted the boys to take them after coming out of the burning house. The boys struggled among themselves to come out first in order to have the best toy-cart. The father then felt relieved at the safety of his sons. When the boys asked for toys, the father, immensely rich as he was, gave each of them not the cheap types of toy-carts but extremely expensive fast carriages (*mahāyāna*), replete with all conceivable furnishings, and drawn by very sturdy bulls.

Buddha then asked Śāriputra whether he would consider the father guilty of telling a lie. When Śāriputra answered in the negative, Buddha told him that he himself might be likened to the rich father, the house to the world (of five organic sense-desires) and the sons to the men of the world unmindful of the fire burning the world. Then wooden cheap toy-carts were the various disciplinary and meditational practices prescribed in Śrāvaka-yāna, Pratyekabuddha-yāna and Bodhisattva-yāna, which were held out as the bait for the men of the world to come out of the three worlds of existence (*tridhātu*). The bait was the attainment of eternal happiness through perfection in *bala*, *bodhyāga*, *dhyāna*, *vimokṣa*, *samādhi*, *samāpatti* etc. Some of the men of the world, who relied upon Buddha’s words, retired from the worldly lives. Of them again some became interested in attaining salvation (*parinirvāṇa*) for himself only by listening to the teachings and following the practices relating to the four āryasatyas. They were the Śrāvakayānists and they might be compared to the boys seeking toy-carts drawn by deer. There were others, who sought self-control without any guide, but who also wanted their own salvation through the comprehension of the law of causation (*hetuprātyaya*). They were the Pratyekabuddhayānists and might be compared to the boys asking for toy-carts drawn by goat (*aja*). There were also those, who aspired for omniscience like that of the Buddha by self-acquired perfect knowledge and wished to help all beings to attain *parinirvāṇa* and exerted to attain the qualities, which made a Buddha. These were the Mahāyānists, seeking exit from the *Tridhātu* and might be compared to the boys seeking carts drawn by bulls.

Though the father tempted the boys by showing to them
different toy-carts, he actually gave them not toy-carts but actual vehicles of a very high class and so Buddha gave his disciples Buddhayāna. In fact, all the four yānas were of one nature and so Buddha could not be said to have told a lie by taking recourse to the expedient of teaching his dharma in three different ways, viz., Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna and Bodhisattvayāna. Buddha avoided teaching the Sūtra to any unbelieving person lest he should be the victim of dire consequences (detailed in the gāthās 113-136) to which a person was destined for not accepting this Sūtra as Buddha-vacana. A person’s virtues and acquisitions, which entitled him to learn this sūtra from the Teacher, are given in the gāthās 137-147.
Chapter I

POLITICAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND OF MAHÂYÂNA BUDDHISM

The obscure period in the history of India commenced after
the end of the Maurya period, i.e., about the 2nd century B.C.,
but the stream of Buddhism, which received its impetus from
Emperor Aśoka, flowed quietly without being affected by the
political changes. During the Maurya period, the early and
historical Buddhism became divided into eighteen or more sects,
on account of their different views about the interpretation of
Buddha’s teachings. One of these viz., the Mahāsāṅghikas inter­
preted the teachings in a manner, which led ultimately to the
appearance of full-fledged Mahāyāna Buddhism. It should be
noted that the traces of Mahāyānism are found even in the Pāli
Sutta Piṭaka, the earliest literature preserving Buddha’s teach­
ings, and this has been indicated in the next chapter.

An attempt is now being made to throw some light on the
obscure period, mentioned above.

About the 2nd or 1st century B.C. Mahāyāna Buddhism be­
came a recognised phase of the religion, and it gradually
passed on to Central Asia, China, Korea and Japan. In Tibet,
Bhutan, Mongolia and in the Far East border of U.S.S.R.
appeared its later phase, viz., the Tāntric Mahāyāna Buddhism.

1. See infra.

THE BACTRIANS AND THE PARTHIANS

The last king of the Maurya dynasty was Bṛhadratha, who
was assassinated by his military-general Puṣyamitra. With the
latter started the reign of the Śuṅgas, who ruled over a large
empire, which included Magadha, Ayodhyā, Vārāhajjā, Jalandhara
and Sākala in the Punjab. Puṣyamitra had to face a Bactrian
invasion and came into conflict with the Bactrian princes, and
he ultimately became victorious and drove them out of Magadha.
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Perhaps, even beyond the Sindhu. He reigned for 36 years (circa 187-151 B.C.). He was succeeded by his son Agnimitra, who was followed by other descendants, and all of them remained in power from 151-75 B.C. The Śuṅgas revived Brāhmaṇism and patronised the Bhāgavata cult. A Yavana (Yona) prince Heliodoros erected a Garuḍa Pillar and described himself as a Bhāgavata in the inscription of Bhilsā (Besnagar). Though the Śuṅgas were anti-Buddhist in spirit, the people of Vidiśā expressed their faith in Buddhism, as is proved by the fine gateway railings around the Sāṇci stūpa erected by Emperor Asoka.

During the reign of Bṛhadṛatha, the various powers, both Indian and foreign, became independent rulers of the territories, which happened to be under their control.

In the 3rd century B.C. the Mahāvamsa is particularly important for the history of Buddhism in Kashmir, on account of the fact that Majjhantika was sent to Kashmir to propagate Buddhism there. Later the scene of discussions between King Milinda and the Buddhist monk Nāgasena is placed at a spot, 12 yojanas from Kashmir and 200 yojanas from Alasanda or Kalasigāma. The author of the treatise is familiar with the people of the North as he refers twice to Saka-Yavana, Cīna-Cilāta (=Kirāta = a tribe who lived by hunting birds and animals, probably of Tokharistan), Alasanda, Nikumba, Kashmir and Gandhāra, i.e., the region round about Kashmir.

As regards King Milinda, the treatise states that, at first he became a lay-devotee, built the Milinda-vihāra and then after sometime he handed over the administration of his dominion to his son and joined the Buddhist Sāṅgha as a monk, attaining ultimately arhathood.

1. The Age of Imperial Unity, Bhāratiya Vidyābhavan, Bombay, p 95f.
2. Ibid., p. 98
3. Ibid., p. 99
4. Milindapañha, p. 82-83
5. Ibid., p. 327 : Cilāta=Kirāta (=Tokharistan, a mleccha country (see Nāgārjunakoṇḍa inscriptions in EI, XX, 1).
6. Ibid., p. 420
Though only two Kharoṣṭhī inscriptions, inscribed at the instance of the Greek rulers, have been discovered at Swat and Taxila, these show that Mahāyāna Buddhism obtained a firm footing in N. W. India and was welcomed by the foreign rulers.

The Bactrian Greeks, who had come up to some parts of Northern India, shortly after the downfall of Magadhan empire, not only adopted the Indian culture but also made a special contribution to its development in course of two centuries of their rule. They carried the tale of Indian wisdom and prosperity across the Indian frontiers to the hordes of Central Asian Steppes on the one hand and to the Graeco-Roman world in the west on the other hand.

In the 2nd century B.C., the Greek rulers viz., the houses of Euthydemus and Eucratides crossed the Hindukush and took possession of Kabul and North-western India. They were followed by Demetrius and Theodorus, who, it appears, were supporters of Mahāyāna Buddhism as they enshrined Buddha’s relics and erected sanctuaries. Two Kharoṣṭhī inscriptions incised at the instance of the Greek chiefs have been discovered at Swat and Taxila. These show that Mahāyāna Buddhism had a firm footing in North-western India and was appreciated by the foreign rulers.

Demetrius (=Dattamitra of the Mahābhārata I. 139.23) wrested from Brhadhratha a considerable portion of Magadha.

1. CII., II, 1, p. 4: By Theodoros the Meridarkh was established a stūpa, enshrining these relics of Bhagavān Śākyamuni for the good of many people.
2. Ibid. p. 5: By ... the Meridarkh together with his wife, the stūpa was established in honour of his parents for the presentation of a respectful offering.
3. Ibid., p. 94
4. CII, II, i, p. 4 “By Theodoros the Meridarkh was established the stūpa, enshrining the relics of Bhagavān Śākyamuni for the good of many people.”
5. Ibid., p. 5 “By ... the Meridarkh together with his wife, the stūpa was established in honour of his parents, for the presentation of a respectful offering”.
6. Ibid., p. 49
7. Dharmamitra in Tibetan, see Journal Asiatique, 1933, p. 27, n. 1.
Menander (=Milinda) carried on several expeditions into the interior of Northern India and made Sialkot (=Sāgala) his capital.¹

In the history of Buddhism, during the period intervening between Puṣyamitra and Kaṇiṣka, the reign of King Menander reveals that the foreigners took interest in Buddhism. The Milindapañha offers some information about the state of Buddhism in Northern India. The date of the Sanskrit original of this text may be taken as the 1st century BCE.

The Śakas

The first horde, after the Greeks to be attracted to India was, the Śakas or the Scythians, who were settled in the Oxus region, which was previously occupied by the Greeks, who were ousted from that region in the 2nd century BCE by the nomadic hordes, known as Yueh-chihs, a name given by the ancient Chinese. The Yueh-chihs previously settled near the Chinese frontier but they were ousted by other hordes of people. They migrated to the west and compelled the Śakas to leave the Oxus valley and to go in search of a new land for their settlement. The Śakas went to the south. As the Northern Punjab was then in the hands of Greeks, they entered India through a different route, took possession of the lower Indus Valley and then spread out to Western India. Like the Greeks they also adopted Indian culture and before long they became strong propagators of Indian culture outside India.²

1. Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya (III. 2. 111) deplors that the Greeks besieged Sāketa (near Ayodhyā) and Madhyamika (=Nagari) near Chitor in Rajputana.

The Gārgi Sāṁhitā (pp. 94-116) deplored the advance of the Greeks up to the wall of the Puṣpapura (Pāṭaliputra)...having conquered Sāketa and Paṅcāla (Doab) and Mathura, the Yavanas reached Kusumadhvaja (Pāṭaliputra). Then a fierce battle ensued with sword and knock-out blows (hasta-yuddha).

At the end of the Yuga there will appear the Anāryas destitute of religion. The Brāhmaṇas, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras will become inferior and imitate the foreign style of dress and practices. See Lamotte, op. cit., p.411-12.

Like the Greeks, the Sakas also patronised Buddhism and gave donations to the Buddhist Sangha, erected stūpas and installed images of Buddha.

Maues, the Saka ruler (60-50 B.C.) established a principality in the Western Punjab. He was followed by Azes (50-30 B.C.), then Gondopherenes (30-15 B.C.), and Pakores (15-10 B.C.). The Sakas of Syr Daria fell upon Bactria and then entered into India up to Takṣaśilā and Mathurā in the north, and Malwa and Kathiawad in the west. They established themselves in Sind and the Punjab also. Their representatives were known as Satraps (=Viceroys), e.g., of Saurāśṭra and Malwa. They are referred to as Daivaputra Shāhi Shāhānushāhi-Śaka Muruṇḍa in the Allahabad Pillar Inscription. The Sakas, however, were in favour of Indian civilization and ideals and also introduced the same in Central Asia and the Far Eastern countries. The Sakas are referred to in the Epics as degraded Kṣatriyas along with the Kambojas and Yavanas. The reigning periods of the Scythians in India extended from the 1st century B.C. to the time of the Imperial Guptas. The Sakas sought the help of the Kushāṇas and thereby paved the way for the advent of the Kushāṇa-rule in India.

The Kushāṇas

The Kushāṇas, at this time, dominated over Afghanistan, after ousting the Parthian successors of the Greeks. They drove out the Parthians from the Gandhāra region, the Saka ruler Azes becoming a protégé of the Kushāṇas.

Kujula Kadphises (=Kadphises I) was the first Kushāṇa ruler. During his reign, he extended his dominion up to Kipin (Kashmir City) and the neighbouring lands. Very likely he reigned from 16 to 65 A.D.

He was succeeded by his son Wima Kadphises (Kadphises II), who extended his dominion over the Punjab region watered by the river Sindhu. He was a Śaiva. though his father was a Buddhist.

1. P. C. Bagchi, India and China, p. 3.
Following the Śaka-Yavanās, the Kushāṇas also adopted Buddhism as their religion and showered their munificence on the erection of stūpas, temples and images of Buddha all over Northern India. The earlier Kushāṇas like Kadphises II, as their coins indicate, were Śiva worshippers, but Kanishka and his successors, as shown by their monuments and inscriptions, offered gifts to the Buddhist Saṅgha, particularly, to the Sarvāstivāḍins and occasionally to the Mahāsaṅghikas.1

INTRODUCTION OF BUDDHISM INTO KASHMIR

Before the account of the Fourth Buddhist Synod is taken up, it behoves us to deal with the introduction of Buddhism into Kashmir. The kingdom of Kashmir appears in our ancient records as a part and parcel of Gandhāra. In the list of sixteen mahājanapadas, Kashmir-Gandhāra is indicated as one janapada, indicating thereby that the two countries formed one political unit in the pre-Asokan days. That it continued to be so is evident from the Greek records in which Kasparypuro (=Kāsyapapura =Kashmir) is described as a Gandhāric city.3 In the MilindaPañha,4 which was composed about the beginning of the Christian era, the two countries were compounded as Kāśmīra-Gandhāra. The Chinese translators of the Buddhist texts, which were dated in the 3rd or 4th century A.D., used the Chinese term Kipin for Sanskrit Kāśmīra. Kipin, however, included Kapiṣa-nagar and Gandhāra in addition to Kashmir. In one of its chapters, the Mahāvamsa5 designates the two countries as Kāśmīra-Gandhāra, but in another chapter, which deals with an incident of a much later date, it refers to monks as hailing from Kāśmīra-maṇḍala.6 Yuan Chwang and

1. CII., II, i, pp. 137, 145, 155.
2. Ibid., Wardak Vase inscription, p. 170.
5. Mahāvamsa, XII. 33.
6. See Levi's remarks in JA., 1896, p. 384. Takakusu in T'oung Pao, V, p. 276n. furnishes us with the following information : Chinese authority always identify Ki-pin with Kashmir up to the 5th century A.D. Yuan Chwang calls it Ka-shu-mi-la while Song Yun writes Ki-pin.
Ou-K’ong distinguished Kashmir from Gandhāra while Yuan Chwang deals with the two countries separately. Both the travellers described Kashmir as an extensive valley surrounded by mountains, which could be crossed only through a few passes. Ou-K’ong specifies the passes, which were three in number, one in the east, giving access to T’ou-fan (Tibet), the second in the north, leading to Po-liu (Baltistan) and a third in the west, connecting with K’ien-to-lo (Gandhāra).

The second pass, Tāranātha writes, became fit for communication soon after Madhyāntika’s death. It is perhaps represented at present by the Gilgit road, and on this road stood the stūpa, which yielded the valued manuscripts. In the Government of India’s Census Report of 1931 (pt. I, p. 321) the following note appears: “There are two Buddhist stūpas, one on the hill-side about three miles east of Gilgit and the other on the road to Nagar between Chalt and Minapin. There is a small Buddha carved on the rocks at the mouth of the Kirghā Nāllāh about three miles west of Gilgit, and small Buddha-images and Buddhist relics have been found in Yasin”. This note testifies to the fact that Buddhism lingered in this part of Kashmir up to a very late date, and the geographical information given above shows that the culture and beliefs of the ancient people of Kashmir were not very different from those of Gandhāra, i.e., the present Rawalpindi, Taxila, Peshawar etc. where Buddhism flourished in the early days, and that Buddhism may well be pointed out as one of the factors for linking the peoples of the two countries.

The earliest traditions relating to the introduction of Buddhism into Kashmir are preserved in the Ceylonese chronicle, the Mahāvaṃsa² and the Tibetan Du-lva³ (Vinaya Piṭaka of the Sarvāstivādins). The Mahāvaṃsa tells us that Moggaliputta Tissa, the religious adviser of Aśoka, sent missionaries to the different parts of India. Majjhantika was deputed to Kāśmīra-Gandhāra. About the time of his arrival there,

1. Schiefner, Tāranātha, p. 23.
Aravāla,¹ king of the Nāgas, was destroying the ripe corns of
the country by hail-storm. Majjhantika, by his supernatural
power, stood on the surface of the lake unaffected by rain and
storm. At this the Nāga king became furious and sent forth storm
and lightning, and hurled stones and rocks at him but without
any effect. Thus convinced of Majjhantika's great power, the
Nāga king with his followers submitted to him and listened to
his discourses on the evils of anger and hatred. Paṇḍaka
Yakkha and Hāritī Yakkhiṇī with their 500 children became
his devotees and offered a jewelled throne. When they were
fanning him, the residents of Kashmir-Gandhāra came with
offerings for the Nāgas, but they offered the same to
Majjhantika, who then delivered to them a discourse on āśīviṣa
(venom of a serpent) and converted them to Buddhism. From
that day up to the time of composition of the Mahāvamsa, i.e.,
the fifth century A.D. the author says that Kāśmīra Gandhāra
continued to be illumined by yellow robes.

A legend, similar to the above, appears with slight variations
in the Tibetan Dul-va and the traditions derived from it in the
works of Tāranātha and Bu-ston, in Aśokāvadāna, and in Yuan
Chwang's Records. The story runs as follows: Madhyāntika, a
disciple of Ānanda, was a teacher of Vārāṇasi. His disciples
were so numerous that the lay-devotees of Vārāṇasi found it
difficult to maintain them, so Madhyāntika left the town for
Mount Uśīra in the north,² where he stayed for three years.
After this period Madhyāntika went to Kashmir and settled
down on the bank of a lake inhabited by the Nāgas.³ His
presence was resented by the Nāgas, who, however, were sub­
dued by his supernatural powers. Tāranātha adds that at this
time there were in Kashmir nine cities, many villages of
mountain-dwellers, a royal residence, twelve vihāras and that
Madhyāntika brought with him many monks and lay-devotees
and increased the wealth of the country by introducing the

1. Apalāṭa in Chinese rendering. See Watters, op. cit., I, p. 229
2. Identified with a mountain near Mathura. See Watters, op. cit., I.
p. 308; B. C. Law, Geog. of Early Buddhism p. 34
3. Kalhana also says that Kashmir was full of lakes inhabited by Nāgas.
Yuan Chwang records that “according to the local records, Kashmir was
originally a dragon lake”. Watters, op. cit., I, p. 265
cultivation of saffron,¹ for which Kashmir has become famous even today. Madhyântika resided in Kashmir for twenty years and propagated the religion widely. After his demise, when road communication was established between Kashmir and Tukhâra, Kashmirian monks went to Tukhâra and introduced the religion there during the reign of Minara and Imasya.²

AŚOKAN EDICTS RE. BUDDHISM IN NORTHERN AND NORTH-WESTERN COUNTRIES

In the edicts of Aśoka, the northernmost countries mentioned are those inhabited by the Yonas, Kambojas and Gandhâras, which must have included the region round about Shahbazgarhi and Mansehra, where the edicts were discovered. Kashmir, it seems, came within his kingdom in the latter part of his life when he realised his mistake of supporting one section of the Buddhist monks to the exclusion of another. The Pâli tradition speaks of the earlier part of his life when he supported the Theravâda points of view. The probability of such a bias for the Theravâdins may be traced to his residence in Avanti during the period of his viceroyalty. As it was one of the principal centres of the Theravâdins at this time, he imbibed the Theravâda doctrines. The Sanskrit tradition refers to the later part of his life, when he became inclined to the doctrines of the Sarvâstivâdins. It is stated in the Pali chronicles that he convened a Synod under the presidentship of Moggaliputta Tissa, who insisted on recognising the Theravâdins as the only orthodox monks, dismissing the rest as unorthodox. It is not known how far Aśoka adhered to his view but it will be apparent from the account given below that the monks other than the Theravâdins, particularly, the Sarvâstivâdins had to leave Magadha for some distant regions. Yuan Chwang records the

¹ Cf. Watters, op. cit., I p. 262 : Madhyântika carried this valuable plant from Gandhamâdana.parvata and introduced it in Kashmir. See Sarvâstivâda Vinaya, Tsa. shih, ch. 40

² Schiefner, p. 23 : Târanâtha adds (p. 25) "but how far can this statement be taken at its worth is apparent. Minara, according to Târanâtha (p. 23), was the king of Tukhâra. Imâsy, however, cannot be identified."
above event in another form. He writes that during Asoka’s reign there was in Magadha a distinguished monk called Mahādeva, who was a subtle investigator of name and form (nāma-rūpa i.e., mind and matter = physical body) and expressed his extraordinary thoughts in a treatise, which taught heresy’. An attempt was made to drown him in the Ganges. This monk, therefore, along with his followers, saved themselves by leaving the place and going to Kashmir, where they settled down on the hills and in the valleys. On hearing this news, Asoka became unhappy and requested them to return, and on their declining to comply with his wishes, he built for them 500 monasteries and “gave up all Kashmir for the benefit of the Buddhist Saṅgha.”1 The fact underlying this account is that “the investigators of name and reality”2 were the Sarvāstivādins, whose principal tenet was that nāma and rūpa were real but momentary and were divisible into 64 elements, which existed up to the attainment of Nirvāṇa, (i.e. sarvam asti), and it is for this doctrine they had appellation, Sarvāstivāda.3 Then the statement that they resorted to the hills and valleys of Kashmir corroborates the flight of the Sarvāstivāda monks to the north in Kashmir. They had also a centre at Mathurā.

Yuan Chwang must have fallen in confusion in regard to the name Mahādeva. There must have been two monks of this name, “one was an influential abbot of Pātaliputra”4 who preached the Devadūtasūtra5 and the other a monk, who introduced the tenets relating to the imperfections of an arhat.6 Mahādeva, the investigator of nāma and rūpa, must have been

1. Watters, op. cit., p. 267
2. ‘Reality’ as the synonym of rūpa is wrong. Rūpa means physical body or worldly objects, while nāma is the constantly changing consciousness (vijñāna), the Buddhists do not accept the Upaniṣadic conception of eternal soul (ātman).
3. See the present writer’s books Buddhism in Uttara Pradesh and Buddhist Sects in India (1971). It should be noted that by reality of all (sarvam asti) it means that all objects as also Vijñāna are subject to momentary changes. In other words, all exists dynamically and not statically.
4. Watters, op. cit., I, p. 269
5. Majjhima Nikāya, III, p. 179
6. Watters, op. cit., I, p. 268. See the present writer’s Buddhist Sects in India.
a Sarvastivadin while the other Mahadeva was a Mahasanghika. Yuan Chwang could not also distinguish the Theravadins from the Mahasanghikas, when he wrote that Aśoka supported the Mahasanghikas as against the Theravadins and that 500 Arhats left Pāṭaliputra and propagated the Sthavira school in Kashmir, while the majority of the inferior brethren at Pāṭaliputra began the Mahasanghika School.¹ The Mahasanghikas, as we know, lived originally at Vesāli and later passed on to the south, making their principal centre in the Andhra country² at Dhanakaṭaka (present Guntur District).

The statement that Aśoka became later on repentant and wanted the monks, who had fled to Kashmir to return to Magadha might be regarded as an indirect reference to the fact recorded in the Divyāvadāna³ and Aśokāvadāna⁴ that Aśoka made an attempt towards the end of his life to reconcile the monks of the different schools of Buddhist thought by convening a Council, to which he particularly invited the monks living at Tamasāvana in Kashmir. The Ceylonese chronicles maintain a discreet silence over this incident, and this is not unusual in view of the sectarian spirit permeating the chronicles.

The Sarvastivādins also claim Aśoka as their patron. They ignore the name of Moggliputta Tissa and put in his stead the name of Upagupta. Their Avadāna literature is full of episodes dealing with Aśoka’s life and munificence. Tāranātha also speaks of his lavish gifts to the Sarvastivāda monks of Aparantaka, Kashmir and Tukhāra.⁵ Kalhaṇa⁶ writes that Aśoka not only built Śrīnagarī but also covered Suskaletra and Vītastrā with numerous stūpas, one of which was so high that its pinnacle was not visible. Yuan Chwang noticed four Aśokan

1. Watters, op. oct., I, p. 269. By the word inferior he meant Hinayāna.
2. Ibid.
4. Prof. Przyluski writes in his Legende de l’ Empereur, Aśoka, pp. 101, 117 that a Council of 30,000 monks was held by Aśoka, the professed sources of information being the Aśokāvadāna and Tāranātha (Schiefner, p. 38) but we do not find any such reference in Tāranātha.
5. Schiefner, p. 38.
6. Stein, I, p. 19
topes, each of which contained relics of Buddha’s body. The Avadāna records that Aśoka’s liberality to the Buddhist monks was carried to such an excess towards the end of his life that his grandson Sampadi,¹ who was in charge of his treasury, refused to carry out his commands and even reduced his food to a myrobalan, half of which was the last gift made by Aśoka to the Buddhist Saṅgha.

Through the activities of the Sarvāstivādins, Kashmir became a centre of Buddhist philosophical studies and was also, according to Tāranātha, the scene of the activities of Vatsa,² the propounder of the ātmaka theory (pudgalavāda) and the founder of the Vātsiputriya or Sammitiya school. The monk Vatsa taught that pudgala (soul, individuality) persists through the innumerable existences of an individual and ceases only on his attainment of Nirvāṇa.³

BUDDHISM AND NĀGA BELIEFS

In spite of all the patronage of Aśoka and the glorious accounts of the popularity of Buddhism in Kashmir, the fact remains that Buddhism had to face a strong opposition in the country from the established beliefs in Nāga-worship.⁴ Without adverting to the antiquity of the Nāga-worship, it may safely be stated that Nāga beliefs were quite common in India when Buddhism made its appearance and that is the reason why the legend of Nāgas and their conversion by Buddha occur occasionally in the Buddhist texts. In Ceylon, Java, and Indo-China, Nāga-worship was no less in vogue, and Buddhism could not help incorporating into itself some of the local beliefs in order to secure a footing in these distant countries. Kashmir was avowedly a land of Nāga-worship. Its two main chronicles the Nilamatapurāṇa and the Rājatarāṅgini relate how Kashmir was created out of water and left to the care of the Nāgas, of whom Nīla was the chief. The Buddhist chronicles also speak of

1. Diyyā, p. 430. Tib. nor. lhas byin. It has been restored by Schiefner as Vāsavadattā, but it might also be Dhanadā or Sampadi.
2. Schiefner, op. cit., p. 44.
3. See the present writer’s Buddhist Sects in India.
4. Traces of Nāga-beliefs are still to be found in the names of spots in Kashmir like Verinag, Anantanag, Serhnag, etc.
Kashmir as a land of lakes under the control of the Nāgas. They are generally associated with watery and mountainous regions, and so it is quite likely that Kashmir should be called a land of Nāga-worshippers,¹ and attribute the origin of its rites and rituals to Nīla. Buddhism probably undermined the faith of the people and this was supposed to be possible partly on account of the abhiññās (superhuman powers) acquired by the advanced Buddhist monks. Madhyāntika is said to have succeeded in winning over a large section of the populace by the show of his miraculous powers. Kalhaṇa also states it in the Rājatarangini I. 178;

Te vādinaḥ parājitya vādena nikhilān budhān,
 kriyāṃ Nīlapurāṇoṅktācchhandan nāgamadviṣaḥ.

[The (Buddhist) disputants, the Veda-haters after defeating all wise men in disputations, brought to an end the rites and rituals prescribed in the Nīlamatapurāṇa.]

The Nīlamatapurāṇa also could not ignore its influence and help prescribing as follows:—

Viṣṇur devo jagannāthaḥ prāpte Brahman kalau yuge,
aṣṭāvinśatitame bhāvi Buddhho nāma jagad guruḥ. 684
Puṣyāyukte niśanāthe Vaiśākhe māsi Kaśyapa,
tasmāt kālāt athārabhya kāle bhāvinyataḥ paramā. 685
šukle sampūjanamāṃ tasya yathā kāryam tathā śṛṇu,
sarvauṣadhais sarvaratnaiḥ sarvagandhais tathaiva ca. 686
Buddhārcāṇāpanaṃ kāryaṃ Śākyoktaīr vāṇais tathā,
sudhāsitaśa ca kartavyāḥ Śākyavāsāḥ prayatnataḥ. 687
kvacic citraytuḥ kāryāś caityā devagṛhās tathā,
utsavaṃ ca tathā kāryaṃ naṭanartaka-saṅkulaṃ. 688
Śākyānāṃ pūjanaṃ kāryaṃ cīvarāhāra-pustakaiḥ,
Sarvam etad bhavet kāryaṃ yāvat prāpta bhaven maghā.

2. Raychaudhury, op. cit., p. 239. See also IHQ., 1930, p. 343.
3. Przyluski, op. cit., p. 301-02; Dīvyā., op. cit., p. 434; Schiefner, p. 81.
[O Brahman, in the 28th Kaliyuga, in the month of Vaiśā­kha on the full-moon day with the conjunction of Puṣyā nakṣatra, Viśṇu, the lord of the world, will appear as Buddha, the teacher of the world. Listen how his worship is to be performed. In the bright fortnight, the image of Buddha is to be bathed with water containing all herbs, jewels and scents and by uttering the words of Śākya. The place is to be carefully besmeared with honey; the temple and the stūpa are to have frescoes, and there should be dancing and amusements. The Śākyan worship is performed with civara (robes), food and books.]

**Buddhism and Śaivism**

The Kashmirian history shows that Aśoka built temples both for Śiva and Buddha and during his reigning period, the two religions Buddhism and Śaivism flourished in Kashmir side by side, and even claimed at times the same persons as their devotees. Both Śaivism and Buddhism existed not only in Kashmir but also in Tibet, Nepal and even Mongolia as well as in Champa, Java and Burma. The two cults existed side by side, and had common adherents. The explanation that can be offered for such amity between the two religions is that while Buddhism catered to the ethical and philosophical needs of the human mind, Śaivism, or for the matter of that Brahmanism catered to the devotional and religious needs. Buddhism made no provision for rites and rituals, which were almost a part and parcel of Hindu’s life, and naturally took no objection to those prescribed by Brāhmanism. All that Buddhism demanded of its followers was maitri (amity) and karuṇā (compassion), and a moral life with faith in Buddha as the liberator of mankind from duḥkha. To the unbiased Hindu mind there was not much of difference between Buddhist and Śaiva doctrines. In both the systems, the highest truth or the ultimate reality was inexplicable. In Buddhism it is Nirvāṇa or Śūnyatā, and in Śaivism, particularly the Pratyabhijñā or the Idealist school of Kashmir, denoting it as Śiva. If Śiva be
explained as śānta, i.e., undisturbed by birth and death, the Buddhists would have no objection to accept it as Śūnyatā or Nirvāṇa. Both the systems look upon the phenomenal universe as subject to origin and decay; the caused and conditioned theory of Buddhism corresponds to the reproductive and destructive cult of Śaivism, the fundamental difference between the two religions being the denial by Buddhism of any real individual self or an infinite self as opposed to the assertion of the latter by Śaivism or Brāhmaṇism generally. As regards the externals, asceticism and certain morphological and metaphysical ideas may be pointed out as the common features of the two systems. Buddhism favoured asceticism but did not look upon it as the essential means of salvation, while in Śaivism, the ascetic ideal of Śiva is placed as compulsory before every devotee for śādhanā. With the appearance of Avalokiteśvara and Tārā in the Buddhist pantheon, many mythological and metaphysical ideas woven around Śiva and Durgā were transferred to them while many of Nepal, Tibet and Mongolia in the worship of the ungainly rites of the Śaivites came to be adopted by the Buddhists of Nepal, Tibet and Mongolia in the worship of gods and goddesses. In Siam and Camboja, the worship of Śiva and Durgā is sometimes described as identical with the worship of Buddha and Prajñā, and there is a number of instances of devotees, worshipping both Buddha and Śiva in Champa, Camboja, Java and Nepal. The Yueh-chis took to Śiva worship, and Kadphises II and Vāsudeva issued coins with Śiva emblems, but Buddhism was no less popular with them. It cannot be said with precision how far the fusion of the two religions took place within India, but there is no doubt that it did happen in Champa, Camboja, Java, Siam, Nepal and Tibet. In India no two religions are regarded as incompatible with each other and the worship of images belonging to two or more religions is regarded in each as equally meritorious. No Hindu will hesitate to light a candle at the tomb of a Muslim Fakir or offer flowers to a Jaina or Buddhist image. So Kalhaṇa’s statements that kings, queens

and ministers of Kashmir from Asoka and later rulers built temples both for Śiva and Buddha can be accepted as correct.

KAŅIŠKA

Kaṇiška embraced Buddhism according to the epigraphic and numismatic evidences. Al-birūnī and Hiuen Tsang refer to a grand monastery and a Caitya having been built by Kaṇiška in Peshawar. The Kushāṇa period witnessed the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism as also the making of images of Buddha with sharp features by the Indo-Greek sculptors. Prof. Ray Chaudhuri remarks that the Kushāṇa age was a period of great missionary and literary activities. Distinguished writers like Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asaṅga, Aśvaghōṣa, Vasubandhu appeared at the time and so did also Pārśva, Vasumitra, Saṅgharakṣita, Caraka and the politician Māṭhara also flourished then. Missionaries carried on the propagation of Buddhism from Gandhāra and Kashmir to countries in the North like Eastern Turkestan and Central Asia, and thence gradually to China and from China to Mongolia, and the far eastern countries of U. S. S. R., Korea and Japan where it is still a living religion. Ngan-shikao, a Parthian prince, Kāśyapa Mātaṅga (circa 61 to 67 A. D.) and several others introduced the religion into China, making Tun-huang, the westernmost cave of China, as their first rendezvous. There were three routes from India to China. The route lay along the Kabul river and reached Hindukush through Peshawar, Jalalabad, Bamiyan and other places. Beyond the Hindukush lay Balkh (Bāhlika, Bactriana). From this place three routes proceeded to the Tarim Basin. In all the places along the routes there were Buddhist establishments, probably small in size.

In the Kalpanāmaṇḍitika it is stated that Kaṇiška came to Peshawar and made it his capital.

It is a fact that Kaṇiška patronised the Indian religions, art and scholarship. He supported Buddhism particularly.

1. PHAI, p. 399-440
He became acquainted also with the Sarvāstivāda school of Buddhism, which preserved its scriptures in Sanskrit language.

In the Śrīdharmapitaka-nidāna-sūtra (Chinese translation 742 A.D.) it is stated that Chen-tan Kia-ni-cha (Kañīṣka) defeated the king of Pātaliputra and demanded a large ransom, but he agreed to accept Aśvaghoṣa, Buddha’s alms-bowl and a compassionate cock in its stead. Aśvaghoṣa became associated with Kaṇīṣka on the occasion of his expedition towards the eastern parts of India and strengthened his faith in Buddhism.¹

Aśvaghoṣa afterwards converted Pārśva to the Buddhist faith. About this time a codification of the Buddhist Canon was effected in Sanskrit, though the language of North-western India was a Prakrit as is found in the Prakrit version of the Dhammapada² in Kharoṣṭhi script. A Prakrit inscription has also been found on the Kurram casket.

The successors of Kaṇīṣka were Vāsiṃka, the latter being a younger brother of the former. Huviṣka was the last great ruler of the Kushāṇas.

The Turuṣkas, i.e. the Kushāṇas built Maṭhas and Caityas. It is said that Kashmir was in possession of the Buddhists. According to Tāranātha (Ch. XII) the great Kushāṇa ruler Kaṇīṣka invited Buddhist monks from all parts of India and had a collection of the Tripitaka prepared by them. It took place either in the Kuvana monastery or Jālandhara. Most scholars, however, agree that 500 Arhats and 500 Bodhisattvas in a Council made the collection. Mahābhadanta Vasumitra was the President of the Council and Aśvaghoṣa its Vice-President. In the Council, all differences of opinion were reconciled and the Vinaya texts, after thorough revision, were put into writing. At this time appeared also the Mahāyāna teaching of faith in ‘the non-origin of all worldly objects’ (anuttapattika-dharma-kṣānti), in other words, all worldly objects are evanescent.

Since the demise of Aśoka, Buddhism withstood several repercussions and survived in North India. It is signified by donations given by several lay-devotees and monks to the Buddhist

Saṅgha. In the session of the Fourth Buddhist Council, took place composition of the Vibhaṇḍa śāstras, appearance of distinguished authors, and the propagation of Buddhism outside India. These are some of the factors, which rendered the reign of this king as an outstanding event in the history of Buddhism.¹

**The Kushāṇas**

Following the Śaka-Yavanas, the Kushāṇas also adopted Buddhism as their religion and spent lavishly on the erection of *stūpas*, temples and images of Buddha all over North-India. The earlier Kushāṇas like Kadphises II, as their coins indicate, were Śiva-worshippers, but Kaṇiṣka and his successors, as their inscriptions and monuments reveal, offered their gifts to the Buddhist Saṅgha, particularly to the Sarvāstivādins² and occasionally to the Mahāsāṅghikas.³

Since the demise of Aśoka, Buddhism continued its existence in N. W. India with the patronage of the Śaka-Yavanas and the Kushāṇas. In the reign of Kaṇiṣka, it once more came to the forefront of Indian religions and recovered its lost popularity. The Buddhist ecclesiastical historians like Tāranātha pass silently over the reign of Aśoka, and resume their accounts with the advent of Kaṇiṣka.⁴

**Kaṇiṣka and his successors**

The reigning period of Kaṇiṣka is of great importance in the history of Buddhism in North India. It is marked by donations from several lay-devotees and monks to the Buddhist Saṅgha, evidences of which have been unearthed by the archaeological department of the Central Government. The session of the Fourth Council, composition of the *Vibhaṇḍa-śāstras*, appearance of distinguished authors and the propagation of

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¹. *CII., II., i., pp. 29f.*
². *Ibid., II., i., pp. 137, 145, 155, 176*
³. *Ibid.,* Wardak Vase Incription, p. 170
⁴. Tāranātha has referred to the reign of Viśoka, Nanda and Mahāpadma and mentions nothing of importance in connection with the history of Buddhism.
Buddhism outside India are some of the factors, which rendered his reign so important in the history of Buddhism.

Of the successors of Kaṇiṣṭha, we come across the names of only Vāsiṣṭha and Huviṣṭha in the several inscriptions relating to this period. Kalhana\(^1\) mentions the names of three successors Huṣka, Juṣka and Kaṇiṣṭha (II). The Wardak Vase inscription discloses the Buddhistic leaning of Huviṣṭha but there is no clear evidence about such leaning of Vāsiṣṭha. Tāranātha, however, tells us that the son of Kaṇiṣṭha maintained several arhats and bhikṣus in his Puṣkalāvati palace for five years. Kalhaṇa informs us that Huṣka, Juṣka and Kaṇiṣṭha (II) built Huṣkapura (mod. Uskur),\(^2\) Juṣkapura (mod. Zukur)\(^3\) and Kaṇiṣṭhapura (mod. Kanespur),\(^4\) and that these kings, though belonging to the Turuṣka race, were given to acts of piety. They erected Mathas and Caityas at Suskaletra\(^5\) and other places, and the Buddhists of that time acquired great renown as recluses (Pravrajītsa), and were predominant in Kashmir, defeating their opponents in disputations.

Though the available account of the Kushan rulers are meagre, there are yet ample evidences that Buddhism enjoyed a prosperous time during this period all over North India and specially in Gandhāra and Kashmir. Kaṇiṣṭha built a monastery and a Caitya at Peshawar. The Council held under his auspices in Kashmir and the valuable work done in the Council bear a testimony to its influence and popularity.

**BUDDHISM IN KASHMIR**

*The Fourth Buddhist Council*

Tāranātha commenced the story of the Council with the conversion of King Sirṣha of Kashmir to Buddhism. It is said that King Sirṣha became an arhat and his name after ordination was Sudarśana. He preached the religion in Kashmir. Kaṇiṣṭha was

1. *Rājat.* I, 68
2. Schiefner, *op. cit.*, ch. XIII
3. It is now a small village near Baramula, see Stein *op. cit.*, i, 168n.
4. It is a large village near Srinagar. *Ibid.*
5. It is between Vitastā and the High Road linking Baramula and Srinagar.
then the king of Jālandhara. He heard of Sudarśana and came to Kashmir to listen to his discourses.¹

The Buddhist Saṅgha was then divided into eighteen sects.² Venerable Pārśva came to Kashmir from the east, and advised King Kaṇiśka to collect all the monks at Kuṇḍalavānāvihāra³ (in Kashmir). 500 Arhats, 500 Bodhisattvas and 500 Paññītās⁴ took part in the deliberation of the Council.⁵ An attempt was made to reconcile the conflicting opinions of the different sects and settle once more the Vinaya, Sūtra and Abhidharma texts. Bu-ston gives an account similar to the above, adding only that “after recitation of the texts, it was settled that the texts acknowledged by the eighteen sects were all of them the words of Buddha.”⁶ Yuan Chwang’s account is substantially to the same effect. He attributed the session of the Council to the confusion that Kaṇiśka had while listening to the conflicting interpretations of Buddha’s words as given by the adherents of different sects. Pārśva explained to the king the cause of his confusion. Yuan Chwang adds that in this Council several expository commentaries on the Sūtra, Vinaya and Abhidharma were composed and were called the Upadesa-sūtras and Vibhāṣā-śāstras, in which the original texts and their different interpretations were discussed. King Kaṇiśka, according to Yuan Chwang, had all the treatises inscribed on copper-plates and had them enclosed in stone-boxes and deposited them in a stūpa made specially for the purpose.

Paramārtha in his Life of Vasubandhu⁷ refers to this Council

¹. Schiefner, op. cit., Ch. XII. There is a Kashmirian king of this name in the Rājatarangini. It may be that king Sīrṇṭa was only a prince. Bu-ston (II, p. 160) preserves a tradition that Sudarśana delivered the teaching (of Vinaya) to an Anāgāmin and the latter to Anivarttikabuddhi, who in his turn, imparted it to Guṇaprabha.

². See the present author’s Buddhist Sects in India.


⁴. Tib. so. so. skye. boḥi. pāṇḍita = Prthagjana-pāṇḍita, i.e. the pāṇḍitas who were not srotāpānṇas. Bu-ston, II, p. 97.

⁵. Schiefner, p. 60.

⁶. Bu-ston, II, p. 97


Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa-kārikā and its bhāṣya contain the whole of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma condensed and versified in a beautiful manner in the Kārikās. Yasomitra has written a Vyākhyā on the Bhāṣya. Published in Patna and Japan.
though not expressly. He writes that Katyāyaniputra went to Kipin (Kashmir) and there with the co-operation of 500 Arhats and 500 Bodhisattvas arranged the Sarvāstivāda texts, the main treatise of which was the *Jñānapratīṣṭhāna-sūtra* in 8 sections i.e. *Pādas*. Its alternative title is the *Āṣṭa-grantha* as it contained eight topics.

A commentary was written on the Abhidharma texts and was called the Vibhāṣā-śāstras. Katyāyaniputra then sent for Aśvaghoṣa, who was then residing at Śrāvasti and requested him to give the *Vibhāṣā* a proper literary shape. After completion of the commentary, Katyāyaniputra declared by an inscription on a stone that any portion of the *Abhidharma* text and its *Vibhāṣā* must not go out of this province, but he could not anticipate that a prodigy like Vasubandhu would commit to memory all the words and take them out. The *Vibhāṣā* is so closely associated with Kashmir that it is called in Chinese *Kashmir-shi*.¹

**The Vibhāṣā Śāstras**

By the expression *Vibhāṣā-śāstra*, Paramārtha had only in view the systematic exposition of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts, while Yuan Chwang meant by the expression ‘expository commentaries’ not only of *Abhidharma* but also of *Sūtra* and *Vinaya*, the commentaries on Śūtras being only distinguished as *Upaniṣad-śāstra* and not as *Vibhāṣā Śāstras*. It is a matter for regret that the Śāstras exist only in Chinese translation and have not yet been studied adequately. About the merits of the works, Yuan Chwang tells us that in these “there is evidence of great study and research. In them he found an extraordinary insight into the Buddhist lore of various kinds and also into the Brāhmanical learning, and the Vedas with their Āngas.”²

**Distinguished Acāryas**

The composition of the *Vibhāṣā-śāstras* in Kashmir indicates that Kashmir grew up to an academic centre, attracting

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2. Watters, I, p. 278.
distinguished acāryas from other places.\footnote{Eu-ston, II, p. 142: A number of Pratyeka-buddhas had formerly expressed in their entreaties their desire that, that country should be the place where the Abhidharma was to be exclusively studied.}
The accounts of the Chinese travellers and of Paramārtha, mention the names of Kātyāyanīputra, Aśvaghoṣa, Vasubandhu, Vasumitra, Dharmatrata, Saṅghabhādra, Viśuddhasimha, Jinabandhu, Sugata-mitra, Sūryadeva, Jinatrata, Kanakavatsa\footnote{Watters I, p. 241-45; Schiefner, p. 297.} and many other distinguished teachers and writers, who lived in Kashmir, from the time of Kaṇiṣka. Tāranātha tells us that during the reign of Kaṇiṣka one wealthy brahmin called Sūtra maintained the Vaibhāṣika teacher Dharmatrata and the earliest Sautrāntika teacher Mahābhadranta Sthavira along with their disciples. Dharmatrata is well known as one of the four renowned acāryas of the Vaibhāṣika school, the other three being Ghoṣaka of Tukhāra, Vasumitra of Maru, and Buddhadeva of Vārāṇasī.\footnote{Watters I, p. 241-45; Schiefner, p. 297.} One Dharmatrata, according to the Chinese tradition, was the uncle of Vasumitra, to whom is attributed the authorship of the Pañcavastu-vibhāṣā-sāstra, Sanvyuktābhidharma-hydaya-sāstra, etc. In the Sui Vihāra copper-plate inscription one Dharmatrata is mentioned as the disciple of Bhava (Bhavya) and teacher of Nagadatta (Nāgadatta). In the present state of our knowledge, it is not possible to state whether the Dharmatratas were one and the same person or different. Vasumitra was another famous figure of Kashmir, but there were five authors bearing this name.\footnote{Nanjio, p. 375.} In the Tattvasamgraha, Kamalaśīla discusses the opinions of Dharmatrata and Vasumitra but we do not know which Dharmatrata and Vasumitra were in his view. The Sautrāntika teacher, Śrīlāba was an inhabitant of Kashmir.\footnote{ClI., II, i, p. 141} He was a disciple of Kuṇāla. Saṅghabhādra was another Kashmirian acārya, who was a profound scholar of the Vibhāṣā śāstras of the Sarvāstivāda school.\footnote{For details, see Asia Major. II, p. 78.} He wrote a commentary on Vasumitra’s Prakaraṇapāda and was the author of the Abhidharmāvatāra-sāstra.\footnote{For details, see Asia Major. II, p. 78.} One of his distin-
guished students was Vasubandhu, who studied with him the Vibhāṣā’s śāstras of the 18 schools, Sūtras and Vinayas, six systems of Indian philosophy and the art of dialectics. He compressed the Abhidharma texts and their Vibhāṣās in his Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya and sent them to the Kashmir Vai-
bhāṣikas, who were highly pleased to get them. Vasubandhu later on turned from the Sarvāstivāda point of view to that of the Sautrāntika, as is evidenced in the expression of his opinions in the Bhāṣya, and which elicited vehement criticism from Saṅghabhadra, who was a staunch Sarvāstivādin and wrote two treatises to refute Vasubandhu’s later views.

Guṇaprabha and Vimalamitra were the two other teachers, whose names occur in the Records of Yuan Chwang. Guṇaprabha is mentioned by Tāranātha and Bu-ston as a great authority on the Vinaya of the Mulasarvāstivādins and as the author of several works. Yuan Chwang refers to the monastery at Matipur, where he composed his treatises. As regards Vimalamitra, Yuan Chwang writes that he “was a native of Kashmir and an adherent of the Sarvāstivāda school, having made a profound study of canonical and heterodox scriptures, and had travelled in India to learn the mysteries of the Tripiṭaka.

Kaṇiṣṭha, according to the traditional, epigraphic and numismatic evidences, adopted Buddhism as his religion. Al-birūnī and Hiuen-Tsang speak of the grand monastery erected at the instance of the emperor Kaṇiṣṭha at Peshawar. It was during the period of his reign, images of Buddha with sharp and delicate features were carved for the first time by the Indo-Greek sculptors. Prof. Ray Chaudhari remarks that the Kushan age was not only a period of wide and deep literary activities of the Buddhist savants but also of missionary activities beyond the frontiers of India. Among the savants may be mentioned the names of Pārśva, Vasumitra,

1. Schiefner, pp. 67, 79.
2. Watters, I, p. 325.
3. Watters, II, p. 280
5. Watters, I, p. 210-11; Bu-ston, II, p. 143
6. PHAI., pp. 399-400; The Age of Imperial Unity, p. 146-47.
Saṅgharakṣita, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, and Aśvaghosa. Besides the Buddhist authors, there appeared at this time the founder of the Āyurvedic system, Caraka, and the politician Māṭhara. From Gandhāra and Kashmir, both Indian and non-Indian monks risked their lives by travelling on foot or mules over the hilly regional and mountainous tracks at the foot of the Himalayanas in order to carry the message of Buddha to the semi-civilised races of Central Asia and Eastern Turkestan, from which places again at a later date the religion was carried to China, Korea, Mongolia and ultimately to Japan.

The Routes

The route from Gandhāra proceeded along the Kabul river passed by Hidda and Nagarahāra (Jalālābād) and reached Bamiyan, a valley surrounded on all sides by snowy cliffs of the Hindukush. It was a halting place for the monks going to Central Asia and thence to China. It was also the seat of a Government and attracted pilgrims and traders from all the neighbouring countries. It became an important centre of Buddhism in the early centuries of the Christian era and continued to be so up to the 8th century. A number of grottos in the hills around Bamiyan was converted into Buddhist temples of the Ajanta type. Colossal images of Buddha were carved out of the hills. Hiuen Tsang states that at Balkh there was a monastery called Nava-saṅghārāma (Naubahar) the only institution on the north of Hindukush, where resided a number of commentators of the Canon. Towards the end of the 7th century, the monastery was destroyed by the Moslems and its chief priest was converted to Islam. They, according to Al-birūni, inaugurated the study of Indian astronomy and mathematics in Baghdad.

Bactriana was the meeting place of two different routes, leading to Central Asia and China. Of these two, the shorter

1. There was at a much later date a noted dialectician called Māṭhara.
one was preferred by the Buddhist missionaries, travelling to China through Kashgar. There was another shorter route joining Kashgar with the upper valley of the Indus. It passed through Gilgit and the Yasin valley up to Tashgurkhan, where it joined the other route towards Kashgar. By the middle of the 7th century Kashgar and Yarkand abounded in hundreds of Buddhist monasteries.

According to the Buddhist traditions, Khotan was colonised by the Indians from N. W. India. It is said that Kuṇāla’s courtiers and followers, infuriated at the inhuman act of a queen of Aśoka of blinding Kuṇāla, left the country with Kuṇāla and set him up as the king of Khotan. There was an intimate relation between N. W. India and Khotan during the Kushan period. Khotan played an important part in the history of Buddhism. The premier monastery in Khotan was Gomati Vihāra, one of the biggest seats of Buddhist learning in Central Asia.

Kuci was another important place in Central Asia and played the same role as that of Khotan in the diffusion of Buddhism. The ancient rulers of Kuci bore Indian names, such as Suvarṇapuṣpa, Haradeva, Suvarṇadeva, etc. Fragments of a few manuscripts in Sanskrit and Kuçeian-Sanskrit (bilingual) have been discovered from the Kuci region.

The next stage on the northern route was Karasahr, the monks of which place rendered a great service in the propagation of Buddhism in China. Turfan was the third centre situated on the northern route farther towards the east.

Two routes, of which one came from the south and the other from the north of the Tarim Basin, met on the Chinese frontier at a place called Tu-men-kuan or the Jade gate. Not far from it was Tun-huang cave, which was, at one time, one of the largest centres of the Buddhist culture. In the hills

1. A number of manuscripts was found in a stūpa here; for details, see the present writer’s *Gilgit Manuscripts*, Vol. I, Intro.
2. P. C. Bagchi, op. cit. (1944), p. 11-12
3. Ibid., p. 13f. for detailed treatment, see Dr. Kshanika Saha’s *Central Asian Buddhism* (1970).
5. Hoernle’s *Manuscript Remains in Eastern Turkestan*.
near Tun-huang was located a number of grottos converted into monasteries between the 5th and 8th century for the use of Buddhist monks proceeding to China. These grottos were called by the Chinese Ts’ien-fo-tong or the Caves of Thousand Buddhas.¹

In ancient times there were other overland routes from India to China. One of these passed through Assam, Upper Burma, and Yunan, and the other through Nepal and Tibet. There were also sea-routes from India to South-east Asia, and thence to China.²

**Missionaries**

The Parthians occupied a portion of North-western India and came to be known as the Indo-Parthians. Towards the middle of the 2nd century A.D. a Parthian prince embraced Buddhism and later became a monk. His name was Ngan-she-kao (lit. Parthian Lokottama). He translated a number of Buddhist texts into Chinese. He resided in the White Horse Monastery (Poma-sse). The ancient Sogdians,³ a branch of the Parthians, settled at Samarkand and Bokhara. They went to Eastern Turkestan and established many Buddhist centres towards the beginning of the Christian era. Senghui was another Sogdian monk, who migrated to Tonkin and propagated the religion in South China.

Kaniska belonged to the Yueh-chi race. He made Mahāyāna Buddhism a state religion in India. He established a close relation between Kashmir and Kući. He took personal interest in the propagation of the religion outside India. A few Buddhist missionaries of the Yueh-chi race went to China in the 2nd and 3rd centuries A.D. Among them the most distinguished was Dharmarakṣa (Fa-hu = lit. protector of the law), who went to China in the middle of the 3rd century A.D. He resided at Tun-huang cave on the western frontier of China. He translated a few Buddhist Sanskrit texts into Chinese.

3. There are a few Sogdian translations of the Buddhist texts, see Hoernle’s *Manuscript Remains in Eastern Turkestan.*
The monks of Kuci (northern part of Central Asia) also took an important part in the propagation of the religion in China. The noted and the most accurate translator of the Buddhist texts into Chinese was Kumārajīva, son of an Indian Kumārāyana, who was a minister of the king of Kuci and a princess Jīvā of the royal family of Kuci. In Kashmir where the Sarvāstivādins predominated, Kumārajīva studied the Buddhist Sanskrit literature and philosophy of the Sarvāstivādins with Bandhudatta. He returned to Kuci, wherefrom he was taken by force to China in 401 A. D. He was in China till his death in 413. His translations revealed remarkable improvement on the works of the earlier writers. Vimalākṣa, a senior monk of Kashmir, worked with him from 406 to 413 A. D.1

Many Kashmirian scholars went to China. One of them was Saṅghabhūti. He wrote a commentary on the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya Piṭaka. He was in China from 381 to 384 A. D. Two other Kashmirian scholars, Puṇyatrāta and his pupil Dharmayaśa went to Central Asia where he translated a number of texts of the Sarvāstivādins from 397 to 401 A. D., and later in China from 424 to 453 A. D. Buddhayaśas was another monk of Kashmir, who went to Kashgar, en route, for Kuci. Guṇavarman, a prince of Kashmir first went to Ceylon and thence to Java, wherefrom by the sea-route he reached Nanking (Jetavana monastery) in 431 A. D. Many scholars of countries other than Kashmir also went to China by different routes.

The suzerainty of the Kushāṇas did not uproot the Śakas from India altogether. The Śaka-Satraps or Kshatrapas (Chatrapatis) in the different provinces of western India owned their allegiance to the Kushāṇas. The Śakas, i.e., the Scythians adapted themselves to the Indian customs and religious beliefs. About 15 A. D. Mathura became the head-quarters of the Śaka Satraps, according to the Mathura inscriptions.

The Kushan supremacy declined after Vāsudeva (145-176 A. D.) and the Śaka Satraps became independent rulers of the large parts of Central and Western India, which were under their control. A flood of light is thrown by an extract from

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the Jaina treatise \textit{Kālakācārya-kathānaka}. It runs as follows:—

\begin{verbatim}
to sūri-pajjuvāsaya-
Sāhiṁ rāyāhirāyaṁ aha kāuṁ
bhumjaṁti ṛajja-sukkham
sāmaṁta-paiṭṭhiyyā sesā
Sagakulāo jenaṁ
samāgayā, teṇa re Sagā jāyā;
 evam Saga-rāṇaṁ
eso vaṁso samuppanno.
...
...
...
kāl’ aṁtareṇa keṇai
uppaḍīttā Sagāṇa tam vaṁsaṁ
jāo Mālava-rāyā
nāmeṇaṁ Vikkamāicco
...
...
...
tassa vi vaṁsaṁ uppā-
diūna jāo puṇo vi Sagarāyā
Ujjeni-pura-varīye
paya-pamkaya-paṇaya-sāmaṁtō
paṇa-tise vasa-sae
Vikkama-savaccharassa voliṇe
parivattūna ṯhavio
jeṇaṁ saṁvaccharo niyao.
Saga-kāla-jāṇaṁ’-satthāṁ
eyaṁ pāsamgiyaṁ samakkhaṁaṁ
müla-kahā-saṁbaddhāṁ.
pagayaṁ ciya bhannae īhiṁ
\end{verbatim}

\textit{Translation} : Kālakācārya had a sister called Sarasvatī, who joined the convent. King Gardabhilla of Ujjayinī was fascinated by her beauty and ravished her. Kālakācārya, being enraged, went to the west of the Sindhu and lived with a Shāhi (Śaka) chief, over whom he obtained great influence by means of his astrological knowledge. Gradually he came to know that his patron and 95 other chiefs, who lived in the same locality, obeyed a common overlord. Kālakācārya persuaded his patron to invade the kingdom of Gardabhilla with the aid of all of his 95 fellow-chiefs and he himself joined the army that marched along Sind and Gujrat and besieged Ujjayinī. Ujjayinī fell and
the Śakas established their supremacy in Mālava. After 17 years, Vikramāditya, son of Gardabhilla, regained his kingdom by expelling the Śakas. Kālakācārya, after defeating Gardabhilla and releasing his sister, went to the court of Sātavāhana at Pratiṣṭhāna. The Jaina tradition, given above, has a definite historical value.1

After the Indo-Greeks, the Scythians ruled over western India, Gujrat, Kathiawad and the Ajmer region of Rajputana till the time of Chandragupta II, who annexed their dominions to the Gupta empire. The Scythians ruled at first as Viceroy of western India, Gujrat, Kathiawad and the Ajmer region of Rajputana till the time of Chandragupta II, who annexed their dominions to the Gupta empire. The Scythians ruled at first as Viceroy of the suzerainty of the Kushāṇas. Chaḍtana was a viceroy of the Kushāṇas, ruling over the south-western provinces of the Kushan empire. His son Jayadāman died early and so his grandson Rudradāman succeeded him and defeated Śātakarṇi, lord of Dakṣināpatha. The earliest known Kshaharāta was Bhumaka. He was succeeded by Nahapāna (119-125 A. D.).2 But the relation of Bhumaka to Nahapāna is not known. Nahapāna’s son-in-law Rṣbhadatta (Usavadāta) was the viceroy of the southern provinces ruled over by his father-in-law. He was a Hinduised Śaka and ruled over the districts of Govardhana (Nasik) and Mamaṭa (Poona), southern Gujrat and the northern Konkan from Broach to Sopārā and also Malwa, Kathiawad and the Marathā country and a large part of Rajputana. Shortly after 124-125 A. D. the Sātavāhanas of Pratiṣṭhāna, Gautamiputra Śātakarṇi, ousted the Kshaharātas, Śakas, and Yavanas, and became the lord of Surāṣṭra, Kathiawad, Kukura (in the Gujrat, Kathiawad region), Anupa (Mahēśvara region on the Narmadā), Aparānta (northern Konkan), Ākara (East Malwa) and Avanti (West Malwa), Rṣika (on the Krishnā), Aśmaka (in the Hyderabad state), Mālaka (with Pajiṭhan on the Godāvari) and Vidarbha (Berar). Gautamiputra claimed suzerainty over the whole of the trans-Vindhyan range, Malaya (Travancore hills), Eastern Ghats and other mountain ranges encircling the peninsula of South India (trisamudra-toypita-

1. H. Jacobi, Das Kālakācārya-Kathānakam ZDMC 34; (1880); Age of Imperial Unity, p. 155; J. E. Van Lohuizen de Leeuw, The Scythian Period, p. 385
2. The Age of Imperial Unity, Ch. XIII, pp. 182, 201, detailed list of Satraps.
vāhana). He was succeeded by his son Vāsiṣṭhiputra Pulumāyi (106-130 A. D.). Before his death Gautamīputra Sātakarni lost most of the districts he had conquered to another dynasty of Scythian rulers known as the Kārdamakas. The Sātavāhana king Gautamīputra Sātakarni defeated the Śaka Satraps. The Śakas under Chaṣṭana and his grandson Rudradāman defeated the Sātavāhana kings (106-130 A. D.) and recovered most of the northern districts. In the Junagarh inscription of Rudradāman he is represented as the ruler of many countries including Ākara, Avanti, Anūpa, Aparānta, Surāṣṭra and Ānarta (Dvārakā region in Kathiawad). It is also claimed that Rudradāman defeated the republican tribe Yaudheyas of southern Punjab and the adjoining regions.

Rudradāman was a patron of classical Sanskrit and studied grammar, poetry, music and logic, and composed treatises in Sanskrit prose and verse.

Rudradāman was followed by a series of Satraps up to 304-305 A. D.¹

The Scythian ruler Nahapāna (119-135 A. D.) was in possession of the northern part of Mahārāṣṭra and the Konkan as well as of Malwa, Kathiawad and Rajputana. The immediate predecessor of Gautamīputra Sātakarni, who restored the fallen fortunes of the dynasty, continued its precarious existence as the subordinate allies of the foreigners. Gautamīputra Sātakarni is said to have conquered the Scythians, the Indo-Greeks and the Indo-Parthians (saka-yavana-pallava-nisūdana) and established the dynasty of the Sātavāhana (Sātavāhana-kula-yatath-pratīsthāpana-kara) about 124 A. D. The dominion of Sātakarni, according to the Nāsik Praśasti, included Aparānta, Anūpa, Surāṣṭra, Kukura, Ākara, and Avanti. His dominion also included Rṣika (district round Rṣika-nagara on the Krishnā), Aśmaka (territory about Bodhan) in the Hyderabad State, Mūlaka² with Pratīsthāna (modern Paṭhān on the Godāvari) and Vidarbha (Berar). The direct rule of this king seems to have extended over the whole territory from

¹. The Age of Imperial Unity, p. 185.  
². In the Sutta Nipāta, Aśmaka and Mūlaka are mentioned as Andhra countries.
the Krishna in the south, to Malwa and Kathiawad in the north, and from Berar in the east to the Konkan in the west. But Gautamiputra claimed suzerainty over the whole of the trans-Vindhyayan region of India.  

**The Sātavāhanas**  
(30 B.C.—270 A.D. approx.)

After the Maurya and Śunga periods, the Sātavāhanas of the Upper Deccan came into prominence as the lord of Dakṣiṇāpatha. At the time when the Greeks, the Sakas and the Kushānas were carrying on their operations of conquest in the northern and western parts of India, the Andhras established a powerful kingdom in the south. They were also designated as the Andhrabhṛtyas, the word “bhṛtya”, perhaps signified their allegiance to the Mauryas and Śungas, while the last Śunga king Brhadratha was ousted by his minister Vasudeva, the founder of the Kārṇa or Kāṇvāyana dynasty. The last Kārṇa ruler was overthrown by Simuka, the founder of the Sātavāhana dynasty. He maintained a large army and conquered several countries. He extended his dominion from the mouth of the river Krishna to whole of the Deccan plateau. His western capital was at Pratiṣṭhāna (Paithan) and the eastern capital at Dhānyakaṭaka, where the Amarāvatī and Nāgārjunakoṇḍa stūpas were erected. This dynasty ruled over the countries, south of the Vindhyas for 300 years from 30 B.C. By ousting the Kārṇas, the Sātavāhanas brought the whole of Magadha under their control.  

The Vākāṭakas were followed by the Ābhīras, a foreign tribe, which entered into Northern Mahārāṣṭra, the southern and eastern parts of India and gave their own name to their settlements, e.g., Āhraura (Ābhravaṭaka) in Mirzapur district, U. P. The Ābhīras advanced up to the Deccan. According to the Purāṇas, the Deccan was held by the Ābhīras after the Andhrabhṛtyas. In the Viśnu Purāṇa (V. 38) and the Mahābhārata (Mauṣala Parva, Ch. VII) they are described as ṛṣyas and mlecchas.

1. *Age of Imperial Unity*, p. 201  
2. R. C. Majumdar, *Ancient India*, p. 135
After the Ābhīras, the Vākāṭakas were followed by the Bodhis and Ikṣvākus.

The founder of the Ikṣvāku dynasty was Śāntamūla (Chāntamūla) (2nd quarter of the 3rd century A.D.). The Ikṣvākus were known as Śripārvatiya Andhras. King Śāntamūla was succeeded by his son Maṭhariputra Vīrapuruṣadatta (3rd quarter of the 3rd century A.D.). Records of the reign of Vīrapuruṣadatta have been found in the inscriptions of Amaravati and Jaggayyapeta and Nāgārjunakoṇḍa. In the inscriptions are mentioned many benefactions of four female donors to the Mahācaitya.

Vīrapuruṣadatta’s son was Ehuvula Śāntamūla II.

Gautamiputra Sātakarni was a patron of Buddhism next in importance to that of Kaniska. He was succeeded by Vāsiṣṭiputra Pulumāyi, who ruled for 28 years. During Pulumāyi’s reign, the Sakas of Malwa and Kathiawad under Rudradāman fought against the Sātavāhana rulers and regained their power. A later Sātavāhana king Yajñaśri Sātakarni conquered the southern dominion of the Western Satraps and ruled over the whole of Deccan and the eastern part of the Central Provinces. He was the last of the great rulers of the Sātavāhana dynasty.

Pulumāyi’s successor was Śivaśri Sātakarni (circa 159-168 A.D.). The next rulers were Śivaskanda Sātakarni identified with Vāsiṣṭiputra Sātakarni (167-174 A.D.) and Yajñaśri Sātakarni (174-203 A.D.). The death of Yajñaśri (3rd century A.D.) led to the dismemberment of the Sātavāhana empire. The Vākāṭakas were the feudatories of the Sātavāhanas. A Vākāṭaka king is mentioned in an early inscription of Amaravati. He visited the Buddhist establishment at Amaravati for pilgrimage.

Northern India after the Kushāṇas

After the Kushāṇas, the undermentioned tribal republics wielded great powers.

In Rajputana and the adjoining regions, there were the following tribal states:—

(i) Arjunāyanas of Bharatpur and Alwar states.
(ii) Udhehikas of Bharatpur state.

1. Ibid.
(iii) Mālavas of Jaipur state, parts of the Punjab and the adjoining tracts of U. P. and Rajputana.
(iv) Sibis (Sibipura, mod, Shorkot in the Jhaug district of the Punjab). The Sibis later migrated to Rajputana in the district Nāgari near Chitor.
(v) Rājanyas along with Yaudheyas in North-western Rajputana.
(vi) Uttamabhadras, neighbours of the Mālavas, lived in Pushkara near Ajmer.

Most of these tribes submitted to the Scythians and the Kushāṇas. After the decline of the Kushāṇ empire in the 4th century A.D. they acknowledged the suzerainty of the Guptas. It may be pointed out that in Rajputana and the adjoining regions Buddhism did not reach at all. In the exhaustive account of Hiuen Tsang of the Buddhist establishments in the whole of India from Kashmir to the Andhra province, there are no references to monasteries in Rajputana and the adjoining regions, where, it seems, Jainism found a firm footing.

It should be noted also that the Buddhist religious movement was not affected by the political changes that took place after the Kushāṇas and the Śatavāhanas. The Buddhist monks and scholars carried on their activities in the solitude of their monasteries and practised the ethical and meditational practices as prescribed in the Piṭakas. Mahāyānism appeared about this time. Its followers continued the ethical and meditational practices of the old system but added to it their own outlook about the final emancipation (Buddha-hood) and the consequential fulfilment of the six pāramitās in order to become perfect Bodhisattvas. The attainment of Bodhisattvahood was no doubt a long and arduous process but its followers did not fight shy of the same.

After the Kushāṇas, besides the tribal republics mentioned above, the Śakas ruled over Gujrat and a part of Malwa but their power was on the wane. They fought with the Śatavāhanas and were mostly defeated and ousted from the trans-Vindhyan region. After such political disintegration, the Guptas established their empire. Candragupta I, whose queen was Kumārādevī, a Licchavi princess, crushed the rulers of the small kingdoms and annexed them to his empire.
Samudragupta, son of Candragupta I and Kumārādevi, succeeded his father and carried on military campaigns in the various parts of India.¹ He defeated a number of rulers, among whom nine may be mentioned. They are:

(1, 2) Nāgasena and Gaṇapati Nāga of the Nāga family, the serpent-worshippers, were rulers of Padmāvatī (Gwalior state), Vīdisā (Bhilās) and Mathurā.

(3, 4) Acyuta and Candravarman ruled respectively over Ahicchatra (near Bareilly) and Western Bengal (Bankura district).

(5, 6, 7, 8, 9) Rūdradeva,² Matila, Nāgadatta, Nandin and Balavarman (location not known). These five tributary kings were stationed on the frontiers of Samudragupta’s empire. The nine states may be divided into two groups. The first group comprised the Mālavas (Eastern Rajputana), Mewar, Tonk, and Kotah). Arjunāyanas, Yaudheyas (border of the Bahawalpur state), extending up to Yamunā and included Bharatpur. Of the second group, the Sanakānikas near Bhilsa, Ābhīras (Central India — Ahirawara) between Bhilsa and Jhansi. The remaining three states, viz., Prājrjunas, Kākas and Kharparakas (north and east of Bhilsa).

**Samudragupta**

(320—380 A.D.)

Of the Gupta rulers, the most distinguished was King Samudragupta, whose accession to the throne took place about 320 A. D. Samudragupta ruled over the territory extending on the east up to the whole of Bengal, on the north up to the foothills of the Himalayas (excluding Kashmir), West Madrakas (in the Punjab), on the south from Bhilsa to Jubbalpore and thence along the Vindhya range of the hills. He conquered Aranyarājyas (forest states). He defeated the twelve rulers of the Deccan, viz., Mahendra of Dakṣiṇa Kośala

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1. *The Classical Age*, p. 9
2. Rūdradeva, according to Prof. D. C. Sircar, may be identified with Rūdradāman II or his son Rudrasena III and Nāgadatta, a king of N. Bengal.
(Drug, Raipur, Bilaspur, and Sambalpur districts), Vyāghra-rājya of Mahākāntāra (Jeypore state, Orissa), Hastivarman of Veṅgi, seven miles north of Ellore. In short, Samudragupta’s empire comprised the whole of Northern India (except Kashmir), Western Punjab, Sind, Gujrat, highlands of Chattisgarh, and Orissa as far south as Chingleput and probably even further.

Samudragupta ruled directly over his empire through his officials. His suzerainty was acknowledged by the Śaka and Kushān principalities of the west and the north-west. The Pallavas of the south beyond the Krīṣṇā were his feudatories. Ceylon and other islands in the south seas maintained friendly relations with him. He was a follower of Brāhmānism. He died about 380 A.D.

**CANDRAGUPTA II**
**(379/380-413/415 A.D.)**

Samudragupta had many sons and grandsons but he was succeeded by his son Candragupta II, who used the epithet "Parama Bhāgavata", i.e., he was a staunch Vaiṣṇava. His chief enemy was the Śaka ruler Rudrasimha III of Gujrat and Kathiawad. He defeated Rudrasimha III and thereby ended the Śaka rule in India.¹

During the reign of Candragupta II, the Chinese pilgrim Fa-hien (399-414 A.D.) visited India and furnished us with an account of the state of Buddhism in India, so his account has been given in the next few pages.

**FA-HIEN**
**(399-414 A.D.)**

During the reign of Candragupta II, Fa-hien came to India and stayed here for 14 years. His main object was to find out the original Vinaya texts, as he believed that the monks of China were not strictly observant of the disciplinary rules, prescribed in the Vinaya Piṭaka. The information, which he has given us, about the state of Buddhism at the time of his

visit to this country is scanty and is devoted more to legends connected with the events of Buddha's life-time than to the actual state of the religion in India at his time. On his way to India, in Central Asia and Afghanistan, he observed that the quinquennial assemblies of monks were held in those regions and these lasted for a number of days. He reached Udyāna, where he saw many monasteries with inmates, professing Hinayāna Buddhism (very likely Sarvāstivāda and Dharmagupta). At Rohi in Afghanistan there were 3,000 monks of both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna schools. In Udyāna there were 500 monks with a large number of lay-devotees. In Gandhāra he saw a stūpa and a monastery (built very probably by Kaṇiśka), the monks of which were Hīnayānists. From Gandhāra he took four days to reach Takṣaśilā, where he found four stūpas and the faithful scattering flowers and lighting lamps. In Peshawar there was an alms-bowl, believed to have been used by Buddha. The alms-bowl was kept in a stūpa built by an Yueh-chih king (very probably Kaṇiśka), who also constructed by its side a monastery. In Bhida (Pi-ta) on the bank of the river Jhelum, Buddhism was in a flourishing condition and the monks studied both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. From Bhida he passed through a number of monasteries where resided many monks and came down to Mathura, where he noticed 20 monasteries and 3,000 monks.

Fa-hien gives us the interesting information that the Vaiśyas (seīṭhis) built monasteries and endowed them with fields for cultivation, gardens, orchards, along with the tillers of soil, and cattle. These grants were inscribed on metal-plates so that their successors might act according to the directions given in the plates. A share of the crops and yields of the garden had to be given to the monks for their maintenance. He further observed that the regular duties of the monks were to perform acts of piety, to study the scriptures and to practise meditation.

1. Confirmed by Hiuen Tsang (see Watters, op. cit., p. 63)
2. Fa-hien gives in round figures and these also by 100s and 1000s. The figures are evidently fantastic and so these should not be taken seriously but these indicate that Buddhism was existing at the places and give an idea of its popularity.
At Mathura he saw 20 monasteries and 3,000 monks. He noticed also the *stūpas* of Śāriputra, Mahāmaudgalyāyana, and Ānanda, representing *Abhidharma*, *Vinaya* and *Sūtras* respectively. This has been described more accurately by Hiuen Tsang thus:

The Ābhidharmikas worship Śāriputra, Samādhists Mudgala-putra, Vinayists Upāli, Bhikṣuṇīs Ānanda, Śrāmaṇeras Rāhula, and the Mahāyānists the various Bodhisattvas, particularly, Mañjuśrī and Avalokiteśvara and the Prajñāpāramitā (i.e. prajñā-devī). Then he went to Jetavana (Śrāvastī) and referred to the traditions associated with the famous place. Likewise, he referred to the events of Buddha’s time associated with Vaiśāli, Pātaliputra, Rāja-grha and Vārāṇasī. In a monastery at Patna he found a copy of the Mahāsaṅghika-Vinaya. He stayed there for 3 years to learn Sanskrit and to copy the Vinaya texts. He then went to Saṅkāsyā and saw the Aśoka Pillar. He writes that Aśoka erected a square stone-pillar, 50 cubits high with a lion on its top and images of Buddha in the niches on its four sides. There he constructed a monastery by the side of the pillar. Some heretical teachers disputed with the Śramaṇas about their right of residence at that place. The Śramaṇas, being weak, could not stand against their claim. At this place, there were a thousand monks and nuns, who were provided with their food from a common store. They pursued their studies, some in Hinayāna and some in Mahāyāna. Fifty yojanas from here, a monastery known as Dragon-vihāra was built. Here, Fa-hien stayed up to the end of the rainy season retreat (= vaśsā-vāsa). From here he travelled south-east for 7 yojanas and reached Kanauj on the bank of the Ganges. Here he saw two monasteries, the inmates of which were Hinayānists. He crossed the Ganges and came to Sāketa.

At Sāketa there were only heretics, while at Jetavana (Śrāvastī) there were rest-houses for all travellers, including heretical teachers and Buddhist monks. There were a few followers of Devadatta, who made offerings to the three previous Buddhas but notto Śākyamuni. At Kapilavastu only, very

1. Watters *op. cit.* I. p. 302
recently some monks had gone there but he noticed that a Srāmaṇera was the head of the monastery.

Fa-hien then reached Pāṭaliputra, where he came across a distinguished Brāhmaṇa called Rādhāsvāmī, who was a Buddhist by faith. He had clear discernment and deep knowledge. He taught Mahāyāna doctrines. He was revered by the king of the country. He was instrumental in popularising Buddhism. Śramaṇas from other countries came to him to comprehend the Truth.

By the side of the Aśoka stūpa, there was a Mahāyāna monastery, grand and beautiful; there was also a Hinayāna monastery. The two together had about 600 to 700 monks. Here was another teacher known as Mañjuśrī, who was proficient like Rādhasvāmī. To him flocked Mahāyāna students from all countries.

Every year on the 8th day (i.e. aṣṭamī) of the 2nd month (i.e. Jyaiśṭha), the rich and prosperous made four-wheeled chariots shaped like a stūpa. In the chariot were placed images of various gods, a Buddha image with figures of Bodhisattvas as attendants. There might be 20 such chariots. The local Brahmins invited the Buddhists. The Vaiśyas (i.e. śeṭṭhis) distributed gifts and medicines. The ceremony lasted for two days. Fa-hien stayed in Pāṭaliputra for three years to learn Sanskrit and to copy the manuscripts. He copied the Mahāsaṅghika Vinaya as well as the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, the Saṃyuktābhidharma-sāstra, Vaipulya sūtras, and Mahāsaṅghika Abhidharma.¹

From Pāṭaliputra he proceeded to Campā (Bhagalpur), where he found Buddhism in a flourishing state. From Campā he proceeded to Tāmrālīpti, which had a sea-port. In this country there were 20 monasteries, with monks in every one of them. Fa-hien stayed here two years for copying the Sūtras and drawing sketches of the images of Buddha. From here, at the beginning of winter, he embarked on a large merchant-vessel to Ceylon, reaching there in fourteen days. In Ceylon, he


Fa-hien refers to Rājagrha (Indra-sāla-guhā), Sūraṅgama-sūtra and the stūpas at Gaya. He could not go to Vārāṇasi.
stayed for two years, copied the *Mahātāsaka Vinaya, Dirghāgama, Saṃyuktāgama* and the *Saṃyukta-saṅcaya-piṭaka*. He embarked therefrom and reached Java (Javadvipa) where he stayed for 5 months and then sailed again in a large merchant-vessel to China. He reached China after a perilous voyage and was received there with great honour.

The time of Fa-hien's sojourn in India from 399 to 414 A.D. coincided almost with the reigning period of Candragupta II, and so it may be inferred that the state of Buddhism in India as per Fa-hien's account may be regarded as authentic.

Fa-hien writes that during the reign of Candragupta II, the people were numerous and happy; they did not have to register their households (perhaps properties) and appear before any magistrate; the only conditions were that those, who cultivated the royal land, had to give a portion of their gains, i.e., crops to the king. He does not refer to the lawlessnesses, from which Hiuen Tsang suffered at a later date. He speaks of peace and prosperity and contentment prevailing in the empire of Candragupta II.

I-tsing (671-695 A.D.) mentions one Śrīgupta, who built a rest-house for the Chinese pilgrims and endowed it with 24 villages. It has been inferred from this that Śrīgupta was a small independent ruler of Magadha about 400/500 years before I-tsing, i.e., about 2nd/3rd century A.D. Hence, Śrīgupta may be regarded as the founder of the Gupta dynasty, which rose to prominence under Candragupta II.

**Budhagupta**

(477-496 A.D.)

Candragupta II was succeeded by his son Kumāragupta (415-455 A.D.), followed by the latter's son Skandagupta (455/6-467 A.D.), who conquered the Hūnas. The Gupta empire extended, at his time, from the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea. The official genealogy of the Later Gupta rulers ignores Skandagupta and traced the line from Kumāragupta, through his two sons Budhagupta (477-496 A.D.) and Narasimhagupta. He invited Vasubandhu,¹ the famous Buddhist teacher, to be

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1. Re. Vasubandhus, see *infra*; see also p. 23 above.
the tutor of his son, Narasimhagupta Bālāditya. During Budhagupta’s reign the Hūnas under Toramāna and Mihirakula made inroads into his territory while the Maitrakas of Kathiawad Peninsula, who were formerly Senāpatis of the Gupta rulers, asserted their independence and adopted the title of Mahārājās. Their example was followed by other such feudatories. Budhagupta was succeeded by his brother Narasimhagupta.

Narasimhagupta, His Sons and Grandsons
(497-570 A.D.)

Narasimhagupta took the title of Bālāditya. He triumphed over Mihirakula, the persecutor of the Buddhists, and became a great patron of Buddhism. After him, there was political disintegration. In the 6th century, the Maitrakas asserted their independence and became Mahārājās of Valabhi. Śilāditya I Dharmāditya (606-612 A.D.), according to Hiuen Tsang, built a large Buddhist temple with artistic structure and installed in it images of seven Buddhas and held a religious assembly every year, to which the Buddhist monks of all countries were invited. He offered to every monk three robes and the minor requisites (parikkhāraś). His pious works were continued by his successive generations.¹

Vasubandhus

It is a baffling problem to solve how many distinguished monk-scholars bore the name of Vasubandhu. In Kaniṣka’s Council, the date of which cannot be later than the 2nd century A.D., Kātyāyanīputra is said to have composed the Jñāna-prasthāna-sūtra and other scholars its six Pādas (supplements) (see above). It is said that Vasubandhu, a noted figure in the Council and a prodigy, summed up the contents of the Abhidharmavibhāṣā-sāstra, in the form of Kārikās called the Abhidharmamokṣa-kārikā and later wrote a bhāṣya (commentary) on it. In the Bhāṣya, he argued that Ākāsa, Pratisamkhya-nirodha and

¹ Watters, op. cit., II, p. 242
Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha held by the Sarvāstivādins as real and positive are not correct. It was argued that ākāśa (space) meant that in which there was no obstruction; on its analogy it was contended that the two nirodhas also meant, similarly, absence of all kinds of impurities (kleṣas andu pakleṣas). The Asaṅskṛtās are not real and positive (vide Kośa, II, 64, pp. 282, 284). From this conception, it is not a very wide jump to the Vijñaptimātratā view of the Yogācāra-Viśṇunāvādins. Hence, on the basis of these arguments, it may be concluded that the earlier Vasubandhu,1 brother of Asaṅga lived about the 2nd century A.D. Hence, this Vasubandhu was different from the teacher Vasubandhu of Candragupta II and his son Bālāditya, whose reigning period was 500 to the middle of the 6th century A.D. Hiuen Tsang writes that Narasimhagupta was the last Gupta ruler, who defeated Mihrakula. He referred to him as a great patron of Buddhism and builder of the grand Saṅghārāma of Nālandā.

One Vasubandhu was born in Peshawar. His father was Kauśika and mother Bilindi. He was the second of the three brothers. Hiuen Tsang saw on the east side of Pārśva’s chamber the old house of Vasubandhu, the author of the Abhidharma-kosa-śāstra, a book of 600 aphorisms, being the “Disquisitions on the treasure of Buddhist philosophy.” It was sent from Ayodhyā to the Kashmir Vaibhāṣikas, who were very pleased with it. In the meantime he became a follower of the Sautraṇtika school and in his Bhāṣya he criticised the Kashmir Vaibhāṣikas. This book was written in Ayodhyā during the reign of Vikramāditya or his son Bālāditya. It was refuted by Saṅghabhadra, who composed two treatises, in which he refuted those views and defended the Vaibhāṣikas. Vasubandhu dealt with both Mahāyāna and Hinayāna philosophy. The book was translated into Chinese twice by Paramārtha and Hiuen Tsang. This Vasubandhu, writes Hiuen Tsang, should not be confused with the 21st Patriarch, by which he evidently meant that Vasubandhu, who was associated with the tradition of the

1. F. Frauwallner, On the date of the Buddhist Master of Law Vasubandhu, (Rome) 1951. See also, Winternitz, History of the Buddhist Literature, pp. 356-363, 611-614, etc.
Kashmir Council held under the auspices of Kañśika. He is the author of the *Abhidharma-prakaraṇa-pāda-sāstra*. A contemporary of Vasubandhu, Ācārya Manoratha composed also a *Vibhāṣā-sāstra*. Hiuen Tsang (I, p. 291) records that in Sākala there was a Buddhist monastery with about 100 monks, all of them were of the Hinayāna school. In this monastery P'usā Vasubandhu composed the *Paramārtha-satya-sāstra*.

It is also necessary to bring in here the information given by Hiuen Tsang (Watters, I, p. 361) that to the south-east of Ghoṣitārāma in Kauśāmbī (near Allahabad) there was a two-storeyed building with an upper chamber made of old bricks, where lodged Vasubandhu and composed the *Vijñapti-māratā-siddhi* (Nanjio: *Vidyāmātra-siddhi*), the first Chinese translation of this book was made by Bodhiruci (520 A.D.), the second by Paramārtha (560 A.D.) and the third by Hiuen Tsang (661 A.D.).

*Vijñapti-māratā-siddhi* has another title, which in Chinese means "the sāstra refuting the existence of both 'matter and mind'. This book has been compressed into small philosophical poems entitled *Vīṃśatikā* and *Trīṃśikā*, edited by Prof, Sylvain Lévi. It has an explanatory commentary on the nature of 'mind and matter.' In Ming collection, it is named *Mahā-yāna-Laṅkā-sūtra-vidyā-mātra-sāstra*. Åsāṅga composed also the *Togacarya-bhūmi-sāstra*.

King Narasīṃhagupta’s son was Kumāragupta, who defeated the Maukharī king Īśānavarman, and ruled from 550 to 570 A.D. Kumāragupta’s son Dāmodaragupta also defeated another Maukharī king, but he died in the battle. Dāmodaragupta’s son Mahāsenagupta is described in the *Harsacarita* as the ruler of the territory from Mālava to Bengal. Mahāsenagupta revived partially the glories of the Guptas but he had to suffer misfortunes. The Maitraka king Śilāditya I Dharmā-ditya took possession of a considerable portion of Mālava, the Kalacuri king Saṅkaragaṇa occupied Ujjayinī in 595 A.D. and Saśāṅka asserted his independence in Bengal. After such discomfitures, Kumāragupta and Mādhavagupta had to take shelter in the court of Prabhākaravardhana of Thaneswar, whose mother Mahāsenguptā Devī was a sister of Mahāsengupta.
The two sons remained with Rājyavardhana, son of Prabhākaravardhana and then with his brother Hārśavardhana.

**Post-Gupta Period**

After the dissolution of the Gupta empire in the 6th century A.D., a number of states not only asserted their independence but also tried to gain control over other countries. Śaśāṅka of Bengal was a Mahāsāmanta (=feudatory chief) of Mahāsenagupta of the Later Guptas. He freed himself from the yoke of Mahāsenagupta,¹ and extended his dominion from Bengal to Mahendragiri mountain in the Ganjam district in the Andhra Province. He killed king Rājyavardhana by alluring him with false promises.

**Buddhism during the reign of Śaśāṅka in Bengal**

Śaśāṅka the Gauḍa-rāja was no doubt a cruel persecutor of Buddhism and the Buddhist recluses, and it is said, that he did not spare even the sacred images of Buddha of Bodh-Gaya² and that he went to the length of uprooting the Bodhi tree of Gaya. It is rather surprising that in spite of evil designs of Śaśāṅka, the people of Bengal including the Brahmins extended due courtesies and respect to the Buddhist recluses as also to the followers of the Jaina and other faiths. The Indians in general by their innate nature were very tolerant and did not hesitate to show due regard to the religieux of non-Brahmanic sects. In Śaśāṅka's days, according to the figures furnished by Hiuen Tsang,³ it is apparent that there were monasteries and religieux all over Bengal. The figures are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Number of monasteries</th>
<th>Number of religieux</th>
<th>Sects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kajaṅgala (region round Rajmahal)</td>
<td>6/7</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Sammitiya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The *Classical Age*, p. 74
2. In Beal's *Records of the Western World*, II, p. 121 appears this information: Śaśāṅka failed to remove the image of Buddha of Bodh-Gaya, and so he enclosed it with a brick wall. *He destroyed the stone, which had a footprint of Buddha, set up by Asoka.*
3. Watters, *op. cit.*, II, p. 183f
Puṇḍravardhana
(= North Bengal) 20 3,000 Hinayāna and Mahāyāna
Karṇasuvarṇa
(= West Bengal, Murshidabad, etc.) 3 2,000 Sammitīya
Ṭamralipti
(= Tamluk, Midnapore) 10 1,000 not mentioned
Samataṭa (= Baṃlādeśa) 30 100 Sthavira

It may be stated that the neighbouring province, Assam had neither Buddhist monasteries nor religieux. The people of Assam were mostly Śaivas as also its king Bhāskaravarman, who, however, had to attend the religious assemblies held under the auspices of King Harṣavardhana.

RISE OF THE MAUKHARIS (ASSAM)

Puṣyavarman¹ was the earliest historical ruler of Kamrup, in the Brahmaputra valley of Assam. There were three other kings of this family, ruling in different places. Yajñavarman, Śārdūlavaran and Anantavarman ruled in the neighbourhood of Gaya in the 6th century A.D.¹ The Maukhari king Iśānavarman ruled from 550 to 576 A.D. The Later Guptas challenged the power of the Maukharis, after Iśānavarman, in the 6th century A.D. The genealogy of the Varmans stands thus :-

1. Puṣyavarman (350 A.D.)²

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8. Bhūtivarman = Viṇḍana-devī
(founder of the family; after disintegration of the Guptas, he asserted independence). Kamrup was one of the

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1. The Classical Age, p. 89; a royal seal found at Nalanda describes Puṣyavarman as the lord of Prāg-jyotisā and had the title Mahārājadhirāja, Ibid., p. 89
2. PHAL., (5th edition), p. 603
feudatory states of Samudragupta in the 4th/5th century A. D. Kamrup in Bhūtivarman’s time extended up to the west of North Bengal.


11. Susthitavarman = Śyāmādevī  

|  
|  


Bhāskaravarman was a contemporary of Harṣavardhana and ruled about the 7th century A. D. Bhāskaravarman was defeated by Mahāsenagupta, who was then the king of Gaúḍa. The incident (for details, see The Classical Age p. 120) in connection with Hiuen Tsang shows that he became ultimately an ally of Harṣavardhana. Though Bhāskaravarman was a Śaiva by faith, he attended the religious assemblies held by Harṣavardhana at Kanauj and Prayāg.

ANOTHER BRANCH OF THE MAUKHARIS  
(South Bihar and Uttar Pradesh)

Another branch of the Maukharis ruled in South Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and that they became very powerful is known from their seals and Inscriptions. The genealogy of this family is as follows :

1. Mahārāja Harivarman = Jayasvāmini
2. Ādityavarman = Harṣaguptā
3. Iśvaravarman = Upaguptā
4. Mahārājādhirāja Iśānavarman = Lakṣmīvatī (554 A. D.) claimed victories over the Andhras, the Gauḍas, and took the title of Mahārājādhirāja.
5. Mahārāja Sarvavarman = Indrabhatṭārikā
6. ″ Avantivarman
7. ″ Su..........

These Maukhari chiefs ruled since the time of Budhagupta, i.e. after the decline of the Guptas in the early 6th century A.D. They wielded great power till the latter half of the 6th century A.D.

Grahavarman, the eldest son of Avantivarman, married the princess Rājyaśrī, sister of Rājyavardhana and Harṣavardhana in or shortly before 606 A.D.1 The marriage was regarded as a bond uniting the two dynasties of Maukharies and Puṣpabhūtis. Śaśāṅka made an alliance with Devagupta, king of Mālava, against Grahavarman of Kanauj and imprisoned Rājyaśrī in Kanauj. The Maukhariis were ultimately ousted from Kanauj by the Puṣpabhūtis, of which Harṣavardhana was the outstanding ruler.2

Puṣpabhūtis

The kingdom of Thanesvar was founded by Puṣpabhūti. In Harsacarita, Bāna does not speak of the consecutive successors of Puṣpabhūti and begins his account with king Prabhākaravardhana of this family. He is given the title of Paramabhaṭṭāraka Mahārājādhirāja. Prabhākaravardhana had two sons: Rājyavardhana and Harṣavardhana, and one daughter Rājyaśrī,2 married to Grahavarman, mentioned above. On receipt of the information about the death of Grahavarman and the imprisonment of Rājyaśrī, Rājyavardhana marched against the king of Mālava and routed the Mālava army. He was, however, allured by Śaśāṅka by false promises and was killed by him. On hearing this news, Harṣavardhana took a vow of vengeance against Śaśāṅka. He made an alliance with Bhāskaravarman. Śaśāṅka died between 619 and 637 A.D. Jayanāga was the next Gauḍarāja, who was overthrown by Bhāskaravarman.

1. The Classical Age, p. 79
2. Ibid., p. 71
THE PUŚHPABHŪTIS
(Kingdom of Thanesvar)

The earliest historical kings of the Pušpabhūti dynasty were Mahārāja Naravardhana

Rājyavardhana

Ādityavardhana = Mahāsenaguptā Devī

Paramabhaṭṭāraka Mahārājādhirāja Prabhākaravardhana = Yaśomati Devī

Rājyavardhana Harśvardhana Rājyaśri

The first three kings of this dynasty flourished between 500 and 580 A.D. They were very likely feudatory chiefs of the Hūṇas, the Guptas or of both. According to the Harṣacarīta\(^1\) (Cowell 101), Prabhākaravardhana was a lion to the Hūṇa deer, a burning fever to the king of Sindhu, a troubler of the sleep of the Gurjaras (Rajputana), a fever to the elephant of Gandhāra, a destroyer of the skill of Lāṭas, an axe to the creeper, which is the goddess of fortune (i.e. sovereignty) of the Mālavas.\(^2\)

Rājyavardhana heard the news of the death of Graha-varman by the king of Mālava, making his sister Rājyaśri a widow. Rājyavardhana proceeded with his army against the king of Mālava and routed his army. Śaśāṅka, probably an ally of the king of Mālava allured Rājyavardhana with false hopes and then he treacherously put him to death (HC., p. 187, Beal, op. cit. I, 210). Harśvardhana with his ally Bhāskaravaraman continued his march for a few days and met Bhaṇḍī the military


2. Authenticity of the claims made in this passage remains to be verified.
general and learnt from him that Rājyaśrī, out of despair, had
gone to the Vindhya forest along with her retinue. Harṣa met
Rājyaśrī just at the moment when she was going to mount the
funeral pyre. He returned with his sister to the camp on the
bank of the Ganges.

**Harṣavardhana & Harṣacarita**

Bāṇa was a contemporary of king Harṣavardhana and hence
his date may be placed towards the end of the 6th century and
the beginning of the 7th century a. d. Bāṇa’s account of the
reign of Harṣavardhana is no doubt full of poetic effusions but
still some facts may be elicited from them. The account given
in his Harṣacarita (edited by Mm. P. V. Kane) is given here
briefly:

Prabhākaravardhana alias Pratāpaśīla was a descendant of the
Puṣpabhūti family. He fought against the Hūṇas of the North­
west, king of the Gurjaras (of Rajputana), and the lords of
Sindhu, Gândhāra, Lāṭa and Mālava. He was a worshipper of
the Sun. The first son of this king was Rājyavardhana and the
second son Harṣavardhana, and the third was the daughter
Rājyaśrī. Prabhākaravardhana married Yasomati. Queen Ya­somati’s brother Bhaṇḍi handed over his son as a companion of
the two princes. King Prabhākaravardhana procured from the
king of Western Mālava his two sons named Kumāragupta and
Mādhavagupta. They accompanied the two princes as their
shadow. When Rājyaśrī came of marriageable age, she was
given in marriage to Grahavarman, son of Avantivarman of the
Maukhari family of Kanauj and she went to her husband’s
place. When Rājyavardhana had grown up to a strong youth
able to hold arms, Prabhākaravardhana sent him along with
his ministers and devoted feudatory chiefs to the north against
the Hūṇas. Harṣavardhana accompanied them for some dis­
tance, and when they entered the Kailāsa region, he remained
behind and disported himself in hunting excursions.

In the meantime, a courier came from the capital with the
news that Prabhākaravardhana was seriously ill. Harṣa returned
in hot haste, riding day and night, and reached the capital on
the third day after the death of his father and his mother’s
mounting the funeral pyre, and the necessary ceremonies were being performed by various sects.

About a fortnight after this sad event, Rājyavardhana conquered the Hūnas, although he was wounded in the fight. He became very much worried and desired to retire from the worldly life. At this moment he received the sad news that his brother-in-law Grahavarman of the Maukhari dynasty of Kanauj was killed by the machinations of the king of Mālava and that his sister Rājyaśrī was put in prison in Kanauj, in the words of Bāṇa, "with fetters on her feet like the wife of a brigand". The Mālava king also planned to attack Thanesvar. Rājyavardhana started immediately with his army accompanied by Bhaṇḍi's thousand cavalry against the king of Mālava and routed his army, but unfortunately he was seduced by the Gauḍa king Śaśāṅka with false temptations and was killed by him treacherously.

Simhanāda, the faithful military general of the Vardhana family, incited him to avenge his brother's death, but he could not do anything without assuming the royal power. As there was no other alternative, Harṣavardhana ascended the throne after worshipping the Sun. At this time, he was approached by a courier from Bhāskaravarman of Kamrup, offering to be an ally of him and expressed his desire to join him in his expedition against Śaśāṅka, who was also his enemy. He brought also the news that his boy-friend Kumāragupta, a son of the Mālava king, laid siege on Kanauj and rescued his sister Rājyaśrī from the prison. Rājyaśrī, however, out of despair proceeded to the Vindhya forest. Harṣa asked Bhaṇḍi to march against the Gauḍa king Śaśāṅka and he himself went to the Vindhya forest in search of his sister. After roaming for several days, he met Vyāghraketu, son of the Bhil chieftain Sarahaketu, who introduced him to a young Bhil called Nirghāta, the military general of the Bhils. He informed Harṣa that the recluse Divākaramitra, a convert from Brāhmanism to Buddhism could help him. Harṣa remembered him as a friend of Grahavarman. Harṣa went to the hermitage of Divākaramitra and found him surrounded by many followers and students of various sects. Just then Harṣa was informed by a Buddhist bhikṣu that his sister was going to immolate herself on a funeral pyre-
He met her there and learnt from her that when she was released from the prison by Kumāragupta, she heard the news of the death of Rājyavardhana, and so out of grief, she was going to burn herself in a fire. At the intercession of Harṣa, she wanted to join the Buddhist Saṅgha of bhikṣuṇīs. Harṣa requested her to wait a little, as he would also join the Buddhist Saṅgha after destroying the Gaūḍa king Saśānka.

The above account of Harṣavardhana, as given by Bāna in his Harṣacarita may be supplemented by the statements of Hiuen Tsang whose sojourn in India took place from 629 to 645 A.D. i.e., during the reign of Harṣavardhana (606-642 A.D.). Hiuen Tsang records that there were in Kanauj 100 monasteries and 10,000 Buddhist monks and nuns. Regarding Harṣavardhana, he writes that the king carried on wars continually for 6 years and enlarged his kingdom as also his army and reigned in peace for about 30 years. He was just in his administration and punctilious in the discharge of his duties. He prohibited the use of animal food, taking of life, under severe penalties. He erected thousands of stūpas on the bank of the Ganges and provided rest-houses for travellers. He built monasteries at the sacred Buddhist sites. He regularly held the quinquennial assemblies, which were also attended by Bhāskaravarman, king of Kāmarūp, showing thereby his sympathetic attitude to Buddhism. Harṣavardhana gave away to the religieux everything except the materials of war. Once a year he summoned the Buddhist monks and provided them with food and other requisites for 21 days. He furnished the chapels with the necessary articles and decorated the central halls of the monasteries. He brought the monks together for discussions, giving rewards for merit. The monks, observant of the rules of the Order strictly, and thoroughly, proficient in theory and practice, were placed by him on a high platform, and religious discourses delivered by them were appreciated by him. He merely honoured those monks, who were not learned but were observant of the moral and disciplinary rules of the Order. Those, who neglected the observance of the rules of the Order, were removed from his presence as well as from the country. He carried on visits of inspection throughout his dominion. At the royal palace 1,000 monks and 500 Brahmins were provided with food. The king divided his day
into three periods, one of which was devoted to the work of administration and the other two to religious works.

The Chinese pilgrim, on his way back to China, paid a visit to Kāmrūp at the request of king Bhāskaravarman and the advice of Śīlabhadra, the head of the Nalanda Monastery. At this time an assembly was going to be held at Kanauj. Harṣavarṇdhana asked Bhāskaravarman to send back the pilgrim; he refused to do so and wrote that he could take his head but not the pilgrim. Harṣa got enraged and asked the king to send his head per bearer. Bhāskaravarman became submissive and came to Kanauj along with the pilgrim, and offered his apology. He also attended the assembly held at Kanauj. Harṣa then went to Prayāga for the periodical, distribution of gifts to the religieux.

Harṣa is said to be the author of three works, viz., Priyadarśikā, Ratnāvali and Nāgānanda.

Harṣavarṇdhana was not only a distinguished ruler but also an admirer of literary writers. He was a patron of learning and his court was adorned with poets like Bāṇa, Mayūra and Divākara. He himself, according to the testimony of Bāṇa and I-tsing, was the author of the drama Nāgānanda, which is a versified and dramatised form of the story of the Bodhisattva Jimūta-vāhana. Though its topic is Buddhistic, it attempts to bring about a harmonious relation between Gaurī and Gaurūḍa. In the colophon of Nāgānanda is mentioned "Nāgānandam iti nāṭakaṃ Śrī Harṣadevena kṛtaṃ samāptaṁ." (Vide Bibliotheca edition of Prof. Vidhuśekhara Bhattacharya.)

The other two books Ratnāvali and Priyadarśikā are very similar to each other. These were composed almost on the same lines as of Kālidāsa’s Mālavikāgnimitra, having nearly the same plot. In his Kuṭṭanimitam, Dāmodaragupta ascribed the authorship of the Ratnāvali to a royal author. In the colophon of the Ratnāvali also appears "Iti Harṣadevasya kṛtih samāpteyam Ratnāvalī nāma nāṭikā." (Vide edition of M. R. Kale.)

Hiuen Tsang gives a detailed account of the various places in India, where he noticed Buddhist monasteries and monks, mentioning the sects, to which the inmates belonged. Prof. Lamotte has collected all the facts and figures in his Histoire du Bouddhisme indien, 2 Vols. (Louvain, 1958) from the Chinese original of Hiuen Tsang’s Records. His references to the Chinese texts
have been replaced by references to Watters’ *Yuan Chwang* for the convenience of the general readers.¹

**Harṣavarudhana**

(606-643 A.D.)

It was during the reign of king Harṣavarudhana that Hiuen Tsang came to India and furnished us with a detailed account of the state of Buddhism all over India. He has given also an account of king Harṣavarudhana’s interest in Buddhism, and so it behoves us first to make a survey of his military campaigns and the extent of his empire. His reign began at a critical time when the undermentioned kingdoms asserted their independence in the post-Gupta period:

1. Gandhāra and Sindh in North-western India and in Western India.
2. Laṭa Malayā and Gujrat in the south-west; the king of Mālava put to death Grahavarman and imprisoned his queen Rājyaśri, sister of Rājayavardhana and Harṣavarudhana.

Harṣavarudhana carried on his military campaigns against

1. Śaśānka of Bengal for rescuing his sister, Rājyaśri. It was only after Śaśānka’s death, he could conquer some portion of Bengal. Śaśānka died soon after cutting the Bodhi-tree of Gaya, a little before 637 A.D.
2. Valabhi but he could not meet with the success;
3. Pulakeśin of the Narmadā region but perhaps, Harṣa had a total failure;
4. The Lāṭas, Gurjaras and Mālavas; he was not successful;
5. Magadha was conquered only after Śaśānka’s death and carried on his victorious campaigns up to Orissa and Koṅgoda and that also after 641 A.D., i.e., towards the close of his reign.

Basing on the data supplied by Hiuen Tsang, it may be stated that Harṣa’s dominion did not substantially extend beyond Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal and Orissa.²

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¹. See the present author’s book on *Buddhist Sects in India* (1970).
². See *The Classical Age*, p. 112.
Reverses met by Buddhism in Kashmir

(5th century A.D. and later)

Some time after the Kushan rule, Buddhism fell on evil days. Tāranātha reports that a mlecha faith called Ardho appeared for the first time in India and secured many followers. The mlecha religion was perhaps confined to Makha and did not spread to Kashmir. Tāranātha then refers to the royal families of Saitā and Turuṣka, stating that King Turuṣka ruled in Kashmir for 100 years as a Dharmarāja, but destroyed the viharas of Magadha and put the monks of Nalanda to flight. Then Mahāsammata, son of a Turuṣka, brought under one rule the kingdom of Kashmir, Tukhāra and Ghazni and helped the spread of Mahāyāna teaching. The Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa refers to one Turuṣka, who ruled over the Uttarāpatha up to the gate of Kashmir. He was a pious Buddhist and during his reign Mahāyānism, particularly the teaching of Prajñāpāramitā, spread in the north. After him appeared Mahāturuṣka, who also erected Buddhist temples and monasteries and propagated the mantra and worship of Tārādevi. In the Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa the Turuṣka king is referred to as "Gomi" and his successor as Buddhapakṣa, who, according to both Tāranātha and Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa, made good the loss suffered by Buddhism on account of the vandalism of his predecessor by re-erecting several temples and monasteries. Tāranātha adds that he erected many Caityas in Ghazni and invited to Kashmir Vasubandhu’s disciple Saṅghadāsa, who founded

1. Tāranātha, op. cit., p. 79; Tib. p. 64, 1.3: dus de tsam. nak. la. klohi. chos dañ par byan yin te. Tib. Kla. klo may be mlechas or Tukhāras Cf. Mmk., p. 621-22, Schiefner, pp. 78, 304. They killed cows by uttering Bismilla.

2. Makha is mentioned by Bu-ston (II, p. 171) as one of the countries where Buddhism spread and disappeared. It is perhaps Mecca (Schiefner op. cit., p. 80); the founder of the religion is Mamathār (=Muhammad) and the teacher is called Paikhama (Paigamber?)


4. Mmk., p. 623

5. Ibid.


8. Schiefner, p. 103.
the Ratnaguptavihāra in Kashmir and spread the Mahāyāna teaching there for the first time.¹

The Turuṣka lord² was very likely the well-known persecutor of Buddhism, Mihirakula, whose accession to the throne is placed in 515 A. D.³ The Chinese traditions as also Kalhaṇa’s Rājataraṅgīni speak of his cruel nature, and his vendetta against the king of Siṃhala. Perhaps there was some sort of provocation from the Buddhists,⁴ which incited him to pull down the Buddhist temples and monasteries all over Northern India, and to massacre the monks. The inhuman cruelties and depredations perpetrated by the White Huṇa ruler were, according to Yuan Chwang,⁵ checked by Bālāditya of Magadha, but there was none in Kashmir to restrain his atrocious acts of destroying stūpas and monasteries and exterminating even the lay-adherents of Buddhism, until his complete overthrow by Yaśodharman. Following Tāranātha, Bu-ston and Mmk., and Kalhaṇa tell us that his son Baka (=Mahāsaṃmata of Tāranātha, Buddhapakṣa of Mmk. and Bhadanta of Bu-ston), who brought Kashmir, Tukhāra and Ghazni under one ruler, atoned for his predecessor’s sins by erecting caityas and monasteries for the Buddhists.

It is written by both Kalhaṇa and Tāranātha that Buddhism had a serious set-back in Kashmir after the reign of Kanishka II. Kalhaṇa (I. 180-81, 199) relates that after Nāgārjuna, during whose time “the Bauddhas obtained preponderance in the land by defeating in disputation all learned opponents.” There were excessive snow-falls, killing the Bauddhas; and king Nara, on account of the crime of a Buddhist monk, flew into rage and “burnt thousands of Buddhist vihāras” while Tāranātha informs us that after Nāgārjuna left N. India and went to the south, the religion of the Mlecchas prospered.⁶

Though it is difficult to make out a dependable account of these traditions, it may be assumed that after the Kushāṇas, a Turuṣka royal family ruled over Kashmir. It was very likely the family of Turki Sāhis, who held sway over Northern India

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1. Ibid., p. 135.
2. Tib (p. 64) Saita daṅ Turuṣkaḥi ‘Gyal-poṣi rigs. ri rnam byuṅ tío.
for about a century from the 3rd century A. D. The Turki Sāhis were supporters of Buddhism, and so the religion must have prospered under their rule. It must have been sometime after the disappearance of this royal family that Mihirakula came to the throne of Kashmir and massacred the Buddhists. Towards the end of his life, Mihirakula became a worshipper of Šiva and "established pious observances in the lands occupied by the impure Daradas, Bhauṭtas and Mlecchas" (I. 312-16). Mihirakula’s son recompensed his father’s cruel acts by restoring some of the ruined temples and monasteries.

**Narendrāditya Khīṅkhīla and Pratāpāditya**

A few generations later Narendrāditya Khīṅkhīla came into power (I, 347). There are a few coins bearing the legends Deva Sahi Khīṅkhīla, Śrī Narendra, establishing the historicity of this king. Narendrāditya was a worshipper of Šiva and made endowments for the Brāhmaṇas. He was succeeded by his son Yudhiṣṭhira I. The people of Kashmir deposed him and brought Pratāpāditya, a relative of Vikramāditya, from outside and placed him on the throne (II. 5). This new line of rulers worshipped Šiva, the last king of the dynasty being Tunjina.

**Jayendra and Samdhimat**

Tunjina was succeeded by Vijaya, belonging to a different family. Vijaya’s son Jayendra had a long and glorious reign, excepting that it was stained by the attempt to kill his very popular minister Samdhimat, who ultimately ascended the throne of Kashmir. Samdhimat ruled for a long time, built Šiva temples and practised Šiva-sādhanās. His end was also unhappy, as he was compelled by the people to retire.

**Meghavāhana**

Meghavāhana, a descendant of Yudhiṣṭhira I, was brought by the people from Gandhāra and placed on the throne (III. 2). He had a soft corner for Buddhism, hailing, as he did, from Gandhāra, a predominantly Buddhistic country. His queen Amṛtaprabhā of Prāgjiyotiṣa is said to have built for the use of
Buddhist monks a lofty vihāra called Amṛtabhāvana (III. 9), to which a reference is made by Ou K'ong. Her guru was a Tibetan, a native of Leh (i.e. Ladakh). His other queens also built monasteries and stūpas, of which the one built by Khādanā is located at Khādanīya about 4 miles below Varāhamūla on the right bank of the Vitastā."

Meghavāhana cherished also some Aśokan ideas inasmuch as he himself was not only keen about observing the dharma but compelled his neighbouring kings to abstain from killing living beings (III. 27). With him are associated some Avadānas, which extol his extreme sacrifices for the sake of others. His services to Buddhism were so great that the people attributed to his pious deeds an atonement for the sins of his predecessor Mihrakula (III. 57). The long rule of this line of kings was only once interrupted by the reign of the poet Mātrgupta for four years as a viceroy of Vikramāditya of Ujjainī. The kings were mostly worshippers of Śiva and supporters of Brāhmaṇism, but during the reign of Pravarasena II, the king’s maternal uncle, Jayendra, built the Jayendra-vihāra and placed in it a colossal image of Buddha, known as Brhadbuddha. In this vihāra, Yuan Chwang stayed and received instructions in the various śāstras.

During the reign of Yudhiṣṭhira II, his ministers constructed vihāras and caityas (III. 380-81), one of which was Skandabhavanavihāra, built by Skandagupta. During the reign of Raṇāditya, one of his queens called Amṛtaprabhā placed a fine statue of Buddha in the vihāra built by a queen of Meghavāhana (III. 464). Raṇāditya was succeeded by his son Vikramāditya, who was a devotee of Śiva. His minister Galuṇa had a vihāra built in the name of his wife, Ratnāvalī (III. 476). The last king of this line was Bālāditya.

1. Stein, Intro, I, 74n.
2. It offered shelter to king Pārtha and his queens (V. 428), but destroyed later by Kṣemagupta.
4. It is located by Stein at Khandabavan, in Srinagar (Stein, I, p. 105n.)
Lalitāditya Muktāpiḍa
(Middle of the 8th century A.D.)

Bālāditya was succeeded by his son-in-law, Durlabhavardhana, whose queen set up the Anaṅgabhavana-vihāra (IV. 3), referred to by Ou K'ong as Ānanda or Ānaṅga vihāra. The king himself as also his successors were mostly Viṣṇu-worshippers. The noted king of this line was Lalitāditya-Muktāpiḍa, who successfully fought against Yaśovarman (IV. 134). It was after this war that he created, for the better management of his vast dominion, a few high offices, which were filled up mostly by the Saḥis and other princes (IV. 143). He brought under his control a large portion of Northern India as also his neighbouring tribes, the Tukhāras, Bhauṭtas and Daradas (IV. 166 ff.; cf. I. 312). The king showed his highest veneration to Viṣṇu and then to Śiva and lastly to Buddha. He built Viṣṇu and Śiva temples and also Buddhist vihāras and stūpas (IV. 188, 201-3). He erected the "ever-rich Rājavihitra with a Catuḥsālā (refectory), a large Caitya and placed in it a large image of Buddha" (IV. 200). In one of these vihāras lived Bhikṣu Sarvajñamitra, author of the Sragdhariastotra. The king was a nephew of the king of Kashmir. His chief minister was Caṅkuna, who put up two vihāras, one of which was very lofty and contained golden images of Buddha (IV. 211, 215). His son-in-law Iśānacandra, a physician, built also a vihāra (IV. 216). Caṅkuna was known as a Tantrik Buddhist for the acquisition of some magical powers, by which he charmed the king. At the king's request, he imparted the charms to him and took in turn the image of Buddha, which had been brought by Lalitāditya from Magadha. Both Kalhaṇa and Ou K'ong testify to its existence.

Jayāpiḍa

One of the notable kings of this line was Jayāpiḍa. Kalhaṇa records that he owed the throne to a Caṅḍāla called Śrīdeva,

1. Rajat., IV. 262; Stein I, p. 144n.
2. Stein (II, pp.302-03) has traced some remains of this vihāra at Paraspur. The image was spared by King Harṣa. See infra.
who killed the usurper Jajjā (IV. 475) and remained always guarded by the fierce Caṇḍālas (IV. 516), specially at night. He bore an antipathy to the Brāhmaṇas, whom he treated very harshly (IV. 640 ff.). He loved learning and assembled learned men in his Court (IV. 848-9). He worshipped both Viṣṇu and Buddha, and set up Viṣṇu temples, Buddha images and a large vihāra (IV. 484, 507-8) in his capital Jayapura. Very probably it was during his reign that Sañtiprabha lived in Kashmir along with his disciples Puṇyakīrti, Dānaśīla, Viśeṣāmitra, Prajñāvarman and Ācārya Śūra.¹

**AVANTIVARMAN (855 A.D.)**

Jayāpiḍa was followed by Avantivarman, who along with his ministers showed veneration to Viṣṇu and Śiva. Like Jayāpiḍa, he patronised learning, and prohibited the killing of living beings (V.64). During his reign Bhāṭṭa Kallāṭa and other Siddhas appeared in the country (V.66). This seems to indicate that about this time Tantric Buddhism made some headway in Kashmir. The king was a devotee of Viṣṇu, a fact disclosed to his minister Śūra only at the time of his death (IV. 124-5).

**ŚAṆKARAVARMAN AND PĀRTHA**

Avantivarman’s son, Śaṅkaravarman, was a Śiva-worshipper. He was miserly and exacted too many taxes from the people. He was uncharitable to the learned and used to speak Apabhramśa and not Sanskrit. His queen Sugandhā, who ruled for two years, was a devotee of Viṣṇu but had to spend her last days in a Buddhist convent called Niśpālaka-vihāra (V.262). Another king of this line called Pārtha was dethroned through ministerial intrigues and took shelter in the Jayendra-vihāra, where the inmates of the monastery supplied him and his queens with food (V. 428). It was about this time that the Brāhmaṇas regained their ascendancy and were able to place on the throne a king of their own choice, viz., Yaśaskara, who was, however, not of royal descent.

¹. Schiefner, p. 204; Bu-ston II, p. 161.
Yaśasakara (939-948) and Kṣemagupta (950-958)

Yaśasakara's rule was marked by an effective administration of justice and equal treatment to the high and low without any discrimination of caste and creed.

Kṣemagupta, one of his successors, burnt down the Jayendra-vihāra (see above) and took the brass of the images of Buddha, and utilised the stores of the Vihāra for erecting a Śiva temple. He appropriated also the 32 villages, which belonged to the vihāra (VI. 172-3, 175).

Sāṃgrāmarāja (1003-1028) and His Successors

By the marriage of Kṣemagupta to Diddā, the Sāhi's granddaughter, the Sāhi princess, since the reign of Lalitāditya Muktāpiḍa, became more influential in the Kashmir court.

Towards the end of her life, Diddā was able to place her nephew Sāṃgrāmarāja on the throne of Kashmir. Sāṃgrāmarāja sent a large army to help Sāhi Trilocanapāla (VII. 47-48) but to no effect, as the Sāhis were completely routed by the Turuṣkas under Hammira. From now on the Sāhi princes took shelter in the Kashmir court and acquired great influence during the reign of Ananta, the grandson of Sāṃgrāmarāja (VII. 146 f.). One of the Sāhi refugees was Rudrapāla, who became the right-hand man of king Ananta. He fought against the Daradas and defeated them (VII. 175, 375). At this time an epidemic carried away Rudrapāla and many of the Sāhi princes (VII. 178). After Ananta, his son Kalāśa came to the throne. He also had four princes of the Sāhi family as his best companions1 (VII. 274), of whom Vijja was the most trusted and favoured. Towards the end of his life, he destroyed the copper-image of Śūrya and appropriated without fear the brass images of the viharas (VII. 696).

Hārṣa (1089-1101)

Kalāśa's son was Utkarṣa, who was followed by his son Hārṣa, a highly gifted prince and a master of all branches of learning (VII. 610). He is called by Kalhaṇa a Turuṣka and

1. Vijja described himself as a Rājaputra, (VII. 325. 836.)
is said to have supported the Turuška merceneries (VII. 1095, 1149). Being a Turuška he was a mleccha\(^1\) by faith, as otherwise he could not have destroyed the Hindu and Buddhist temples. Kalhaṇa writes that “divine images of gold, silver and other materials rolled about even on the street, which were covered with night-soil” (VII. 1093). He spared from spoliation only the temple of Raṇasvāmin and Mārtanda and spared the two colossal statues of Buddha, one of which was at Parihāsapura built by king Lalitāditya and the other at Srinagar, known as the Brhad-buddha at the request of his favourite singer, Kaṇaka and the śramaṇa Kuśalāśrī (VII. 1095-98). Tāranātha\(^2\) records that during his reign three distinguished teachers of Buddhism, viz., Sākyamati, Śilabhadra and Yaśomitra lived in Kashmir. Yaśomitra was a king’s son and is well-known by his ātek\(^3\) on Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakosabhāṣya. The Kashmirian Harṣa was a debauch and a cruel and greedy king, and his reign, as Kalhaṇa reports, was marked by unjust exactions, and attempts at conquest of the neighbouring tribes. Vijayamalla, his chief adviser, rebelled against him and joined the Daradas, who were then ruled by Vidyādhara Sāhi, but his attempts to humiliate Harṣa were of no avail (VII. 911).

**Jayasimha (1128-1149)**

King Harṣa was succeeded by Uccala, a descendant of Kāṃṭirāja, another brother of Diddā, the Sāhi princess. Jayamati, queen of Uccala, built two monasteries, one of which was in honour of her sister Sullā (VIII. 247-8). This, it is said, was completed by king Jayasimha (VIII. 3318), the illustrious ruler, who succeeded Uccala. King Jayasimha patronised literary men and there was once more a revival of learning in Kashmir. He looked after the Mathas and Viharas, the first of which that attracted his attention was the one built by his queen Ratnadevi (VIII. 2402, 2433). His chief minister

1. See Stein, I, p. 353 n. Tāranātha (p.128) speaks of one Śrīharṣadeva, as having propagated mleccha faith but he was of an earlier date, being a contemporary of Dignāga.


3. Edited by Prof. Wogihara of Japan.
Rilhaṇa was also very pious. He showed his veneration to both Śiva and Buddha, and erected a monastery in memory of his deceased wife Sussalā (VIII. 2410-1). Sussalā must have been a great devotee of Buddha, as she erected, on the site of the famous Caṅkuna-Vihāra, which had been destroyed. It had a magnificent establishment for the Buddhist monks (VIII. 2427). Cintā, wife of Jayasirṇa’s commander Udaya, adorned the bank of the Vitastā by a monastery consisting of five buildings (VII. 3352-3), and Dhanya, one of the ministers, commenced the construction of a vihāra in honour of his late wife (VIII. 3343-4). Evidently, therefore, the reigning period of Jayasirṇa marked a revival of the Buddhist faith in Kashmir.

THE SAHIS OF KASHMIR

One of the Gilgit manuscripts mentions in the colophon the name of Śrideva Sāhi Surendra Vikramādiya Nanda, and the spot of this ms. find is in the Dard country, where the Sāhis later on found their asylum. Dr. H. C. Ray has dealt exhaustively with the history of the Sāhis of Afghanistan and the Punjab, and has furnished us with a list of coins, bearing the names of the rulers. It will be observed that “Śrideva” formed a part of all these names. It seems that the title “Vikramādiya” occurring in the manuscript got currency in Kashmir since the reign of Pratāpādiya, who was a nephew of Vikramādiya.

Prof. Sylvain Lévi thinks that “the Turk dynasty of Kipin is identical with Al-birūnī’s Shahiyas of Kabul and Kalhaṇa’s Sāhi dynasty. The Sāhi princes, according to the testimony of Al-birūnī, were Turks of Tibetan origin and were zealous followers of Buddhism. The Buddhist dynasty of Sāhis continued without interruption up to the ninth century, when they were replaced by a Brāhmanic dynasty, bearing the same title, and which dynasty existed up to the 11th century.”

Kalhaṇa furnishes us with the following account of the career of the Sāhis in Kashmir:

1. See Bhaiṣajyagurusūtra, edited by the present author, p. 32.
3. *JA.*, 1895, p. 381.
4. See *Al-birūnī* (Sachau), II, pp. 10 ff.
During the reign of Śaṅkaravarman, took place the appearance of Lalliya Sāhi, who ruled over the region between the Daradas and the Turuṣkās, and located his capital at Udabhāṇḍapura (IV. 152-5). During the reign of Śaṅkaravarman’s son Gopālavaranman, the minister Prabhākaradeva, proficient in the Kākhordā1 witchcraft, carried on expeditions against the Sāhis of Udabhāṇḍapura but later on he bestowed the same on Lalliya’s son Toramāna (V. 233). The Tantrin soldiers and Dombas came into prominence about this time (936-37 A.D.). The Sāhi’s grand-daughter, Diddā, was married to king Kṣemagupta. She became afterwards the queen regent, and during her regime, her commander-in-chief Yasodhara led an expedition against the Sāhi ruler Ė̄̄akkana and captured him (VI. 230-1). Towards the end of her life Diddā made some pious foundations, one of which was a Vihāra with a large Catūḥṣālā meant for use by the Kashmirians and the Daiśikas. She was succeeded by her brother’s son Saṅgrāmarāja on the throne of Kashmir (1003-1028 A.D.). Kalhana tells us that it was during the reign of Saṅgrāmarāja that the Sāhi kingdom of Trilocanapāla was destroyed by the Turuṣkās under Hammira (VII. 669), and it was brought to an end during the reign of the following king Ananta (1028-1063). During the reign of Harṣa, one of his ministers incited Vidyādhara Sāhi, the ruler of Dards, to fight against Harṣa.

The Sāhis had their first seat on the west and south of the Dard country, and then with the disappearance of their independence they were scattered, some Sāhi princes taking to service under the kings in the Kashmir court and some preferring to lead independent lives in the mountainous regions of north Kashmir. The entry of the Sāhi princes into Kashmir court commenced in the reign of Lalitāditya Muktāpīda, who for the first time brought under his rule the Tukhāras, Daradas and Bhauṭtas (see above). Thenceforward, the Sāhi princes, by marriage alliances or otherwise, became closely connected with the Kashmir royalties. Diddā, the Sāhi princess managed to place on the throne of Kashmir her nephew Saṅgrāmarāja, who was followed by his sons and grandsons. Some of the

1. See Bhaisajyagurusūtra (Gilgit Mss.) pp. 13, 20.
kings of this line had Sâhi princes as their ministers, who wielded great influence over the king and the country. Stein\(^1\) infers from the Lahore Ms. of the *Rājatarangini* that ‘Sâhi’ was the title of the Dard rulers, and these account for the name, Vidyādhara Sâhi, the ruler of the Dards, during the reign of Harṣa. From the above account of the Sâhis, it is apparent that the Sâhi princes lost their independent rulership over the region round about Udabhâṇḍapura but wielded a great influence on the administration of the Kashmir State. About the 10th or 11th century, some Sâhi princes managed to create small independent States for themselves in the mountainous regions of Citral, Yasin, Gilgit, etc., generally known as the country of the Dards.

**Testimony of the Chinese Pilgrims**

Some of the Buddhist edifices mentioned by Kalhaṇa were noticed by Yuan Chwang and Ou K'ong.\(^2\) Yuan Chwang on his way to Kashmir passed through Hushkara-Vihāra (mod. Uskur, near Baramula) and stayed for one night at the Jayendra-vihāra, built during the reign of Pravarasena.\(^3\) He noticed four Aśokan topes, each containing relics of Buddha's body. He saw 100 monasteries, but the religion followed in these, he remarks, was mixed, hinting thereby that the people worshipped both Buddha and Śiva. He remained for two years in the king's palace, where scores of clerks were engaged by the king to copy for him the Buddhist scriptures under the supervision of Yaśa.\(^1\) Very likely these are the copies, which formed the basis of the Chinese Tripiṭaka of the 6th or 7th century.

The next Chinese traveller of some importance to visit Kashmir was Ou K'ong, who was also known as Dharmadhātu. He came to Kipin in 759 A.D. through the Kabul valley and Gandhâra. He lived in Kashmir for four years and studied Sanskrit, as well as the Vinaya texts in seven sections from three teachers. In the convent of Moung-ti or Muṇḍī-Vihāra,

1. See his note in p, 339.
3. See above.
he learnt the Silas and studied the Vinaya Piṭaka of the Mūlasarvāstivādins. He refers to the following seven other Buddhist establishments besides the Mound-ti-vihāra:

1. Amitābhavana 
2. Anāgā or Ānandabhavana 
3. Ki-tcho 
4. Nao-ye-le 
5. Je-je 
6. Ye-li-t’e-le 
7. K’o-toen

He noticed more than 300 monasteries in the kingdom and a large number of stūpas and images. After four years’ stay, he went to Gandhāra and resided in the monastery of Jou-lo-li—a monastery carrying the name of the king, its founder, belonging to the line of Kanishka.

**Archaeological Survey and Explorations**

In 1908 Sten Konow was deputed by the Government of India to search for inscriptions and objects of archaeological interest in Kashmir. In course of his survey, he noticed at the village Uskur (Hushkapura) the ruins of a stūpa about 400 yards to the west of the village and took it to be the one referred to by Ou K’ong as Mound-ti Vihāra. He expected that the other two places, Zukur and Kanaspur, if excavated, would bring to light similar ruins. He noticed at Khādaniyār the ruins of the monastery built by queen Khādana (see above) and discovered a stone inscription in a Brahmin’s house at Āñgom (Hāḍigrāma). It is written in Śāradā characters in Sanskrit and its translation runs thus:

“Salutation to the exalted noble Avalokiteśvara. Salutation to thee, the Lord of the world, who has become a light to the three worlds, who putest an end to transmigration, who art a moon of delight to the world.”

“Formerly a Vaidya Ulhaṇadeva by name made a spotless shrine of wood, an abode for the Lord of the world in the vicinity of the Gaṇgeśvara temple. After these had been burnt by king Siṃha through the will of fate, Rāmadeva, son of Kulladeva, who was devoted to him (i.e., Avalokiteśvara) made

2. See his Notes on a Tour in Kashmir, 1908, p, 27; ASR., 1915-16, p. 50. In the beginning of the 8th century a stūpa and a vihāra were built here by Lalitāditya Muktāpiḍa (Kalhaṇa, iv, 180).
yonder shrine excellent with burnt bricks. Anno 73, the 5th day of the bright half of Mārgaśīrṣa."

In this inscription Prof. Sten Konow traced the reference made by Kalhaṭa to the burning of Hāḍigrāma in the region of Jayasimha (VIII. 1586). He read the date as 4273 corresponding to the 16th November 1197. Before his survey Paṇḍit Kasi Ram also had traced some ruins of temples in this village (Stein, I, p. 50 n.).

In the *Archaeological Survey Reports of 1915-16*, Rai Bahadur Daya Ram Sahni published an account of the explorations carried on by him. He discovered Buddhist monuments at Parihāsapura, Purāṇādiṣṭhāna (mod. Pandrethan) and Hushkapura, while Prof. Vogel found remains of a Buddhist stūpa near a village called Malangpura, three miles south-west of Avantipura.

Paṇḍit R. C. Kak, while in charge of the archaeological department of Kashmir, collected several images of Buddha, Bodhisattvas, Buddhist gods and goddesses, fragments of stūpas and railings, and several earthen jars and pots, some of the large sized jars bearing inscriptions in early Gupta characters. But his greatest discovery was the ruins at Harwan (Ṣaḍhrad-ṭana), said to have been once the seat of Nāgarjuna. In Paṇḍit Kak’s work, the *Ancient Monuments of Kashmir*, he furnished us with an account of the sculptures, architectural style, artistic values of the finds, of which the following were Buddhistic:

(i) the temple at Pandrethan, the old capital founded by Aśoka and referred to by Kalhaṭa as Śrīnagarī (pp. 114-16);
(ii) the stūpa of the mediaeval period at Malangpura, first noticed by Prof. Vogel, on which the remnants of sculptured reliefs depicted “a furious monster pursuing a man who is flying precipitately before it” (p. 125);
(iii) the stūpa, monastery and caitya at Parihāsapura, the erection of which is attributed to Lalitāditya and his minister Caṅkuna. From the coins discovered in the monastery, it is apparent that it existed up to the time of the king Vinayāditya Vigrāha and Durlabha (pp. 146-48);
(iv) the stūpa at Uskur, the erection of which is attributed to Huvishka (2nd century A.D.), on the ruins of
which, a second stūpa was built by Lalitāditya in the middle of the 8th century A.D. (pp. 152-54); and

(v) the monastery and stūpa at Śaḍhradavāna (mod. Harwan). Here Paṇḍit R.C. Kak discovered a stūpa, bases of chapels and a flight of steps connecting the stūpa and the chapels, and a large number of brick-tiles. The remarkable feature of the tiles is that they are prepared with a view to present Jātaka scenes or certain scenes from Buddha’s life, the other motifs being designs of flowers, aquatic plants, flying geese, girls, musicians, etc. The tiles are numbered in Kharoṣṭhi figures, the use of the Kharoṣṭhi script showed that the buildings were erected before the 5th century A.D. when the Kharoṣṭhi characters ceased to be in use (pp. 109 ff.)

The latest and epoch-making archaeological discovery in Kashmir is the find of several manuscripts deposited in a stūpa at Gilgit, the country of the Dards and the seat of the later Śahi rulers, the name of the ruler being very likely Śrīdeva Śahi Surendra Vikramaditya Nanda, whose queens were Śamīdevi, Trailokyadevi and Vihali. One of the mss. was the gift of this king while there were several others given away by the local devotees like Śulkhina, Śulivarja, Maṁtoṭi, Maṅgalaśūra, Ārya Devendrabhūta. The scribe of the king’s ms. was Ārya Sthirabuddhi and the collaborator Narendra Datta.

The discovery of the mss. was first announced by Sir Aurel Stein in the Statesman on the 24th July 1931. He reported that some “boys watching flocks above Naupur village, about two miles west of Gilgit Cantonment, are said to have cleared a piece of timber sticking out on the top of a small stone-covered mound. Further digging laid bare a circular chamber within the ruins of a Buddhist stūpa filled with hundreds of small votive stūpas and relief plaques common in Central Asia and Tibet.”

“In course of the excavation, a great mass of ancient manuscripts came to light closely packed in what appeared to have been a wooden box.” “The palaeographic indications of some of the mss. suggest that they might date back to the sixth century A.D.”
M. Hackin also paid a visit to the spot and furnished us with the following information (Journal Asiatique, 1932, pp. 14-15):

"The place of discovery is situated about 3 miles to the north of Gilgit in the mountainous region. There are four stūpas with square basements placed side by side.

The hemispherical domes of the stūpas A and B are well preserved and it is the third stūpa C which has yielded the mss. This stūpa C has double basements, the lower of which measures 6 metres 60 cm. on each side and the next receding to about 60 cm. on all the four sides. The height of this stūpa is 12 to 15 metres. The diameter of the chamber containing the mss. is 2 metres 40 cm. In the centre of the chamber there were the five wooden boxes, the fifth containing the other four in which were kept all the mss."

In 1938, Panḍit Madhusadan Kaul was deputed by the Kashmir Government to carry on further excavations at the site but he could not discover anything of importance in stūpa A, B and C but he found 3 or 4 more mss. in stūpa C.

The script used in the mss. is mostly Upright Gupta of a date little later than those used in the manuscript-remains found in Eastern Turkestan1 and similar to the script found in the Bower mss.2 The script of the Bower mss. is assigned to the 6th century A.D., and so the Gilgit mss. may also be dated in the 6th or at the latest in the 7th century A.D. This date takes us to the reign of kings preceding Lalitāditya, who ruled about the middle of the 8th century. The Sāhis were then ruling over the region round about Udabhāṇḍapura up to Gilgit and were occasionally coming into conflict with the Kashmir kings, ultimately succumbing to Lalitāditya in the middle of the eighth century. One would be tempted to identify the king mentioned in our ms. with a son of Vikramāditya, son of Raṇāditya. According to Kalhaṇa, Vikramāditya was succeeded by his brother, Bālāditya; so it may be suggested that 'Vikramāditya Nanda' of the ms. was related to Vikramāditya and his name was 'Surendra' and his title 'Śrīdeva

1. Edited by A. F. R. Hoernle.
2. See Hoernle’s Intro. to the Bower Ms., chap. III.
Sāhi'. This prince probably ruled over the Dard country during the reign of king Bālāditya in Kashmir.

It will be observed that the kings, queens and ministers of Kashmir commencing from Meghavāhana patronised Buddhism more than any other faith, and a large number of Vihāras was built at this time. After a short period, the Chinese travellers visited the country. The mss. copied for Yuan Chwang were, therefore, of the same time as our mss. and it is noteworthy that the Gupta scripts\(^1\) preserved by the Chinese for transcribing the Sanskrit *mantras* in their Chinese translation\(^1\) are similar to those found in the Gilgit mss.

**Résumé**

In the survey of the traditional history of Buddhism in Kashmir as given above, there may be chronological errors, or exaggerations of exploits, but the fact remains that from the time of Aśoka, the Buddhist monks penetrated into the valleys of Kashmir and found there a place where they could carry on their missionary activities successfully. It will be observed that the evangelical spirit of the Buddhist monks was a vital factor in the spread of Buddhism. They generally selected, as their fields of activities, those places where cultured religious beliefs had not yet secured a firm footing. Kashmir, therefore, along with its neighbouring regions, offered in those early days a fruitful field to the Buddhist missionaries backed, as they were, by Emperor Aśoka. The original inhabitants of Kashmir were designated by the term ‘Nāgas’ who were mainly believers in serpent worship — a belief popular in those days almost all over India, including Ceylon. Trade and colonization by the Indian population must have followed the footsteps of the hardy and self-sacrificing monks. This is indicated in the story that many lay-devotees went to Kashmir from Benares, and that the wealth of the country was increased by the cultivation of saffron at the instance of Madhyāntika.

1. Vide the scripts (block prints) in the Taisho edition of the Chinese *Tripitaka*.
Kashmir offered good opportunities for study and culture and consequently for the growth of Buddhist monasteries as centres of learning. The Sūtra and Vinaya Piṭakas did no doubt take shape in Magadha in pre-Asokan days, but the development of the Abhidharma Piṭaka must be delegated to a post-Asokan date and to regions outside Magadha. Kashmir appears to have been the earliest centre where this supplement to the sūtra Piṭaka emerged; it is for this reason that the Kashmirian Buddhist monks were referred to mostly as Ābhīdharmikas. The Vibhāṣā-śāstras might have been expository commentaries in a general form, but it must be admitted that these texts dealt more with Abhidharma topics than with comments on the Sūtras. The Abhidharma texts of the Sarvāstivādins, a gist of which has come down to us in the masterly treatise of Vasubandhu, the Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya and its tīkā written by a Kashmirian prince, Yaśomitra, reveal what a large amount of contributions of a subtle character had been made to the Indian stock of knowledge relating to the analysis of mental states of a Yogi. The appearance of the Ātmaka theorists, the Vātsiputriyas, is also associated with Kashmir, showing thereby the large amount of latitude allowed by the country for philosophical discussions and expressions of new thoughts. Still more remarkable is the harmonious existence of Buddhism and Śivaism side by side without acrimonies and persecution. These existed together in many outlands, and their existence in Kashmir is another such instance. The kings themselves showed their veneration to Śiva, Buddha and even Viṣṇu altogether by erecting temples dedicated to the three deities, and even allowing their queens and ministers perfect freedom in the expression of their veneration to any one of the three deities. One king might have had more than one queen or minister, belonging to different nationalities, professing different faiths; and it was not unoften the case that the kings acceded to the wishes of their queens and ministers of different religious leanings by endowing temples for all the three prevailing faiths. It is evident from traditional history sketched above that from the time of Aśoka up till the 12th century, Buddhism existed side by side with Śivaism and Viṣṇuism and enjoyed glorious periods at intervals. The credit
of Kashmir lies not only in its being a cultural centre for Buddhistic studies but also in being a centre for the dissemination of Buddhist and Hindu cultures in countries abroad. In ancient days Gandhâra and Kashmir were treated as one country and so it cannot be said how far one or the other country was responsible for the spread of Indian culture. But in the post-Kushân period, Kashmir had a direct communication with Tukhâra, Khotan and Tibet, and therefore, much of the Indian culture and religion propagated in those countries was due to the pandits of Kashmir.

The Kushân rule was followed by an onslaught on the Buddhists by Mihirakula, which was partially recompensed by his son Baka. The career of Buddhism in Kashmir was not very happy till the reign of Meghavâhana. From his time it enjoyed a glorious period till the time of Jayâpiḍâ. In Avantivarman's time (855 A.D.) the Brâhmanic faith became ascendant, putting into shade the Buddhist religion up to the reign of Kṣemagupta, who burnt Buddhist vihâras and utilised the brass of the Buddha-images for other purposes. From now on till the 11th century, the Buddhists fell on evil days and all the kings were anti-Buddhistic in spirit. The last of them was Harâ (1089 A.D.) who cherished the mleccha faith, and destroyed the Hindu and Buddhist temples. In the reign of Jayâsimha, there was a revival of Buddhism under the patronage of Jayamati, queen of Uccala. The Turki Sâhîs, according to Al-birûnî, professed the Buddhist faith and were in power up to the 9th century. Their successors, the Brahmanic Sâhîs supported Sivaism and had little regard for Buddhism.

Thus, it is apparent that Buddhism passed through good and evil days from the reign of Aśoka up to the 12th century. It did enjoy glorious periods at intervals, when several stûpas and vihâras were erected for them. To the existence of these monuments the Chinese travellers bear eloquent testimony. The archaeological explorations unfortunately have not yet been carried on extensively, but it may safely be surmised that such explorations, if carried on, will reveal the ruins of many a stûpa and vihâra referred to by Kalhana.
MAHĀYĀNIC TRACES IN THE NIKĀYAS

Though Mahāyāna Buddhism appeared as a new phase of the religion about the 2nd or 1st century B.C., along with a vast literature on the subject, it may be stated that in the Nikāyas, dated about 487 B.C. and compiled from Buddha’s discourses in the First Buddhist Council, there are however definite traces that Bhagvān Buddha had at the back of his mind the philosophical outlook of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Prof. Keith¹ and later Prof. Venkataraman² and Bhikkhu Jñānānanda³ have drawn our attention to this fact. Let us take into consideration a few of such sayings:

In the *Mūlapariyāyā-sutta*⁴ (i.e. the basic discourse on Buddhism) it is stated that a person regards earth as earth and establishes a relation with it, e.g., in earth, from earth, my earth etc. In the same way, he does with the other four elements (*mahābhūtas*),⁵ the various gods as gods, the different kinds of meditation as meditation and establishes a relation with them as indicated above. Even an Arhat regards Nibbāna as Nibbāna and thinks that he has attained Nibbāna. Bhagavān Buddha or the Tathāgata, however, knows earth etc. but does not establish a relation with them (pathavirīpa, pathavirīpa, na maññati, etc.) because the Tathāgata is free from all ideas or conceptions while an Arhat is not, hence, this is the difference that exists between an Arahant and a Tathāgata. In other words, earth, water, meditation etc. are merely worldly phenomena.

1. *Buddhist Philosophy* (1950)
5. Scientifically earth, water, fire and air can never be separated, earth has watery element and heat; likewise water has earth element and heat and so on. At the present state of science, an element is a conglomeration of atom-sorions, hence it is also a composite. Bhagavān Buddha, being omniscient, realised this fact.
with a fleeting existence and do not exist in unchangeable reality.

In the Alagaddupamāsutta (=Water-snake simile)¹ Buddha taught that all dhammas (=religious practices), the various śāstras (navāngam satthuśasanam); even all meditational practices of a bhikkhu are mere aids like a raft with the help of which as well as by physical exertion, a person crosses the stream and after reaching the other shore, throws away the raft. Likewise, a bhikkhu, by means of several ethical and meditational practices, becomes a sotāpanna, etc. and after reaching those stages² throws away the various practices and strives to attain the highest knowledge, i.e., becomes sambodhiparāyana, i.e. he gets rid of his notions, good or bad, and then becomes destined to attain sambodhi, which is beyond all conceptions(kalpanābahir-bhūta).

In the Aggi-vacchagotta sutta³ Bhagavān Buddha does not give answer to Vacchagotta paribbajaka’s questions: sassata loka or asassata loka, i.e. the world is eternal or non-eternal; antavān or ananta loka (limited or limitless world) and so forth. Buddha then explained it by a simile: Take, for instance, a fire burning off a faggot, when the faggot is exhausted and the fire is extinguished, where does the fire go. Likewise, the Tathāgata is composed of saṃkhāras (constituents of a worldly being) and when the saṃkhāras are eschewed by him, he disappears in the unknown, unknowable, unfathomable (ananuvėjjo), i.e. infinity.

Prof. Keith⁴ writes that all the world of appearance is summed up by Buddha in the term pañca upādānakkhandhā or in one word saṃkhāras—ideas and presentations, to which Buddha attached only physical value.

In the Kevaddha sutta (Digha Nikāya, i. 222f.) it is stated that all the elements (mahābhūtas), and mind or name and form (nāmarūpa) are comprehended by an Arahat with the help of the law of causation (paṭicca-samuppāda) that they are subs-

1.  M. N. i. Sutta No. 22  
2.  M. N. i. Sutta No. 72  
4.  Buddhist philosophy, p. 47
tanceless, \((\text{sabbe dhammā anattā})^1\) as this is essential for attaining Nibbāna. The highest meditation \((\text{samāpatti})\) named Akiṅcān-ñāyatana,\(^2\) which means the complete absence of kīcchānas (impurities), which are counted as three, viz., attachment, hatred and delusion \((\text{rāga, dvesa, moha})\); when counted as seven the additional four are I-ness or Mine-ness \((\text{māna})\), wrong views \((\text{diṭṭhi})\), mental and physical impurities \((\text{kilesas})\), and misconduct \((\text{duccarita})\). An Arhat is \text{khiṃsavo, khiṃ-samsāro} \text{ (free from impurities and free from repeated existences)}.

In the \text{Majjhima Nikāya} (i. 141-2) it appears that those, who are in the first stage of \text{sanctification} \((\text{sotāpannā})\) have no chance of retrogression from that stage and they are destined to attain the highest \text{emancipation} \((\text{sambodhi})^3\). Further, those who are faithful followers of the Dhamma are also destined to attain sambodhi.

In the \text{Majjhima Nikāya} (i. 235) it is stated that those who have attained mental freedom \((\text{vimuttacittā})\) and the excellent object \((\text{sadattho})\) and perfect knowledge \((\text{samma-dānā-vimutto})\) may by the highest exertion of insight \((\text{anuttariya-dassanena})\) and highest path \((\text{anuttariyena pariṇāpada})\) and devote themselves to the worship of the Tathāgata and develop belief in Him as the Teacher of the highest truth are, also destined to attain sambodhi.

In the \text{Majjhima Nikāya} (i. 140), it is stated that all the gods \((\text{devā})\), viz., Indra, Brahmā, Prajāpati etc. will not be able to trace the mind \((\text{vikñāna})\) of the Tathāgata as it is unknowable \((\text{ananuvejā})\), unfathomable.

In the \text{Sān̄yutta Nikāya} (III. p. 142) there are also many other passages referring to the Tathāgata. Now let us take up the other Mahāyānic terms, \text{suññatā} \text{ (voidness, devoid of all attributes), animitta} \text{ (devoid of characteristics) and appanihita} \text{ (absence of desire for worldly objects)}, which are also non-existent. These terms occur in the \text{Dīgha Nikāya} (III. 219; cf. \text{Majjhima Nikāya} III. 104. 109, — \text{Suññatāsuṣṭa}).

1. M. N. I p. 299
2. Cf. \text{Dhammapada} 421: \text{Suttanipāta} 643: \text{aksiṃcanam anādānam tam aham frūmi Brahmān}.
3. \text{Sabbe te sotāpannā avinipātadhammā niyata sambodhiparāyanā}. 
In the *Samyutta* (II. 267) and *Anguttara* (I. 112) *Nikayas* occur the statement that the Suttantas delivered by the Tathāgata are deep, supramundane and closely connected with *sunnata*.\(^1\)

In the *Samyutta Nikāya* (III, pp. 140-2) while giving a discourse on the nature of the unconstituted (*asaṃkhala*) Bhagavā gave the following illustrations:

(i) The Ganges, a large river, carries on the surface of its water mass of foam, which is useless and insubstantial.

(ii) Likewise the bubbles seen on the earth during the autumnal rains are equally useless and insubstantial.

Like the foam and bubbles are the material constituents viz., matter (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*sāññā*), impressions (*asaṃkhāra*) and consciousness (*viññāna*).

A wise person, after eradicating from his mind clinging, hatred and delusion (*rāga, dvesa, moha*), then by practising the lower and higher meditations (*jhānas, samāpattis*) of voidness (*sunnatā*), signlessness (*animittta*) and unaspiration (*apanihita*) in short, all that is needed, he can realise the unconstituted.

The closing stanza of this section runs thus:

\[
\text{Dasabala-sela-pabhavā nibbāna-mahāsamudrā-pariyantā,} \\
\text{Aṭṭhaṅgā-magga-saliḻā Jīnavacana-nādi ciraṃ vahati.}
\]

(Transl. Issuing out of the mountain of ten powers (Buddha), water of eightfold path flows for ever up to the Nibbāna-ocean).

In another passage of the same *Nikāya* (III. p. 120) appear the following words:

\[
\text{Dhammaṃ hi passato maṅ passati. Maṅ passato dhammaṃ passati.} \\
\]

(Transl. He who realises my teaching visualizes me, and he who visualizes me realises my teaching.)

These instances distinctly show that there were Mahāyānic traces in the *Nikāyas*.

In the *Samyutta Nikāya* (II, p. 17; MKV., p. 269) : Kaccāyana-gottasutta, Bhagavā said to Kaccāyana, in reply to his enquiry "What is sammādiṭṭhi=right view, that there are two extreme views, of which one considering from the stand-point of the origin of the world (*loka-samudayānti*) upholds the view that the world exists (*atthītā*), and the second, considering from the stand-

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1. *Ye suttantā Tathāgata-bhāsitā gambhirā lokottarā suññatāpaṭisamuyuttā.*
point of the decay of the world (*loka-nirodhā*) upholds the view that the world does not exist (*natṭhitā*).’ The Tathāgata teaches that the two extreme views should be eschewed and the middle view should be accepted (*majjhime Tathāgato deseti*) i.e., neither *atthitā* nor *natṭhitā*.

In the *Milinda-pañha* (p. 420) it is admitted that King Menander became a Hinayāna monk and even attained *arhathood*. He discussed with Nāgasena certain topics relating to Mahāyāna. The topics discussed are:

(i) the conception of Buddha and Bodhisatta.

(ii) the fourfold problem about the existence of the Tathāgata after death and its inexplicability.

(iii) Does Buddha accept worship (*pūjā*)? Is the offering made in the name of the Tathāgata, does he accept the offerings?

Nāgasena replied,

(i) Take for instance, the earth produces corn, the earth does not enjoy it while it is consumed by the people. Likewise, by worshipping Buddha, one gets rid of his attachment, hatred and delusion (*rāga, dvesa, moha*) and attains *sotāpatti* stage of sanctification and subsequently all the *maggas* and *phalas*, i.e. the four stages of sanctification and their fruits. Ultimately he becomes an Arhat, even a Paccekabuddha, and it is not improbable that he will become Bodhisatta like Maitteya and in due course, attain even Buddhahood.

Apart from the scattered instances, as collected above, there is one sutta in the *Majjhima Nikāya* called the *Ariyapariyesaṭṭha sutta* (26), which has almost verbatim similarity with the *Ajñāta-kauṇḍinya Jātaka* of the *Mahāvastu*, an avowed text of the Lokottaravādins, an offshoot of the Mahāsāṅghikas, the precursors of Mahāyānism. By way of illustration, a few common stanzas are presented here:

In the *Ariyapariyesaṭṭha sutta*, Brahmā, lord of the Sahā world (Sahampati) addressed to Bhagavā in these words:

`Prāturahosi Magadhesso pubbe
dhammo asuddho samalehi cintito,
apāpur etam amatassa dvāram
sunantu dhōmmam Vimalenānubuddhaṃ.`

(Formerly in Magadha appeared wrong teachings thought out
by impure persons; open the door to immortality realised by Pure, and let the people listen to it).

While in the Mahāvastu the corresponding stanza is as follows:

Prādurahosi samalehi cintito
dharmo asuddho Magadhesu pūrve,
apāvṛtaṁ te amatasya dvāram
śṛṇantu dharmam Vimalenānubuddhāṁ

Brahmā said further

Uttthehi Vijitasāgāmo
satthagāha anaṇa vicara loke,
desaśsu Bhagava dhammaṁ
aṅṅātāro bhavissanti ti.

(Rise, O Conqueror of the war of miseries, leader of men, free from all impurities, wander forth in this world, O Bhagavā, preach your teaching, there will be persons, who will comprehend it.)

In the Mahāvastu the corresponding stanza is:

Uttthehi Vijitasasamgrāmo
tvam anṛṇam vicara loke,
dēṣeḥi Sugata dharmе
dājñātāro bhavissanti.

Bhagavān Buddha was not close-fisted, i.e. he had no ācāriya-muṭṭhi. He said that he had preached his dhamma absolutely, i.e., without any reserve and without bringing in any extraneous matter (anantaram abāhirām) (M. P. S. in D. N. II, p. 100).

He laid bare the highest truth (paramattha-sacca) as he had realised but his listeners, i.e., the Śrāvakas comprehended his exposition from their own angle of vision. The Theravadins understood it primarily as ethical practices, and secondarily as meditational processes. Nibbāna was the end of the all impurities, and it was their goal.

The Mahāsaṅghikas, however, conceived of Bhagavān Buddha quite differently. They expressed their conception by this stanza:

Sabbābhībhū sabbavidū 'ham asmi,
sabbesu dharmesu anupalitto.
Ahām hi arahā loke, ahām satthā anuttaro,
eko’mihi Sammā Sambuddho sitibhūto’smi nibbuto.

(Ariyapariyesanā Sutta in MN. I, p. 171.)

(Transl. I am the all conqueror. I am omniscient. I am untouched by all worldly objects. I am the Perfect in this world. I am a teacher incomparable; I am the only enlightened, tranquilized and have extinguished everything).¹

Re-Suññata

Suñño loko, suñño loko ti, bhante, vuccati,
Yasmā ca kho, Ānanda, suññamī attena vā attaniyena.

(Sāṁ. Nik., IV, 34).

(Transl. Void is the world, void is the world, people say, O Lord, how does this saying goes? Because the world is void of the self, Ānanda, of what belongs to the self, i.e., unreal.

Suññamī lokam avekhhasu......Mogharāja Maccurāja

Sutta-nipāta 1119.

(Transl. Regard the world as void and ever. The king Death, the false king).

In the Dhammapada (vs. 279), there is the general saying:

Sabbe dhammā dukkhā, aniccā ca anattā.

(= all worldly beings and objects are associated with suffering, impermanence and non-self (i.e. unreal, phenomenal).

Hence, sabbe dhammā anattā tiḍadā paññāya passati,
athā nibbindati dukkhe/esa maggo visuddhiyā.

(Transl. When one realises this fact by knowledge, then only his suffering ceases; this is the way for attaining purity (i.e., perfection).

It should also be noted that Mahāyāna Buddhism was divided into two philosophical schools, viz. Śūnyatāvāda of Nāgarjuna and Vijñānavāda of Asaṅga, and it was later developed into Vijñāpatimātrata-vāda= absolute pure consciousness by Vasubandhu. As śūnyatāvāda has already been dealt with in the previous pages, the following stanzas deal with Vijñānavāda (idealism).

¹ See my Buddhist Sects in India. p. 76.
In the *Digha Nikāya*, (I, p. 223) appears the following stanzas:

Kattha āpo ca paṭhavi tejo vāyo na gādhati?
Kattha dighañ ca rassañ ca anuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ
Kattha nāmañ ca rūpañ ca asesam uparujjhatīti?

Tatra veyyākaraṇaṃ bhavati:
Viṇṇāṇam anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbato pabhaṃ,
Ettha āpo ca paṭhavi tejo vāyo na gādhati,
Ettha dighañ ca rassañ ca anuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ,
Ettha nāmañ ca rūpañ ca asesam uparujjhati.

Idam avoca Bhagava. Attamano Kevaddho gahapati-putto bhāsitam abhinandīti.

[Transl. Where does the water or earth, or fire or air not find a place?
Where does the long or short, minute or coarse, good or evil?
Where do the name and form (i.e., mind and matter) cease totally?
Where does water or earth or fire or air not find a place?
Where does long or short, minute or coarse, good or evil find no place?
Where does the name or form (nāma-rūpa), i.e., mind and matter cease totally?

The exposition of the above is as follows:

"Pure consciousness, i.e., Idealism is signless, infinite and shining like a bright jewel.

In this (pure consciousness) water or earth or fire or air does not exist. Here long or short, minute or coarse, good or evil or name and form cease absolutely (lit. without any remnant).

This was said by Bhagavā and Kevaddha the householder’s son felt satisfied with the answer).
CHAPTER III

THREE MAIN PHASES OF BUDDHISM

Buddhism may broadly be divided into three Yānas (systems), viz., Hinayāna or Śrāvaka-yāna, Mahāyāna or Buddhayāna, of which, Tantrayāna is a later phase.1

Hinayāna is ethical and historical, as it commenced from Buddha’s mahāparinirvāṇa and its scriptures were written in Pāli and later in Sanskrit while the scriptures of Mahāyāna were always in Sanskrit.

The central theme of Hinayāna is the twelve-linked chain of causation (Pratitya-samutpāda = Paticcasamuppāda), perpetual flux (santāna) of mind and matter (nāma-rūpa, consisting of the five elements, viz., rūpa (matter), vedana (feeling), samjñā (perception) and viññāna (consciousness). The adherents of this branch of Buddhism seek individual enlightenment, i.e., arhathood and, at the end of the span of life, Nirvāṇa, i.e., quietude, eternal peace and bliss (santāni sukhanī).2 The aim of Hinayāna is the realisation of the non-existence of soul, i.e. pudgalanairatmya by eradicating mental impurities (kleśavarananām), i.e. mental and physical impurities, while Mahāyāna in contrast seeks both Pudgala-nairatmya as well as Dharmanairatmya, by which they mean that the five elements (skandhas) which is the basis for the conception of Pudgala (soul) do not exist, in other words, all the elements, which compose the worldly objects and beings (i.e. Dharmas) do not exist. For attaining this goal, Mahāyāna prescribes the realisation of both Pudgala-nairatmya and Dharma-nairatmya.

About a century after Buddha’s mahāparinirvāṇa, Hinayāna became split up into eighteen or more sects.3 Each sect had its particular doctrinal views. Of the eighteen sects eleven held

1. S. B. Das Gupta, Introduction to Tantric Buddhism. This branch of the religion was first sub-divided into Paramāta-nāya and Mantra-nāya and then into Vajrayāna, Kālacakrayāna and Sahajiyāyāna.
2. Dhammapada, 203-4; Nibbānāṁ paramāṁ sukhaṁ; vs. 23: Nibbānāṁ yogakkheṇāṁ.
3. For detail see my Buddhist Sects in India.
orthodox views with certain differences. The remaining seven headed by the Mahāsaṅghikas held semi-Mahāyānic views, paving the way for the advent of Mahāyānism. They conceived of Buddha as superhuman and even super-divine. Their Buddha’s *Kāya* conceptions were vague and was in a nascent form. The Sautrāntikas and Harivarman’s *Satyasiddhiśāstra* held views midway between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.

Mahāyāna was again sub-divided into two schools of philosophy known as Śūnyatāvāda, i.e., of the Mādhyamika, of which Nāgārjuna was the main exponent and Vijñānavāda of the Yogācāra, the main exponent of which was Asaṅga, who, it is said, was inspired by Maitreyanātha, a Bodhisattva. The Vijñānavāda was further developed to Vijñaptimātratāvāda by Vasubandhu, younger brother of Asaṅga.

The Mahāyānists contend that Buddha realised the highest truth (*paramārtha-satya*) at the foot of the Bodhi-tree. In many of his discourses embodied in the Nikāyas, he referred to the highest truth but he also realised that it was not possible for all of his disciples, being of different intellectual levels, would comprehend his deepest teaching. He indicated this by a fine simile in the *Ariyapariyesañña-sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*: In a tank there are many lotus flowers, some of which have risen much above the water-level, some reached just the level of the water while there are many lotuses, which remain within water. By this simile he meant that the Bodhisattvas were like the flowers much above the water-level while the Śrāvakas or Hīnayānists were like the lotuses just on the level of water, and the rest which were within water were the common people (*puthujjans* or *prathagjanas*).

Hīnayāna (Hy.) and Mahāyāna (My.) may briefly be compared thus:—

(i). Hy. is ethical and historical, while My. is religious and metaphysical, being a later phase of Buddhism (2nd or 1st century B.C.).

(ii) The Hy. scriptures are recorded in Pāli and later in mixed Sanskrit, while those of Mahāyāna are in pure Sanskrit.

(iii) In Hy. the conception of non-ego *anātman* is that the conglomeration of five elements (skandhas), which are constantly changing (*anitya*) or momentary (*ksanika*).
(iv) In Hy. emancipation (Nirvāṇa) is individualistic but at the same time, it should be noted that it is not annihilation but it is eternal state, peaceful, happy and excellent, while in My. it is the attainment of perfection of knowledge, i.e., Prajñāpāramitā or Buddhahood.

(v) In Hy. Nirvāṇa is attained by eradication of impurities due to ignorance (avidyā), while in My. emancipation is not only by the eradication of impurities due to ignorance but also the eradication of obscuration of the immutable calm, pure and eternal (jñeyāvaraṇa).

(vi) In Hy. its followers are known as Śrāvakas, who seek arhathood, and at the end of life-span, Nirvāṇa, while in My. its followers are known as Bodhisattvas, who are instructed to attain Bodhi-pranidhi-citta and Bodhi-prasthāna-citta, i.e., by the former term it is meant that they are to take the vow that they want to attain Bodhi and ultimately become a Buddha, and by the latter term it is meant that the Bodhisattvas are to start attempts for attaining perfection in the six perfections (pāramitās) and Daśa bhūmis. Their aim should be to realise the highest truth paramārtha-satya), which is vast and of one taste like the ocean, in which all rivers lose their identities.

(vii) In Hy. the laity is mainly supporters of the Saṅgha by making gifts of food, robes and by erecting monasteries for the residence of monks. They are mere listeners to the discourses delivered by the monks and observers of the five precepts and occasionally of the eight precepts temporarily, while in My. the laity is designated as Bodhisattvas, whose duties have been mentioned above.

(viii) According to Hy., Buddhas appear only once in an aeon (kalpa), while, according to My., all beings possess Buddha-nature, technically known as the Tathāgata-garbha (womb of Tathāgatas), which is a mixture of both good and evil, and it is only when the evils of a being are totally eradicated, the particular being becomes a Tathāgata.

2. See infra.
3. The agreements and differences are based on Beatrice Suzuki's Mahāyāna Buddhism.
(ix) In Hy. there is no place for metaphysical conception of Śūnyatā of the Mādhyamikas nor for the conception of Vijñāna-mātra of the Yogācāras. Both the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācāras regard that the worldly beings and objects are transient, momentary (kṣaṇika), and hence they are actually non-existent (śūnya) or absolutely pure consciousness.

It is now proposed to deal with the agreements between Hy. and My. These are:

(i) to get rid of attachment, hatred and delusion (rāga, dveṣa, moha).

(ii) the world has neither beginning (anamataggo ayam samsāro) nor end.

(iii) The four Āryasatyas, viz., duḥkha, samudaya, nirodha and mārga (=suffering, its origin, its decay and the eightfold path leading to its decay.)

(iv) All worldly beings and objects are transient (anitya), momentary (kṣaṇika) and are in a state of perpetual flux (santāna), and are without any real substance (anātmakaṃ).

(v) The law of causation (pratitya-samutpāda) is universally valid. It is thus explained in verse:

Ye dharma hetuprabhāva hetum teśāṃ Tathagataḥ hyavadat,
tēśāṃ yo nirodh’ evaṃ vādi Mahāśramanāḥ.

(Transl. The worldly beings and objects, which arise from a cause, the Tathāgata has explained it and their extinction has also been explained by the Great Ascetic.)

Nāgarjuna in his Mādhyamika Kārikā (pp. 6, 160, 503, 542) has identified the law of causation with the highest truth and its incarnation is Buddha in these words:

“yaḥ pratityasamutpādam paśyati, so dharmaṃ paśyati, yo dharmaṃ paśyati, so Buddhaṃ paśyati.”

(The sense of this passage is that the worldly beings and objects, which arise out of causes, do not exist in reality. One, who realises this unreality of worldly beings and objects, visualizes the Truth, and therefore visualizes the Buddha, the embodiment of truth.)
CHAPTER IV

DASA BHŪMI

PRE-BODHISATTVA STAGE

It has been mentioned above that there were two gotras, one of which was the Ārya-gotra, which included the Bodhisattvas. A Bodhisattva's completion of the six Perfections (pāramitās) is also termed Gotra-bhūmi, in which the aspirant, who had developed Bodhicitta and completed the Pāramitās, was entitled to take up the course of spiritual progress as indicated in the ten Bhūmis,¹ and was therefore qualified to take up the Adhimukti-cāryā, i.e., he could make progress in the ten Bhūmis.

BODHISATTVA'S STAGES OF SPIRITUAL PROGRESS

The ten Bhūmis are briefly as follows:

(i) Pramuditā (Joyous stage) when a Bodhisattva (henceforth abbreviated as Bs.) becomes conscious that he had perfected himself in charity (dāna-pāramitā) as he had realised voidness of self (pudgala-nairātmya) as well as voidness of the worldly beings and objects (dharma-nairātmya).

(ii) Vimalā (Immaculate stage). A Bs. realises that he was free from sin or evil deeds as he had perfected himself in Śīla-pāramitā (perfection in moral precepts) and had accumulated the roots or bases or ten good deeds (kusala-mūlas). His thoughts were also freed from infection or defilement. He practises also meditation (dhyāna) and deep concentration of mind (samādhi).

(iii) Prabhākari (Shining stage or the stage of illumination). The Bs. shined on account of his perfection in forbearance (ksānti-pāramitā) because he had no anger or spirit of vengeance. The Bs. also completed the four trances (dhyānas)

¹. For detailed treatment see the present author's edition of the Bodhisattvabhūmi.
and the four immeasurables (apramāṇas) and acquired the five supernormal knowledge (abhijñā). He had freed himself from attachment, hatred and delusion (rāga, dveṣa, and moha).

(iv) Arcismati (Bright or Radiant stage) on account of his perfection in energy (virya-pāramitā), which helped also his moral and intellectual activities. He applied himself to the acquisition of virtues leading to Bodhi (37 Bodhipakṣiyadharmas) (for enumeration, see Mahāvyutpatti).

(v) Sudurjaya (Hard to win). In this stage, the Bs. practices meditation and deep concentration of mind (dhyāna, samādhi). He develops wisdom (prajñā) and comprehends the four Aryan truths (āryasatyas), and realises the two truths: relative or conventional and real or the highest (sāmīryatī and paramārtha).

(vi) Abhimukhi (Right in front or Turned towards Bodhi). In this stage he comprehends the dependent origination of worldly beings and objects (pratitya-samutpāda). In his mind predominates perfect knowledge (prajñā) on account of his realisation of Śūnyatā (voidness).

(vii) Dūraṅgamā (Far going stage). In this stage (a) the Bs. makes acquisition of compassion (karuṇā), (b) knowledge of the five elements of existence (skandhas), (c) aspiration for Bodhi, (d) immaculate sojourn in existence (e) extreme energy (virya-pāramitā), (f) turns Śrāvaka-yānist to Mahāyāna by upāyakausalya-pāramitā, i. e., expediency, and (g) ultimately leading them to enlightenment.

(viii) Acalā (Immovable stage) marks a definite advance of the aspirant, who now knows where and when he will become a Buddha by the usual prophecy (vyākaraṇa).

(ix) Sadhumati (stage of good thoughts). He perfects himself in the Bala-pāramitā i. e., the ten powers of Buddha (daśabala). The Bs. now possesses perfect wisdom. He now makes necessary preparation for leading all beings to Nirvāṇa.

(x) Dharma-meghā (Cloud of the Law). In this stage the Bs. attains perfection in knowledge (jñāna-pāramitā). The Bs. attains the excellence and pre-eminence of a Buddha. He receives consecration (abhiṣeka) from all Buddhas for Buddhahood. His body of Law (Dharmakāya) is now complete and he
can exhibit the magical transformations. Thus, ends the career of a Bs. in the ten Bhūmis.

It is now proposed to give an account of the Bhūmis along with a comparison with the Hīnayānic spiritual stages of progress.

The difference between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, as we have already stated, centres round the conception of the highest truth, which, according to the Hīnayānists, is Pudgalaśūnyatā only, while, according to the Mahāyānists, it is both Pudgala-and Dharmasūnyatā. This difference is also evident in the various stages of progress chalked out by the two schools. The Hīnayānists recognize four stages called Sotāpatti Sakadāgāmi Anāgāmi and Arahatta and mention specifically the attainments of an adept as he passes from one stage to another, obtaining in the last stage complete knowledge, which, according to them, is Arhathood. The Mahāyānists likewise recognize ten (according to the Bodhisattvabhūmi twelve) stages of progress, through which a Bodhisattva passes in order to have complete emancipation and to become a Buddha.

As the Mahāyānists hold that an insight into dharma-śūnyatā is the only means of attainment of the highest knowledge and that an insight into pudgalaśūnyatā equips an adept for proceeding higher up and realising dharma-śūnyatā, they divide their stages of the progress into two sections. The first, comprising the first bhūmi, leads an adept to the realisation of pudgalaśūnyatā while the second, comprising the last four bhūmis, gives them the real knowledge, Dharmasūnyatā or Dharmasamātā. Thus, the first satisfies the aspiration of the Hīnayānists and hence corresponds to their four stages, while the second lies beyond their reach, as they do not admit Dharmasamātā or Śūnyatā.

Though this is essentially the relative position of the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists with regard to the stages of spiritual process, one must, however, add to it the various other features, which are so often repeated by the Mahāyānists about their chief aim being not so much to attain happiness and emancipation for their own selves as to enable the suffering millions of the world to attain happiness and escape from the miseries of the world, even at the cost of the adepts’ lives
and religious merits. So while detailing the attainments necessary for each bhūmi, the texts point out the progress made by a Bodhisattva in regard to Āsaya, Upadesa, Prayoga, Upastambha and Kāla, as also the Ākāra, Liṅga and Nimitta. If the additional features of the Mahāyānac account of the first six bhūmis be left out, one may reasonably say that the description of the six bhūmis is simply a Sanskritised form of the Pāli passages, which deal with the stages of sanctification. Hence, the real addition of the Mahāyānist is the last four bhūmis, viz., Dūrāṅgamā, Acalā, Sādhumati, and Dharma-meghā.

**Literature on the topic**

Regarding the literature on the subject, we may state that in Pāli there are no works dealing exclusively with the stages of sanctification. The accounts are found scattered in almost all the Pāli canonical works as well as in the few available Sanskrit works of the Sarvāstivādins. Buddhaghosa follows the Hinayānic scheme of spiritual progress in his *Visuddhimagga.* He divides it into three sections, of which the first deals with Śīla (moral precepts), the full observance of which results in the attainment of the first two stages, sotāpatti and sakadāgāmi; the second deals with Citta or Samādhi, which results in the attainment of the third stage Anāgāmi; and the third treats of Pāññā (knowledge), perfection in which leads the adept to the final state, Arahatta or complete emancipation. Vasubandhu has dealt with the stages in various places in his *Abhidharmakośa,* supporting mostly, as we shall see later on, in the accounts of the Pāli works.

In Mahāyāna literature, there are a few treatises, dwelling exclusively with the stages of spiritual progress while there are many, which deal with them incidentally. Of the works treating mainly of the Bhūmis, the most important and at the same time comprehensive treatise is the *Daśabhūmikāśītra,* one of the

2. *Vis. M.* p. 6
3. *Kośa,* VI. 34ff.
4. Edited by Dr. J. Rahder. 1926.
nine recognised scriptural texts of the Nepalese Buddhists. The
next in importance are the Bodhisattvabhūmi¹ and the Madhyamakāvatāra,² both following the Daśabhūmika-sūtra with minor
variations. For works containing an incidental treatment of the
Bhūmis, reference may be made to the Laṅkāvatāra, Śūtrāloka-koṣa
and other similar works. The Prajñāpāramitāśruti (Śatasāhasrikā
and Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā) devote a chapter exclusively to the
treatment of the Bhūmis, though they do not omit to state that
from the standpoint of the highest truth these are devoid of
any reality and are mere matters of convention.³ The Pañcavin-
śati-sāhasrikā again has a peculiar feature of its own. While speak-
ing of the various practices followed by the Bodhisattvas in
connection with their progress in the Prajñāpāramitā, it indicates
many of the attainments by using expressions, which are
current among the Hinayānists, e.g. Kulāṅkula, Ekavijaya, Sotā-
panna.⁴ The Śatasāhasrikā⁵ also gives a list of ten Hinayānic
bhūmis, which are not in use in the Pāli texts. These are Śukla-
vipāyanā (or vidarṣanā)-bhūmi, Gotrabhūmi, Aṣṭamakabhūmi,
Darśanabhūmi, Tanubhūmi, Vitarāgabhūmi, Kṛṣṇābhūmi, Pratyeka-
buddhabhūmi, Bodhisattvabhūmi and Buddhhabhūmi. The names
clearly indicate the stages, which these are intended to signify.
The first two refer to the pre-sotāpanna stages, the third and
the fourth to the sotāpatti-maṇga and sotāpanna stages, i.e. so
long as the adept is in the āravani-mārga, the fifth to sakādā-
gāmi, in which stage rāga, dveṣa and moha reach their mini-

¹. A portion of the Bodhisattvabhūmi [Cambridge ms.—Vihāra-Paṭala]
has been published by Dr. Rahder as an Appendix to his Daśa. Dr. Rahder
has very recently published an article La Carrière du Saint Bouddhique in
the Bulletin de la Maison Franco-Japonaise, Tome II, no. 1—Tokyo 1920. In it
he has presented us with some new materials from the Chinese sources.
². The Tibetan version of this work has been edited by Prof. Poussin in
the Bibl. Bud. Series, and a French translation of the first six chapters of the
same has also been published by him in Le Muséon, vols. VIII, XI, and XII.
A reconstruction of its Sanskrit text was published in the Journal of Oriental
Research, 1929, 1930, Madras.
³. Śata. ch. X; Pañca, Paris ms. fol, 122-8.
⁴. This is the peculiar feature of the Pañca., the Sanskrit original of which
is available at present. It is a recast of the original Pañca., of which the
Sanskrit original is lost. See the present author’s Intro to Pañca. for details.
⁵. Śata., pp. 1470, 1520 =Mvyut. 50 =Das’s Tib. Dict., p. 475.
mum (tanutva), the sixth to the anāgāmi stage when the above three are completely eradicated, the seventh to the arahatta stage, when the adept completes all that is to be done, for which reason an Arahat is often described as kṛtakṛtya (having done what is to be done). The eighth, ninth and tenth are self-explanatory and need no comment. It should be noted that the treatment of the Bhūmis in the Prajñāpāramitās is much simpler than that of the Daśabhūmikasūtra, and very likely it represents a stage in the evolution of the Bhūmi conception standing midway between the Mahāvastu⁴ and the Daśabhūmikasūtra. The account of Bhūmis in the Mahāvastu appears to be earliest. The names used are not the standard ones. From the names used in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, it seems that the writers on Bhūmis considered it a piece of literary skill to devise names indicative of the qualities attained by a Bodhisattva in a particular stage. The description of bhūmis in the Mahāvastu is very scanty and does not contain the details, which are important and even essential from the Mahāyānic standpoint. On the other hand, it mentions some disciplinary (vinaya) rules, which a Bodhisattva is expected to observe, and the non-observance of which not only impeded his progress but also brought about his fall to the next lower stage. In the accounts of the first three bhūmis, some traces of the description contained in the Daśabhūmikasūtra are found, but in the next seven, and specially in the last four, there is hardly anything more than


2. Dr. Rahder says in his paper on La Carrière du Saint Bouddhique that the Chinese Avatamsaka-sūtra devotes a large section to the discussion of the career of a bodhisattva. He says that it speaks of 52 stages (or degrees), viz., “10 especes de Foi+10-Résidences (adhimukti)+10 Conduites (ācāra) + 10 Deflexions+10 Terres (Bhūmi)+Eveil égal +Eveil merveilleux.” These, it seems from their details, are only a form of classification of the bodhisattvas according to their qualities and do not indicate the gradual stages of spiritual progress. It is in the fifth item that we find mention of the Bhūmis (stages of progress). These are as given by Dr. Rahder in French, (i) Joyeuse; (ii) Immaculée; (iii) Clarifiant; (iv) Radieuse; (v) Dure-a-gagner; (vi) Droit-en-face; (vii) Va-loin; (viii) Immobile; (ix) Bon-Esprit; (x) Nuage d Essence. These are exactly the same bhūmis as mentioned in the Daśa and other works.
a mere mention of the names of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, who attained them. It is apparent that the conception of bhūmis was very hazy to the author of the Mahāvastu, who tried to supply the gaps by recounting some legendary lives of Bodhisattvas and fictitious names of Buddhas.

For our present purpose of comparison between the Hīnayānic and Mahāyānic stages, we shall follow the account of the Dasabhūmikasūtra, indicating at places its agreements and disagreements with the Bodhisattvabhūmi and the Madhyamakāvatāra, and referring in the footnotes to the accounts of the Mahāvastu and the Prajñāpāramiś; while for the Hīnayānic stages, we shall depend mainly on the Pali works, supplementing them where necessary by the information supplied by the Kośa.

**Pre-Bhūmi stages**

*Pre-Bodhisattva or Pre-Sotāpanna stage,*  
(*i.e.,* Prthagjanahood to Āryahood)

The most difficult task of an adept both in Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna is the fulfilment of the conditions laid down for passing from the state of a prthagjana (common man of the world) to that of an Ārya (a man capable of attaining the highest knowledge). The Mahāyānists demand that one must develop Bodhicitta before he can be entitled to commence the practices of bhūmis,¹ while the Hīnayānist held that one must comprehend the Four Truths and have firm faith in the teaching of Buddha, or in other words, he must complete the fifteen kṣaṇas of the Darśanamārga to be able to drift himself along the stream (sota) of sanctification—the eightfold path.²

About the pre-Bodhisattva stage, it is found very often in the Prajñāpāramitās and other Mahāyāna works a general remark that a being, who has performed meritorious acts (avaropitakusa-laṃṭu) served many previous Buddhas (pūrvajina-krtādhikāra), and had many kalyāṇamitrās (spiritual guides) is destined to

2. Śāntiputta, V, 347; soto soto tiha Sāriputta vuccati; katamo nu kho Sāriputta soto ti? Ayam eva hi bhante arīyo affhāngiko maggo seyyathidaṃ sammā diṭṭhi pe, sammā samādhi ti.
attain Bodhi. In a slightly different manner, the Sūtrālaṅkāra says that a being, who has developed Adhimukti (aspiration) through innumerable existences, furnished himself with merits as the sea is by water, completed the preliminary purification by the observance of the Bodhisattva discipline, became wise by learning śāstras, and made his mind soft and pliable, was entitled to exert himself in bhāvanā (i.e. repeated darśana) and derive benefit from the teachings of Buddha.

Adhimukticaryābhūmi

It is in the Madhyamakāvatāra that there is mention of a pre-Bodhisattva stage called the Adhimukti-caryābhūmi. The Madhyamakāvatāra quoting the Ratnamegha-sūtra, states that the bhūmi of the Bhaviṣyad (future) Bodhisattva is placed just before the first bhūmi and consists essentially of excessive (adhimātra-adhimātra) practices of Adhimukti (aspiration). He is a future Bodhisattva because he has not yet developed Bodhicitta. He is therefore said to be in the Adhimukticaryābhūmi, i.e., he has been aspiring to become a Buddha by following the doctrines of Mahāyāna. After hearing a religious discourse, or praises and accounts of the power of a Buddha, he has only passing thoughts that he would become a Buddha, but unless and until this thought stays permanently in his mind, he cannot be said to possess Bodhicitta and become an Ārya, a Bodhisattva.

The Bodhisattvabhūmi is more explicit in regard to the pre-bodhisattva stage; the technical name given by it is Prakṛticaryā. It divides this stage into two: Gotrabhūra and Adhimukticaryā-

2. Sūtrā, xiv. 1-3, p. 90. The Sūtrā, is mainly a treatise on the Bodhisattvacarya. Its treatment is general and comprehensive. As we are here concerned with the Bhūmis, we shall pass over the minor details.
3. For a note on Adhimukti, see Lévi, Translation of the Sūtrā, p. 13.
4. For kalpacitta, read kalyacitta, see Lévi, Transl. of the Sūtrā, p. 16 fn.
5. Le Museon, VIII. p. 262.
7. This is mentioned also in the Mtu. as the first of the four caryās.
8. Vihāra-bhūmi. The corresponding Hinayāna term is Gotrabhū, which is reckoned as a pre-sotāpanna stage. See Anguttara, IV, p. 373. The first two bhūmis, Śuklavipśyanā and Gotra, mentioned in the Sata, also correspond to this.
These two preparatory stages cannot be strictly called bhūmis. The *Dasabhūmikasūtra* and other treatises dealing with bhūmis do not therefore mention them in their list of bhūmis. These deal with or refer to the qualities needed in the pre-bodhisattva stage but do not reckon them as additional bhūmis as the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* does.

The *Gotravīhāra* is thus described in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*: A person who is *gotrastraḥ*, i.e., belongs by nature to a noble class of beings, is endowed with the qualities, high aims, and good dharmas of a bodhisattva. These are apparent in his natural demeanour. He sets himself to perform good deeds naturally, and does not require persuasion; he does the same with a certain amount of wisdom and charitable feeling. He possesses the seeds of Buddha-dharmas and is incapable of committing evil deeds, not to speak of the deadly (*ānantaryā*) sins. The gotra-vīhāra forms the root cause (*hetumātra*) of the other eleven vihāras. It only makes it possible for one to exert himself for the attainment of the other bhūmis but does not carry him further.

The *Adhimukticāryāvīhāra* is the name given to the first attempts made by a bodhisattva to develop bodhicitta, the noble aspiration. In this bhūmi the bodhisattva actually starts on his march to the Tathāgata-vihāra, while in the Gotravīhāra he gives only an indication of same. When he completes the

1. It is the same as the Adhimukticāryabhūmi of the *M. Ava*. The *Laṅkā* (p. 65) speaks of the preparatory stage as Parikarma-bhūmi, (See *E.R.E*. II p. 744 for Parikarma and Upacāra bhūmis). In the *Śata*. (ch. x), Parikarma refers to the duties to be performed by a bodhisattva in a bhūmi.

The *Mt.ū*. (I.46f.) names the corresponding bhūmis as *Prakṛti-cāryā* and *Praṇidhāna-cāryā*. The former refers to the worldly virtues of a being e.g., respectfulness to parents, śramaṇas and brāhmaṇas; performance of the ten kuśala-karmapathas, worship of Buddhas, etc. The latter (*praṇidhāna-cāryā*) refers to the aspiration made, by a bodhisattva to become a Buddha and to achieve the same at any cost. The *Mt.ū*. gives also the legends about the present Buddha as to when and in what circumstances, he made the resolution (*praṇidhāna*).


3. These two vihāras have a parallel in the two kinds of bodhicitta, mentioned in the *Bodhic.,* viz., Bodhipraṇidhi and Bodhiprasthāna. The *Bodhic.* puts these two after the development of bodhicitta, see *infra,*
duties of the Adhimukticarya, he can be said to have done the work preliminary to the first bhūmi, the Pramuditī. In the Adhimukticaryaāvihāra, a bodhisattva practises bhāvanās to a limited degree, and is incapable of retaining what is acquired. He makes only an attempt for nirmimitta-bhāvanā (i.e. meditation of the Absolute, devoid of all signs)\(^1\). He is possessed of pratisāmkhyānabala (power of discriminating knowledge) and applies himself to the duties of a bodhisattva with pratisāmkhyānaprajñā and not by natural tanmayatā (absorption). He cannot yet have the Bodhisattva-bhāvanās which make one steadfast and non-receding. He is not above the five fears, viz., of livelihood, dispraise, death, evil destiny (durgati) and censure by the assembly.\(^2\) With pratisāmkhyā he exerts himself for the good of being and not out of natural love and compassion. Sometimes, he explains things wrongly and sometimes he interests himself in improper spheres or in the material requisites of life. He may have reverential faith (śraddhā) but not innate knowledge of the truth. He possesses only limited śrutamayī and cintāmayī prajñā (knowledge derived through hearing and reflection)\(^3\) which again sometimes gets bewildered. He follows the bodhisattva-path with great difficulty and sluggish knowledge (dhandha-ābhijñā) and does not develop a very strong desire for bodhi. Now and then he forgets the right means, in which beings should be trained and even the Buddhavacanas. Occasionally he imparts teaching incautiously and fails to produce the desired result. At times he diverts his mind from bodhi and loses energy for the observance of Bodhisattva-samprāyas (disciplines) or for rendering service to beings. Sometimes he also seeks his own happiness, though after reflection he seeks the happiness of others as well. Not unoften he notices his own failings but lacks sufficient energy to correct them. He likes instruction in the Bodhisattva-dharmas. These are the chief indications, by which it can be ascertained whether or not a person is in the Adhimukticaryābhūmi.

1. B. Bh. p. 3.
2. Cf. Āṅguttara, IV, p. 394.
The idea underlying the preparatory state is that these are beings, who possess to their credit such \textit{kusalamūlas} that they are destined to become Buddhas. These beings are called \textit{gotrasthas}.\(^1\) Just as a king’s sons are different from those of a commoner by their inherent nature, demeanour and aspiration, so also those beings, who possess the germs of Buddhahood are known by their inherent nature.

The \textit{Daśabhūmikasūtra}\(^2\) furnishes us with the details of the pre-bodhisattva stage, which are on many points different from the account of the \textit{Bodhisattvabhūmi}. Some of the details are: The pre-Bodhisattvas develop bodhicitta after having accumulated enough merits, followed the prescribed practices, worshipped many Buddhas, possessed pure and sublime intention and aspiration, and held compassion always in the forefront of their mind. They are desirous of attaining the Buddha-knowledge, the ten powers, the four great Vaisāradyas, realisation of the sameness of all dharmas (things), rescuing all beings from misery, acquiring every form of knowledge, and purifying all Buddha-kṣetras.

These accounts depict the wavering mind of a person, who is endeavouring to develop the Bodhicitta. It is by the actual development of the Bodhicitta\(^3\) that a person gets rid of his prthagjana-hood and becomes an Ārya or the Elect to proceed along the stream of sanctification\(^4\). Bodhicitta, in short, means the vow or aspiration of a being to become a Buddha and to acquire all the qualities and powers of a Buddha. The \textit{Bodhi-caryāvatāra} divides it into two parts, \textit{Bodhiprājñidhīcitta} and \textit{Bodhiprasthāna-citta}. The former is simply an aspiration to become a Buddha for saving worldly beings from misery without seriously thinking of the duties of making the highest gifts, and acquiring such other virtues. The latter refers to the resolution to

1. See \textit{Sūtra.}, p. 11 for gotrāgratva. The \textit{B. Bh.} devotes about six leaves to the details of the gotra; see Camb. Ms. leaves 1-6.
2. \textit{Daśa.}, p. 11.
3. The topic of Boddhicitta is of all-absorbing interest in most of the Mahāyāna works. The \textit{Bodhi.} devotes to it its first three chapters, and its commentary quotes many sūtras throwing light on the same.
4. See \textit{E.R.E.}, II, p. 744; \textit{M. Ava.} in the \textit{Le Muséon}, VIII p. 11: \textit{yena cittotpādena sahotpannena bodhisattvo \textquoteleft atikrānto bhavati prthagjanabhūmim avakrānto bhavati bodhisattva-niyamaṁ, etc.}
observe the *Bodhisattva-samvaras* (disciplines) and to strive for the acquisition of merits. The former is compared to a traveller, who is thinking of going to another country, while the latter to one who has actually set out on his journey in order to reach the destination. As soon as one develops bodhicitta, he is entitled to perform the duties connected with the first Bhūmi.

**Hinayānīc treatment of the pre-sotāpanna stage**

We have in the Hinayānic works also an elaborate description of the qualities necessary for a person to pass from the puthujjana stage to the Ariya. Like the general statements in the *Prajñāpāramitā* about the previous kusalamūlas of the bodhisattvas, we have also in the Pāli texts references to the previous merits (*upanissaya*) of a person seeking ordination or spiritual progress. It is often said in connection with the conversions made by Buddha that he delivered discourses after ascertaining the kusalamūlas (merit-roots or previous merits) of persons whose conversion he had in view. The usual passage is “*Satthā paccussakāle lokam avolokento imassa kulaputtassa upanissayam addasa*” [the Teacher at dawn looked round the world and saw the previous merits (lit. bases) of the person]. This implies that the real benefits of discourses cannot be derived by everybody. It is only those, whose previous actions have raised them to a certain height, that they derive benefits from the discourses. There are many instances in the Pāli works showing that a person had to have to his credit sufficient merits entitling him to become a sotāpanna after hearing only one discourse; there are also cases of persons becoming sakadāgāmi, anāgāmi, arahat, pacceka-buddha by virtue of their stores of previous merits. The implication in such cases is that the persons in their previous lives had died after attaining the stage of sanctification, or its corresponding qualities, just preceding the one obtained by them in this life. The Hinayānists hold that a pṛthagjana must have

2. According to the *Mt. u.* (I, 78) a bodhisattva in the first bhūmi is still a pṛthajana but he is prāptaphala and daksineya.
some kuśalamūlas before he can expect to be an ārya, i.e., a srotāpanna.¹

A puthujjana is defined in the Majjhima Nikāya as one who labours under the delusion of "I-ness" and "Mine-ness" and thinks that he has rūpa, vedanā, etc. Not knowing the true law, he develops attachment to things which he should avoid, and thereby produces and increases the āsavas (inflowing impurities) of kāma (desire), bhava (desire for existence) and avijjā (ignorance).² The Puggala Paññatti³ simply says that a puthujjana is one who has neither got rid of the three samyojanas nor applied himself to get rid of them. The Paṭisambhidāmagga⁴ tells us that the puthujjanas, who are striving to be ariyas, try to be indifferent to the saṅkhāras by looking upon them as anicca, dukkha and anatta but this indifference of theirs does not stay permanently in their minds and sometimes even appears distasteful to them.

The stage next to Puthujjana is Gotrabhū, corresponding in some respects to the Gotravihāra of the Bodhisattvabhūmi. The Gotrabhū represents the last state of a puthujjana, for a person becomes gotrabhū when he is just fit to commence the works, which make a person an ariya. The Paṭisambhidāmagga⁵ takes gotrabhū not only as a stage prior to sotāpanna but also as an indication of a class of persons, who are on the way to arhathood and may be in possession of one of the eight maggas and phalas. Likewise the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha⁶ places the Gotrabhū stage after Paṭipadā-ñāṇadassana-visuddhi (the purity of insight in regard to the path)⁷ and Vutṭhāna-gāmini-vipassanā-ñāṇam (discernment leading to uplift) and makes the Gotrabhū an ariya, i.e., a sotāpatti-maggattha. In the two works mentioned last, Gotrabhū denotes those persons, who are on the path and are entitled to become Arhats, and hence persons in any

¹. The Kuśalamūlas are called Mokkhabhagaias in the Kośa.
². Majjhima, I, pp. 7,239. It will be observed that the four āsavas is not mentioned here. An Arahat in contrast to puthujjana is called a kiṃsava. See also Paṭis. M. pp. 117-8.
⁵. Paṭis. M., I, pp. 66-8
⁷. Buddhaghoṣa also supports this. See Vis. M., p. 672: Ito Paṭipadā-ñāṇadassana-visuddhi) param gotrabhū-ñāṇam hoti.
one of the three stages, sotāpatti, sakadāgāmi, and ānāgāmi.1 The Aṅguttara Nikāya2 and the Puggala Paññatti3, however do not consider the Gotrabhū an ariya and hence these distinguish Gotrabhū as a stage preceding the Sotāpattimagga.

Those, who are between Gotrabhū and Sotāpanna (i.e. sotāpatti-paññatti) are divided into two classes, called Saddhānusārī and Dhammānusārī.4 They still practise the Darśana-mārga. According to the Kośa, the former are of mild (mṛdu) and the latter of sharp (tikṣṇa) faculties. The Saddhānusārīs are those who follow the dharma through faith in their spiritual guide, or in other words, they take the practice of smṛty-upasthāna, etc., and work for the realisation of the Truth by being incited by others (para-pratyayena), while the Dhammānusārīs are those who set themselves to practise the Bodhipakṣika dharmas through the study of the scriptures (dvādaśāṅga).5

The Puggala Paññatti simply states that, of the persons, who are working for the realisation of sotāpattipala, those who have Saddhindriya (faculty of faith) in a great measure (adhimattam) are called Saddhānusārī, while those who have paññindriya (faculty of paññā) in a great measure are called Dhammānusārī. The persons of the former class, when established in the sotāpattipala, are called Saddhavimutta and those of the latter class are called Dīṭhāppatta. The only difference between these two classes is this that the former destroys some of his āsavas but not as much as the latter.6 For progressing along the path to Nibbāna, there are (i) two dhūras (courses)—saddhā (faith) and paññā (knowledge) (ii) two abhinivesas (adherences), samatha (quietude)7 and vipassanā (introspection), and (iii) two.

1. Comp. of Phil., p. 68.
5. Kośa, VI, 29. Prof. Poussin drew my attention to the fact that the Dwādaśāṅga is mentioned only in the Vyākhya in explanation of the term ‘Dharma’ in the Kośa.
6. Pug. P., 15 : paññāya c'assa disā ekacce āsavā, parikkhīnā honti na ca kho-yathā dīṭhāppattassa. See also Kośa, VI, 63.
7. Cf. Geiger, Saṃyutta Transl., II, p. 172. See also DhP., A., 1, p. 7; granthadhura (way of study) and vipassanādhura (way of contemplation).
sisas (heads)—ubhatobhāgavimutta (one who is free in both ways) and paññāvimutta (free by reason of knowledge). The followers of Paññādhura and Samathābhīnivesa are called Dharmānusārī in the sotāpattimagga stage, Kāyasakkhi in the next six, and Ubhatobhāgavimutta in the arhat stage; the followers of Paññādhura and Vipassanābhīnivesa are called Dharmānusārī in the sotāpattimagga stage, Diṭṭhippatā in the next six, and Paññāvimutta in the arhat stage. The followers of Saddhādhura and Samathābhīnivesa are called Saddhānusārī in the sotāpattimagga stage, Kāyasakkhi in the next six, and Ubhatobhāgavimutta in the arhat stage; the followers of Saddhādhura and Vipassanābhīnivesa are called Saddhānusārī in the sotāpattimagga stage, Saddhāvimutta in the next six, and Paññāvimutta in the arhat stage.

Those, who are either Saddhānusārī or Dharmānusārī, reach the second stage of the ariyamagga called sotāpattiphala, also called sattakhattuparama (i.e., they are to have seven more births). Mention is made of specific qualities, which an adept must possess in order to become a sotāpanna. In the Samyutta Nikāya Sāriputta asks Ānanda, "How many are the dhammas, which one must give up as well as one must acquire for being a Sotāpanno avinipatadhammo niyato sambodhiparāyano (a sotāpanna gone beyond the possibility of retrogression and destined to attain the highest knowledge)." The reply of Ānanda was

2. Kāyasakkhi is defined in the *Aṅguttara* (IV, pp. 451-2) as implying those who realise within their own body (kāyena phassitaya) the eight jhānas or vimokkas) and also destroy āsavas by paññā.
3. Diṭṭhippatā is described in the *Pug. P.*, (p. 15) as referring to those who know truly the four truths, and put an end to āsavas by comprehending the dharma of the Tathāgata by paññā.
4. See *infra*.
6. See *infra*.
7. Saddhāvimutta (*Pug. P.*, p. 15) are similar to Diṭṭhippatā; only the paññā of the former is not as much as that of the latter.
8. *Pug. P. Cy.*, pp. 194-5. See also *Kośa*, VI, 63, 64.
9. The first stage being sotāpattimagga comprised the two classes called Saddhānusārī and Dharmānusārī.
that one must have firm faith (pasāda) in Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṅgha and must be endowed with all the silas, liked and praised by the wise. They are called the Sotāpattiyaṅgas. One who has the four Sotāpattiyaṅgas is considered free of five sins, viz., killing, stealing, misconduct, lying, and drinking. The Samyutta Nikāya also tells us that when an ariyasaṅvaka knows the taste, the dangers and the way out of the indriyas, viz., sukha, dukkha, somanassa, domanassa and upekkhā, he is a sotāpanna. In a discourse in connection with the illness of Ānāthapiṇḍika, it is said that the puthujjana was expected also to comply as far as possible with the eight conditions of the aṭṭhaṅgikamagga plus sammā-ñāna and sammā-vimutti, besides the four sotāpattiyaṅgas. The sotā-pattiyaṅgas, in fact, are merely preliminaries, though essential, to the actual commencement of practices for attaining the sotāpatti stage. The duties, entailed upon a candidate just after the sotāpattiyaṅgas, are further increase in piti (pleasure), pāmojja (joy), passaddhi (calmness), samādhi (concentration) and the practice of the cha vijjā- (or nibbedha-bhāgiya-) dhammas (six dharmas leading to knowledge), viz. the realisation (anupassanā) of (i) transitoriness (anicca) of constituted things, (ii) unhappiness (dukkha), due to transitoriness, (iii) essencelessness (anattā)

1. There is a formula for announcing the faith, see Dīgha, III, p. 227. The faith is called Saddhindriya, Samyutta, V, p. 196. Paṭis. M. p. 161: Ye keci mayi aveccapasanna sabbe to sotāpanna. See Kośa, VI, 73b; XXIV, p. 205: La pureté de la conduite (prayoga) : règles de moralité (śilāni) chères aux Āryas; pureté des sentiments (āsaya) and avetyaprasāda (firm faith).

2. The other four sotāpattiyaṅgas, very rarely found, are: (i) sappuri-sasāṃsevā, (ii) saddhammāsavaṇṇām, (iii) yoniso manasikāro, and (iv) dhammadharmamapatipatti, Samyutta, V, pp. 345, 411; Dīgha, III, p. 227; Paṭis. M., II, p. 17 show the connection between these and the indriyas.

3. Samyutta, II, pp. 61, 71.

4. Ibid, V, p. 207; Paṭis. M., I, pp. 115-6. It says “Aṭṭhāṭṭāṭṭassāmitin-driyamekam thānaṃ gacchati, sotāpattimaggam” and then tells of the position of the indriyas. It adds that in the sotāpattimaggakhaṇṇa, except things already existing, all thoughts that arise are pure, transcendental, and lead to nibbāna.

of things; (iv) giving up (*pahāṇa*), (v) detachment (*virāga*), and (vi) (cessation) *nirodha*. The *Nikāyas* do not go into details about the attempts of a candidate in the sotāpanna stage to comprehend the anicca, anattā and dukkha or the four ārya-satyas. In the *Dīgha Nikāya* there is only a bare mention of the four *ñāṇas*, *viz.* dukkhe *ñāṇam*, nirodhe *ñāṇam*, samudaye *ñāṇam*, and magge *ñāṇam*. An exposition of these has been given in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* which says that when one has "understanding, search, research, discernment, discrimination, etc., of each of the four truths, he is said to have comprehended the four truths. This topic has received special treatment in the *Kośa* which may briefly be stated: There are two mārgas, darśana and bhāvanā, the latter commencing at the last stage of darśanamārga. The darśanamārga has sixteen kṣaṇas or moments of comprehension of the truths, which are as follows:

1. *Samyutta*, V, p. 345; *Dīgha*, III, p. 251; *Kośa*, Intro. to chs. V, and VI, p. iv, as Prof. Poussin shows, puts the order of progress in the presotāpanna stage thus:

(i) Acquisition of the Mokṣabhāgiya-kuśalamūlas;
(ii) Acquisition of the Ariyavamsas (*Kośa*, VI, 7c-d; 8a-b; *Āṅguttara*, II, p. 24; *Dīgha*, III, p. 224—rules relating to the requisites of a monk);
(iii) Āsubhabhāvanā, Ānāpānasmṛti;
(iv) Practice of Samṛtyupasthānas;
(v) Acquisition of the Nirvedhabhāgiya dharmas;
(vi) Satyābhisamaya (15 kṣaṇas)—darśanamārga.

There are many details which should be mentioned in an exposition of the path of spiritual progress, but as we are concerned here mainly with the comparison of the Hinayāna and Mahāyāna stages, the details have been passed over.


4. Prof. Poussin has given a summary of it in the Intro. to his transl. of the *Kośa*, chs. V and VI; *M. Vr.*, p. 479, n. 4.

5. Bhāvanāmārga is seeing the Truths again and again. See *Kośa*, Intro. to chs. V and VI, p. vi.

6. See *Kośa*, VI, 261; VII, 4.
1) Duḥkhe dharmaṁśāna-kṣānti (faith producing the knowledge that things of the Kāmādhātu are full of duḥkha, are subject to samudaya and nirodha, and that there is also the mārga to the origin and cessation of things).

2) Duḥkhe dharmaṁśāna (actual realisation of the Kāmādhātu are full of duḥkha, are subject to samudaya and nirodha, and that there is also the mārga leading to their origin and cessation).

3) Duḥkhe anvayajñāna-kṣānti (faith producing the knowledge that things of the Rūpa and Arūpa dhātus are full of duḥkha, are subject to samudaya and nirodha, and that there is also a mārga leading to their origin and cessation).

4) Duḥkhe anvayajñāna (actual realisation of the fact that things of the Rūpa and Arūpa dhātus are full of duḥkha, are subject to samudaya and nirodha, and that there is also a mārga leading to their origin and cessation).

The Kathāvatthu shows the stages of gradual progress of a srotāpattiphalapratipannaka while he is in the darśanamārga thus:

| 1. | The order of the kṣāṇas is to be made out from the number prefixed to each of the sixteen kṣāṇas. For a list, see Mvyut. 56; and for detailed exposition, see Kosa, VII, 8, p. 13. |
By Dukkhadassana, the srotāpattiphala-pratipannaka gives up partially but not completely sakkāyadiṭṭhi, vicikicchā and sīlabbataparāmāsa, and the kilesas involved in them.

By Samudayadassana, he gives up sakkāyadiṭṭhi completely, and the other two partially, and so also the kilesas.

By Nirodhadassana, he gives up vicikicchā completely and sīlabbataparāmās partially and so also the kilesas.

By Mārgadassana, he gives up sīlabbataparāmāsa completely and the kilesas partially.

The Köṣa tells us that a candidate while progressing along these kṣānas is called Śraddhanusāri, Dharmanusāri or Srotāpattiphala-pratipannaka up to the fifteenth kṣāṇa. It is in the sixteenth moment that he is considered established (sthita) in the srotāpattiphala, and he may now be said to have obtained Catūsatyābhisamaya.¹ This attainment, or in other words, the completion of the Daṁśanamārga frees him from the avastuṅga-kleśas etc. and makes him an Ārya, i.e., a person entitled to let himself flow along the stream of sanctification—the eight-fold path. He is no more to be called Śraddhānusāri or Dharmānusāri. He is now a Srotāpanna.²

The pre-Ārya stage, in fact, decides the path which a candidate is to follow. If one aspires only to mokṣa or Nirvāṇa and accumulates kuṣalāmūlas of not a very high excellence as the Hīnayānīst is to do, he is a Śrāvaka and if he aspires to Buddhahood in order to become the rescuer of the worldly beings, i.e., he develops Bodhicitta and accumulates kuṣalā-

¹. Köṣa, I, p. 164 leaves this point as doubtful but all the passages mentioned there support the inferences drawn above.
². Köṣa, p. 25 n. VI.
mūlas which only an exceedingly rare person can, he is a Bodhisattva.

I. Pramuditā

An adept as soon as he brings his mind up to the path described above goes beyond the pṛthagjanabhūmi (plane of an ordinary being) and becomes definitely a bodhisattva. He can now be regarded as a member of the Tathāgata family becomes irreproachable (anavadya) by any taint relating to birth (sarvajātivādena), ceases from worldly existences, proceeds on in the transcendental existences, becomes established in the bodhisattva-dharmatā and well established in the rank of a bodhisattva, comprehends sameness (tathā) and is destined to be in the family of tathāgatas of all times (past, present and future) and ultimately attains Sambodhi. Such bodhisattvas while in this bhūmi have prāmodya (joy), prasāda (faith), priti (pleasure), utplāvanā (elation), udagrī (exaltation), uṣi (fragrance), uṣāha (energy), and become asamrāmbha (devoid of pride), avihiṃṣā (devoid of malice) and akrodha (devoid of anger). The Jinaputras become joyous on remembering the Buddhas, their dharmas, the Bodhisattva practices, the pāramitā purifications etc. They are pleased also because they know that they are out of worldly matters, nearing the Buddhabhūmi, the Jñānabhūmi, and cut off from births in hell or any lower form of existence. They are the refuge of all beings, and are always within the close view of the Tathāgatas. They are devoid of all sorts of fear because they have no love for self or for things. They do not expect any service from others; on the other hand, they are prepared to render service to all beings. As they have no conception of self, they cannot have any fear of death, as they know that when they are dead, they will always be with Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.

1. Kośa, VI, 31a-b: He is now either a kāyasākṣi or dṛṣṭiprāpta or śraddhāvimukta.
2. See infra.
3. Cf. B. Bh., p. 7; ‘Abhisamayālaṅkārāloka’ in the Kośa, VI. 26, p. 181 fn.
Then the Bodhisattvas, having sublime aspiration and mahākarunā in their forethought, engage themselves in the attainment of further merits. On account of their having in a greater degree śraddhā, praśāda, adhimukti, avakalpanā, kṛpākarunā, mahāmaitrī and having a firm mind endowed with hrī, aparāpya, ksānti, sauratya and admiration for the doctrines, and being helped by spiritual guides (kalyānāmitras) they become well-established in the first bhūmi. They now take the following mahāprāṇidhānas (resolutions):

(i) to perform the worship of Buddhas in every possible manner and as completely as possible;
(ii) to preserve and protect the doctrines of the Tathāgatas;
(iii) to watch the Buddhotpādas of all the worlds and to accompany the Bodhisattvas in their last existence from their descent from the Tuṣita heaven up to their mahāparinirvāṇa;
(iv) to practise all the bhūmis along with the pāramitās;
(v) to ripen all beings and help them in attaining omniscience;
(vi) to purify all Buddhakṣetras by paying visits to them;
(vii) to comprehend the endless distinctions that exist in the things of all lokadhātus;
(viii) to persuade all bodhisattvas to develop the highest aspiration and collect merits therefor, to attend upon all Buddhas, to see Buddhotpādas whenever wished for, to pass through the various forms of existence with his own body in order to be accomplished in the doctrines of Mahāyāna and to propagate the same;
(ix) to perform the duties of a bodhisattva, to do righteous acts by body, speech and mind, to realise the Buddhadharmā, to remove afflictions by faith, to obtain a body like that of the Mahābhaisajyajāra or be like the wish-fulfilling gem and to obtain speech which will never be fruitless; and
(x) to attain Sambodhi in all lokadhātus, to make without moving a hair-breadth from the right path from his birth as an

1. See Šīkṣā, pp. 291-5=Dāsa., p. 14—18; Sūtra. (Fr. transl.), p. 36n: Suzuki, Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism, pp. 308-310; E.R.E., sv. Bodhisattva (based on the Bodhisattvabhūmi) and is not the same as Dāsa : Dharmasaṅgraha. exii : Prāṇidhānam trividham.
ordinary human being, to retire from the world, perform miracles, attain bodhi under the bodhi-tree, preach the dharma-cakra and attain ultimately mahāparinirvāṇa.¹

While in the Pramudita bhūmi, the Bodhisattvas take innumerable praṇidhānas, of which the ten mentioned above are the chief. They now pity the countless beings, who are led by wrong views and blinded by ignorance, desire and so forth, repeatedly take birth in the three worlds, and according to the law of causation, increase their stores of misery. They try to establish themselves in Nirvāṇa, the extreme happiness (atyantasukha).²

While in the first bhūmi they develop compassion and love and apply themselves to mahātyāga (i.e. giving up everything) of worldly wealth, sons, wives, etc. They seek again and again the worldly and transcendental things and thus become versed in all śāstras and are consequently able to judge what is good and what is evil for beings. They become lokajña.³ By constant worship and observance of śāsana (doctrines), they possess the ten qualities needed for the purification of the ten bhūmis,⁴ viz., faith (śraddhā), compassion (karunā), love (maitri), sacrifice (tyāga), patience to withstand distress (khedaśahisnutā), knowledge of the scriptures (śāstrajñatā), knowledge of the world (lokajñatā), modesty, bashfulness steadiness and the ability of performing the worship of the Tathāgatas.⁵ They now see many Buddhas and worship them with all the necessary requisites, show respect to their Saṅghas and transfer the merit thus-acquired

2. Daśa, p. 18; B. Bhumi, p. 9.
4. Mtu., I, p. 78 has tyāga, karunā, aparikāgha, amāna, sarvasādhyāyitā vikrama, lokānujñā, and dhṛti. Śata. (p. 1454) has adhyāśaya, sarvasātvamsācittatā, tyāga, kalyāṇamitrasevanā, dharmaparyeṣṭi abhiśkaṇa-naiśkramya, buddhakāyaspr̥ha, dharmavivaraṇa, māṇastambhananirghātana, satyavacana. For an explanation of these terms, see Śata., pp. 1458-1460. It will be observed that all the attainments mentioned in the Mtu. and Śata. appear in the account of the Daśa. Cf. B. Bh., p. 9: daśa vihāraparipādhakā dharma.
5. Daśa., p. 19 ; B. Bh p. 9. Mtu. I, p. 78 mention these eight qualities in connection with the first bhūmi.
to the attainment of Sambodhi. They gain the power to ripen beings through gifts \( (dana) \) and affable words \( (priyavaditā) \) and (strong desire) adhimukti. Over and above these, they gain the other two \( saṃgrahavastus \) \( (\text{elements of popularity}) \) but not yet the insight into the unlimited knowledge. Of the ten pāramitās, their dānapāramitā is of an extraordinary nature. A bodhisattva, who has attained the first bhūmi, is entitled to become a king of Jambudvīpa and be a righteous ruler with mind always turned towards Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha, the bodhisattva practices and omniscience. Wishing to become a leader of men, he renounces the worldly life, takes ordination and in a moment enters into a hundred samādhis, sees a hundred Bud­dhhas, traverses over a hundred lokadātus and performs other extraordinary matters.

**CORRESPONDENCE OF BHŪMIS WITH MAGGAS AND PHALAS**

The Hinayāna system does not offer any parallel to the first bhūmi of the Mahāyānists, for it has no concern with Bodhicitta, Prañidhānas, Maitri, Karuṇā, and the ten qualities needed by a bodhisattva for fortifying himself to proceed along the ten bhūmīs. It is from the second bhūmi that the Hinayāna system offers a parallel to the Mahāyānic stages of progress. The *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* and the *Madhyamakāvalāra* notice this fact in their treatment of the bhūmīs.

In the Hinayāna system a very common way of speaking about the various stages of progress is that an adept by complying with the rules of Adhīśīla (entire moral precepts) becomes

3. *Mvyut.* 34 gives a list of ten. This is common in Pāli works.
5. See Rahder’s edition in the App. to *Daša.* p. I.
7. The Aṭṭhaṅgika Magga is arranged thus :
   \( \text{Sīla} = \text{Sammāvācā,} \) kammanta, and ājīva.
   \( \text{Cittā or Samādhi} = \text{Sammāsaṅkappa,} \) vāyāma, sati, samādhi.
   \( \text{Paññā} = \text{Sammādiṭṭhi. See, e.g., *Vis. M.*, pp. 4,510 ; *Dīgha, III*, p. 219.} \)
a Sotāpanna and Sakadāgāmi, by complying with the rules of Adhicitta, becomes an Anāgāmi, and by those of Adhipaññā, becomes an Arhat. So we can name the Hinayāna stages also as (1) Puthujjana but Gotrabhū; (2) Adhisila, (3) Adhicitta and (4) Adhipaññā. We may now compare with these the Mahāyānic bhūmis as named in the Bodhisattvabhūmi; the relation of the Hinayānic to Mahāyānic bhūmis becomes apparent. These are as follows: (1) Gotra-Vihāra, (2) Adhimukticaryā-Vihāra, (3) Pramuditā-Vihāra, (4) Adhisīla-Vihāra, (5) Adhicitta-Vihāra, (6), (7) and (8) Adhiprajñā-Vihāra, (9) Sābhīmukṣāra-sābhoga-nirnimitta-Vihāra, (10) Anābhoga-nirnimitta-Vihāra, (11) Pratisamvid-Vihāra, and (12) Parama-Vihāra. Of these twelve Viharas, we have already dealt with the first two, the preparatory Bhūmis, which are, as a rule, not included in the usual list of bhūmis, and correspond to the Hinayānic Puthujjana or pre-Sotāpanna stage. Hence, if these be left out, we have the usual ten bhūmis. Evidently the five bhūmis (4-8 of the Bodhisattvabhūmi, and 2-6 of the Daśabhūmikasūtra) correspond to the four Hinayānic stages. The higher knowledge and attainments, which the Bodhisattvas claim and which, according to the Mahāyānists, are beyond the capacity of the Hinayānists, are to be attained in the last four bhūmis.

II. Vimala or Adhisīla

A Bodhisattva, who has well practised the first bhūmi and seeks the second, develops ten cittasayas, viz., āju (plain), mṛdu (soft), karmāṇya (pliable), dama (submissive), sāma (tranquil), kalyāṇa (beneficial), asamsṛṣṭa (unlogged), anapekṣa (indifferent), udāra (noble) and māhātmya (magnanimous).

1. Three samanakaranīyas in the Aṅguttara I, p. 229.
2. B. Bh., p. 42 tells us that the Adhisīla is the same as Vimalābhūmi of the Daśa.
3. B. Bh., p. 11 mentions ten samyagāsayas but does not enumerate them. The Mtu., I, pp. 85-9 mentions twenty adhyāsayas and amplifies each of them by a stanza. This is followed by an enumeration of the evil consequences that follow their non-observance, making the Bodhisattvas go down-
When these cittásayas are developed, he is established in the second bhūmi, Vimalā. He then quite naturally refrains from prānātipāta (taking life), odattādāna (stealing), kāme mithyāsāra (misconduct), anṛtavacana (telling lies), pīṣuṇavacana (malignant speech), paruṣavacana (harsh speech), sambhinnapralāpa (frivolous talks) and becomes anabhīdhya (non-avaricious), avyāpannačitta (devoid of malevolence), and comes to possess samyag-dṛṣṭi (right view). He then thinks that all beings suffer on account of not avoiding the said ten akuśalakarmapathas. He therefore must persuade them to follow the right conduct, and with that object in view, he must himself first observe them.

He ponders over the fact that persons are graded according to their kuśalakarmapathas (good deeds performed) and other practices, by virtue of which they become men, gods, etc., and also Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, Bodhisattvas and Buddhas. He also ponders over the fact that by committing evil deeds (akuśala-karmapathas) beings are born in hell, the animal world or the Yama world, or as human beings with a short life and many diseases. So he decides that he will observe the ten kuśalakarmapathas and persuade others to do so. He therefore becomes loving and compassionate towards all beings and takes upon himself the duty of being a teacher and a guide, diverting them from the wrong to the right view. He observes that beings suffer on account of anger, avarice, desire, hatred, delusion, mental darkness, lack of energy and so forth, that they are tossed up and

wards. It is in connection with the third bhūmi (Mtu., I. p. 101) that the Mtu. tells us daśa karmapathān kuśālān sevate purusottamo.

1. Daśa., pp. 23-5; in p. 26 the sufferings that follow each of the misdeeds are mentioned.

2. B. Bh., pp. 11-12 refers briefly to the acquisition of kuśalakarmapathas and remarks that just as gold is purified by heating and other processes, so a Bodhisattva is purified by the practice of these karmapathas. The Mtu., however, makes no reference to the kuśala karmapathas in the second bhūmi.

3. M. Ava. (ch. II) enumerates the kuśalakarmapathas in details, and also dilates on the purity acquired by the bodhisattva in this bhūmi, which is for this reason named Vimalā.

3. Śata., p. 1455 refers to śilas, but its account agrees to a great extent with that of Daśa. Śata. enumerates eight duties, śilapariśuddhi kṛtaññatā, etc. For comments on them, see Śata., pp. 1460-1. The Mtu. gives us very little information in regard to this bhūmi.
down by the waves of desire, love of existence, ignorance, that they are tied up by love and hatred, likes and dislikes, and labour under the misconception of ‘I-ness’ and ‘Mine-ness’, etc. Out of compassion, he resolves to rescue those beings and lead them to a suitable heaven of peace.

While in this bhūmi, he can see many Buddhas, worship them and transfer the merit thus acquired to the attainment of Bodhi. He receives the kuśalakarmapathas from the Buddhas and fulfils them in many kalpas. He gets rid of mātsarya (covetousness) and carries out fully the precept of liberality. Of the four samgrahavastus, he increases priyavadya (affability) to a great measure, and of the ten pāramitās, he improves the śīlapāramitā to a great degree but not so the other pāramitās.

Should a bodhisattva, after the attainment of the second bhūmi, desire material prosperity, he can become a righteous cakravartin with seven ratnas and so forth.¹

This account of the second bhūmi leaves us in little doubt as to its similarity to the Adhiśīla practices of the Hīnayānists, without, of course, taking into account the adhyāsayas developed by the Bodhisattvas. In the Visuddhimagga it is stated that the śīla practices lead to the purification of all impurities relating to conduct,² and serve as the basis for the attainment of sotāpanna and sakadāgāmi stages. In the first chapter of the Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghoṣa dilates on the various śīlas to be observed by the householders, lay devotees, monks and nuns, supplementing it by the second chapter on the thirteen dhūtaṅgas, which he considers necessary for the ascetics (yogi) to bring their śīlas to perfection.³ The Nikāyas usually mean by the śīlas the commonly known ten śīlas and the 250 pātimokkha rules.⁴ By the complete observance of śīlas and a little of samādhi and paññā⁵ an adept becomes a sotāpanna and a sakadāgāmi. We know that a sotāpanna is free from the three saṃyojanas and

¹ Cf. B. Bh., p. 12. The Mtu. adds, in every bhūmi, the qualities which make a bodhisattva retrogress from a higher to a lower bhūmi but passes over other details.
³ Ibid., p. 59, ⁴ See, e.g. Anguttara, I, pp 229, 235.
⁵ It will be observed that an adept commences practising all the three śīla, samādhi, and paññā, but he fulfils only one in this stage.
the two anusayas, *viṣṇu*, diṭṭhi and vicikicchā.¹ By bringing the three hindrances, *rāga* (attachment), *dosa*² (hatred), and *moha* (delusion) to their minimum (*tanutta*), and by getting rid of anusayas, kāma, rāga and paṭigha and by practising a little more of samādhi, and paññā, he becomes a sakadāgāmi. In the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*,³ it is stated that an adept in sotāpattiphala, sakadāgāmimagga, etc., obtains *aññindriya* (the faculty of perfect knowledge), and the dhammas that were already existing in him become unmanifest (*avyakta*), and the new thoughts that arise in his mind are pure, transcendental and conducive to Nibbāna.⁴ A sotāpanna also gets rid of diṭṭhasava completely and the other three āsavas so far as they lead to hell, while a sakadāgāmi of ṣālārika (gross) kāmāsava, and partially of bhavāsava and avijjāsava.⁵ In addition to the attainments required in the sotāpattimagga, the adept must also think of the transitoriness and essencelessness of the five upādaṇa-khandhas.⁶

There are two sub-stages between sotāpatti (or sattakkhatūparama) and sakadāgāmi. These are called kulañkula (*kulañkula*) and ekabiji (*ekavicika*).⁷ Any one who has got rid of the three samyojanas, completed the silas and practised a little (*mattaso*) of sattakkhatūparama, because he will be re-born seven times more among men and gods before he can attain Nibbāna. He will never fall back into hell and is destined to attain Nibbāna after getting rid of two more *avarabhāgiya* (*orabhāgiya* = lower) fetters, *viṣṇu*, kāmacchanda and vyāpāda, and five *ūrdhvabhāgiya* (*uddhabhāgiya* = higher) *samyojanas* (fetters), *viṣṇu*, rūparāga, arūparāga, audhhatya, māna and moha. A sotāpanna becomes a kulañkula by getting rid of the third

7. *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 233; IV, pp. 380-1; *Samyutta*, V, p. 205; *Pug. P.*, p. 16; *Nettī*, p. 189; *Vis M.*, p. 709; *Kośa*, VI, 34. For the two stages prior to sotāpanna, *viṣṇu*, Dhammānusāri, and Saddhanusāri see *ante*.
8. There are disagreements among the schools as to the number of existences; some interpret seven existences among men and seven among the gods, and some even more, though the texts cited by each clearly show that seven existences in all were meant. See, for details, *Kośa*, VI, 34, pp. 200-2.
and fourth categories of passions of the Kāmadhātu and by the acquisition of purer indriyas as opposed to the passions. He will be reborn twice or thrice either among the gods when he is called Devakulāṅkula or among men when he is called Manuṣyakulāṅkula. The Nikāyas do not draw any clear difference between sotāpanna and kolaṅkola. The Visuddhimagga distinguishes them by stating that the Kolaṅkolas have vipassana and indriyas of the medium order, while the sotāpannas have those of mild (mrūdu) order.

The next stage Ekabījī (Ekavīcika) is put in the Pāli texts after Kolaṅkola and before Sakadāgāmi, but in the Kośa it is put after Sakadāgāmi. The superiority of Ekabījis, as shown in the Pāli texts, is that they develop samādhi and pañña still more but cannot complete them. The Visuddhimagga adds that they have sharp faculties (tikkhindriya). In consequence of this, they are reborn once more among men (mānuṣakaṁ bhavaṁ) for attaining Nibbāna. Quite similar is the description of a Sakadāgāmi; only in this case, it is not mentioned whether the one (sakṛd) more rebirth will be among the gods or men; the texts simply say “imaṁ lokam āgantvā”, i.e., they will be born in the Kāmadhātu, which includes both men and gods. In any case, the Sakadāgāmi reduce rāga, dosa, and mohā to their minimum (tanuttā).

The Kośa tells us that a Sakṛdāgāmi destroys passions (kleśas) up to the sixth category. Having been born among the gods, he will be reborn once more among men. In him rāga, dveṣa, and mohā are brought to the minimum, and there remain only the three lower categories of passion, viz., mṛdvardhimaṭra, mṛdumadhyā and mṛdumṛdu. The Ekavīcikas are distinguished from them by the fact that they destroy seven or eight categories of passions and acquire the faculties opposed to these passions.

The division of srotāpannas into three classes are mentioned

4. ‘Na paripurakāri’ is used instead of ‘mattasokāri’.
5. Kośa, VI. 36 says on the etymology of the word thus : vici=interval, separation, i.e., they are separated from Nirvāṇa by one more birth. Quite different, however, is the etymology given in the Pāli texts, where bija=seed.
also in the *Laṅkāvatāra*. It states that the srotāpannas are of ordinary (*hina*), medium (*madhya*), and excellent (*vīśṭa*) classes.¹ The *hina* class will undergo seven more rebirths, the *madhya* (*i.e.* *Kulaṅkula*) three or five and the *vīśṭa* (*i.e.* *ekavicika*)² only one. The *saṃyojanas*, viz., satkāyadṛśṭi, vicikitsā and śilavat aparāmarṣa are mild, medium or sharp according to the class of srotāpannas. A srotāpanna by getting rid of the three *saṃyojanas* does not have rāga, dveśa and moha.³ While speaking of the sakṛdāgāmi, the *Laṅkāvatāra* simply mentions that they require one more birth to put an end to duḥkha.⁴ The stage next to sakṛdāgāmi is anāgāmi corresponding to the third bhūmi of the Mahāyāṇists.

### III. Prabhākari or Adhicittavihāra

A Bodhisattva, who has completed the second bhūmi and seeks the third, should develop the following ten cittāśayas:⁵ *suddha* (pure), *sthira* (firm), *nirvid* (world-disgustful), *avirāga* (non-detached), *avimūrtta* (non-returning), *āṛdhā* (strong), *uttapta* (energetic), *āśṛpta* (never satisfied), *udāra* (noble) and *māhātmya* (magnanimous).

While in the third bhūmi the bodhisattva realises that the constituted beings and things are impermanent, full of suffering, have momentary origin and decay, are without beginning and end, and are subject to the causal law. He comprehends the misery and despair as issuing from attachment to saṃskāras, and so he applies his mind to the attainment of Tathāgata-jñāna,⁶ which he finds as unthinkable, immeasurable and above all misery and despair, and where there is neither fear nor

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¹. *Laṅkā.*, p. 117.
². *Ibid.*, pp. 117-9 explains Satkāyadṛśti as of two kinds, *sahaja* (natural) and *parikalpita* (imaginary), and then interprets Vicikitsā and Śilavat aparāmarṣa as a Yogācāra text would do.
³. *Laṅkā.*, p. 119; on this point *Laṅkā* differs from all Hinayāna texts, which say that Sakṛdāgāmis bring rāga, dveśa and moha to the minimum.
⁵. Cf. *B.Bh.*, p. 12; *Mtu.*, I, pp. 89-90 mentions 28 factors, which send back a Bodhisattva from the 3rd to the 2nd bhūmi.
trouble, and by attaining which one can save beings. He then develops ten more citāśayas.

Realising this state of things, the bodhisattva again resolves to rescue beings and strive for their benefit. He then thinks over the means, by which he can rescue them and finds that it is possible only by anāvarana-vimokṣa-jñāna (the unscreened knowledge of emancipation). He observes that it is attainable only by hearing and practising the dharma. So he turns his mind to perfecting himself in the dharma and resolves to sacrifice all earthly wealth and enjoyment, and undergo all sorts of suffering. He now sees that mere purification in speech and action would not be sufficient and that he must observe the dharmas and anudharmas. With that end in view, he practises the dhyānas, the four brahmavihāras, viz., maitrī, karuṇā, muditā, and upekṣā, and acquires the abhijñās, viz., rddhividha (power of performing miracles), diyaśrotra (supernatural power of hearing), paracittajñāna (power of reading the thoughts of others), pūrvanivāsānusmaraṇa (power of remembering former births), and diyaγacṣu (supernatural power of vision).

He sees many Buddhas, hears their discourses, and follows their directions. He comprehends that all dharmas are non-transmigrating, non-decaying and are only subject to cause and condition. The fetters of Kāma, Rūpa, Bhava and Avidyā become weak, those due to wrong views (micchādiṭṭhi) having been already destroyed. He gets rid of rāga, dveṣa and moha, and the following āśayas are purified: ksāntisauratya (forbearance with gentleness), akhilamādhurya (sweetness without hindrance), akṣopya (non-anger), akṣubhīta (non-agitation), alubhīta (non-covetousness), anunānānavamāna (non-desire for remuneration for works done), aśāthyaṃmāyāvitā (non-deceit),

1. Cf. Mtu., I, pp. 91-5 for ekā gāthā subhāṣitā, a Bodhisattva is prepared to sacrifice even his own life. This is followed by an enumeration of the evils, for which a Bodhisattva may retrogress.
2. Cf. B. Bh., p. 13; Mtu., I, pp. 91-2; M. Ava. (Le Muséon, VIII, pp. 301 ff.)
3. Śata., p. 1455 mentions only five dharmas in connection with the third bhūmi. Except the first there is very little agreement in the three works: Mtu., Śata., and Daśa.
and agahanatā (non-mysteriousness). Of the four samgrahavastus he increases arthacarya to a great measure, and of the ten pāramitās, he improves kṣāntipāramitā, but not the rest.

In this description of the third bhūmi, it will be noticed that the bodhisattvas, apart from the extraordinary qualities peculiar to them, commence practising the eight dhyanās (jhānas), the four brahmavihāras, and the six abhijñās. Their fetters relating to Kāma, Rūpa, Bhava, and Avidyā become weak, and those due to drṣṭi are destroyed. Their rāga, dveśa, and moha are completely destroyed.

In the Hinayāna system also an adept after completing the silas, attempts to rise higher and higher in the training of mind through samādhi.¹ The Visuddhimagga² treats in detail of the practices that are classed under samādhi. These are the four jhānas with the help of forty kammatthānas (bases of meditation), ten anussatis (objects of remembrance), four brahmavihāras, the four āruppa (higher) jhānas, two bhāvanās, ten iddhis, and six abhijñās, all of which, it will be observed, are included in the third bhūmi. The Visuddhimagga also tells us that an adept after completing the citta-practices becomes an Anāgāmi, i.e., he will not be reborn any more in the Kāmadhātu.³ He gets rid of the five orambhagiyas (lower fetters) viz., sakkāyadiṭṭhi, vicikicchā, silabbataparamāsā, kāmacchanda and vyāpāda,⁴ completely destroys rāga, dosa and moha, and removes wholly kāmāsava, and partially bhavāsava and avijjāsava.⁵ He comes into existence as an upapatti (self-born)⁶ and attains Nibbāna.

The Anāgāmis are divided into five sub-classes⁷ called:

(1) Antarāparinibbāyi, i.e., those who practise the path to destroy the five higher (uddhambhāgiya) saṃyojanas just after

1. Vis. M., p. 84.
2. Ibid., ch. II.
4. The first three are destroyed by the Sotāpattis and Sakadāgāmis; so in this stage only the last two are destroyed.
7. Vis. M., p. 710. The Kosa adds five more to this list, Pug. P. Cy., p. 200 calculates 48 classes of Anāgāmis out of these five.
coming into being and before reaching the middle of their lives.¹

(2) Upahacca (=Upapadya of Kośa)-parinibbāyi, i.e., those who practise the path of destroying the five higher saṃyojanas after the middle and a little before the end of their lives.²

(3) Asaṅkhāraparinibbāyi, i.e., those who attain parinibbāna by putting an end to kilesas with a little trouble and without great effort (appadukkhena adhimattam payogam akatvā).³ The Kośa explains it as those who attain Nirvāṇa without effort because they are not energetic.⁴ The Aṅguttara-Nikāya gives a different interpretation. It states that those who complete the fourth Jhāna, develop the five balas and five indriyas, and attain parinibbāna in this life are called Asaṅkhāraparinibbāyi.⁵

(4) Sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyi, i.e., those who attain parinibbāna by putting an end to kilesas with great trouble and great effort (dukkhena kasirena adhimattam payogam katvā).⁶ The Kośa explains it as those who attain Nirvāṇa without relaxing the exercises because they are energetic. The Aṅguttara Nikāya explains it as those who look upon the body as evil (asubha), food as loathsome and all constituted things as disgusting. They cogitate on the transitoriness of the beings and death, and make their minds steady. They develop greatly the five balas and five indriyas.⁷

(5) Uddhaṁsota Akaniṭṭhagāmi, i.e., those Anāgāmis, who do not attain parinibbāna while they are in the Aviha heaven

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¹. Pug. P., p. 199 : āyukkhayassa āsanne ṭhatvā. It may be remarked in this connection that the length of lives in these existences is counted by thousands of kalpas. Kośa, VI, p. 211 explains it as those who attain soppa-dhiśeṣanirvāṇa-dhātu immediately after birth.

². Pug. P. Cy., p. 199.

³. Kośa, VI, p. 211.

⁴. Kośa. VI.

⁵. Aṅguttara, p. 156.


⁷. Aṅguttara, II, p. 156, Cf. Kośa, VI, p. 212 fn. The Anāgāmis (1) and (4) are of sharp faculties, (2) and (3) of mild faculties. (3) and (4) practise the dhyānas while (1) and (2) are described without any mention of dhyānas. About the precedence of (3) to (4) see Kośa, VI, p. 212.
but rise higher and higher until they reach the Akaniṭṭha heaven where they attain Nibbāna.\(^1\)

Thus we see that the Hīnayānic Anāgāmi stage is parallel to the Mahāyānic third bhūmi.

The practices of the fourth, fifth and sixth bhūmis correspond to the Adhipaṇḍa practices of the Hīnayānists. In the Bodhisattvabhūmi, three bhūmis are put under Adhiprajñā vihāra, the reason being that the Bodhisattva acquires Prajñā by three different means (tribhīr mukhāḥ), viz., bodhipakṣika dharmas, the four truths, and the causal law. So it subdivides this Vihāra into three.

(i) Bodhipakṣyapuratisamyuktādhiprajñāvihāra (practice of Prajñā with reference to the Bodhipakṣika dharmas);

(ii) Satyapuratisamyuktādhiprajñāvihāra (practice of Prajñā with reference to the Truths);

(iii) Pratityasamutpaḍapuratisamyuktādhiprajñāvihāra (practice of Prajñā with reference to the law of causation).

### IV. Arciṃṭa or Bodhipakṣyapuratisamyuktā-

**dhiprajñā-vihāra**

A Bodhisattva passes from the third to the fourth bhūmi after acquiring the ten dharmālokas,\(^2\) i.e., after obtaining in sight into sattvadhātu (word of sentient beings), lokadhātu (various worlds), dharmadhātu (universe), ākāśadhātu (space), vijnānadhātu (world of consciousness), kāmadhātu (world of desires), rūpadhātu (world of forms), ārūpyadhātu (world of formlessness),

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1. See *Kośa*, VI. 37, p. 213 for two kinds of Urdhvasrotas: (i) Akaniṣṭhayagā and (ii) Naivasanjanāsanjanāyatanagā.

The Akaniṣṭhayagā are divided again into three sub-classes:

(a) Pluta (one who soars high) on account of dhyānas practised by him, he is born in the Brahmakāya heaven and lastly he is born in the Akaniṣṭha heaven where he attains Nirvāṇa;

(b) Ardhapluta (one who soars only half-way); on account of dhyānas practised by him, he is born in the Brahmakāya heaven, from which he passes to Suddhāvāsa and thence to Akaniṣṭha to attain Nirvāṇa there and

(c) Sarvacyuta; before entering into Akaniṣṭha heaven, he passes across all the heavens except Mahābrahmā. An Anāgāmi cannot have two existences in one heaven because he always rises higher and higher.

udārādhyaśayādhimuktidhātu (spheres of noble intention and aspiration) and māhātmyadhyaśayādhimuktidhātu (spheres of magnanimous intention and aspiration).

He becomes an accomplished member of the Tathāgata family by acquiring the following ripeners of knowledge, — unbending aspiration, implicit faith in the three ratnas, clear perception of the origin and decay of saṃskāras, of the non-origination of things in reality, of the incoming and outgoing of the world, of saṃsāra (worldly existences) and nirvāṇa (cessation), and of the actions of beings of the various spheres.

He practises the four smṛtyupasthānas (earnest thoughts) and exerts to acquire further merits and preserve the merits already acquired and not to commit evil actions any more. He practises the ṛdhīpādās, the five indriyas and balas, the seven bojjhangas and the eight mārgas.²

In this bhūmi he gets rid of satkāyadrśti and its relevant factors and performs actions leading to sambodhi.

As he acquires the various qualities of this bhūmi, his mind becomes softer, aspiration stronger, compassion for the sentient beings greater, and consequently he becomes more and more energetic.³ His doubts are removed and his cittāsāya becomes immeasurable.

He now takes ordination.⁴ His kusalamulas become of the purest kind. Of the four saṃgrahavastus, he develops samānārthatā (feeling of equality) and practises the viryapāramitā of the ten pāramitās.

V. Sudurjayā or Satyapratisamāyuktādhiprajñā-vihāra

A Bodhisattva passes from the fourth to the fifth bhūmi by developing the cittāśayavisayavisuddhisamātā⁵ (uniformity and

4. See 1st Bhūmi.
5. The fourth Bhūmi in the Mūl is not clearly described. It mentions some evils, which retard the progress of a Bodhisattva and speaks about the avaiavartika qualities, attained or to be attained. See Śala.1⁴ pp. (1452, 1462-3), which gives a slightly different list.
purity of intention) relating to the following matters: doctrines of the past, present and future Buddhas, mental discipline, removal of wrong views and doubts, knowledge of the right and wrong path, practice of the Bodhipakṣika-dharmas, and the duty of elevating beings morally.

In this bhūmi, on account of the repeated practice of the various Bodhipakṣika dharmas, the possession of a still more purified intention,¹ the comprehension of tathātva (thatness) of all dharmas, and further increase of his aspiration, compassion, love etc., he comprehends the four Āryasatyas.

He becomes proficient in understanding the

(a) Conventional truth (samvrti-satya) on account of catering to the wishes of other beings;
(b) Transcendental truth (paramārtha-satya) on account of following only one path;
(c) Truth of signs (lakṣaṇa) by realising the generic and particular characteristics of things (svasāmānyalakṣaṇa);
(d) Truth of analysis (vibhāga) by knowing the various divisions of dharmas;
(e) Truth of overcoming (nistirāṇa) on account of knowing the real condition of skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, etc.;
(f) Truth of things (vastu) by subjecting his body and mind to afflictions;
(g) Truth of origin (prabhava) on account of births;
(h) Truth of decay and non-origin (kṣayānuttāda) on account of the complete suppression of all sufferings;
(i) Truth of the knowledge of the path (mārgajñātāvatāra); and
(j) Truth of the origin of Tathāgata knowledge (tathāgata-

¹. Cf. B. Bh. p. 16. The Mtu. (p. 110) states that the citta of a Bodhisattva, when passing from the fourth to the fifth bhūmi, realises ādīptaṇ sarvabhavaṁ rāga-dveṣa-mohebhyaḥ. But this is mentioned in the Daśa., in connection with the third bhūmi. The account of the Satai is also different and speaks only of some disciplinary rules. It says that in this bhūmi, a Bodhisattva avoids grhi-saṁsraṇa, bhikṣunīsāmstaṇā, kula-mātsarya, saṃganiṅka gaṅkā-sthāna, ātmoṭkarṣaṇa, vyāpāda, para-paṁsaṇa, daśākusala-karmapatha, māna, stambha, viparyāsa, rāga, dveṣa, moha (Sata., pp. 1450, 1463-5).
jñānasamudaya) on account of attaining knowledge in all its details and for following the bodhisattvabhumis.

Having known the truths he realises that all the constituted things are essenceless, false. He pities the ignorant beings, who undergo repeated births and the consequent sufferings for not knowing the truth, and he wishes that all his merits be transferred to them for their happiness, training and ultimate emancipation.

In this bhūmi he becomes smṛtimān, i.e., does not get bewildered, matimān for having clear knowledge, gatimān for knowing the sense in which a sūtra is uttered, hrīmān for preserving himself as well as others, dhṛtimān for practising the disciplinary rules, and buddhimān for being proficient in ascertaining what is proper and improper and such other things. His desire and energy for acquiring further merits and rendering service to beings become greater and greater. He pleases the beings by means of all the four samgrahavāstus, by showing his rūparāga, by giving discourses on the doctrines, on the Bodhisattva practices, on the greatness of Tathāgatas, on the evils of the world, on the virtue of acquiring Buddhajñāna, and by performing miracles. For establishing the Buddha-dharma he also acquires the secular sciences, viz., mathematics, medicine, poetry, drama, metallurgy, astronomy, etc.

A Bodhisattva on the completion of the mārgas, passes to the sixth bhūmi and realises the ten kinds of sameness, viz., the sameness of all dharma on account of being (i) animitta (baseless), (ii) alakṣana (signless), (iii) anutpāda (originless), (iv) ajāta (unborn), (v) vivikta (detached), (vi) ādiviśuddha (pure in the very beginning), (vii) māśrpaṇca (inexpressible), (viii) anāvāha-niryūha (non-taken and non-rejected), (ix) māyā-svapna-pratibhāsa-pratissrutakopama (similar to dream, illusion, or echo), and (x) bhāvābhāvādāvaya (identity of existence and non-existence).

2. Cf. B. Bh. p. 18. The Mūtuv (I, p. 120) does not speak of anything particular in this bhūmi. It simply states that a bodhisattva by associating with the meditating ascetics (yogācāras) and by developing śamatha and vipaśyanā passes from the 5th to the 6th bhūmi.
Looking upon all things in this manner, the bodhisattva, through his deep faith, reaches the sixth bhūmi but does not yet attain the *anutpattikadharmaṃskāṃśānti* (faith in the non-origination of the things by nature). As mahākarunā predominates in his mind, he pities the beings who, on account of their ignorance, think of the things of the world as originating, decaying and possessing a soul (*ātman*). Not knowing the truth, they walk along the wrong path, are moved by merits and demerits, and thus have some *abhisamskāras* (thought-constructions). The thought-seed (*citta-bijam*) thus produced by the abhisamskāaras becomes contaminated (*sāravāna*), being full of *upādāna* (attachment to existence) and productive of birth, old age, death and rebirth. Then by the thought creation of *karma-kṣetra* (fields of action), ignorance and desire, a net of views is woven, from which appear name and form (*nāma-rūpa*); from them arise in succession the five means of sense, contact, feeling (*vedanā*) *abhinandana* (enjoyment) combined with *ṛṣṇā* (thirst), attachment (*upādāna*), desire for existence (*bhava*), and five skandhas distributed into five classes of beings (*gatipañcaka*). These beings fade into old age, despair, etc. The bodhisattva comprehends that there is really no doer of these, which being by nature are uncreated by any power (*anābhojga, sāntilakṣaṇa*), disappear and there is no destroyer of them. The bodhisattva further realises that the non-comprehension of the highest truth is *avidyā* (ignorance) and this avidyā is the source of samskāras, which produce the first *citta-vijñāna* with its concomitant (*sahaja*) the four *upādāna*-skandhas, from which arise name and form and gradually the mass of sufferings. The tree of suffering grows without any doer, or feeler (*kārakavedakaraḥita*). So he realises that these three worlds are all mere thought-constructions (*cittamātram asad idam traiḍhātukāny*).1

Through his comprehension of the law of causation from the ten different standpoints and on account of his being convinced of the fact that there is no doer or feeler, and no creator (*asvāmika*), and that all things are subject to cause and condition, and devoid of any essence, detached from everything else,

1. The Pratityasamutpāda is explained here from ten different standpoints, see *Dāsa*, pp. 48-51.
and essentially non-existing, the bodhisattva realises the śūnyatā-vimokṣaṃukha (release of essencelessness). Then by comprehending that the bhavaṅgas (the links in the chain of causation) are by nature extinct (svabhāva-nirodha), he does not notice any dharmanimitta (basis of dharmas) and thus he attains animitta-vimokṣaṃukha (release of baselessness). Lastly, on account of his understanding the śūnyatā and animittatā of all bhavaṅgas, he does not really seek any vimokṣa, though he keeps up the appearance of doing so out of compassion for the innumerable beings; hence he obtains apraṇihīta-vimokṣaṃukha (release of desirelessness). Keeping mahākaruṇā before his mind, he completes the bodhyaṅgas, which are still incomplete, and being convinced of the fact that the saṃskāras proceed from the assemblage of, or connection with, materials that are by nature non-originating and non-decaying, he turns his mind to asaṅgajñāna (knowledge free from attachment) called Prajñāpāramitāvihāra and develops it greatly. He now practises all the śūnyatā, animitta and apraṇihīta samādhis and develops ten āśayas for rising higher and higher in the spiritual attainments and goes beyond every possible chance of fall to Śrāvaka or Pratyeka-buddha stage. Of the ten pāramitās he greatly develops the prajñāpāramitā.

A bodhisattva by passing through these bhūmis attains all the qualities of an arhat besides those which are indispensable to a bodhisattva. He is now an arhat because as the Laṅkāvatāra states that he is now free from the thought-constructions (vikalpa), of dhyāna (meditation), dhyeya (objects of meditation), samādhi (concentration), vimokṣa (release), bala (powers), abhiñā (higher knowledge), kleśa (afflictions) and duḥkha (misery).

We have seen that, according to the Hinayānists, an adept, on completion of the paññā practices, becomes an arhat.

3. Śata., p. 1456 states that a Bodhisattva in this bhūmi completes the six pāramitās and avoids the following six thoughts: śrāvakacittam, pratyeka-buddhacittam, paritarṣaṇacittani, anabalinacittam, durmanaskacittam and vikṣepacittam.
4. Laṅkā., p. 120.
Buddhaghoṣa devotes the last twenty chapters of the *Visuddhimagga* to the elucidation of the various matters which comprise the Paññābhūmi. In this bhūmi the adept is accepted to examine analytically the five *skandhas* (constituents of the body), the twelve *āyatanas* (fields of the organs of sense), twenty kinds of indriyas (faculties), four truths and the twelve-linked chain of causation. These are only the preliminary practices of the Paññābhūmi. These help the adepts to complete the bhāvanāmārga. We have seen that the bhāvanāmārga commences in the sixteenth moment. *i.e.*, the last srotāpanna stage. So the adepts, while progressing along the stages of sanctification, complete the sila and citta-visuddhis, and partially the visuddhi relating to paññā. These visuddhis, as classified in the *Visuddhimagga* and the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* are "(i) diṭṭhivisuuddhi (purity of views), kaṇkhāvitarana-visuddhi (purity by which all the sixteen classes of doubts with reference to the past, present and future are transcended); maggāmaggañāṇadassana-visuddhi (purity consisting in distinguishing the actual path from that which is not the path); paṭipadīnāṇadassana-visuddhi (purity of insight during the progress of the practice of discernment), and nāṇadassana-visuddhi (purity-insight or path-insight)." In the arhat stage, the adept gets rid of the five remaining saṅyojanas (uddhabhāgiyas), all kilesas (afflictions), āsavas (impurities) and comprehends finally the real sense of the four truths, *i.e.*, he obtains perfect knowledge and his mind is completely freed. He will have no more rebirth and will attain Nibbāna. This also is borne out by the description of the arhats that we find in the *Prajñāpāramitā* and other Mahāyāna texts. It generally runs thus; an arhat is kṣīṇāsrava (devoid of the four āsravas), nīskleśas (free from afflictions),

3. Mrs. Rhys Davids has lucidly explained these visuddhis in her Intro. to the Compendium; her English rendering has been adopted here; for further details, see *Comp. of Phil.*, pp. 65ff.
5. Buddhaghoṣa calls these five visuddhis sarīra while the sila and citta-visuddhis mūla. See *Vis. M.*, p. 443.
vaśībhūta (with a well-controlled self), suvimuktacittā (with the mind completely freed), suvimuktaprajña (with knowledge cleared up), ājāneya (well-bred), kīṭakṛtya (doer of all that is to be done); apahṛtabhāra (relieved of the burden of five skandhas), anuprāptasvakārtha (successful in achieving the object of life) and parikṣinabhasaṃyojana (free from the fetters of rebirth).

Corresponding to the two classes of sotāpannas called Saddhānusāri and Dhammānusāri, the arhats are also divided into two classes: Ubhatobhāgavimutta and Paññāvimutta. ¹ The former comprises those who realise the eight vimokkhas (releases) and destroy their āsavas (impurities) by pañña (knowledge) while the latter comprises those who do not realise the eight vimokkhas but destroy their āsavas by pañña.²

All the arhats, it seems, did not possess the paṭisambhidas, which a bodhisattva acquires among others in the ninth bhūmi. It is often found that an arhat, who possessed paṭisambhida also, was specially described as saha-paṭisambhidā arhatam pāpuṇi (i.e., attained arhathood with paṭisambhidā).³

With the sixth bhūmi, our comparison of the Hinayānic and Mahāyānic stages end. The accounts of the remaining four bhūmis have nothing to do with the Hinayānic practices, and besides, the attainments for which a bodhisattva performs the tasks of these bhūmis were unknown to the Hinayānists. From the seventh bhūmi really commence the attempts of the bodhisattva to realise the dharmaśūnyatā, the nīrṇīmatā of things cognised, and the four bhūmis only indicate the gradual development of this knowledge of bodhisattvas until the Tathāgata-bhūmi, in which he becomes a perfect Tathāgata and one with all the other Tathāgatas. The Hinayānists, of course, accord a

1. Dīgha, II, pp. 70-1 (up to saññāvedayitanirodha).
2. Dīgha, II, p. 71; Pug. P., p. 14; Aṅguttara, IV, p. 453; Kośa, VI. 63. The Aṅguttara, IV, pp. 452-3, however states that the Paññāvimutta attains the eight vimokkhas, and omits the words ‘kāyena phassitva’ which are mentioned in connection with the Kāyasakkhins and Ubhatobhāgavimuttas.
3. Mil., p. 18; DhP. A., II, pp. 58, 93; Aṅguttara, II, p. 160: Sāriputta attained it within a fortnight after his ordination; Mahāvamsa, pp. 3-6: Pabbhin-natthādiṇānaṃ pitakattayadhārīnaṃ... arhantānaṃ; p.54: chaṭhabhiṅne t-pitaka pabbhinnapaṭisambhide, etc.
very high position to Buddha with the extraordinary power and attributes, some of which are found mentioned in connection with the last four bhūmis.

**VII. Dūraṅgama or Sābhisaṃskāra-sābhoga**

**Nīrṇimitta-vihāra**

A Bodhisattva after completing the bodhisattvamārga enters into the seventh bhūmi. He now commences practising a different and superior part aided by the ten kinds of knowledge of expedients (upāyaprajñā). The ten kinds are as follows: He

i. (a) possesses a mind well-trained by the meditations of śūnyatā, animitta and apranīhitā; (b) appears as if acquiring a collection of great merit and knowledge;

ii. (a) comprehends the essencelessness (nārātmyaniḥsattva) of all dharmas; (b) does not give up the four apramāṇavihāras, vīra, karuṇā, maitri, mudita and upeksā;

iii. (a) collects the best of all merits; (b) does not cling to any dharma;

iv. (a) remains detached from the three dhatus; (b) shows also his doings in the three dhatu;

v. (a) frees himself absolutely from all afflictions (kleśas); (b) performs actions needed for eradicating rāga, dveṣa etc. of beings;

vi. (a) realises the non-duality (advaya) of all things which are like mirage, echo, etc.; (b) shows also his various actions, discriminations, and immeasurable aspirations;

vii. develops a mind well aware of the sameness of all Buddhakṣetras;

viii. (a) merges himself in the dharmakāya of all Buddhas; (b) shows also his rūpa-kāya with its major and minor laksānas;

1. **B. Bh., p. 19.** It should be noted that there are two sections in each of the ten kinds of knowledge or activities of the bodhisattva, the first section being indicated as (a) representing his actual, and the second as (b) the expedients (upāyakausalya) adopted by him for the sake of ordinary human beings.

2. **Laṅkā., p. 192,** states that the bodhisattvas in this bhūmi cannot see the manomaya-dharmakāya of the Tathāgata.
ix. acquires the voice of the Tathāgata; and

x. (a) comprehends the time distinguished as past, present and future as one moment (ekakṣaṇa-tripadhvānubodham); (b) shows also for the sake of the world his existence in the various kalpas.

For even a moment he does not remain dissociated from mārga-abhinirhāra (activities relating to the path), and jñānābhinirhāra (activities relating to jñāna). He completes all the ten pāramitās¹ and the four saṃgrahavastus, four adhiṣṭhānas and thirty-seven bodhipāka-dharmas.² He is now endowed with kāyakarma and vākkarma, pure according to the aspiration of the bodhisattva, the ten kuśalakarmapathas practised by Samyaksambuddhas and performs spontaneously the functions connected with the worldly arts and crafts (sīlpaṃtāna-karmasthāna), which were mastered by him in the fifth bhūmi,¹ and is now the teacher of beings of the three thousand worlds² and has no equal in āsaya (aspiration) and prayoga (exertion) excepting, of course, those bodhisattvas who are in the higher bhūmis. He has now in front of his mind all dhyānas, samādhis, abhijñās and vimokṣas, which will be completed in the following bhūmis. He now practises many samādhis and goes beyond the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha bhūmis and approaches the Prajñā-jñāna-vicaraṇabhūmi.³

He attained nirodha in the sixth bhūmi, and in the seventh, he entered into and arose out of it but it should not be thought that he is subject to nirodha because he is above that delusion (vitarkadosa) of the Śrāvakas, viz., that nirodha is saṃskṛtyantar-vyupāsama (the ultimate cessation of the constituted things).⁴ It is one of the excellences of bodhisattvas that they rise up to,

1. Daśa., pp. 56-7. It will be observed that the pāramitās are counted here as ten i.e., adding to the usual six (7) Upāyakauśalya, (8) Prajñādhāna, (9) Bala and (10) Jñāna.

2. Daśa., pp. 57-8 gives briefly a comparative statement of the previous six bhūmis and the seventh bhūmi. All the attainments acquired hitherto up to the seventh bhūmi are completed spontaneously (anābhogena) by the bodhisattvas in the later bhūmis.

3. Daśa., p. 60 accounts for the reasons of Bodhisattva’s repeating the performances of the first or other bhūmis. Cf. B. Bh., p. 20.

4. In fact this shows the line of demarcation between the Śrāvakas and the Bodhisattvas.
and remain in, the bhūtakoṭi-vihāra (i.e., ultimate possible state sentient existence)¹ but are never subject to nirodha.

Armed with a great power, meditation and knowledge of expediets, he manifests himself in the world, shows his aspiration for Nirvāṇa and surrounds himself with a large number of followers but he remains mentally detached from everything. According to his prāṇidhāna, he appears in the trīdhātu to rescue beings from misery, but he is not contaminated by the worldly impurities. Though he has the Buddhajñāna, he shows himself as belonging to the class of Śrāvakas or Pratyekabuddhas, or even as subject to the snares of Māra and the influences of heretical teachers, going even so far as to sever himself from the Buddhadhharma, take to worldly rites, or the enjoyments of the worlds and heavens.

He sees many Buddhas, hears from them the law, and acts according to their directions. His faith in the abstruse dharma (gambhiradharmaṃśānti) is purified. He greatly develops the upāyakauśalya-pāramitā.²

VIII. Acala or Anābhoga-Nirmittā-vihāra

A Bodhisattva after completing the seven bhūmis and purifying the mārga by means of knowledge and expediets, collecting merits, forming the great resolution (mahāprāṇidhānas), establishing himself in the four adhīṣṭhānav (viz., satya, tyāga, upaśama and prajñā), and so forth, he comprehends that all things are without origin, growth, decay, change and are by nature non-existent, and that their beginning, middle and end are all the same, in short, he comprehends the tathatā

1. Cf. Bhavāraparaṇa—Nevaśāṅkāśaṅkāyata. Kota VI, 37 fn. Cf. also Dīgha, II, p. 156: When Buddha was attaining parinibbāna, it was said that he nevasaṅkāśaṅkāyata-sāṇāpattiyā vaṭṭhatātva saṅkā-vedayita-nirodham. sāṇāpajjī. Then he comes down from there and attains parinibbāna in the fourth jhāna.

2. The Mūla. (I, p. 127) states nothing in particular about this bhūmi except that a bodhisattva practises self-control for doing good to beings. The Sūtra, (p. 1457) speaks of forty dharmas relating to the non-existence of soul and other worldly things, and the realisation of śūnyatā and allied matters. Hence, it gives the gist of the practices mentioned in the Dāsa.
(thatness) of all things. He goes beyond the thought constructions due to citta and manovijnāna and knows that all dhammas are same like ākāśa (that is the faith that things have no origination). As soon as he acquires śānti, he is established in the eighth bhūmi (Acalā) and is above all enjoyments. He is possessed of dhammas which are spontaneous (anābhūga), and hence, has no anxiety for matters relating to kāya, vāk and citta, is free from all thought-constructions produced by the movements of thought and is established in the vipākadharmas (completion). He does not, in fact, practise the rules of conduct (samudācāras) of Bodhisattvas and Śrāvakas.

He is now asked by the Buddhas to exert for acquiring the ten balas and four vaisāradyas, which he up till now has not acquired, and also to take into consideration the ruffled, afflicted, deluded state of mind of the ignorant people. He is then reminded of one of his previous resolutions that dharmatā (i.e. dhammas being without origin, continuity and decay) is not for Tathāgatas only but that the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas should also be made to realise it. He is then asked by the Buddhas to exert for possessing like them immeasurable body, knowledge, worlds, refulgence, purity of mind and limbs, dharma lokas, kṣetras, sattvas and the variety of dhammas of the ten corners of the universe. The possession of immeasurables is of great value, far surpassing all the merits and knowledge acquired in the previous seven-bhūmis, because the merits and knowledge acquired hitherto were by means of exertion (sābhoga-karmāṇa) while in the present bhūmi the merits and knowledge are acquired spontaneously.

On account of his acquiring spontaneously the upāyakausalyajñāna (knowledge of expedients) and as the result of his efforts to acquire omniscience, he comes to know how and when a world comes into being, continues to exist, and then disappears, and which karma is responsible for it. He under-

1. Cf. B. Bh., p. 21. The Mtu. (1, p. 136) simply tells us that the Bodhisattva develops mahākaruṇāsamprayuktaṃ cittaṃ for going from the seventh to the eighth bhūmi and completes the account of the eighth bhūmi by mere enumeration of some legendary names.
2. Cf. B. Bh., p. 22; see also pp. 49, 273.
stands the smallness, greatness, i.e., every minute detail of the four elements, of the various classes of sentient beings, and their fields of action. Such detailed knowledge is needed by a bodhisattva, because he must appear among those sentient beings just as one of them in order to make them feel that he is same as them and that it is possible for every sentient being to become a Buddha.¹

He develops ten *vasítus*—(control) over *āyu* (span of life), *cetas* (mind), *pariśkāra* (requisites), *karma* (action), *upapatti* (origin, i.e., birth) *adhimukti* (aspiration), *pranidhāna* (resolution), *rddhi* (miracles), *dharma* (doctrines) and *jñāna* (knowledge).

The bodhisattva at this stage can be said to possess inconceivable, incomparable, immeasurable knowledge and all actions are always faultless. He now possesses the *pranidhānas*, *adhiśthānas*, *pāramitās*, *mahāmaitri*, *mahākarunā*, *dhāraṇī*, *pratibhāna*, etc., in short, all dharmas, which make a Buddha. Hence, this bhūmi is called Acala and there is no possibility of his going back from this bhūmi (*avaivṛtyabhūmi*). He is now a member of the Buddha family, and may be said to possess the Buddha gotra. He is henceforth constantly attended by all the gods and Vajrapāṇi.²

IX. Sādhumati or Pratisamvīdhāra

A Bodhisattva after acquiring and developing the apramāṇa jñānas, dhāraṇīs, samādhis, abhijñās, minute knowledge of the lokadhātus, balas, and the vaiśāradyas of the Tathāgata mentioned in the previous bhūmi, enters into the ninth bhūmi.³

At this stage, he knows truly whether the dharmas are good, bad or indifferent, pure or impure, worldly or transcendental, conceivable or inconceivable, definite (*niyata*) or indefinite.  

1. Daśa., pp. 67-70 refers to the minute details of this knowledge, which is called Sarvākāratā. The details are passed over here. See also Karikā (Bibl. Buddhica), p. 1.

2. Daśa., p. 1458 gives the attainments of this bhūmi. These are similar to those described in the Daśa, Cf. Laṅkā, p. 192.

3. Mtu., I, p. 141 mentions only some legendary names in this bhūmi and speaks of nothing else.
(aniyata), constituted or unconstituted. He knows the duties of
the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, Bodhisattvas, and the Tathāgata-
bhūmi. By the intelligence thus derived, he knows correctly
the habits or the nature of thoughts of beings, their affliction
(kleśa), actions (karma), faculties (indriya) aspiration (adhimukti), elements (dhātu), desire and intention (āśayānusāraya),
birth according to desires (vāānusanādhi) and the rāsis (i.e.,
gotras). He knows the multifarious nature (nānātva) of thoughts
(citta), afflictions, karma, etc.

The bodhisattva in this bhūmi is in a position to have a
very minute knowledge of the aims and qualities of every being
and so he is now capable of deciding the way, in which a being
is to be guided to the goal. He therefore modifies his teaching
according to his judgment.

He also takes the form of a dharmaḥanaka¹ (preacher of
dharmas) in order to preserve the doctrines of the Teacher.
On account of his immeasurable knowledge, he preaches the
dharma in various ways, adopting the four pratisarvavidas (bran-
ches of logical analysis).² By the practices of these prati-
sarvavidas and working as a dharma-preacher, he becomes a
receptacle of dharma utterances. Possessed of dhāranis and
pratibhānas he preaches the dharma to beings of all loka-
dhātus and does the same in an infinite number of ways.

Even in this bhūmi he continues his own spiritual practices
and never gets out of the sight of Buddhas. He greatly deve-
lops the bala-paramitā. If he wishes, he can now become a
Mahābrāhma.³

X. Dharmameghā or Parama-vihāra

A bodhisattva on completion of the duties of the ninth

2. Viz., Dharma (nature or condition), Artha (analysis), Nirukti (etymo-
logical analysis) and Pratibhāna (context). It is difficult to find suitable
expressions for the Pratisarvavidas. An idea, however, can be formed from the
illustrative passages given in the Daśa., pp. 77-8.
3. See Śata., p. 1458. It speaks of quite different matters, some of
which appears in Mtu., I, p. 142, in connection with the tenth bhūmi.
bhūmi passes to the tenth. Now he masters countless samādhis, and as the result, a lotus of infinite splendour and size appears and he is found to be seated on it with an equally resplendent body and established in the samādhi of omniscience (sarva-jñānaviśeṣābhiṣeka) surrounded by countless bodhisattvas, who are not yet in any one of the nine bhūmis and all looking at him. The rays of light issue forth from his body and make all beings happy. While he is thus seated on the lotus, rays come forth from the Tathāgatas and consecrate him as a Samyaksambuddha possessed of omniscience, and hence this bhūmi is called Abhiṣekabhūmi.

He now knows thoroughly how the world and its dharmas appear and disappear, the innumerable functions of a Buddha, the countless bodhisattva-vimokṣamukhas, samādhis, dhāraṇīs, etc. He is now possessed of such smṛti-kauṣalya (expedients of memory) that he can hold all dharmas showered on him (dharmameghā) by infinite Buddhas. He can perform any kind of miracle. In this bhūmi he greatly develops the jñānapāramitā.

It is after the tenth bhūmi that a Bodhisattva becomes a Tathāgata, and so the Lankāvatāra calls this stage Tathāgata-bhūmi. The Šatasāhasrikā also remarks that a Bodhisattva in the tenth bhūmi can be called a Tathāgata.

In the Hinayāna literature one does not expect any account corresponding to that of the last four bhūmis. The conception of Buddha among the Hinayānists is more or less hazy and that is due to the fact that the introduction of the Bodhisattva

1. The Mtu., I, p. 142, has nothing corresponding to the account of the Daśa. It mentions something connected with the Bodhisattva's descent from the Tuṣita heaven and birth in the world of nectaral beings.


3. The wonders of the lotus rays described here are found as well as in the Prajñāpāramitās and other Mahāyāna works.


5. Šata p. 1472 says that the bodhisattva in this bhūmi obtains, besides, the pāramitās, Tathāgata-balas, four vaiśāradyas and four pratisamvīds, eighteen avemikadharmas, sarvākāraśīnta, sarvavāsanāklesānusandhiprahāṇa and sarvabuddhadharmaparāyaṇa.


7. Šata p. 145.
conception in their literature was only an afterthought, suggested undoubtedly by the Mahāyānic speculations. They carefully avoided all metaphysical conceptions introduced by the Mahāyānist in connection with the Bodhisattva and Buddha conceptions, though they could not offer a similar treatment to the devotion-inspiring stories of the lives of the Bodhisattvas. The Hinayānists, consistent with their doctrinal principles incorporated in their literature a life of Buddha preceded by a short account of the Bodhisattva lives under the headings Dūrenidāna and Avidūrenidāna.1 These two Nidānas are nothing but the gist of stories current among the Mahāyānists and possess trace, though very slight, of borrowings. Apart from the expressions like Buddha-bija2 and Abhinirhāra,3 the passage in which Sumedha brāhmaṇa says, “I have no need of nibbāna by destroying the kīleṣas, like Dīpaṅkara Dasa-balā, I shall attain the highest sambodhi and by means of the boat of dharma, I shall lead the men across the sea of transmigration and attain parinibbāna,”4 shows clearly Mahāyānic, or at least, semi-Mahāyānic traces. But the Hinayānists rejected not only the metaphysical speculations but also the stereotyped list of pāramis of the Mahāyānists. The Jātaka as well as the Mahābodhiṃśa5 states that the Buddhakāraka dhamma is only ten pāramis, viz., dāna, sīla, nekhamma, paññā, viriya, khanti, sacca, adhiṭṭhāna, mettā, and upekkhā. This is a list of their own making and does not agree with the Mahāyānic list.6 

Of the extraordinary spiritual powers attained by a Buddha, the Hinayānists say very little. We have in the Nikāyas the remark that Buddhas (including Paccekabuddhas) attain perfect knowledge by themselves, and by following the dhamma unheard before.7 A Samyaksambuddha preaches the dhamma and becomes the founder of a religion, and the leader of men and gods. He is sabbāññu (omniscient) and his knowledge of

2. Ibid, I, p. 16.
3. Ibid., I, p. 7.
6. Ibid., p. 25; Mahābodhiṃśa, p. 9.
any matter whatsoever does not require any āvajjana (reflection); he possesses ten balas and four vesārajjas. In the Kathāvathu there is a discussion on this topic, viz., whether the powers of a Tathāgata are the same as those of a Sāvaka—a point raised by the Andhakas on the basis of the Anuruddha-samyutta. Among the powers of Buddha referred to there is nothing very special except the few mentioned above, and the Theravādins were driven to an uncomfortable position by the question of the Andhakas. In their literature Hinayānists try to prove that Buddha is a rare being and superior to men and gods, but they mention also that there is hardly any distinction between an Arhat and a Buddha except that the latter is a founder and teacher of a religion.

1. Majjhima, I, p. 482 subbaññu sabbassāvi aparisesaṃ nāṇadassanaṃ paṭijānāti,
2. Kvet., III, 1. 2.
4. For a comparison of Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and buddhas see above and also Dialogues of Buddha, II, 1-3; III. 6.
### TABULAR STATEMENT SHOWING THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HINAYĀNIC AND MAHĀYĀNIC BHŪMIS

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| III. | Anāgāmi :- | III. | Prabhākari | V. | Adhiśilavihāra | VI. | Vitarāga-bhūmi | III. | Puṣpamanḍitā |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| The last mentioned is again subdivided into |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
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CHAPTER V

CONCEPTION OF KĀYA

The first point of difference between the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna schools noticed in the Saddharma-Puṇḍarika, viz. that Buddha makes a show of his existence in the three dhātus, leads us to an examination of the question of the Kāyas of Buddha as conceived by the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists. Of the Hīnayāna schools, the Sthaviravādins had very little to do with the kāya conceptions, as Buddha was to them an actual man living in this world like any other human being and subject to all the frailties of a mortal body. Metaphorically they sometimes spoke of Buddha as identical with Dhamma without any metaphysical implication but these remarks gave an opportunity to the Sarvāstivādins and the Mahāyānists to put forth their theories of Dharma-kāya.

The Sarvāstivādins commenced speculating on the kāya of Buddha, but it was the school of the Mahāsaṅghikas that took up the question of kāya in right earnest and paved the way for the speculations of the Mahāyānists.

The early Mahāyānists, whose doctrines are mostly to be found in the Aṣṭadāsasahasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, along with the school of Nāgārjuna (i.e., Mādhyamika) conceived of two kāyas: (i) Rūpa (or Nirmāṇa) kāya, denoting bodies, gross and subtle, meant for beings in general, and (ii) Dharmakāya, which was used in two senses, one being the body of Dharma, (i.e., collection of practices), which makes a being a Buddha, and the other the metaphysical principle underlying the universe—the Reality (Tathatā).

The Yogācāra school distinguished the gross rūpakāya from the subtle rūpakāya, naming the former Rūpa- or Nirmāṇa-kāya and the latter Sambhoga-kāya. The Lankāvatāra, representing the earliest stage of the Yogācāra, conceives the Sambhoga-kāya as Niṣyanda-buddha or Dharmaniṣyanda-buddha (the Buddha produced by the Dharma). The
Sūtrakāra uses the term Sambhogakāya for Niṣyandabuddha and Svābhāvikakāya for Dharmakāya. In the Abhisamayālaṅkārakārikā and the recast version of the Pañcavinīśati-sāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, Sambhogakāya denotes the subtle body which the Buddhas adopted for preaching the doctrines to Bodhisattvas, and Dharmakāya the body purified by the practice of the bodhipakṣika and other dharmas, which constitute a Buddha. For the metaphysical Dharmakāya these texts use the term Svabhāva or Svabhavikakāya. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi retains the conception of the Kārikā but adopts a new term Svasambhogakāya to denote the Dharmakāya of the Kārikā and distinguishes the Sambhogakāya by naming it Parasambhogakāya.

**REALISTIC CONCEPTION OF BUDDHA IN THE Nikāyas**

In a land where the tendency to deify saints is so strong, that it lies to the credit of the early Hinayānists that they were able to retain the human conception of Buddha even a century or two after his actual existence, when the scriptures may be regarded as having been put into a definite shape. They gave expression to their conception of Buddha in the following words:

*Bhagavā arahat sammāsambuddho vijjācaraṇasampanno lokavidū anuttaro purisadammasārathi satthā devamanussānam buddho bhagavā. So imaṃ lokam sadevakaṃ sabrahmakam sasamāraṇaṃ pajaṃ sadevaṃ sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti. So dhammaseti ādi-kalyāṇam, etc.*

[The Blessed One is an arhat, a fully awakened one, endowed with knowledge and good conduct, happy, a knower of the world, unsurpassed, a leader able to control men, a teacher of men and gods, the awakened, the blessed. He knows thoroughly the worlds of gods, māras, recluses, brahmins and men, and having known them he makes his knowledge known to others. He preaches the *dhamma* (doctrines), which is excellent in the beginning, middle and end, etc.]

2. Digha, I, pp. 87-88; of Lal, Vis., p. 3; Sad. P., pp. 144, 376.
A description like this does not suggest that Buddha was originally more than a man, a mortal. In the cosmology of the Buddhists, the gods of the various heavens, the highest of which is Brahma-loka,\(^1\) are only beings of superior merit and power, but they are inferior, in the matter of spiritual attainments, to the saints or arhats. So in this description, the Hinayānists do not attribute any transcendental or theistic element to Buddha. All they say is that Śākyamuni, by pure and simple spiritual culture in this life and as a result of the accumulated merits of his previous lives, reached the highest stage of perfection and attained not only knowledge and power superior to any man and god but also the highest knowledge and power attainable. In the *Majjhima Nikāya*, Ānanda explains why Buddha should be considered superior to the Arhats as well, although both arrived at the same goal. He says that there is not a single bhikkhu, who can be regarded as endowed with all the qualities in all their forms as possessed by Buddha. Moreover, a Buddha is the originator of the path not existing before, a knower and promulgator of the mārga, which is only followed by the sāvakas.\(^2\)

**Nikāya passages admitting a non-realistic conception**

In the face of such descriptions of Buddha, it would have been difficult for the later Hinayāna schools to sublimate the human elements in him, had it not been for certain expressions in some of the earlier works of the Piṭaka, which lent themselves to other interpretations. Some of these expressions are:

1. Yo vo Ānanda mayā dhammo ca vinayo ca desito paññatto so vo mam accayena satthā.

(Buddha said to Ānanda just before his parinibbāna ‘the dhamma and vinaya that have been preached by me will be your teacher after my death’).\(^3\)

The dhamma and vinaya clearly refer to the collection of doctrines and disciplinary rules delivered by Buddha. It is also

1. In the Mahāyānic works also, as for instance, in the *Daśa*, it is stated that a Bodhisattva can become a Mahābrahmā in the ninth bhūmi if he so wished.

This passage occurs in many places of the *Nikāyas*. 

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\(^1\) In the Mahāyānic works also, as for instance, in the *Daśa*, it is stated that a Bodhisattva can become a Mahābrahmā in the ninth bhūmi if he so wished.

\(^2\) *Majjhima*, III, p. 8.

\(^3\) *Dīgha* II, p. 154; *Mil*, p. 99.
evident from the conversation of Ānanda with Gopaka-Moggallāna, in which the former explains why the monks after Buddha's death should not be regarded as without refuge (appāṭisaraṇa). He says that they have now a refuge in Dhamma (dhamma-paṭisaraṇa), which, he points out, are the doctrines and disciplinary rules.\(^1\)

\(2\) Bhagavatō'mhi putto oraso mukhato jāto dhammadayo dhammnimmito dhhammadāyado iti.\(^2\) Taṃ kissa hetu? Tathāgatassa h' etam adhivacanam. Dhammakāyo iti ṁi Brahmakāyo iti pi, Dhammadbhūto\(^3\) iti pi ti.

Just as a brāhmaṇa would say that he is born of Brahmā, through his mouth — Brahmāno putto oraso mukhato jāto brahmaṇo brahmanimmito brahmadāyado — so a Śākyaputriya brāhmaṇa may say that he is born of Bhagavā, through his mouth, born of his doctrine, made of his doctrine, etc. Though in this passage Dhamma is equated to Brahmā, the context shows that there is no metaphysical sense in it; it is only to draw a parallel between a brāhmaṇa and a Śākyaputriyasamaṇa that Dhammakāya is equated to Brahmakāya.

\(3\) Vakkali on his death-bed became very eager to see Buddha in person; so Bhagavā came to him and said:

\(\text{Alaṃ Vakkali kim te pūtikāyena diṭṭhena. Yo kho Vakkali dhamman passati so māṇi passati. Yo māṇi passati so dhamman passati.}\)

Just after saying this, Buddha referred to his dhamma of impermanence (anicca). There are in the Nikāyas many passages of this import, which may well be taken as precursors of the later Mahāyānic conceptions and probably formed the basis of their speculations. But the passages, when read as they stand, do not appear to bear any metaphysical sense. In this passage Buddha refers to his body as pūtikāya (body of impure

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1. *Majjhima, Gopaka-Moggallāna Sutta* (No. 108). Cf. *Saddhamma Saṅgaha* (*JPTS.*, 1890), ch. x, p. 65: Buddha says “84,000 dhammakhandhas have been preached by me in 45 years, I alone only pass away while there are 84,000 dhammakkhandas, which like 84,000 Buddhas (Buddha-sadisa) will admonish you.”

2. *Samyutta*, II, p. 221; *Majjhima*. III, p. 29 has the identical passage with the addition “no āmisadāyado” after “dhammadāyado.” For the interpretation of “dhammadāyado” see *Majjhima*, I. pp. 12f.

3. *Majjhima*, II, p. 84; *Digga*, III, p. 84; *Majjhima*, III, pp. 195, 224 has “Bhagavā jānami jānāti passati cakkhubhūto hānabhūto dhammabhūto.”
matter), and to lay stress on his doctrines, he says that his dhamma should be looked upon with the same awe and reverence by his disciples as they regarded his person.

(4) The passage in the Aṅguttara Nikāya, where Buddha says that he is neither a god, nor a gandhabba, nor a man, has been taken by Prof. Masson-Oursel as showing trace of the Mahāyānic kāya conceptions. It is not impossible to read some metaphysical ideas into the passage, though probably the compiler of the Suttas did not mean to convey them. Droṇa brāhmaṇa, noticing the sign of wheel in the feet of Buddha, enquired of him whether he was a deva, a gandhabba, a yakṣa or a mortal. Buddha replied that he was none of these beings as he had got rid of the āsavaś (impurities) by the continuance of which one remains a deva, gandhabba, yakṣa or a mortal. Just as a lotus is born in water, grows in it but it remains above and is apart from it, so also Buddha was born in the world, grew up in it but overcame it (abhibhūya) and lived unaffected by the same. Therefore, he asked the brāhmaṇa not to regard him as anything but the Buddha.

There are other passages referring to the miraculous powers of Buddha, viz., his ability to live a kalpa or to assume different forms and perform such other miracles, but it should be noted that these powers were attributed not to Buddha alone but also to his disciples in general, who had been able to attain the higher stages of sanctification.

1. Saṁyutta, III, p. 120; Majjhima, I, pp. 190, 191: Yo paṭiccasamuppādam passati, yo dhamman passati, yo paṭiccasamuppādam passati. For other references, see Prof. Vallée Poussin's article "Notes sur les Corps du Buddha" in Le Muséon, 1913, pp. 259-290. Compare the remarks in the later Pāli works.—

Saddhamma Saṅgāha (JPTS., 1890), p. 61:
Yo me passati saddhamman so maṁ passati Vakkali,
Apaṭṭamano saddhamman maṁ pase pi na passati.

Milinda, p. 71: Yo dhamman passati so bhagavantam passati, nidassetum
dhammo hi mahārāja bhagavāt desito ti.

Ibid., p. 73: Dhammakāyena pana kho mahārāja sakyā bhagavā nidassetum,
dhammo hi mahārāja bhagavatā desito ti.


4. See Kota, II, 10 also for references to the Nikāyas.
Kāya-conception of the Theravādins Remains Unchanged

Even if it be assumed that the Mahāyānic ideas are latent in the above-mentioned expressions, though not adequately expressed, the discussion in the Kathāvatthu to establish the historical existence of Buddha as against those who denied it, and the manner in which references were made to the events of Buddha’s life as depicted in the Nikayas leaves no vestige of doubt about the opinion of the Theravādins regarding the kāya of Buddha.

Though the terms rūpakāya and dharmakāya found their way into the later Pāli works from Mahāyāna or semi-Mahāyāna works, these did not bring with them any non-realistic sense. Buddhaghoṣa even as late as the fifth century A. D. refers thus to the kāyas:

_To pi so Bhagavā asiti anuwayaṇjana-patimandita-dvattittsamahāpurisalakkhana-vicitra-rūpakāyo sabbākārapisuddha-silakkhandhādīguratana-samiddha-dhammakāya yasamahatta-puṇāmahatta........appati-puggalo arahaṭṭ samma-sambuddho._

(That Bhagava, who is possessed of a beautiful rūpakāya, adorned with eighty minor signs and thirty-two major signs of a great man, and possessed of a dhammakāya purified in every way and glorified by śīla, samādhi, etc., full of splendour and virtue, incomparable and fully awakened). 4

Though Buddhaghoṣa’s conception was realistic, he was not immune from the religious bias of attributing super-human powers to Buddha. In the Attha sālinī he says that during the three months of his absence from the world while Buddha was engaged in preaching Abhidhamma to his mother in the Tusita

1. Kuu., xvii, 1 : The Vetulyakas held on the basis of the passage cited above that “it is not right to say that the exalted Buddha lived in the world of mankind.” The Theravādins did not agree with them. Buddhaghoṣa also pointed out how the passage should be interpreted.

2. See e. g., Sad. Saṅ. (JPTS., 1893), p. 69 :
_Sambuddhānaṃ deve kāya rūpakāyo siriddharo,
Yo tehi desito dhammo dhammakāyo ti vuccati._

3. The five khandas referred to here are śīla, samādhi, pañña, vimutti and vimuttīñāṇadassana. See Mil., p. 98.

4. Vis. M., p. 234; Jātaka, I, p. 84; Rūpakāyasiri.

5. Attha., p. 16.
heaven, he created some *Nimmita-buddhas* as exact replicas of himself. These Nimmitabuddhas could not be distinguished from the real Buddha in voice, words and even the rays of light that issued forth from his body. The created Buddha could be detected only by the gods of the higher classes and not by the ordinary gods or men of the world.

In short, the early Hīnayānists conceived Buddha’s *rūpakāya* as that of a human being,¹ and his *dhammakāya* as the collection of his dhammas, *i.e.*, doctrines and disciplinary rules collectively.

**Conception of the Sarvāstivādins**

The other school, the Sarvāstivādins, who retained the realistic conception of Buddha, differed a little from the Theravādins. Unfortunately their original Piṭakas in Sanskrit are lost beyond recovery and we have to depend for our information about them on the few fragmentary pieces of their literature discovered in Central Asia, or in the Chinese translations of their Āgamas, in which again very little spade-work has yet been done.² Our main source of information at present is the *Abhidharamakośa*, made accessible to us from Chinese by the monumental French translation of Professor La Vallée Poussin. The *Kośa*, again, it should be noted, is the work of a systematiser and the production of a time much later than that of the Āgamas, to which it bears the same relation as the *Visuddhimagga* does to the Pāli Piṭakas. As the present state of our knowledge indicates that the *Divyāvadāna* and the *Lalitavistara*³ originally belonged to this school, though these were recast by the Mahāyānists, we should examine with caution some of the statements found in them regarding the kāya conception.

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1. See Prof. La Vallée Poussin’s *Buddhisme*, pp. 232f.
2. Dr. Chizen Akanuma (*Eastern Buddhist*, II, p. 7) quotes some passages from the Chinese Aṅguttara and Saṁyukta Āgamas and shows that the *dharmakāya* of Buddha denoted the collection of dhammas (teachings).
I. Divyāvadāna

There are a few passages in the Divyāvadāna throwing light on the rūpakāya and dharmakāya of Buddha and bearing the identical sense of the Pāli works. On the occasion Śrōṇa Koṭikarṇa said that, through the grace of his teacher, he had seen the dharmakāya of Buddha, but as he was anxious to see the rūpakāya, he wanted to go to the place where Buddha was living at the time.¹ Upagupta once said to Māra that he had seen the dharmakāya only and requested him to show him the rūpakāya. Māra thereupon made an image (vigraha) of Buddha replete with all the major and minor signs of great men.² In the answer that king Rudrāyaṇa gave to Bimbisāra that

“na rājan kṛpāṇo loke dharmakāyena saṃsrṣet”

[let not, O king, an irreligious person³ attain (lit. touch) the dharmakāya],

the word “dharmakāya” may bear a metaphysical interpretation but the context does not warrant it.⁴ The remark made by Asoka, after Upagupta had pointed out to him the stūpa of Ānanda, makes the sense of dharmakāya quite explicit. It runs thus: “That body which you all call pure, excellent and made of dharma (dharmatmano dharmamayo) was borne (dhāritam) by him called Viśoka (=Ānanda) and therefore his stūpa deserves great honour. The lamp of dharma, the dispeller of darkness of afflictions that shone still among men was due to the power of him, the son of Sugatendra, and therefore, should be worshipped with special reverence.”⁵

There are, however, Avadānas in the Divyāvadāna, which were not without some Mahāyānic tint, for, we read in the Rudrāyaṇavadāna,⁶ as we usually find in the Mahāyānic works,

1. Divyā., p. 19.
2. Ibid., p. 360.
3. Ibid., p. 560: kṛpāṇa is defined thus:
   yas tu dharmavirāṅghram adharme nirato rūpah,
   sa rājan kṛpāṇo jñeyas tamastamaḥparāyanaḥ.
4. Ibid., p. 560.
that rays of light issued forth from Buddha's mouth when he smiled, irradiating the beings of heaven and hell. It is noteworthy that the *Atthasālīni* also speaks of *raṃsis* (rays of light) of six colours issuing out of Buddha's body. It seems that the Mahāyānic ideas were percolating gradually into the rocky soil of the conservative Theravādins.

II. Lalitavistara

The *Lalitavistara* gives us a picture of Buddha more superhuman than human and yet far from the Mahāyānic conceptions of the Sambhogakāya and Dharmakāya, though in the last two chapters it dwells on the doctrine of Tathatā. In the *Lalitavistara* Buddha is deified but there are no traces of the Trikāya conception. It says in many places that Buddha appears in the world of men for *lokānuvartana* (i.e. to follow the ways of the world), which, if he so desired, he could avoid by remaining in one of the heavens and attaining emancipation there. The running account of Buddha's life is interrupted at times — probably these are afterthoughts of the compiler — by dialogues between Buddha and Ānanda, in order to make the treatise appear Mahāyānic and not Hinayānic. At one place Buddha explains to Ānanda that, unlike human beings, he did not stay in the filth of mother's womb but in a jewel-casket (*ratnavyūha*) placed in the womb, which was as hard as adamant but soft to the touch like the down of a Kācilindika bird, and that his birth and other events connected with it were all superhuman. At the same time, he prophesied that there will be, in the future, men unrestrained in act, thought and speech, ignorant, faithless, proud, believing without deliberation what is heard by them, who will not believe in the superhuman nature of his birth. One can perceive through.

3. *Vis.*, *M.* pp. 88, 105, 106. This formed one of the points of contention of the Mahāsaṅghikas. See Masuda, *Early Origin etc.*, in the *Asia Major*, Vol. II.
the poetical exaggerations of the *Lalitavistara* that it has in view the historical Buddha endowed with the major and minor signs — a human being after all, who requires to be reminded by the heavenly musicians of the acts of his past lives and his resolution to become a Buddha and rescue beings from misery, and who needs a stimulus to renounce the world in order to fulfil his resolution.¹ In connection with the offer of houses, which were made by the gods to the Bodhisattva when he was in the womb, it is said that in order to please all the gods who offered houses, he caused his appearances by means of the Mahāvyūha samādhi. This does not clearly reflect any idea of the Nirmāṇakāya — it appears more like some of the miracles mentioned in the *Nikāyas*. In the last chapter of the *Lalitavistara* where Buddha’s attributes are mentioned, he is called the great tree (*mahādruma*) because he possessed a body of *Dharmakāyajñāna* (knowledge of Dharmakāya).² As this chapter is very likely a Mahāyāna addition, we may reasonably say that the *Lalitavistara* in its original form was a treatise of the Sarvāstivādins, who viewed Buddha as a human being with superhuman attributes.

### III. Abhidharmakośa

We may now consider the writings of Vasubandhu, the great exponent of the Sarvāstivāda school. In his *Abhidharmakośa* he imparted a new meaning to the words Dharmakāya and Rūpakāya. In examining the three Šarāṇas, he tried to bring out the real sense of *Buddha*, *Dharma* and *Sāṅgha*, in which a devotee takes refuge. He said that those who take refuge in Buddha do, in fact, take refuge in the *dharmas* (qualities), which constitute a *Buddha* (*buddhakāraka*), i.e., the dharmas by the acquisition of which a person is called a Buddha, or in other words, the dharmas by the acquisition of which a person understands all things. These dharmas are *kṣayajñāna* (knowledge of

¹. The descriptions gave opportunity to the Mahāyānists to invent Upāyakauśalya Pāramītā, the duties of Adhyēṣanā, Yācanā, etc.
the destruction of misery), \textit{anutpāda jñāna} (knowledge of the further non-origination of misery) and \textit{samyagdrṣṭi} (right view) of the Aśaikṣas together with the dharmas attendant to the jñāna, \textit{viz.} the five pure skandhas. A dharmakāya is formed of these dharmas. In another place, while showing the sameness of the Dharmakāyas of all Buddhas, he explained the Dharmakāya as a series of pure dharmas, or rather a renewal of the psycho-physical organism of the substratum \textit{unāsravadharmasamātāna, āśrayoparāyaṃtī}.\textsuperscript{2} The Dharmakāya then signified a new purified personality or substratum (āśraya), but it is pointed out that such a Dharmakāya is possessed also by an arhat.\textsuperscript{3} In the \textit{Sūrālāṃkāra}\textsuperscript{4} such a Dharmakāya is attributed to the mother of Śākyamuni or to an advanced upāsaka. Thus, it is seen that the \textit{Kośa} has two interpretations of the Dharmakāya, one being the qualities adhering to a Buddha and the other being the purified personality (āśraya) possessed by him. The \textit{Kośa}, in fact, replaces the concrete conceptions of the Dharmakāya found in the \textit{Nikāyas} and the \textit{Divyāvadāna} by an abstract one. In the last two works the Dharmakāya signified only the doctrines, \textit{viz.}, the Bodhipakkhiya dharmas or Anicca, Dukkha and Anatta, together with the \textit{Vinaya} rules contained in the \textit{Pātimokkha}, while to Vasubandhu it meant the qualities adhering to a Buddha as well as the purified personality (āśraya).

1. \textit{Kośa}, VII, 67 explains that Kṣayajñāna with Anutpāda jñāna makes Bodhi. On account of difference among saints in the acquisition of these jñānas, Bodhi is said to be of three kinds: Śrāvakabodhi, Pratyekabuddhabodhi and Anuttarasamayaksambodhi. By the above two jñānas one completely abandons ignorance (aśeṣāvidyāprahānāt); by the first, one realises the truth that his task is accomplished (\textit{i.e.}, duḥkha has been realised by him); by the second, one realises that his task is no more to be accomplished (\textit{i.e.}, duḥkha has been realised by him and he will not have to exert any more.)

The samyagdrṣṭi of the Aśaikṣas is to see things as they are really, to know truly the general character (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of dharmas. See \textit{Kośa}, VI, 50 fn. For a note on the Kṣayajñāna, see Masuda, \textit{Early Origin etc.}, in \textit{Asia Major}, Vol. II, Fasc. I.


Referring to the formulae of the Śaraṇas, Vasubandhu says that as the physical body (rūpakāya) of Buddha does not undergo any modification by the acquisition of the quality of Buddha, one should not take refuge in the rūpakāya of Buddha, which is, in fact, the rūpakāya of the Bodhisattva and hence sāsrava (impure). Just as a man would respect a monk for the qualities adhering to him and not for his person, so a devotee should take refuge in Buddha tva and not in Buddha the person. In the same way, Vaśubandhu explains the two śaraṇas, viz., Dharma and Saṅgha, the former being explained as Nirvāṇa, or the three Truths—Dukkha, Samudaya and Mārga, or Sukha, Duḥkha and Asukha-adukkha — and the latter as the qualities that a saṅgha of monks is expected to possess.¹

The Vibhāṣā informs us that there are some, who believe that to take refuge in Buddha is to take refuge in the body constituted by the head, nape of the neck, belly, back, hands and feet of the Tathāgata. Some say that as the body is born of parents, it is impure (sāsrava) and therefore it should not be a place of refuge. The refuge should be the Asaikṣa dharman, which make a Buddha, i.e., the Dharmakāya.² Apparently the Vibhāṣā refers in the first instance to the earlier Hinayāna schools and in the second to the Sarvāstivādins and their offshoots.

Allied Dharma-kāya Conception among the Satyasiddhis and the Mahāyānists

The Satyasiddhi school takes almost the similar view of the Dharmakāya as the Sarvāstivādins. According to it, the Dharmakāya is made of sīla, samādhi, prajñā, vimuktī and vimuktijñānādārśana. Buddhaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna and the author of the Milindapañha also refer to such a dharmakāya.³ It means that the body of Buddha was purified by the practices of these

1. Compare the formula of Śaraṇa in the Nikāyas, e.g., Dīgha III, p. 227.
2. Kośa, VI, p. 32; IV, p. 76n.; VIII, p. 34.
3. Vis. M., p. 234; M. Vr. (as opinion of non-Mādhyamikas), p. 423; Mil., p. 98.
five skandhas stated above, and hence it can be called Dharma-
kāya. But as these purifications are obtained by Arhats also,
Harivarman, the propounder of the Satyasiddhi school, distin-
guished the Dharma-kāya of Buddha by saying that his
Dharma-kāya consisted not only of the above five purificatory
practices but also of ten powers (daśa bala), four proficiencies
(vaiśāradya) and the three recollections (smṛtyupasthāna), which
the Arhats cannot obtain.¹

The Abhisamayālaṅkāra-kārikā² and Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrika-
prajñāpāramitā,³ important text-books of the Yogācāra school,
define the Dharma-kāya in a similar sense. These state that
the various dharmas, viz., Bodhipakṣikas, Apramāṇas, Vimokṣas,
Samāpattis and so forth, constitute Sarvajñatā (omniscience)
and Sarvajñatā is the Dharma-kāya. It should be noted that the
Kārikā and the Prajñāpāramitā use this expression in a sense
different from that current in the Mahāyāna texts. They really
mean the Svasambhogakāya of the later Vijñānavādins.

The Prajñāpāramitās also maintain the conception that the
Dharma-kāya is produced by dharmas, the highest of which is,
according to them, the prajñāpāramitā, i.e., the knowledge,
which helps a person to realise the dharma-śūnyatā. The
Aṣṭaḍasaśāhasri-kā takes up the question, whether the honour
shown to the relics of the Tathāgatakāya is more meritorious
than the honour shown to the Prajñāpāramitā, e.g., by making
a copy of it. The answer given is that the relics depend on the
body purified by the prajñāpāramitā, and therefore it is the
source of Buddhas. The source deserves more honour than the
remnants of the fruit (i.e., relics of Buddha) produced therefrom,
and therefore it is more meritorious to honour the Prajñā-
pāramitā than the relics.⁴ It adds that all teachings of Buddha
issue from the Prajñāpāramitā, and the Dharma-bhāṣakas
preserve and propagate them; so the Dharma-bhāṣakas should
also be respected. They are protected by the Dharma-kāya, the-

¹. Sogen, Systems etc., pp. 181, 182.
². Kārikā, ch. viii.
³. Pañca., (ASB. ms.) leaf 224a.
⁴. Aṣṭa., ch. iv.
Prajñāpāramitā. Sarvajñatā (omniscience) is pervaded (paribhāvita) by the prajñāpāramitā; from Sarvajñatā issues the body of Tathāgata, the relics of whom are worshipped; hence Prajñāpāramitā deserves greater honour.1

HĪNAYĀNIC SPECULATIONS:
(a) WHETHER RŪPAKĀYA IS VIPĀKAJA?

The Kośa maintains that the rūpakāya of Buddha endowed with the major and minor signs is the result of the excellent karmas of his previous lives. According to it, even the Buddhas cannot escape the effects of their karma. The schism created by Devadatta in the saṅgha is attributed to a deed in one of the previous lives of Śākyamuni. The Vyākhya and the Vibhāṣā explain that it happened to Śākyamuni only, and not to the other Buddhas, because in one of his former lives he sowed dissensions among the disciples of an ascetic, possessed of five abhijñās.2 That the Buddhas enjoy or suffer the effects of karma is also maintained by the Divyavadāna3 and the Majjhima Nikāya.4 The Divyavadāna refers to a saying of Śākyamuni that even the Jinas themselves are not free from their karmas, while the Majjhima Nikāya says that a Tathāgata performs good deeds in his previous lives, and as a result of these, he enjoys in the present, pure and pleasant sensations (vedanā) only. Tradition says that when Buddha was hurt by the splinter of stone thrown by Devadatta, he said that ninety-one kalpas ago he had hurt a person by a spear, as the result of which evil deed, he now received a wound.

The Milindapañha, however, takes a different view of this matter. Admitting that Devadatta created a schism in the saṅgha, it says that as the schism was not created by any act of Buddha’s own, and as it was caused by an external influence, it should not be said that Buddha as the result of his karma

1. Ibid., p. 99. It is from this conception that the Prajñāpāramitā is addressed as the mother of Buddhas.
2. Kośa, VII, 34, p. 8 fn., 84; IV, 102, p. 212 fn. 2,
had a divided assembly (bhejjapariso). In a similar way it explains away the wound or the illnesses, from which Buddha suffered. First it asserts that Buddha attained omniscience after uprooting all roots of evil (akusalamulas); so he could not have any more sufferings through karma. It then says that apart from karma, there are other causes like the three humours, seasons, etc., which produce vedana (feelings). According to it, the wound that Buddha received was due to an opakammika (accidental) cause and his illnesses to causes other than karma.¹

(b) WAS BUDDHA A JARĀYUJA OR UPAPĀDUKA?

In order to remove doubt from the minds of the people as to the nature of the birth of so great and meritorious a being as the Bodhisattva in his last existence—a doubt expressed also in the Lalitavistara, where a ratnayūha has been devised for the Bodhisattva’s abode in his mother’s womb—the Kośa² proceeds to show that the Bodhisattvas possess the power of choosing the manner of their birth (upapattivaśitva), and that Śākyamuni chose birth in a womb (jaraṇyu) with two objects: one was to benefit the Śākya clan and at the same time not to give an opportunity to the people to consider him a magician or a god or a demon, and the other was to leave some relics of his body, by worshipping which men and other beings would go to heaven by thousands, or attain deliverance.

The Mahāsāṅghikas and their followers³ assert that Śākyamuni was an upapāduka (self-born), and that even his son Rāhula was also an upapāduka, for Bodhisattvas cannot have kāma. They assert that the Bodhisattvas are possessed of adhiṣṭhāniki rddhi (i.e., the miraculous power of appearing anywhere and in any form), and that by the power Śākyamuni made a show of his existence in the womb of Māyā. They conceived Buddha as lokottara (transcendental), and Śākyamuni as only a created body (Nirmanakāya). The transcendental Buddha has a rūpakāya, which is limitless, everlasting, free from

¹. Mil., pp. 134.
³. E.g., the Vctulyakas.
all sāsrava dharmas. He is always in samādhi, never sleeps or dreams, and can know everything in an instant of thought. He knows neither fatigue nor rest, and is ever busy in enlightening sentient beings. His power and his life are limitless. For the benefit of sentient beings, he appears at will in any one of the six gatis. Whatever he utters relates to the truth, though people may understand him differently. In short, the Mahāsaṅghikas conceived Buddha as a totally supramundane being with illimitable powers and knowledge, who never desired to attain Nirvāṇa.

KĀYA CONCEPTION AT THE BEGINNING OF MAHĀYĀNA

The Mahāyānists incorporated the Nirmāṇakāya conception of the Mahāsaṅghikas into their Trikāya theory, adding the two others, Sambhogakāya and Dharmakāya, the former approaching the Mahāsaṅghika conception of the transcendental Buddha, and the latter being a new metaphysical conception of the Mahāyānists.

These new Kāya conceptions, it seems, did not make much of an appeal at the beginning of Mahāyāna. The Saddharma-Pundarika and the Suvamaprabhāsa tried to erase from the minds of the people the lingering impression about the historical existence of Śākyamuni. (In the Pundarika we find Maitreya assuming the role of a sceptic and enquiring how Buddha could, within a short space of forty years after the attainment of Bodhi at Gayā, perform the innumerable duties of a Tathāgata and lead incalculable Bodhisattvas to Buddhahood. It appears like the paradox of a man of twenty-five years claiming centenarians as his sons and the latter calling him their father. Similarly Buddha’s pointing to Bodhisattvas, who had been performing the various duties conducive to Buddhahood for many millions of years as his disciples appears paradoxical. Maitreya says

2. For details see Masuda’s Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools, Asia Major, vol. II, fasc. I; Anesaki’s article in the ERE., sv. Docetism (Buddhist); Suzuki’s Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism, pp. 249-251. See also Kösa, III, 9 referring to Mtu., I, pp. 145, 154.
further that in the minds of those Bodhisattvas, who recently became Mahāyānists (nāvānasamprasthitāḥ), there may be doubts of this nature; so the Tathāgata should explain the paradox for the welfare of the religion. Buddha then asks his audience thrice to believe his words (avakalpayadhvam abhisra- ddadhvam), and says “It is not to be considered (naiva draṣṭava-yam), that Bhagavān Śākyamuni lately leaving his family life attained Bodhi at Gayā, said “I attained sambodhi incalculable ages ago; and since then I have been preaching the dharma. All that I have said about the previous Tathāgatas, Dīpankara etc., and their parinirvāṇa were all my own creations. These were only my expedients for imparting the dharma (upāyakau-salya-dharma-desanābhinerhāra-nirmiiāni). All that I have said to the effect that I was young, recently born, left home, and attained Bodhi, was to appeal to a class of people, who otherwise would not have been convinced of the excellence of the religion and derived benefits therefrom. But all that I said was not untrue, as the Tathāgatas know that the three dhātus really are; they know that the dhātus are neither born nor non-exist; neither they are the same nor different, and they are neither true nor false. “All that the Tathāgatas say is true, but people devoid of right knowledge construe different meaning out of it”. “Though I have not attained parinirvāṇa, I say that I have attained it. In order to rouse curiosity in the minds of the people and a desire to see Buddha, I say that the appearance of a Buddha is an exceedingly rare event. I made a show of Nirvāṇa, but did not enter into it, but people with distorted views could not see my real self, and busied themselves with the worship of my relics. But this also produced a good effect, for they thereby became righteous and gave up their passions. From among them I formed my śrāvakasaṅgha, and showed myself at Grāhrakūṭa, and explained to them how to attain the agrabodhi.”

In the Suvarnaprabhāsā¹ Ruciraketu and Kaundinya brāhmaṇa play the role of sceptics. The former enquires why Śākyamuni, who performed so many meritorious deeds, should have such a short span of life as eighty years. The latter seeks

CONCEPTION OF KĀYA

a mustard-like relic of Buddha's body to worship and thus go to heaven. Ruciraketu is told by the Buddhas of all lokadhātus that they did not know any man or god who could calculate the length of Śākyamuni's life. They said that it might be possible to count the drops of water in a sea but it would be impossible to ascertain the length of his life. Kauṇḍinya brāhmaṇa, who only feigned ignorance, was told by Litsavikumāra that, just as it is absurd to expect coconuts from a rose-apple tree, so it is absurd to expect a relic from the Buddhakāya. The Tathāgatas have no origin, they are ever existing and inconceivable. It is only the Nirmitakāya that is shown by them. How can a baby in which there is no bone or blood, leave a dhātu (relic)? Buddhas have only Dharmkāya and there is only the Dharma-dhātu.

NIRMĀṆAKĀYA

The Mahāyānic texts tried to show, on the one hand, that the Hīnayānists were wrong in their belief that Śākyamuni was really a man of flesh and blood and that relics of his body existed, while on the other hand, they introduced two conceptions of Nirmāṇakāya and Buddhakāya. Whatever is said to have been done by Śākyamuni is accounted for by those texts as the apparent doings of a created body of the Buddhakāya, a shadowy image created to follow the ways of the world (lokanuvartana), in order to bring conviction in the heart of the people that the attainment of Buddhahood was not an impossibility. As the Buddhas possess the knowledge of all that is to be done (kṛtya-sthānajñāna) they can take any form they desire for the enlightenment of the various classes of beings. The Mahāyānic conception of Nirmāṇakāya is essentially same as that of the Mahāsaṅghikas.

The Prajñāpāramitās in their quaint way refer to the Nirmāṇakāya or Rūpakāya. The Pañcavimśati says that a Bodhisattva, after acquiring all the necessary Dharmas and practising Prajñāpārmitā, becomes a Sambuddha, He then renders service to beings of all lokadhātus (worlds) of the ten corners at all

2. One of the four jñānas peculiar to Buddha, see Mvyut., p. 2
times by Nirmāṇamegha (Nirmāṇa clouds). This is called the Nairmaṇīkakāya.1

From the Chinese sources we are informed that Nāgārjuna, in his commentary on the Prajñāparamitā, names it as Mahāprajñāpāramitā sātra, and speaks of two kāyas, rūpakāya and dharmakāya. The former is the body born of parents, possessing the qualities of sentient beings, and is subject to human frailties. It was born in Kośala while his Dharmakāya was born at Rājagṛha. The material body was necessary for “earthly truth”. It was for the deliverance of beings that Buddha assumed different kāyas, different names, birth-places and the ways of emancipation. This interpretation of rūpa and dharmakāyas is also followed in the Chinese Parinirvāṇasūtra and Sandhinirmocanāsūtra.3

Some of the Yogācāra texts furnish us with the following information regarding the conception of Nirmāṇakāya as prevailing among the Yogācārins:

(i) The Śūtrālaṅkāra4 explains the Nirmāṇakāya to be those forms, which are assumed by Buddhas to render service to beings of the various worlds. It generally refers to the human form that Buddha takes in order to make a show of his acquiring the ordinary arts and crafts required by an average man, living a family life and then retiring from it, and ultimately attaining Nirvāṇa by recourse to ascetic practices.

(ii) The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi tells us that the Nirmāṇakāya is meant for Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, Prthagjanas (common men) and Bodhisattvas, who are not yet in one of the ten bhūmis. It may appear in all lands whether pure or impure.5 The Chinese commentaries on the Siddhi mention the various ways, in which Buddha can transform his body or another’s body or voice, and his or other’s mind, to suit his purpose. Not only could he transform himself into Śākyamuni, or Śāriputra into a young girl, but also could create an altogether

1. Pañca. (Cambr. ms.), leaf 343c.
3. E. B., pp. 21f.
4. Śūtra, p. 45.
5. Masuda, Die Individualistische etc., p. 60.
new apparitional body, not, of course, a living, thinking being. Often he assumed the voice of Brahmā or expressed himself through the mouth of Śāriputra or Subhūti, and it was for this reason that we find Śāriputra or Subhūti explaining some of the abstruse Mahāyāna teachings, which they themselves were not expected to understand. The third way in which he could transform his voice was to produce sounds from the sky. His thoughts were supramundane (lokottara) and pure (anāsraṇa). He could produce in mind any thought he liked; in fact, he appeared in his Nirmitakāya as Śākyamuni with a mind (citta) suited to the ways of the world. He could also impose his thoughts on the minds of others.

(iii) The Abhisamayālaṃkārakārikā states that there are four kāyas, of which the Svabhāvikakāya is real, and the three others, viz., Dharmakāya (=Svasambhogakāya), Sambhogakāya (=Parasambhogakāya) and Nirmāṇakāya are sāmyota (i.e. unreal); these are meant for Bodhisattvas and Śrāvakas respectively. According to it, the Nirmāṇakāya was intended for Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas who are not yet in one of the ten bhūmis. It describes the Nirmāṇakāya as a body unsevered from the real kāya, and as the actions performed by it are similarly unsevered from the kāya, they should be regarded as asaṃsāra (transcendental, i.e., not worldly). Then it proceeds to show that the thirtyseven kinds of purificatory actions performed by the Nirmāṇakāya are really the actions of the Dharmakāya. The thirtyseven actions, explained by it, are the thirtyseven steps, through which a Nirmāṇakāya passes after its inception. These are as follows: A Nirmāṇakāya (i) is unmindful of good or bad forms of existence; in other words, takes birth as an animal, human being or god as necessities require — this is called gatipraśama; (ii) practises the four saṃgrahavastus (elements of popularity); (iii) enlightens himself about matter opposite and similar, good and evil, by the śrutamaya and such other means of knowledge, and then applies himself to the service of others, keeping himself unconcerned (i.e., having no anunaya, like a magician for the things made

2. JA., 1913, p. 604.
by him magically); (iv) practises the six pāramitās purified in three ways (trimāndalaviśuddha); (v) performs, and persuades others to perform the ten kuśalakarmapathas (moral duties) and thus establish all in the path leading to Buddhahood; (vi) exerts for realising the non-existence in reality of all things; (vii) comprehends the non-duality of things and the all-pervasiveness of the dharmadhātu, and so on, until he reaches the Tathāgatabhūmi after realising the absence of difference between things constituted and unconstituted. In short, the Kārikā wants to say that the whole course of life of a Bodhisattva, extending through incalculable births, is nothing but the Nirmāṇakāya, a thing not separate from the Dharmakāya, as, in fact, according to the Mahāyāna philosophy, all creations are neither the same as, nor different from, the dharmadhātu.

(iv) The Lankāvatāra explains the relation of Nirmāṇakāya to Dharmakāya in the same way as the Kārikā. It states that Nirmitabuddhas are not produced by actions; the Tathāgata is neither in them nor outside them (sarve hi nirmitabuddhā na karmaprabhavā na tesu tathāgato na cânyatra tebhya tathāgatā). It is only when the sons of the Jina realise the visible world to have no existence apart from the citta that they obtain the Nirmāṇakāya free from kriyā and saṃskāra, and endowed with bāla, abhijñā and vaśītā. Like the Siddhi, it says that the Tathāgatas by creating Nirmāṇakāya perform the various duties of a Tathāgata (Tathāgatakṛtya). It gives also the interesting information that Vajrapāṇi serves as an attendant on the Nirmitanirmanabuddhas, and not on the real Buddhas and that the function of such a Buddha is to preach and explain the characteristics of dāna, śīla, dhyāna, samādhi, citta, prajñā, jñāna, skandha, dhātu, āyatana, vimokṣa, and vijñāna.

3. Ibid., p. 73.
4. Ibid., p. 240.
5. Ibid., p. 242.
6. Ibid., p. 57.
SAMBHOGAKĀYA

We have seen that the Rūpakāya or Nirmānakāya was meant for the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, Prthagjanas and Bodhisattvas, who were not in one of the ten bhūmis, so another kāya had to be devised, a very suitable kāya for the benefit of all Bodhisattvas. This is called Parasambhogakāya, as distinguished from Svamabhogakāya, a similar subtle body perceived by the Buddhas alone. It is this Parasambhogakāya, which plays the role of a preacher of the various Mahāyāna sūtras, the scenes being mostly laid either at Grūḍhakūṭa, the only place in the three dhātus considered pure and suitable for the appearance of a Sambhogakāya, or in the Sukhāvatī-vyūha, or in one of the heavens.

It will be observed from the description of the appearance of Buddha and his manner of preaching the Sūtras that the Mahāyānists were not yet able to forget or rise above the human conception of Buddha of the Hinayānists. They still gave Śākyamuni the role of the presiding Buddha of the universe, to whom flocked reverently with flowers, incense, etc., all the Bodhisattvas, Śrāvakas and Gṛhapatis of the various lokadhātus of the ten directions, to hear from him the Prajñāpāramitā, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, or the Gaṇḍavyūha. These Bodhisattvas again had their own tutelary Buddhas, who, according to the Mahāyāna metaphysics, possessed the same Dharma-kāya as that of Śākyamuni. They also came or were sometimes sent by their Buddhas, with messages of greetings and flowers as tokens of their regard, to Śākyamuni Buddha, whose Buddhaksetra was then the Saha lokadhātu. Sometimes the descriptions go so far as to say that the Buddhas themselves came to hear discourses from Śākyamuni Buddha, and the concourse of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas became so great that the Saha lokadhātu had to be cleared of all oceans, mountains, seas, rivers, and cities, as well as of gods, men and other beings. As we read in the Hinayāna texts that monks used to come to meet Buddha, bringing with them one or two sāmaṇeras, so also we read in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka that on account of insufficiency of space the countless Buddhas could.
not have with them more than one or two Bodhisattvas as attendants (upasthāpakas).¹

Now let us see what was their conception of the kāya of this Buddha. According to the Śatasāhasrikā and the Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā,² it is an exceedingly refulgent body, from every pore of which steamed forth countless brilliant rays of light, illuminating the lokadhātus as innumerable as the sands of the Ganges. When this body stretched out its tongue, innumerable rays of light issued forth from it, and on each ray of light was found a lotus of thousand petals on which was seated a Tathāgatavigraha (an image of the Tathāgata, a sort of Nirmānakāya), preaching to Bodhisattvas, Grihas (householders), Pravrajitas (recluses) and others the dharma consisting of the pāramitās. After a Śrīvāiśvākṣita samādhi his body illuminated the trisahasramahāsahasra lokadhātu just as the bright clear Sun or the full Moon illuminates the world. Buddha then shows his Prakṛtyatmabhāva (real form) to all the worlds. The several classes of gods as well as the men of the four continents, Jambudvīpa, Aparagodāna, etc., see this Prakṛtyatmabhāva and think that the Tathāgata is sitting before them and preaching the doctrine. From this body again issue forth some rays of light, by which all beings of all lokadhātus see Śākyamuni Buddha preaching the Prajñāpāramitā to his saṅgha of monks and congregation of Bodhisattvas.

Though this conception of the refulgent body of Buddha found currency in the Prajñāpāramitās, the expression Sāṃbhogakāya was still unknown to them. It was usually called by them Prakṛtyatmabhāva (natural body) or Āsecanaka ātmabhāva (all-diffusing body). As a matter of fact, the Aṣṭasāhasrikā is not even aware of the Prakṛtyatmabhāva or Āsecanaka-ātmabhāva, showing clearly its priority to the other Prajñāpāramitās. It speaks only of Rūpakāya and Dharmakāya³ and the long glorious description of Buddhakāya, which appears in the Śata and Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā as nidāna (introduction to the text), is totally absent from it. It is only in the recast version of the Pañcaviṃśati that the expression Sāṃbhogikakāya was intro-

¹. Sad. P., pp. 244-45.
². Sata., pp. 8-29; Pañca., pp. 6ff.; for 'Āsecanaka' see Samādhīraja ūtra (B. T. S. ed.) p. 10.
³. Āṣṭa., pp. 338, 497, 513.
duced by way of giving a gist of the topic.\(^1\) In it the Sam-
bhogakāya is described thus: Bodhisattvas, after attaining
bodhi by means of the prajñāpāramitā, take a body endowed
with thirty-two major and eighty minor signs with a view to
preach the doctrines of Mahāyāna to the Bodhisattvas and at
the same time to arouse in their minds joy, delight and love
for the excellent dharma. The original *Prajñāpāramitā* regarded
this refulgent kāya as *nirmita* (created) and as such it included
it in Rūpakāya and did not feel the necessity of introducing
the conception of a third kāya, the Sāmbhogika.

In keeping with this dvikāya theory of the *Prajñāpāramitās*,
Nāgārjuna also did not refer to, or probably was not aware of,
the third kāya, the Sārībhogika. Both Drs. Akanuma and
Masuda could not trace the conception of Sambhogakāya in
Nāgārjuna’s *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra*. Dr. Akanuma also men-
tions his disinclination to accept the “Hymns of the Triple Body
(Trikāya)” ascribed by the Tibetans to Nāgārjuna as a work
of the famous author.\(^2\) If the *Kārikās* of Nāgārjuna on the
Tathāgatakāya\(^3\) be examined, it also becomes apparent that
Nāgārjuna was interested in giving an exposition of the real
kāya (i.e., Dharmakāya or Svabhāvakāya) only. To him the
-distinction of Sambhogakāya and Rūpakāya was unimportant,
as both of them were unreal.

Thus, it is seen that up to the time of Nāgārjuna, the concep-
tion of Sambhogakāya was not distinguished from that of
Rūpa- or Nirmāṇa- kāya. The *Laṅkāvatāra* presents us first with
this conception, calling it Niṣyanda- or Dharmatāniṣyanda-
Buddha, and it seems that the term Sambhogakāya was not yet
-current. We have seen that in Hinayāna works also, it is pointed
out that the super-excellent body of Buddha, endowed with the
major and minor signs of great men, was due to the countless
meritorious deeds performed by him in his previous lives.\(^4\) The
Chinese rendering of Sambhogakāya by *pao sheny\(^5\)* in which *pao*
means fruit or reward, also indicates that Sambhoga had no

3. *M. Vr.*, Ch. XXII.
4. *Laṅkā*, pp. 28, 34; see ante.
other sense than 'vipāka or niṣyanda'. The later Yogācārins called it Parasambhogakāya in order to distinguish it from the other kāya called by them Svasambhoga. Though the Asṭasāhasrika does not distinguish Sambhogakāya from the Nirmāṇakāya, it refers to the super-excellent body of Buddha as the result of his meritorious acts in previous lives. The Lāṅkāvātāra, by using the expression Vipākaja or Vipākastha, shows a stage of transition from the Hīnayānic conception of Vipākakāya to that of the Mahāyānic Parasambhogakāya.

(i) The Lāṅkāvātāra says that the function of the Niṣyanda-Buddha is to teach the parikalpita (imaginary) and paratantra (relatively existent) nature of things to those persons, who weave a net of thought-constructions around themselves, being unaware of the dream-like nature of things. This is also the function of Śākyamuni of the Sahā lokadhātu when he imparts the teaching of the Prajñāpāramitā or the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka.

(ii) The Sūtra also does not distinguish Sambhogakāya into Svasambhoga and Parasambhoga. It says that with this body Buddhas enjoy the dharmas and it is different according to the different lokadhātu, implying thereby that a Buddha of each lokadhātu has his own Sambhogakāya, which is different from those of other Buddhas of other Buddhakṣetras.

(iii) The Suvanaprabhasa and (iv) the Abhisamayālaṅkārakārikā tell us that the Sambhogakāya is a very subtle body of Buddha. It is endowed with all the mahāpuruṣa signs and is generally assumed by Buddhas for imparting the higher and metaphysical truths to the advanced Bodhisattvas. The Suvanaprabhasa also does not speak of the two forms of Sambhogakāya, as found in the Siddhi.

(v) The Siddhi says that there are two Sambhogakāyas called Parasambhogakāya and Svasambhogakāya. The former is seen by Bodhisattvas, while the latter is seen by the Buddhas

1. Asṭa., 515. Buddhānāṃ kāyaḥ karaṇasamutpannāḥ pūrve-karmavipākād utpannāḥ, etc.
2. Lāṅkā., p. 57.
3. The function of Nirmitabuddha is to teach dāna, śīla, etc., see ante.
5. Suzuki, Outlines etc., p. 257; in the published portion of the Sanskrit text (B.T.S.) this passage does not appear.
of the various lokadhātus, and not by bodhisattvas. As regards refulgence, illimitability and immeasurability there is no difference between these two kāyas. Both of them have colour and form (varṇa-rūpa-saṃsthāna) as well as voice (śabda). On account of the knowledge of sameness (samatā) obtained by Buddhas, the body is anāsrava (pure). It can appear only in a pure land like the Sukhāvatīvyūha or Gṛdhra-kūṭa. The difference between the Parasambhogakāya and the Svasambhogakāya is that the former has the mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇas while the latter has not, and that the citta of the former is unreal as that of the Nirmāṇakāya, while the citta of the latter is real, and besides, this citta possesses the four jñānas, viz., ādarṣajñāna (mirror-like knowledge), samatā-jñāna (knowledge of the sameness of all things), pratyavekṣanā-jñāna (knowledge of distinguishing subject, object and the varieties of things) and kṛtyānusṭhāna-jñāna (knowledge of doing all that is to be done).¹ The rūpa of both the Sambhogakāyas is exceedingly subtle and expansive without limit, yet it is sapratigha (possessed of the quality of obstruction). Nevertheless the subtle bodies of countless Buddhas are interpenetrable.

The recast version of the Pañcavimśati³ refers to the Sambhogakāya, and does not like the Kārikā, distinguish between Dharmakāya (=Svasambhoga) and Parasambhogakāya, the reason being that in the original version of the Pañcavimśati, there must have been, as in the Prajñāpāramitās, the conceptions of only two kāyas, and not of three or four. The Kārikā, in fact, supports the Siddhi in regard to the conception of kāyas, using only somewhat different names. The conception of the Svasambhogakāya shows a tendency of the Yogācāra school to posit something like the Īśvara of the Upaniṣads behind the phenomenal universe. The Dharmakāya corresponds to the impersonal Absolute of the Vedānta, the Brahman, and the Sambhogakāya to the Īśvara when Brahman assumes name and form. Every Buddha, it should, however, be noted, has his own Sambhogakāya but all Buddhas have one Dharmakāya. The Laṅkāvatāra

2. Explained in detail in the Sūtra, pp. 46 ff; Mvyut. 5.
3. Pañca (A.S.B. ms), leaf. 359a. Cf. Śikṣā., p. 159; Bodhiṣc., pp. 1, 4; Mtu., II I, pp 344, 452.
also gives hints to this effect. It says that abhāva (absence of anything) is not Tathāgata, and again, as Tathāgata is described as ‘Anutpāda-aniruddha’, it has some meaning. It then denotes the Manomaya-dharmakāya.¹ It cannot be seen by the non-Buddhists, Śrāvakas, Pratyeka-buddhas and even Bodhisattvas in one of the first seven bhūmis. Just as different names of one thing or one person like hasta, kāra, pāṇi, or Indra, Śakra, Purandara indicate different aspects of the same thing so also the different names of Śākyamuni Buddha in the Sahā lokadhātu, e.g., Svayambhū, Nāyaka, Trṣabha, Viṣṇu, Īśvara, Pradhāna, Kapila, Soma, Bhāskara, Rāma, Vyāsa, or Śūnyatā, Tathatā, Bhūtakoṭi, Nirvāṇa, Saravjña, etc., indicate the different aspects of Śākyamuni Buddha.² People being subject to the conceptions of two extremes ‘is’ or ‘is not’ (dvayantapatitayā) do not know that Buddha is like a reflection of the Moon on water neither appearing nor disappearing. In this passage there is a clear hint that this Manomaya-dharmakāya, existing in the Sahā lokadhātu, is the same as the Svāsambhogakāya of the Siddhi and the Āsecanka-ātmabhāva or Prakṛtyātmabhāva of the Prajñāpāramitās, and it corresponds to the Upaniṣadic conception of Īśvara.

**Dharmakāya**

The three kāyas, of which we have so far spoken, belong strictly, to the realm of Saṃvṛti, worldly and transcendental, and as such they were treated as Rūpa or Nirmāṇa-kāya by the early Mahāyānists, including Nāgārjuna. The only real kāya of Buddha is the Reality as conceived by the Mahāyānists, and is not different from the things or beings of the universe.³ Though an attempt to define it by the current words and expression is bound to be not only incorrect but misleading, the Mahāyānic texts tried to give an idea of it as far as the language permitted. The Kārikā and the Siddhi call it Svābhāvika or

¹. For the definition of Manomayakāya and its three sub-divisions see *Lānka.*, p. 81; Suzuki, *E.B.*, iv, pp. 284-5.
³. In a Buddhist inscription of Battambang, a stanza in salutation of Buddha brings out this idea. See *Le Muséon.* vol. VII.
Svabhāva kāya. It is, according to them, immeasurable and illimitable. It fills all space. It is the basis of the Sambhoga and Nirmāṇa-kāyas. It is devoid of all marks (i.e. mahāpuruṣa-lakṣaṇas) and is inexpressible (nirprapañca). It is possessed of eternal, real and unlimited guṇas. It has neither citta nor rūpa, and again Dharmakāya Buddhas may have their individual Sambhogakāyas but they have all one Dharmakāya.¹ It can only be realised within one’s own self (pratyātma-vādyya) and not described, for that would be like the attempt of a blind man to describe the Sun, which he has never seen.²

It is often questioned whether the conception of Dharmakāya can be traced in the Prajñāpāramitāś, and the works of Nāgārjuna and whether the Prajñāpāramitāś and the works of Nāgārjuna admit of such a reality, or rather preach only pure and simple negativism? To put it in another way, was it the object of the Prajñāpāramitāś and Nāgārjuna’s works to point out only the incongruities of the world and worldly knowledge and avoid making any statement about the Reality or the Truth?

The Aṣṭasāhasrikā and other Prajñāpāramitāś, though unrelenting in their negation of every possible statement about the reality, never assert that Tathatā or Śūnyatā or Dharmakāya in its real sense is also non-existing. The statements like tathatāvikāra nirvikāravikalpa nirvikalpa (Suchness is immutable, unchangeable, beyond concept and distinctions)³ show rather a positive conception of the Reality than a purely negative one. In regard to the Dharmakāya also the Aṣṭasāhasrikā makes similar statements. It says that he who knows that the dharmas, existing in the world or preached by the Tathāgata, have no more exist-

3. Aṣṭa., p. 307; cf. the passage: yā ca tathāgata-tathatā yā ca sarvadharmatathatā ekāvaiśā tathatā dvaya-vādikārādvayatathatā na kvaicit tathatā na kutaśeit tathatā na kasyaicit tathatā yataḥ sā na kasyaicit tathatā tataḥ sā tathatādvayādvaidhi-kārādvayatathatā.

(That which is Tathāgata-tathatā and that which is all-things-tathatā are non-dual, one and the same. Tathatā is neither anywhere nor arises from anywhere, nor belongs to anything, hence as Tathatā does not belong to anybody, it is non-dual and one).

Four other passages of similar import, see M. Vṛ. Ch.xxii.
ence than things seen in a dream and, does not enquire whence the Tathāgata comes and where he goes, realises the Tathāgata through Dharmatā. The Buddhakāya, that people speak of, arises through cause and condition like the sound of flute; it involves really no appearance or disappearance. Those, who run after the form and voice of the Tathāgata and conceive of his appearance and disappearance are far from the Truth. No further statements than this can be made about the Reality, for that would be again prapañca. When the Aśṭasāhasrikā asserts that the Tathāgata does not exist, it refers to that Tathāgata as conceived by one on reading the Mahāyāna texts. Even the Bodhisattvas, unless and until they reach the tenth bhūmi, cannot extricate themselves from a conception of the Tathāgatakāya, however, subtle it may be (e.g., the Svasambhogakāya). They are still under a delusion and it is this delusion that the Prajñāpāramitās endeavour to remove by asserting that there is no Tathāgata.

Nāgārjuna by denying the existence of a so-called Tathāgata does nothing more than what the Prajñāpāramitās endeavour to establish. His point is that, if bhavaṁsatati (series of existence) be admitted then the existence of a Tathāgata should also be admitted, for the Tathāgata represents the ultimate state of this bhavaṁsatati; it is a state attained by a being after a long series of existence. As in reality (paramārthataḥ), there is no bhavaṁsatati, there is also no Tathāgata—that being who is supposed to have become a Tathāgata after practising mahākaruṇā and other virtues, and thereby attaining omniscience. If the Tathāgata had really existed, he would either be the same as five skandhas or different from them, or the skandhas would be in him or he in the skandhas, but as he is none of these nor any one of these is he, he cannot have any real existence. By these and other similar arguments Nāgārjuna asserts that there is no Tathāgata. By such denial he only establishes that the Tathāgata as the ultimate state of bhavaṁsatati does not exist.

Candrakīrti, in support of Nāgārjuna's arguments, quotes a passage from the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* (p. 472) in which Buddha and his dharma are compared to māyā or svāpna, but at the same time he says "we do not assert the non-existence (nāstitva) of the Tathāgata in every way, for then we would be guilty of *apavāda* (denial), and yet being desirous of describing the Tathāgata by means of *vyavahāra-satya* (conventionally) and by taking recourse to super-impositions (*samāropa*) we say that he is śūnya or aśūnya, śūnyāśūnya or naiva śūnya nāśūnya. But he who endeavours to realise the true Tathāgata by having recourse to statements and denials will never know him. Candrakīrti, in support of the above, quotes the verses from the *Vajracchedikā*, to which the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* as well as the *Bodhicarjāvatara* (p. 42) refer, viz., ‘he who endeavoured to see me through my form and voice could not see me because
dharmato buddhā draṣṭavyā dharmakāyā hi nāyakāḥ,
dharmatā cāpy avijñeyā na sā śakyā vijānītur.
[A buddha is to be seen in the sense of dharmatā (nature of dharmas), for the leaders (of men) have only Dharmakāya. That dharmatā is unknowable (so also is the Tathāgata)].

Nāgārjuna concludes his examination of the Tathāgatakāya by identifying Tathāgata with the world (*jagat*), or nature itself, and asserting that the Tathāgata, whom people or even Bodhisattvas have in view, is only a *bimba* (image) of kuśaladhammas and is not the real Tathātā or Tathāgata. A dialectician like Nāgārjuna cannot go further than this to establish the Reality. It is by denial of the existence of unreal things, including the so-called Tathāgata, that he points towards the Reality—the real Tathāgatakāya, the Dharmakāya.

The conception of Dharmakāya was of special interest to the Yogācārins. The *Laṅkāvatāra* in describing it says that

2. *Tathāgato yatsvabhāvas tat svabhāvam idam jagat,
   Tathāgato nihsvabhāvo nihsvabhāvam idam jagat.*
4. *Prapañcayanti ye buddhāṃ prapañcitam avyayaṃ,
   Te prapañcahatāḥ sarve na paśyanti Tathāgataṁ.*
   See also *M. Vr.*, p. 534.
(Dharmatā) Buddha is without any substratum (nirālamba) and lies beyond the range of functioning organs of sense, proofs or signs and hence beyond the vision of Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas or the non-Mahāyānists. It is to be realised only within one's own self. The Sūtrālankāra¹ calls it Svabhāvika-dharmakāya. It is one and the same kāya in all Buddhas, very subtle, unknowable and eternal. The Triṃśikā² explains the Dharmakāya as the transformed āśraya (substratum)—the ālayavijñāna—the transformation being effected by knowledge (jñāna) and the suppression of the two evils (daṇḍhūlyas), viz., kleśāvarana and jñeyāvarana. The Āloka³ on the Abhisamāyā-lāṅkā-rahārikā also explains the Dharmakāya in a similar way. According to it, there are two kinds of Dharmakāya, one being the Bodhipaśkika and the other dhammas, which are themselves pure and productive of clear knowledge (nisaṃpāṇa-jñānānātmanā) and the other the transformed āśraya of the same which is then called Svabhāvakāya. Professor Stcherbatsky⁴ supplies us with nearly the same information that we find in the Āloka from some source, which he does not mention. He says that “according to the early Yogācāras, the Dharmakāya is divided into Svabhāvakāya (ño-bo-ñid-sku) and jñānakāya (ñe-ses-kyi-sku); the first is the motionless (nitya) substance of the universe, the second is anitya, i.e., changing, living”. Evidently what the Professor means by Jñānakāya is the Dharmakāya, consisting of the Bodhipaśkika and other dhammas, of the Āloka. That the Svabhāvakāya is the nityakāya, as pointed out by him, is also supported by the Suvarṇaprabhāsa and other texts.⁵

The Chinese commentators on the Siddhi state that Dharmakāya is the metaphysical principle of real citta and rūpa of the Tathāgata. It is the real nature of things, and can be equated with Tathatā, Dharmadhātu or Tathāgatagarbha.⁶

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1. Sūtrā., p. 45.
2. Triṃśikā, p. 44.
4. Con. of N., p. 185n.
5. Suvarṇaprabhāsa (B.T.S.), p. 8; Laṅkā., p. 78; Sūtrā., p. 46.
6. I have derived the information from Professor La Vallée Poussin. In Laṅkā. (pp. 77, 78) the Tathāgatagarbha is described as nitya, dhruva, śāśvata, siva, etc., just as the non-Buddhists speak of their great soul as nitya, kartā, nirguna, vibhū, and avyaya.
The goal of Bodhisattvas is to realise the Dharmakāya. Every being has the Dharmakāya, or the Dharmakāya comprises all beings of the world, but as they are blinded by avidyā, they do not realise this fact. What the Bodhisattva aims at is the removal of this avidyā and the realisation of the fact that he is the same as the Dharmakāya. The Āloka on the Kārikā enumerate the steps through which a Bodhisattva passes and points out that the last step of a Bodhisattva is to realise the Dharmakāya (dharmakāyābhīṣambodhena bhavisyati), after which it becomes easy for him to assume any one of the four kāyas. In the Laṅkāvatāra we notice that Mahāmati is anxious to know how the Bodhisattvas, after completing the ten bhūmis, can attain the Tathāgatakāya or Dharmakāya and go to any one of the Buddhakṣetras or heavens. The Laṅkāvatāra also describes in rosy colours the prospect of attaining the Mahādharmamegha in the ninth bhūmi, adorned with many jewels, and sitting on a lotus in a jewelled palace surrounded by other Bodhisattvas of his status. He comprehends there the illusory nature of all things. He is anointed (abhīṣeka) by Vajrapāṇi and a son of Buddha. He then goes beyond the bhūmi of Buddhāsutas by realising within himself the dharma-nairatmya and confronts the Dharmakāya. The Trīṃśikā says that just as Vimuktikāya is the goal of the arhats, so Dharmakāya is the goal of the Bodhisattvas. It shows that as the arhats by getting rid of klesāvaraṇa obtain a purified kāya, so also a Buddha by getting rid of both klesāvaraṇa and jñeyāvaraṇa obtains the Dharmakāya.

The world of experience is phenomenal. It may be compared to a magical illusion or dream. In the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā (R. Mitra’s edition, p. 39) appears the following passage,—

Āyuṣmān Subhūtiḥ tān devaputrān etad avocat, māyopamās te sattvāḥ, swapnopamās te sattvāḥ. Iti hi māya ca sattvāṣ ca advayā advaidhi-kārā. Evam sakṛdāgamin pi...arhattam pi...Samyaksambuddham pi māyopamā swapnopamāt.

2. Laṅkā., pp. 51, 70.
3. Trīṃśikā, p. 44.
[Transl. Āyuśmān Subhūti said to the Devaputras that all worldly beings are illusion, dream. Illusion and worldly beings are one and the same.

It should be noted that not only worldly beings but also saints like the Once-returners (Sakṛdāgāmi) and the Perfect (Arhat) and even the worldly figure of Gautama Buddha are illusion or dream.]

The Absolute, i.e., the Dharma-kāya of Buddha is indescribable. It is the only reality that Buddha realised at Bodh-Gaya.

All things of the world have three aspects: viṣṇa, (i) quint-essence, (ii) attributes and (iii) activity. Take, for instance, an earthen jar; it is subject to origination and disintegration, while the earth is indestructible, i.e., unconditioned while the latter two are destructible i.e., conditioned.

Another simile may be useful. Take for instance, an ocean and the waves of the ocean. The latter may be high or low, according to the force of wind of ignorance but the water of the ocean neither increases nor decreases. It is unfathomable and immeasurable, i.e., unconditioned. The whole universe has two aspects i.e., changed and unchanged. The latter is known as the Bhūta-tathatā, the absolute. It persists through all space and time, the basis of all, the universal and eternal substratum. It corresponds to the conception of Brahman of the Upaniṣads. This is identical with the Dharma-kāya of Buddha. Dharma is the supreme principle of life. Ādi-Buddha happens to be the first conception to the personification of Dharma. It is a metaphysical conception. It is not in active touch with the world.

The leaders of men possess true body or nature, which is unknowable, it cannot be known (except within one's own self) (pratyātmavedya). In the Aṣṭāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (R. Mitra's ed. p. 94) appears the following passage,—

Mā khalu punar imaṁ bhikṣavaṁ satkāyaṁ kāyaṁ manyadhanāṁ. Dharmakāyo parintispattito māṁ bhikṣau draksyaṁti.

[Transl. O monks, you should not think that this individual body is my body. O monks, you should see me from the accomplishment of the Dharma-body).

Again, in the same text (p. 513) appears the following passage:

Na hi tathāgato rūpakāyato draṣṭavyaḥ. dharmaṁ kāyaṁ tathāgatā,
na hi kulaputra dharmatā āgacchati vā gacchati vā. Evam eva kulaputra na hi tathāgatānāṃ āgamanāṃ vā gamanāṃ vā. Tad yathāpi nāma kulaputra purusāḥ svapnāntargata ekān tathāgato paśyet dvau vā trin vā sahasrāṃ tato vā uttaraṃ, na pratīvibuddhāṃ san ekam eva tathāgatānam na paśyet... Tad yathāpi nāma kulaputra vināyāḥ sabdam utpadyamano na kutaścet āgacchati niruddhamāne’pi na kvacit gacchati... hetupratyaya śamgrity’utpadyate. hetvādhinaḥ pratyayādhinoḥ.

[Transl. The Tathāgatas cannot be seen in his form (rūpa) i.e., material body. The Dharma bodies are the Tathāgatas. There is no coming or going of Dharma. Similarly, there is no coming or going of the Tathāgatas. A sleeping man might see in his dream one Tathāgata or two or three up to one thousand or still more. On waking up, he would, however, no longer see even one Tathāgata or two or three up to one thousand or still more. These Tathāgatas do not come from anywhere nor go to anywhere. They are eternal and ever existing.]

Buddha appears in this world with high intelligence and unlimited amity (maitrī) and compassion (karunā) to rescue beings from their lives of misery on account of birth and death.

In the Saddharma-puṇḍarika (Ch. III) appears an episode as to the ways and means (upāya-kauśalya-pāramitā) adopted by Buddha. It is as follows:

There was a fabulously rich man, who had an old, large and unused house, which became a haunt of birds, worms and reptiles. It had a tottering roof of straw and had only one door for exit. The house suddenly caught fire. The owner of the house had a number of children playing within the house. He was very much frightened on account of the fire as well as of the venomous reptiles existing in the house and thought of taking out the children by his strong arms but the difficulty was that they could not be brought together and would not listen to their father’s warning about the raging fire. The father knew his children’s inclinations and so he came out of the house and collected beautiful toy-carts drawn by goats, deer and bullocks and tempted the boys to come out and take them, after coming out of the burning house. The boys struggled among themselves to come out first in order to take the best cart. The father
then felt relieved at the safety of his sons. When the boys asked for the toy-carts, the rich father gave them not the cheap types of carts but expensive, fast carriages, replete with all the conceivable furnishings and drawn by sturdy bulls.

Buddha then asked Śāriputra whether he would consider the father guilty of lying. When Śāriputra answered in the negative, Buddha told him that he himself may be likened to the rich father and the house to the world of existence of senses and desires, and the sons to the men of the world, unmindful of the fire burning the world. The wooden cheap toy-carts were the various disciplinary and meditational practices prescribed in the Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna and Bodhisattvayāna, which were held out as the bait for the men of the world to come out of the three worlds (Kāmadhātu, Rūpadhātu and Arūpadhātu). The bait was the attainment of eternal happiness through perfection in Balas, Bodhyaṅgas, Dhyāna, Vimokṣa Samādhi, Samāpatti, etc.

Some of the men of the world, who relied on Buddha’s words, retired from worldly life. Of them again some became interested in attaining salvation (nirvāṇa) for himself only by listening to the teaching of, and following the practices prescribed in the formula of the Āryasatyas. They were the Śrāvakayānists and they might be compared to the boys seeking carts drawn by goats (aja). There were also those who aspired for omniscience like that of the Buddha by self-acquired perfect knowledge and wished to help all beings to attain parinirvāṇa and also exerted to attain the qualities, which make a Buddha. These were the Mahāyānists, seeking exit from the Tridhātus, and might be compared to those boys seeking carts drawn by bulls, not only, toy-carts but also actual vehicles of a very high class. Likewise, Buddha gave his disciples Buddhayāna. In fact, all the four yānas were of one nature and realise that Buddha could not have told a lie by taking recourse to the expedients (upāya-kauśalya) of teaching his dhamma in different ways, viz., Śrāvakayāna, Pratyeka-buddhayāna and Bodhisattvayāna.
CHAPTER VI

EXPOSITION OF NIRVĀṆA

The second fundamental point of difference between the doctrines of Hīnayāṇa and Mahāyāṇa, mentioned in the Saddharma-Puṇḍarika, lies in the conception of Nirvāṇa.

HĪNAYĀNIC NIRVĀṆA: (1) LIBERATION FROM DUḤKHAṬĀ

The Hīnayāṇist considers himself afflicted with three kinds of misery (duḥkha), viz., (a) suffering due to mental and physical causes (duḥkha-duḥkhatā), (b) that inhering in caused and conditioned existences (sāṁskāra-duḥkhatā) subject as they are to origin and destruction, and (c) that due to transformation of pleasurable sensations into painful ones (viparītāma-duḥkhatā).¹ He seeks release from these miseries incidental to life in any of the three worlds Kāma, Rūpa, and Arūpa² (including the six ordinary forms of existence)³ by realising the formula of the law of causation (pratītyasamutpāda) and the four āryasatyas, and the transitoriness (anītātā) and essencelessness (anātmatā) of the things of this world and the miseries to which these lead. The Puṇḍarika concedes that many of the disciples of Buddha attained Arhatship or Nirvāṇa by perceiving the non-existence of anything corresponding to soul (ātmā) in any of the five categories of mental and physical elements (skandhas).⁴ The Hīnayāṇists admit that their Nirvāṇa consists in liberation from

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¹. Sad. P., p. 109: M. Vṛ., p. 475; Mvuyut. 3; Kośa, vi, 3; Poussin, Nirvāṇa, p. 174; Burnouf, Lotus etc., p. 68; Dīgha, III. p. 216; Samyutta, IV, p. 259, V, p. 56. In the Vībhāṅga-Aṭṭhakathā (pp. 93-94) seven kinds of dukkhas are mentioned: dukkha-dukkham, vipariṇāmad, saṁkhārad, paticchannad, appaticchannad, pariyāyad, and nippariyāyad.


the three kinds of duḥkhatā, incidental to existence in the three laukikadātus. Thus, according to the Hinayānic conception, beings obtain liberation by attaining nibbānadhātutu without any residue.¹ The Pāli works, canonical or post-canonical, agree on the point that this release is obtained by realising anityatā, duḥkhatā and anātmatā as well as pratītyasamutpannata of the world.

What the Mahāyānists endeavour to point out is that the Hinayānists concern themselves with the realisation of the non-existence of a permanent entity like soul (Pudgalanairātmya) and not of the non-existence of anything whatsoever supposed to exist (i.e. Dharma-nairātmya).² According to the Mahāyānists, this realisation attained by the Hinayānists cannot lead them to the ultimate Reality; it carries them only some distance towards the Truth, and hence Nirvāṇa, in the real sense of the term, cannot be said to have been attained by them.³ The Hinayānists, however, consider that they reach Nirvāṇa when they know that they will have no more birth as they have led the life of holiness (brahmacarya) and realised the pudgalanairātmya. Some think, as the Laṅkāvatāra⁴ puts it, that Nirvāṇa is attained by comprehending what is really soul or personality; some others think that it is attained by penetrating into the truth that things are dependent on causes. But, in fact, the Laṅkāvatāra⁵ adds, there is no real emancipation (mokṣa) without the realisation of Dharma-nairātmya. So the Hinayānists do not actually reach mokṣa; they are only tossed up and down by the properties (lakṣaṇa) of things like a log of wood tossed by the waves.

(II) Passage from Nimitta to Animitta

The Hinayānists, according to the Sūtrālaṅkāra,⁶ have only personality as their basis (pudgala-nimitta) for meditation, and

1. Dh. P., 26: saṅkhāradukkhathāyā loko anupādīsesāya nibbānadhātuṣyā muñcati.
3. Cf. Bodhic., p. 442: without the realisation of Śunyatā, there may be nirvāṇi (quietude) but it is not permanent.
5. Ibid., p. 135.
so they reach only Śrāvaka-bodhi or Pratyeka-buddha-bodhi and not Samyak-sambo dhi, which can only be attained by making all dharmas (existent things and conditions) the basis (nimitta) for meditations.¹ The Śrāvakas distinguish between a thing with signs (nimitta) and a thing without signs (animitta) and try to draw away their minds from all nimittas and apply themselves to the attainment of animitta, which they attain in due course. The Mahāyānists think that the dual conception of things cannot lead to mokṣa. They do not know of anything other than Tathatā (thatness of things); so to them a nimitta is equally an animitta, and consequently their knowledge, derived as it is on the basis of Tathatā alone, is free from all differentiations or dualism (dvayagrāha-vivarjitam).² By the remark that the Hinayānists distinguish between Nimitta and Animitta and consider that a person attains Animitta (=Nībbāṇa) by cogitating on the Animitta-dhatu and dissociating his mind from all things with signs, the Śūtrālaṁkāra³ refers in a general way to the practice of the Hinayānists to avoid rāga, dveṣa, moha, and such other nimittas⁴ by which a being becomes entangled in worldly things. There are in the Nikāyas many passages of this import, e.g., in the Dīgha and Anguttara Nikāyas⁵ it is said that a person by inattention to all signs (of allurement) develops such a mental concentration that it may be described as animitta (without sign). But the prevalent meaning of Animitta in Pāli works is Nībbāṇa, the goal to be reached through the meditations (samādhis or vimokkhas) called suññata, appaṭihita and animitta. These vimokkhas help the

1. Śūrā., pp. 169-70.
2. For the exposition of Dharma-tattva as satatam dvayaṁ rahitaṁ, see Ibid pp. 58 ff.
3. Śūrā., p. 169: Sarvanamithtanāṁ amanasikārād animittasya ca dhātvā manosikārād animittaṁ samāpadyante (as done by the Śrāvakas and not by Bodhisattvas).
5. Anguttara, III. pp. 292, 397; Dīgha, II, 100: Tasmin samaye tathāgato sabbanimittanām amanasikārā ekaccaṁ na vedanāṁ nirodho animittaṁ cetosamādhīṁ upasamāpajja viharati: Paṭis. M., I p. 91; -Nimittaṁ bhayato sampassamāṁ animitte adhimattattā pavattamajjhukhetvā nirodham nibbānam animittaṁ āvajjittvā samāpajjīti; see also Vis. M., p. 672; Mahāniddesa, I, p. 198.
adept to comprehend that the things of the world are essenceless (anattā), unpleasant (dukkha) and impermanent (anicca). The Āṅguttara Nikāya hints that a person puts an end to his āsavas (impurities) by dwelling on these three nimittas, while the Atthasālīni states that the five khandhas appear as frightful to a man as a dead body hung round his neck, if he understands the three lakkhanas (anicca, dukkha and anattā).

(III) Removal of Kleśāvaraṇa and not Jñeyāvaraṇa

The Lankāvatāra while explaining the position of the Hinayānists says that they believe in the reality of samsāra (worldly existence) and are frightened by its attendant miseries, from which they seek release; this is only due to their ignorance of the non-existence of any difference between samsāra and nirvāṇa. The standpoint of the Hinayānists is that the world or things around us are produced out of the five skandhas or seventy-two elements having real existence. The constituted things which originate through some causes and conditions (pratitya-samutpanna) are in a constant state of flux and devoid of any substance. The mental and physical constituents undergo momentary (kṣanika) changes and there is no permanent entity apart from them. It is by the removal of the notion of the existence of an ātman as identical with one of the skandhas or something apart from them that a person attains Nirvāṇa.

The Mahāyānists do not admit the real existence of the skandhas or elements composing a being. They assert that the skandhas exist only in imagination (vikalpa) or the illusory...

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1. These three are called also lakkhanas (properties of worldly things). Cf. Jāt. I, p. 48: Buddhānaṇa ca dhammadesanā tilakkhayamuttā nāma natthi, tesām anicca, dukkham, anattā ti.
4. Laṅkā., p. 61.
5. Paññas. M., II, p. 177 devotes a chapter to the exposition of Suññatā. The general definition offered by it is that the things of the world are devoid of attā or attaniya. Then it says that Suñña can be explained in 24 ways, viz., suñña-suññā, saṅkhārasuññā, vipariṇāmasuññā, etc., up to paramatthasuññā (=Nibbāna). The various suññas may well be compared to the 18 kinds of Śunyatā of the Mahāyāna scriptures.
conception (māyā) held by the so-called beings suffering from a defective vision due to ignorance. So the Truth, according to the Mahāyānists, is Śūnyatā or Dharma-nairātmya. The Puṇḍarikā\(^1\) therefore says that he who knows the dharmas as devoid of ātman knows the truth. It is because one does not possess this knowledge of the essencelessness of dharmas (śūnyajñāna-vihina-tvāt) that one is called a Śrāvaka. The Kāśyapa Parivarta sarcastically compares the PudgalaŚūnyatā of the Śrāvakas with the hole made by a termite, and the Dharmaśūnyatā of the Bodhisattvas with the infinite space (ākāśa)\(^2\). Of the seven reasons adduced by the Śūtrālaṃkāra to show why Mahāyāna should be considered superior to Hinayāna, one is that the knowledge of the Mahāyānists is on a higher level, for it penetrates into both Pudgalanairātmya and Dharma-nairātmya.\(^3\) The Triṃśikā\(^4\) brings out very clearly the difference between Pudgala- and Dharma-nairātmya. It says that the realisation of the two forms of Nairātmya is needed for the removal of the two screens (āvaraṇa) viz., that of passions (kleśa) and that hindering true knowledge (jñeyā). The passions or desires, attachment, etc., arise on account of a belief in a self; so when one realises the non-existence of self, the egoism is destroyed, and as a result his passions are eliminated. The realisation of the non-existence of the things of this world (dharma-nairātmya) removes the screen over true knowledge. The removal of both the screens is needed for the attainment of emancipation (mokṣa) and omniscience (sarvajñātva). The passions are obstacles to the attainment of emancipation (mokṣaprāpterāvaraṇam); hence the removal of passions leads to mokṣa. The screen of jñeyā works as a hindrance to the functioning of knowledge (jñāna), i.e., in the apperception of things through knowledge. When it is removed, knowledge penetrates unhindered into all objects of knowledge in detail (sarvākāra) without, however, causing attachment of any kind and this is called the attainment of omniscience or Bodhi.

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3. Śūtrā, p. 171.
The Hinayānists, however, do not admit that they shake off only the kleśāvaraṇa and not jñeyāvaraṇa as stated by the Mahāyānists. They contend that by the removal of the screen of actions (karmāvaraṇa), of the effects of karma (vipākāvaraṇa) and of afflictions (kleśāvaraṇa),¹ the Arhats attain full knowledge without any veil (anāvaraṇa).² They completely eradicate from their minds the āsasas including the avijjāsava. Of the three branches of their spiritual culture, viz., sīla, samādhi and paññā, the last, according to them, brings home to an Arhat the Truth,³ which is the same for Arhats and Buddhas. The function of Paññā consists in destroying avijjā, the veil of ignorance, the source of worldly existences, and therefore, of all miseries (dukkha). It is avijjā, which (i) causes experience of things which ought not to be experienced, e.g., evils through thoughts, words and deeds; (ii) veils things which ought to be known, e.g., the merit of observance of good conduct and so forth; (iii) acts as a hindrance to the realisation of the fact that the five khandhas are in reality an undifferentiated heap (rūṣattham), and that the perceptions of the organs of sense are senseless and that the truths are the same tathāttham;⁴ (iv) drives (javāpeti) beings into the various forms of existence in the Kāma, Rūpa and Arūpa, worlds without cessation; (v) cause one to discriminate between things, which, in the ultimate analysis, have no real difference and clouds one's vision from the real nature of the khandhas; and (vi) blinds one to the relative nature of the world, i.e., its dependence on causes and conditions (paticcasamuppanna).⁵ By the complete removal of Avijjā through paññā, a person becomes an Arhat and reaches the state which is beyond change, beyond

1. The Mahāyānists perhaps made capital out of the statements very often found in the Hinayāna works like Arahattamaggena sabbākilesehi vimuccatiti. Paṭis. M., II, p. 243,
3. Ibid., II, pp. 31, 244: arhattamaggena sabbākilese sāmvaraṭṭhena sīlavisuddhi avikkhepaṭṭhena cittavisuddhi, dassanaṭṭhena diṭṭhinvisuddhi.
4. Paṭis., M., 104 explains tathāttham thus: Cattāro dukkanassa dukkhaṭṭhā tathā avitathā anānathā; dukkanassa pilanaṭṭho saṅkhaṭṭho santāpaṭṭho viparināmaṭṭho... Evaṃ dukkham tathāṭṭhena saccant. In this way the other truths are also explained.
desruction—the state of immortality. There can be no state higher than this. The Hīnayānists acknowledge that the Buddhas, by their extraordinary merits accumulated in the past, acquire omniscience (sabbatiṇātañña),¹ and many other powers unattainable by Arhats,² but they do not admit that the Nibbāna of Buddha is different from that of an Arhat. The knowledge (nāṇa) acquired by Arhats and Buddhas is anāvaraṇa (without any veil) with this difference in the case of a Buddha that his knowledge is detailed and superior in some respects to that of the Arhats.³

(iv) Transition from Laukika to Lokottara

It is stated in the Pūṇḍarika that the Hīnayānists conceive of Nirvāṇa as passing from the worldly (laukikadhātu) to the transcendental sphere (lokottaradhātu), i.e., the Hīnayānic Nirvāṇa is a transcendental state beyond the three dhātus, free from every kind of affliction and beyond any possibility of retrogression to lower stages. The Laṅkāvatāra⁴ points out that ordinary knowledge (laukikajñāna) of the people of the world has reference to the existence and non-existence of things (sada­sasatkṣābhavinivāsta) while the transcendental knowledge (lokottarajñāna) possessed by the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas has reference to the particular and generic characteristics of things (sva­sāmānyalakṣaṇa-patitāśayabhavinivāsta)⁵ penetrating through the notion of existence and non-existence of things. The distinction between laukika and lokottara as drawn in the Pūṇḍarika and Laṅkāvatāra find support in the Hīnayāna scriptures. There it is stated that the puthujjanas (non-solāpannas) labour under the notion of individual existence in the worlds while the arhats are free from such notion, as they know that

¹. Kṛṣṇa, xxi, 3; i. 2.
². For a comparison of the powers (bala) of Arhats and Buddhas, see Buḍḍis. M., II, pp. 173 ff.
³. Pañis. M., I, pp. 131 ff. II, pp. 31, 32. The Buddhas possess 14 jhānas, of which eight are common to the Arhats and Buddhas.
⁵. Kṛṣṇa, VI, 14c, d.; svalakṣaṇa=les caractères propres; sāmānyalakṣaṇa=les caractères généraux.
all beings are made of five skandhas devoid of an underlying permanent entity and owing their origin to causes and conditions (*pratityasamutpanna*), and that the common characteristics of beings are anityatā, duḥkhatā and anātmatā.

The *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, *Vibhaṅga* and other works speak of four dhātus, *viz.*, Kāma, Rūpa, Arūpa and Aparīyāpanna or Lokottara.1 *Kāmaghātu* is the world of beings having *vatthukāma* (desire for existence in any of the three worlds) and *kilesakāma* (proneness to passion). It comprises the eleven spheres of existence from the Avici hell to the Paranimmita heaven.2 In Kāmaghātu, the beings possess 5 khandhas, 12 āyatanas, 18 dhātus, 32 indriyas, 9 hetus, 7 kinds of phassa, vedanā, saññā, cetanā and citta, are conversant with the 3 truths and dependendent on 4 āhāras.3 *Rūpaghātu* is the world of beings without kāma (passion), their actions being subtle (*sukhumā*) in contrast to those of kāmaghātu, whose actions are *ōḷārikā* (gross). It comprises sixteen planes of existence from Brahmaloka to Akaniṭṭhas,5 6 āyatanas, 9 dhātus, 14 indriyas, 8 hetus, and 4 kinds of phassa, vedanā, saññā, cetanā and citta, are conversant with 3 truths and dependendent on 3 āhāras. *Arūpaghātu* is the world of beings without kāma (passion) and rūpa (material constituents of a body). It contains the gods residing in the four spheres from the ākāsānañcāyatanas to nevasaññānañāyatanas.6 In this dhātu the beings possess 4 khandhas,

2. *Attha.*, pp. 61-2; *Paṭis. M.*, I, p. 83. The eleven spheres are the six Devalokas, Manussaloka, Petaloka, Tiracchānayoni and Niraya.
5. These are called Rūpabrahmalokas. By practising the first jhāna, an adept develops a state of mind which is similar to that of the denizens of the first three Rūpabrahmalokas. Should the adept die after perfecting himself in this jhāna, it is believed that he will be reborn in one of those lókas, which are therefore called *Pathamajjhānabhumi*. Applying the same reason, the second three Rūpabrahma lokas are called Dutiyajjhānabhumi, the third three Tatiyajjhānabhumi, the tenth and eleventh Catuttajjhānabhumi, and the remaining five Suddhāvāsabhumi.
6. These four are called Arūpabrahmalokas. The adepts, as above, by practising the Ākāsānañcāyatanas and other jhānas rise to the same level as gods of the Ākāsānanta and other āyatanas.
2 āyatana, 2 dhātu, 11 indriya, 8 hetus, one kind of phassa, vedanā, saññā, cetanā and citta are conversant with 4 truths and dependent on 3 āhāras.

These three dhātus contain all the beings of the universe from the lowest to the highest plane of existence. The aim of Hinayāna Buddhism is to reach a plane beyond the three dhātus, called the Apariyāpanna- or Lokottara-dhātu (the unincorporated or transcendental sphere). According to the Patisambhidāmagga it contains those beings, who have reached the four maggās and obtained the four maggaphalas or the Āsaṅkhata, i.e., Nibbāna. The Vibhaṅga explains that the beings of Apariyāpannadātā possess khandhas and āyatana similar to those of Ariippadātā with the difference that the former are conversant with two truths (nīrodha and magga), possess one additional power, viz., ānāññātaññassāmitindriya and 6 hetus. Evidently, the texts have in view those sentient beings of the first three dhātus, who come to possess one of the stages of sanctification including Arhathood. The texts, however, do not explain how a being belonging to the Kāma- or Rūpa-dhātu and possessing one of the stages of sanctification can be without the rūpakkhandha and how one possessed of the Āsaṅkhata or Nibbāna can continue to have the khandhas, dhātus, āyatana, etc., which are the attributes of the members of Apariyāpanna and Arūpa-dhātu. Thus we find that the Hinayānists seek release from the three laukikadātās by attaining the lokottara or apariyāpanna-dhātu, which includes the Āsaṅkhata- or Nibbāna-dhātu.

Nirvāṇa according to the early Mahāyāna works

The Hinayānic Nirvāṇa thus, according to the Pundarika, is a haven of peace and rest and is a vinukti (emancipation) so

1. Patis. M., I, p. 84.
3. Buddhaghoṣa points out that in reality one cannot speak of lokottarāṇi viññānāi.
far as the *kleśas*¹ (afflictions) are concerned. It further says that there may be people who may look upon this form of existence as *nirvāṇa* and regard the Hinayānists as right in their ways of thinking and practising. In order to counteract such a supposition, it states that there is one and only one *nirvāṇa*, not two or three, and that one is, and, can be attained only by a thorough comprehension of the sameness of all things (*sarvadharma-samatāvadhatu*).² The conception of *Samatā* (sameness) has been developed in the *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, which gives five meanings of the same. It says that a being after comprehending *Dharmasamata* (sameness of things) is realising the non-substantiality of things (*dharma-nairātmya*), sees that in the series of existences whether of himself or of others, there is no difference as regards *nairātmya* (essencelessness) and *duḥkha* (misery); that the desire for the removal of misery from himself as well as from others is the same: that the remedy applicable is the same for himself as well as for others; and that the knowledge, attained by the Bodhisattvas is the same as that attained by him.³ The *Laṅkāvatāra*⁴ explains *samatā* (sameness) by saying that it is the sameness of the world (*saṃsāra*) and its cessation (*nirvāṇa*), i. e., *saṃsāra* bears to *nirvāṇa* the same relation as waves bear to water. The *Pañcaviṃśatī*⁵ explains *samatā* by the illustration of *Ākāśa* (space). It is that *Ākāśa* has no direction like east or west, no past, present or future, no increase or decrease, neither contamination nor purification. It has no origin, continuity or decay. It cannot be a subject of thought. It can neither be heard nor seen; it is neither known nor unknown. It has nothing to do with the *Kāma*, *Rūpa* or *Arūpa* dhātus, with attachment or non-attachment, with hatred or

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2. *Sadd. P.*, p. 133; see also p. 143: *sarvadharmāḥ samāh sarve samāḥ samasamāḥ sadā, evaṃ jñātvā vijnānutvā vijnānti nirvāṇam amṛtāṃ śivāṃ.*
3. *Sūtra*, p. 94: see also p. 48: *samacittatā sarvasattvesv ātmaparasamatayā.*
non-hatred and so forth. It has no concern with the various cittotpādas (i.e., the development of citta for the attainment of bodhi), bhāmis (stages of spiritual progress), phalas (fruits of spiritual sanctification), or any conceptions like happiness (sukha), misery (duḥkha), quietude (sānta), excellence (prāṇīta), etc. This is what is called the samatā (sameness) of Ākāśa. It is in this light that the things of the world are to be seen. What the Paricavadisati contends for is that, from the standpoint of reality, the things seen, heard or known by us are, in fact, the outcome of our imagination. What we should do is to regard these things as our fancies, because they are really the same as Tathatā, of which nothing can be predicated, just as nothing can be predicated of Ākāśa.

According to the Puṇḍarīka, the real Nirvāṇa is that state, in which one sees things without any differentiation or dichotomy, and for the description of which all the expressions that can be used by man, relative as they are, are inadequate. The Laṅkāvatāra describes the jñāna of Bodhisattvas as the lokottaratama-jñāna (super-transcendental knowledge), as distinguished from the lokottarajñāna of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas and laukika-jñāna of prthagjanas (common persons). It consists in the realisation of all dharmas as mere reflections, having no origin and decay. Hence, no question of existence and nonexistence can arise in regard to this (nirābhāsadharmapaśicayād aniroddhānatpadadarsanat sad asat pakṣavigatam).

The Mahāyānists, however, concede the point that the Arhats can remain at peace in the state called by the Hinayānists Arahathood or Nirvāṇa but, according to them, it is a lower ideal, a selfish end, devoid of love (sneha) and charity.

The Puṇḍarīka states that the arhats after attaining (Hinayānic) Nirvāṇa do not, in fact, wish to stay there for ever; it is only a temporary rest (viśrāmo'yam na nivṛtti).

4. Sād. P., pp., 142, 188. Cf. 5 kinds of Nirvāṇa in the Brahmajāla Sūtra. Dr. E. J. Thomas, in his Life of Buddha, p. 200, refers to it thus, "They hold that Nirvāṇa consists in the enjoyment of this life in five ways either in the pleasures of sense or one of the four trances".
18.2 MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHISM

become capable of realising the nature of the Truth and the powers and privileges appertaining to a Buddha, who is indistinguishable from that Truth. Then they set themselves to the performance of the duties still remaining and ultimately becoming Buddhas, *i.e.*, attain Nirvāṇa properly so called. They now realise that the three dhātus, from which they have so long struggled to extricate themselves, had no existence whatsoever,¹ and were merely imaginary superimpositions (*parikalpana*).² The three dhātus that are seen in the ten directions are only appearances like a mirage; hence, they cannot have origination, destruction or transformation, bondage or freedom, light or darkness. As they are non-existent like things seen in a dream or a mirage, any statement about them would be inappropriate. Unless one realises that the things of this universe in this way, he cannot obtain Nirvāṇa (*sarvadharma na prāptaḥ kulas tasya nirvāṇam iti*).³ One who has developed bodhicitta never thinks of himself as existing either in sāṃsāra or in nirvāṇa. Hence, an Arhat, aspiring to comprehend the ultimate truth, should not think of himself as having gone beyond sāṃsāra and established himself in Nirvāṇa. Thus, the Puṇḍarīka brings out clearly the difference between the Hinayānic and Mahāyānic Nirvāṇa.

2. *Sūtrā.,* p. 94; sa *traidhutukāmasamskārān abhūta-parikalpanāmātrān paśyati.
3. Cf. Das Gupta’s *Indian Philosophy*, pp. 425, 426, 428 referring to Gauḍapāda’s definition of the Absolute. The close agreement between the views of the *Sad. P.*, and Gauḍapāda’s *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* will be evident from the following passages:

*Sad. P.*, p. 318 *Drśṭam hi tathāgatena traīdhātukāmaṁ yathābhūtāṁ na jāyate na mriyate na cyavate nāpapadyate na saṃsarati na parinīvāti na bhūtāṁ nābhūtāṁ na sattvaṁ nāsattvaṁ na tathā nānyathā na vītathā nāvītathā. Traidhātukāmaṁ tathāhatena drśṭam yathā bālapṛṭhakjanā na paśyanti.*

*Swapnamāye yathā drśte gandharvanagaram yathā, tathā viśvam idam drśtam Vedāntesu vicārasthitāḥ.*
*Na nirodho na cōptattir na badho na ca sādhakah, na mumukṣur na vaimukta ity esā paramārthatā. Māṇḍūkya, ii. 32:*

*Yathā swapnamayo (māyāmayo or nirmitakā) jīvo jāyate mriyate pi ca, tathā jīvāmi sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca. Māṇḍūkya, iv. 68.*
EXPOSITION OF NIRVĀṆA

EXISTENCE OF SOUL IS DENIED BUT
NIRVĀṆA IS NOT ANNIHILATION

Of late, many scholars have tried to elicit from the various passages of the Nikāyas dealing with Nirvāṇa the sense, which Buddha had in his mind, or at least the sense with which the earliest Buddhism started. Most of the early scholars, who did the pioneering work in the field of Buddhism, namely, Childers, Burnouf, Hardy were inclined to interpret Nirvāṇa as annihilation or to use the common Indian term Ucchedavāda, a dogma which was opposed to the view of the early Buddhists.1 Professor La Vallée Poussin suggests that this conclusion of the scholars was an inevitable consequence of the denial of soul by the early Buddhists.2

The conception of soul and the denial of its existence in the early Buddhist literature constitute as complicated a problem as the interpretation of Nirvāṇa. As the conception of one largely depends on the other, we shall state here briefly the position of the early Buddhists as to their conception of Pudgala (soul). The Theravādins are explicit in their statement that the five khandhas, viz., rūpa (material aggregates), vedanā (feeling), saññā (perception), saṅkhāra (impressions) and viññāna (consciousness) are the ultimates, to which the composition of the world can be reduced. The mass (khandha or saṅgaha) or material aggregates, feeling, etc., would have remained in their original state dissociated from each other if avijja (ignorance) had not stepped in and constituted

1. Cf. Samyutta, iii, p. 109: Yamaka harboured the wrong view that Buddha taught that a khipāsa bhikkhu kāyassa bhedā bhijjati vinassati na hoti param marañña.
3. Usually the Pāli texts speak of Avijjā as ignorance of the four ariya saccas.

In the Vis. M.,(pp. 198, 525) it is equated to bhavatānaḥ (desire for existence) and in another place (p. 526) it is explained as khandhānan rāsaṭṭham,
(saṅkhata) out of them a being (sattva) with the sense of ‘I’. When and how this avijjā of the truth—that the five khandhas remain ever dissociated from each other and do not form an individual—came into existence and brought endless miseries had not been told by any teacher, not even by Buddha (purimā koṭi na paññāyatī avijjāyā).̆̊ Ṿ Evidently, the five khandhas alone constitute a being and there is nothing as the sixth, which can be regarded as Attā or soul. But still one cannot deny the fact that of the five khandhas viññāna (consciousness) is the most active constituent and is mainly instrumental in the formation of a being (nāma-rūpa). It is produced from Saṅkhārā,̇ which again issue out of avijjā. According to Buddhaghoṣa, the belief in a self arises with the ninth link (viz. upādāna) of the chain of causation. Hence, on upādāna hinge the origin and cessation of worldly existence. The belief in a self (ahaṅkāra) is nothing but the false notion of the undisciplined men of the world that one of the five khandhas is soul (attā). It corresponds to the false notion of Ahaṅkāra as conceived by the teachers of Sāṅkhya and Vedānta. The Buddhist conception of self (attā) is therefore as much imaginary as the notion of ahaṅkāra in the Brāhmānic systems of philosophy.

Vasubandhu’s appendix to the eighth chapter of the Abhīdarmakosa and the first section of the Kathāvatthu throw a flood of light upon the early Buddhist theory of soul. In fact,

āyatanānaṁ āyatanāṭṭhaṁ. dhātūnaṁ suññāṭṭhaṁ, indriyānaṁ adhipatiyāṭṭhaṁ, sāccānaṁ tathaṭṭhaṁ aviditāṁ karoti ti pi avijjā. Paramatthato avijjamānesu itthipurisa disujavati, vijjamānesu pi khandhādisu na javatīti avijjā. Api ca cakkhusaṅgādinaṁ vaṭthārammanyāṁ paṭicca-samuppāda-paṭiccasamuppānam ca dhammānaṁ chādonato pi avijjā.


2. Viññāna = six forms of consciousness through the six organs of sense, viz., cakkhu, sota, ghāña, jihvā, kāya and mano.


4. For a full explanation of Avijjā, see Vis., M., p. 526.

5. Vis., M., p. 569: Upādāna is of four kinds; kāmupādānam, diṭṭhupā, ānātthupā and attavādupā.

6. Dh. S. 1217; Vibh., p. 375.

7. Stcherbatsky, Soul Theory of the Buddhists (published by the Royal Academy of Sciences, St Petersburg); La Vallée Poussin, Fr. translation of the Kośa, ch. ix.
in the Nikāyas the existence of soul is not categorically denied in answer to direct questions on that point.\(^1\) What the early Buddhists held was that there was no such thing as soul in the sense, which had come to be widely accepted previous to the advent of Buddhism, viz., as a persisting, unchangeable entity. “In Buddhism”, says Mr. Shwe Zan Aung, “there is no actor apart from action, no percipient apart from perception. In other words, there is no conscious subject behind consciousness... Subject, in Buddhism, is not the self-same permanent conscious object but merely a transitory state of consciousness.\(^2\) This conception is identical with Bergson’s conception of mind or soul, spirit or ego. Mind or soul, according to Bergson, is not “some sort of permanent substantial reality, on which the various states of consciousness are each of them the entire mind in one of the phases of its continuous movement... They are not parts or fragments of the mind, members in an endless series which, for no reason, we choose to regard as a unity and call by a single name.”\(^3\) In Buddhism, the conception of soul as a permanent entity is not only wrong but works as an obstacle to the comprehension of the unreality and transitoriness of things of this world. When Buddhism arose, the term ātman had become so very common, and so much associated with the attributes ascribed to it by the teachers of the early Upaniṣads that the Buddhists had no other alternative than to deny its existence as far as possible in order to wipe out from the minds of the people the deep-rooted ideas. Besides, Buddhism started with the premises that everything whatsoever except Nirvāṇa is unreal;\(^4\) so there could not but be any real soul. But it could not do

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1. E.g., Dīgha, I, pp. 185ff; Stcherbatsky, Soul theory of the Buddhists (p. 864) shows that Buddha would have said tam jīvam tam sarīraṃ if the questioner had not meant by jīva a soul “as a real living unit, controlling our actions from within”. As an answer in the positive or negative about such a soul would be like the discussion about the hardness or softness of the hair of a tortoise, Buddha had to be silent on the point (avyākata).

2. Comp. of Phil., pp. 7, 8.


4. The nature of unreality varies with the two forms of Buddhism. Hinayāna and Mahāyāna; for a discussion of this, see infra.
away with the word ātman, for the Buddhist texts tell us that the early expositors could not help using the current expressions in propounding the doctrines. They wanted to impress on the minds of the people that there is a continuity of the skandhas kept up by action (karma) but there is no persisting, unchangeable and indestructible entity to keep up that continuity. Professor Stcherbatsky puts it thus: "A personality (pudgala), in which other systems imagine the presence of a permanent spiritual principle, a soul (ātman), is in reality a bundle of elements or forces (saṃskārasamūha) and a stream of thought (santāna). It contains nothing permanent or substantial, it is anātman".¹ This definition of soul struck at the root of the supposition of any permanent entity and served fully the purpose of Buddhism, viz., to show that there is nothing in the world, to which one can cling as real and permanent and so he must develop a state of mind in which he must drift to the ultimate, real state called Nirvāṇa, without having anything to cling to in the intermediate process.

FOUR LINES OF INTERPRETATION IN THE NIKĀYAS

Scholars who took the passages in the Buddhist literature on the denial of soul too literally, without considering the motive for the denial of soul made at a particular place and in reply to the query of a particular person, believed that the early Buddhists did not admit the existence of soul and that hence the finality reached by perfect beings was complete annihilation, the absence of existence altogether. There were also some scholars, not very many among the earlier group, who were inclined to the view that Nirvāṇa was not annihilation but an inexpressible state corresponding to the Vedāntic Brahman. All these scholars, although they held one or other of the two views, viz., either complete annihilation or eternal, inexpressible existence, often admitted that Buddha was an agnostic and did not give a definite answer to any of the queries of a metaphysical character, viz., whether there is a soul, or what really is Nirvāṇa. Thus, the opinions of scholars can be classified as follows:

¹. Con. of N., p. 8.
(i) That Nirvāṇa is annihilation;¹
(ii) That Nirvāṇa is an inconceivable and inexpressible eternal state;
(iii) That Nirvāṇa has been left undefined (avyākṛta) by Buddha.² To these may be added the interpretation of Buddhaghoṣa,
(iv) That Nirvāṇa is eternal, pure and infinite consciousness.

NIKĀYAS, A MOSAIC OF MATERIALS OF DIFFERENT TIMES AND PLACES

It should be observed that all those scholars, who arrived at these conclusions, cited passages from the texts of the Nikāyas in support of their findings, and that the views taken by them in most cases followed naturally from those passages. In these circumstances, we have to admit that the Nikāyas as a whole do not present a coherent system of philosophy and doctrine, but the question is whether, in view of the fact that the Nikāyas took centuries to grow and attain a definite shape, we are not entitled to expect from them a coherent system. The Nikāyas are, in fact, a mosaic made up of materials of various times and places, wide apart from each other; hence, it would not be reasonable to expect from them a coherent interpretation of Nirvāṇa. The ancient teachers, too, were puzzled in regard to the correct interpretation of Nirvāṇa, but they never attempted to discover a consistency in the passages of the Nikāyas as a whole. It will be seen from the discussions preserved in the Kathāvatthu and the Abhidharmakośa that the disputants cited a set of passages in support of their contentions, and not any particular Nikāya or Sūtra. To these ancient disputants each

1. Suzuki, Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism, p. 351 quoting the Vimalakīrtisūtra: “Non-activity and eternal annihilation were cherished by the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas”.
2. See La Vallée Poussin, Nirvāṇa, pp. 9, 87 ff.; also E.R.E. II, p. 3 and his Way to Nirvāṇa, p. 134; Beal, Catena etc., p. 172.

According to Colebrooke, Nirvāṇa = profound calm;
“” Hardy, Burnouf, Childers, Nirvāṇa = extinction;
“” Max Müller, Nirvāṇa = rest;
“” Oldenberg, Nirvāṇa = supreme happiness.
saying was independent, and carried the weight, which a num­ber of sayings would do. It is, however, striking that the dis­putants never questioned the authenticity of the passages cited by their opponents. This shows that a dis­putant only preferred one set of passages to another and built his theories on that set. The Nikāyas evidently are only a collection of these various passages put in a uniform setting and given the garb of the sūtras. Attempts, of course, are now being made to sift these sūtras and find out the various strata, but it is doubtful how far the efforts will be fruitful in the absence of new evidences. It may be contended that a Piṭaka is a collection of texts made by a particular school of Buddhist thought, and that consistency should be apparent or discoverable in the passages of that Piṭaka. The contention seems reasonable, but the facts are against it. Professor Poussin has discovered in the Nikāyas many passages cited by the Sarvāstivādins in the Kośa in support of their contentions, while Mrs. Rhys Davids and Mr. Aung have identified many of the citations of the opponents of the Theravādins in the Pāli Piṭaka, the collection of the Theravādins. This fact indicates that the collection of Pāli sūtras was not made with any sectarian motive and that the compilers of the Tripiṭaka included in it all the sayings that they could find out, excepting, very probably, some, which went directly against their creeds and dogmas,¹ and for the rejection of which they took the plea of unauthenticity. It is now fairly well known that each Nikāya developed by itself under the special attention of a group of reciters called Bhānakas, who confined themselves exclusively to the preser­vation of that particular collection.² Buddhaghoṣa, although an orthodox adherent of the Theravāda school, had to acknow­ledge that even these bhānakas differed among themselves regarding the use and sense of certain technical expressions.³ Thus, we see, that even the orthodox supporters of the Pāli Tripiṭakas believed that the Nikāyas did not agree in all their

1. A hint to this effect is seen in the Dipavamsa, ch. iv.
interpretations. We should also bear in mind the significant remark found in the *Kośa*¹ that many sūtras were lost, that many of the sūtras underwent slight changes, and that new ideas and expositions were woven around them in such a way that the accretions conveyed a sense different from that of the kernel around which they were set.²

**Nirvāṇa, the inconceivable state, the infinite consciousness**

On account of this admixture of materials, it is possible to make a selection of passages of the Pāli Nikāyas in such a way as to substantiate any one of the four interpretations of Nirvāṇa to which we have referred. The passages, which give the impression that Nirvāṇa is annihilation, if read in the light of other passages, which interpret Nirvāṇa as an inconceivable existence, may convey a sense different from annihilation.

Prof. Keith has, for instance, shown that the simile of the extinction of the flame, which is one of the many important similes relied on by scholars favouring the view of annihilation, has been worked out in the *Aggivacchagotta sutta* to show that it is not extinction but disappearance in the “deep, immeasurable, difficult to fathom” state of existence.³ Buddhaghoṣa has drawn our attention to one or two passages in the *Dīgha⁴ and Majjhima Nikāyas*,⁵ which present us with quite a new interpretation of Nibbāna. The passage runs thus:

*Viññānam anidassanam anantaṃ sabbato pabhaṃ,*

*Ettha āpo ca paṭhavi tejo vāyo na gāḍhati,*

2. Cf. Prof. Poussin’s remark in his *Nirvāṇa*, p. 9: ‘La vieille tradition scripturaire (Petit Véhicule), codifiée, renouvelée, amplifiée par les écoles, est mal daëée, en partie tardive, point toujours claie contradictoire sinon dans ses dogmes du moins dans ses tardences”. See also p. 133.
3. Keith, *B. Phil.*, pp. 65-6: “The comparison is indeed significant, for there is no doubt that the Indian idea of the extinction of fire was not that which occurs to us of utter annihilation, but rather that the flame returns to the primitive, pure, invisible state of fire, in which it existed prior to its manifestation in the form of visible fire”.
Ettha dighaṁ ca rassaṁ ca anuṁ thūlani subhāsubhāṁ,  
Ettha nāmaṁ ca rūpaṁ ca asesam uparujjhati,  
Viññānassa nirodhena etthi' etam uparujjhătiti.1

[On a certain occasion a bhikkhu was advised by Buddha to put his question thus:—"What is that place where distinctions like water and earth, fire and air have no footing, where long and short, fine and coarse, good and bad, or name and form cease absolutely?" instead of asking "Where do the four elements earth, water, fire and air disappear absolutely?" (The answer quoted above was given to it is) "It is viññāna (consciousness), which is signless, infinite,2 radiant on all sides (sabbato pabham)3 where all the distinctions mentioned above, cease, and where the constituted viññāna, after cessation, disappears". Buddhaghoṣa in commenting upon this passage says that the first viññāna is another name for Nibbāna4 while the second viññāna is one of the five khandhas. His interpre-

1. Cf. Majjhima Nikāya (I, p. 329) passage: Viññānam anidassanam anantam sabatto pabham, tam paṭhaviyā paṭhaviitena ananubhūtaṁ, āpassa āpattena ananubhūtaṁ, etc. The Papaṇeśāuddani (I, p. 413) comments on it as follows:—Padadvayena (i.e., viññānam anidassanam) pi nibbānam eva vuttaṁ. Anantan ti tayidam uppāda-vaya-antarhitattā anantam nāma. Sabbato pabhan ti sabatto pabhāsamanpannam, Nibbāvato hi aṅgro dhhammo sappabhātaro vā jottimattaro vā parisuddhātaro vā pañḍarataro vā n'atthi, etc.

2. Buddhaghoṣa says that it is infinite (ananta) because it has no origin, no decay, no duration (sthitī) and no change.

3. J. d'Alwis' suggestion of 'pabham' for 'paham' has been preferred here. For a note on this, see Sacred Books of the Buddhists, II, p. 282n. Buddhaghoṣa, it seems, preferred the word "Papam" (from Sanskrit Prapā—a shed on the roadside for providing passers-by with water Aufrecht, Abhi. Ratnamālā, p. 283) to "Pabham" more for maintaining the analogy between Nibbāna and sea just mentioned before this passage. He says that just as in a great sea no landing-place is provided for seafarers, so also in Nibbāna there is no particular name corresponding to the 38 kammatṭhānas (bases for meditation), through which a monk aims at Nibbāna, i.e., through whatever kammatṭhānas (compared here to landing-places) one may reach Nibbāna, there is nothing to distinguish it in Nibbāna.

For Prof. O. Franke's notes see his Dīgha Nikāya (Quellen der Religions Geschichte), Leipzig, p. 166n.

tation, it seems, is based upon a few Nikāya passages. In the Saṃyutta Nikāya,1 Buddha referring to the parinibbāna of Vakkali bhikku said that the wicked Māra was searching for the viññāṇa (consciousness)2 of Vakkali, who had been just dead, and predicted that Māra’s attempt would not be successful because Vakkali had passed away (parinibbuto) with viññāṇa, which cannot be localised (apatittita). The sense of apatiṣṭhita-viññāṇa is given elsewhere in the Saṃyutta Nikāya,2 where it is explained as consciousness, which requires no support (patittha or ārammaṇa) for its origin. It arises only when the attachment (rāga) to rūpa (material elements of the body), and the other four khandhas is removed. It is unconstituted, devoid of growth and independent of any cause and condition and hence free. Being free it is steady; being steady it is happy; being happy it is without any fear of change for the worse; being fearless it attains parinibbāna.

In commenting on this passage, Buddhaghoṣa further says that an arhat never has any maññāna (thought-construction)4 in regard to the four elements or Nibbāna or anything whatsoever, which a puthujjana or a khilāsava5 (but not yet an

is abhisamkhāra (constituted) and that it ceases like the flame of a lamp to pass into a state of indistinguishability (apānakabhave). Cf. Keith, B. Phil., pp. 47, 48 where Prof. Keith points out that Prof. Franke’s attempt to prove that there is much of negativism in early Buddhism favours the view that Nibbāna of early Buddhism was more idealistic than negativistic. See also O. Franke’s notes on Nibbāna in Z. D. M. G., lxix, pp. 475-81.

4. The Nikāya passages referred to here (Majjhima, I, p. 4) were not in harmony with Prof. Stcherbatsky’s theory and so these did not appeal to him. See his remarks in Com. of N., p. 42n. The “maññāna” of Buddhaghoṣa reminds us of one of the passages of the Prajñāpāramitāś, in which it is asserted that all dharmas are like dream and that Bodhisattvas svapnāyam api na manyante svapnena na manyante, etc.; e.g., Pañca, (A.S.B. ms.) leaves 225, 399b: samsāraṃ samsārato na vikalpayati, nirvāṇam nirvāṇato na vikalpayati and so forth.
5. For distinction between an Arhat and a Khināsava, see Papañcasūdāni p. 42.
arhat) has. Buddhaghosha thus tries to show that Nibbāna is inexpressible, infinite and that any attempt to establish a relation between it and a being is a delusion of the mind. He is also constrained to say that such a description of Nibbāna had to be given as a set-off to the arguments of Brahmā, hinting thereby that even such statements are not permissible as Nibbāna is inexpressible. From such interpretations of the Nikāya passages as well as from his exposition of Nibbāna in the *Visuddhimagga*, treated later on, it will be apparent that he, far from supporting nihilism, held that Nibbāna was a transcendental, indescribable state. In fact, there was hardly any school of Buddhism, which favoured the view of annihilation, and so it seems that the opinions of scholars, who supported annihilation do not rest on very sure foundations. Prof. La Vallée Poussin has criticised in detail the views of these scholars. He has given the gist of their views, showing the weak points in them along with his learned dissertation on the interpretation of Nirvāṇa (*Etudes sur l'histoire de religions*, 1925). As in his work he has reviewed most of the writings of his predecessors on Nirvāṇa, we need not deal with them again. For our present purpose, it is sufficient to state his opinion and those of Prof. A.B. Keith and Prof. Stcherbatsky, the three latest exponents of the subject.

**Prof. La Vallée Poussin on Nirvāṇa**

Prof. La Vallée Poussin starts with the statement that it is possible to distinguish Buddhism on the one hand as popular and devotional, and on the other hand as clerical and mystic. The former is meant for the laity and the latter for the monks. The popular and devotional form of Buddhism holds out the prospect of paradise to the laity. It is only a means to an end, for the layman in one of his later lives is to become a monk and take to the clerical and mystic side of Buddhism and ultimately attain Nirvāṇa. Prof. Poussin then proceeds to define

2. See infra.
3. *Nirvāṇa*, pp. 1, 7, 8. Cf. *Karma and Jñāna* of Brāhmanic philosophy; the former leads to *svarga* (heaven) while the latter to *mokṣa* (emancipation).
Nirvāṇa. He says that Nirvāṇa is undoubtedly the highest happiness, putting a stop to duḥkha and transmigration. It implies the absence of merit as well as of demerit. It requires a purely ascetic discipline to bring the desires or passions to an end.¹ The monks unlike the laity do not seek paradise, for even the life in paradise ends with the exhaustion of one’s good karma.² They therefore seek a state which affords eternal (dhruva) beatitude (sukha).³ The very common appellation to denote this state is Amatapadām (immortality), which Prof. Poussin considers to be a very old and characteristic expression used to describe Nirvāṇa. He thinks that the notion of deliverance has been made precise in the early Buddhist literature. It is an abode, supreme and definite but yet this notion has not been coloured by any positive philosophic doctrine or by speculation upon God, soul, or being in itself.⁴ He, as also Dr. E.J. Thomas,⁵ refer to the fact that the early Buddhists did not speculate about such Upaniṣadic doctrine as the Parabrahman, which was developed by the Vedāntists long after Buddhism. They knew only of the highest heaven called Brahmaloka. Dr. Thomas remarks in connection with the Brahmagālā Sutta that “among all these views there is no expressed contradiction or even recognition of the Vedāntic theory of Ātman or Brahman as the one ultimate reality”.⁶ Prof Poussin also points out that it is not correct to hold that Buddhism originated purely in opposition to the Brāhmaṇa theories. He says that there is nothing, which permits us to affirm that Nirvāṇa was conceived in opposition to any Brāhmaṇa theory. Nirvāṇa, Immortality, or Deliverance appears to be a rudimentary idea free from all metaphysical speculations. It is connected more with myths than with metaphysics.

1. *Nirvāṇa*, p. 4.
2. Cf. Chāndogya, 8, 1, 6: *Tad yattheha karmajito lokaḥ kṣiyate, evam evāmutra punajito lokaḥ kṣiyate* (just as the things produced by efforts of people are exhausted by their use, so also heavenly lives, etc., earned by sacrifices, merits, etc., are exhausted by their use).
4. *Nirvāṇa*, p. 49: “La notion de la deliverance était précise: l’ascète ne doute pas que la délivrance ne soit un séjour supreme et definite”.
6. Ibid.
Nirvāṇa is an invisible abode where the saint disappears, often as the middle of a flame, or in a kind of apotheosis. In short, the Hinayāna Buddhism from the time of the Mahāvagga to Buddhaghosa emanated, so to say, from the Yoga almost without any mixture. The Immortal State, the Inexpressible is what a saint aims at, because it is the deliverance from birth and death. It is, however, not possible to establish any relation, philosophical or ontological, between the Immortal and the world of beings, who transmigrate. Immortality is the name given to Nirvāṇa; in other words, perfect happiness, extinction, detachment are terms, which are devoid of doctrinal complexities, and which, in fact, appear to signify merely the extinction of the fire of desire, or, to put it in another way, constitute the road to the Immortal State, or the Immortal State itself. It is obvious that Prof. Poussin wants to contradict the long-advocated view that Nirvāṇa is annihilation. He cites several passages to show that the self-originating fire, in which a saint consumed himself, as also the saint himself was not annihilated. While summarising his views, he gives the following different uses of the term Nirvāṇa:

(i) The Nirvāṇa, the Absolute, the Uncaused, which is by itself the destruction of passion, of duḥkha.

(ii) The complete possession of Nirvāṇa, which reduces all passions and all new existences to the quality of anutpatti (not being capable of reproducing); in other words, that which constitutes the saintship, the deliverance from thought (or conceptions), the Sopāḍhiśeṣa Nirvāṇa (Nirvāṇa with corporal residue).

(iii) The consciousness of the possession of Nirvāṇa, consciousness obtained in ecstasy, which is beatitude, and which is the best form of Nirvāṇa in the world, and properly speaking, the only Nirvāṇa.

(iv) The possession of the Samādhi of the cessation of ideas and sensations (samjñāvedayitanirodha), a possession obtainable by saints, perfect or imperfect, a samādhi which appears

1. Nirvāṇa, p. 57.
2. Ibid., pp. 53-4.
like entering into Nirvāṇa, and of which one becomes conscious through the body only, since the thought is then stopped.

(v) The entering into Nirvāṇa at the last moment of thought, the end of duḥkha, the entering into Anupādhiśeṣa Nirvāṇa (Nirvāṇa without any corporal residue).

(vi) The possession of Nirvāṇa relating to such and such a passion, which carries with it the quality of not being able to reproduce itself for such passion and such future existences; an incomplete sanctity which one enjoys in ecstasy.¹

Prof. Poussin has endeavoured to show that the Nirvāṇa of the early Buddhists is not annihilation; it is a state which may well bear comparison with the paradise of the laity but it is free from the implication of a life in paradise, i.e., unlike the life in a paradise, it is eternal (dhruva), it is beatitude, but without any sensation even of bliss.² It is beyond merit and demerit, a quiescent state, which is obtainable in this life by saints when they establish themselves in the samādhi of saṃjñāvedayitanirodha (cessation of ideas and sensations). In this state as the thought is completely stopped, the saint feels only by his body the supreme bliss. He, however, warns us not to identify the supreme state of bliss with the Vedantic Parabrahman, for the Buddhists had not yet arrived at that conception. His reason for holding this opinion is, chiefly, that the early Buddhists were not interested, to any appreciable extent, in metaphysical speculations, but were rather busy with myths. Hence, their conception of Nirvāṇa was not of a metaphysical nature but just the utmost possible extension of the conception of paradise.

PROF. STCHERBATSKY ON NIRVĀṆA

Prof. Stcherbatsky protests strongly against the view of Prof. Poussin that Nirvāṇa is a sort of ultimate conceivable existence—


2. Cf. *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, 1389, 1579 ff.; Nibbāna is not to be taken a: accompanied by piti (delight), sukha (happiness), or upākkha (equanimity). In the *I. H. Q.*, IV, p. 247, Prof. Poussin says, “Nirvāṇa from the beginning is perfect happiness, the *summum bonum*, much better than any paradise not a paradise (of course) without any conceivable relations with any form of existence. The canonical literature states clearly that the happiness of Nirvāṇa, end of suffering, is blissful because it is not vedita”. 
a view suggested by the expression *Amatapadām*,¹ often used to describe Nirvāṇa, and by the descriptions of the same found in the *Milindapañha* and the *Nikāyas*. Prof. Stcherbatsky does not examine the various passages of the Piṭakas and other works, which influenced Prof. Poussin's conclusions. It would appear from the *Conception of Nirvāṇa* as well as from his earlier work the *Central Conception of Buddhism* that Prof. Stcherbatsky bases his finding purely on the study of the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu, and ignores the fact that the *Kośa* does not present us with the original doctrines, which the Piṭakas are supposed to preserve. He also does not attach importance to the fact that the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins do not agree as to the nature of distintegration of constituted elements (*saṁskṛta-vastus*), which is clearly hinted at in the discussion in the *Kāṭhāvatthu*² on the theory of the Sarvāstivādins that “all exists”.³

In his treatment of the discussion of this topic, however, he refers to the fact that the Vibhajyavādin (= Theravādins) did not always agree with the Sarvāstivādins.

In view of the fact mentioned above, it is doubtful how far Prof. Stcherbatsky was right in attributing to Buddha the views found in the *Kośa* that “(i) Buddha was led to a denial of every permanent principle, (ii) that the originality of Buddha's position consisted in denying substantiality altogether, and (iii) that forsaking the Monism of the Upaniṣads and the Dualism of the Śāṃkhya, he established a system of the most radical pluralism”⁴. These might have been the views of the

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1. In this connection, we may mention that Amatapadām does not always necessarily mean “heavenly state”. The word *mṛtyu* (pāli *maccu*), in the lines of the *Taitt. Upa.* 2. 1, i: *Brahmavid āpnoti param, na pūnar mṛtyavo*, and *Chānd Upa.* 7. 26. 2: *Tad ekam paśyati na paśyo mṛtyum paśyati*, is explained by the commentator as neither heavenly existence nor eternal death but as *pramāda* (negligence, error) and *moha* (delusion). This comment is supported by the *Dhammapada* line: *Pamādo maccuno padam*. See *P. T. S. Dict.*, sv. *Maccu.*

2. *Kṣv.*, I, 6, pp. 115 f.

3. *Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 43. 76 ff.: Keith's *B. Phil.*, p. 168; *Con. of N.*, pp. 3, 27; for bibliography on the topic “All exists” see *Kośa*, v, 24, pp. 49, 50 fn.

4. *Con. of N.*, p. 3.
later Vaibhāśikas but were certainly not those of the early Buddhists, not to speak of Buddha himself. Many passages can be, and have been, cited from the Piṭakas\(^1\) to show that Nirvāṇa is a reality, that it is unspeakable and possesses the sign of peacefulness, the taste of immortality, that it offers consolation, that it is unborn, uncreated, and indestructible. In the face of the glowing descriptions that are to be found of the state of Nirvāṇa in early post-canonical works,\(^2\) it is difficult to agree with Prof. Stcherbatsky that Nirvāṇa is nothing but eternal death and that it is an unconstituted element (\textit{asaṃskṛta-dhātu}), because it is tantamount to the absolute annihilation of the constituted elements (\textit{saṃskṛtadharma})—"a kind of entity where there is no consciousness".\(^3\) In fact, Prof. Stcherbatsky's opinion makes it resemble one of the heretical doctrines condemned by Buddha, viz., \textit{Asaṃñi aśta hoti arogo param maraṇa} (the soul remains after death as an unconscious but healthy entity).\(^4\) Without multiplying instances, we can refer to the last few lines of the \textit{Kevaddha Sutta}\(^5\) to show that there are passages in the early Buddhist works which go directly against the conclusions of Prof. Stcherbatsky. If Nibbāna is extreme happiness (\textit{paramasukha}), a place of perfect peace\(^6\) (\textit{santivarapadam}), an object of realisation (\textit{sačchikirīya}),\(^7\) it is safer to accept the opinion of Prof. Poussin that Nirvāṇa is the highest conceivable paradisical existence than to agree with Prof. Stcherbatsky that Nirvāṇa is simply an end of the \textit{saṃskṛta dharmas}—a stone-like life without a vestige of consciousness.

In short Prof. Stcherbatsky makes Buddha a materialist and annihilationist (\textit{Ucchedavādīn}) so severely condemned by Buddha. Prof. Stcherbatsky admits this anomalous position of his exposition, and endeavours to extricate himself from the

\(^{1}\) See besides Prof. Poussin's \textit{Nirvāṇa}, Heiler's \textit{Die buddhistische Versenkung}, Muenchen, pp. 36-42; \textit{P., T. S. Dist. sv. Nibbāna}.

\(^{2}\) e.g., \textit{Thera and Therī-gāthā}; \textit{Milindapañha}.

\(^{3}\) \textit{Central Conception of Buddhism}, p. 53.

\(^{4}\) \textit{Majjhima}, II, pp. 230 ff.

\(^{5}\) \textit{Digha}, I. p. 223; for its commentary see \textit{Sum. Vi.} in the \textit{I. H. Q.} vol., II.

\(^{6}\) \textit{Majjhima}, I, p. 257.

\(^{7}\) \textit{Ibid.}, I. pp. 56, 63, 510.
anomaly by stating that Buddha’s materialism and annihilationism were of a modified nature, because, as he says, the elements constituting a being were not only material, but both material and spiritual, and hence, according to him, Buddha was not an out-and-out materialist like the Cārvākas, or like Ajita Kesakambalin and Pakudha Kaccāyana, but was partially so. Then, as regards Buddha being not an out-and-out annihilationist he points to the moral law, the strength and importance of which were recognised by Buddha; Buddha meant that the being, which is only a conglomeration of “evanescent elements” passes through a series of existence governed by the moral law, ultimately to be annihilated or, in other words, to attain Nirvāṇa or eternal death. Hence, according to Prof. Stcherbatsky, Uccheda or annihilation takes place not after one life but a series of lives.

NIRVĀṇA AS VIEWED BY PROF. KEITH

Prof. Keith on the basis of the Nikāya passages where there is an emphatic assertion of the existence of Nirvāṇa as something unfathomable, unborn, uncreated, unconstituted, and so forth,—a description echoed in the works of Nāgārjuna,—and also on the strength of the discussions in the Buddhistic literature on the existence of the Tathāgata during his life-time or after his decease, thinks that the Madhyamaka view can be traced in the Nikāyas, and that there are “positive assurances of the reality of something over and above the empirical world”.1 He says further that “the great sermon at Benares on the characteristic of that which is not self does not deny in express terms that there may exist another realm of existence which is exempt from empirical determination, and which, therefore, must be regarded as absolutely real”2. Though Prof. Keith thinks that the view of a section of the early disciples about the “existence of an absolute reality admits of serious support” and that passages or expressions can be traced in the Nikāyas having the colour or flavour of the Brāhmanic Upaniṣads or the

1. Keith, B. Phil., p. 67.
2. Ibid., p. 61.
Mahābhārata, he puts forward the proviso that on the basis of these coincidences, it would not be proper to say that the Buddhist Nirvāṇa is "essentially the absolute parallel with the Brahman", for the Buddhists "like every new belief were largely compelled to put their wine in old bottles". He also does not ignore the fact that there are ample evidences in the Nikāyas to show that "Buddha was a genuine agnostic", though he himself is not much in favour of the view. In short, Prof. Keith is of that opinion that the Nikāyas do not teach annihilation, or eternal death. He finds in Nirvāṇa only a negative aspect of the Absolute or the Void and would not recognize it to be the same as Brahman of the Upaniṣads or the Vedāntists. Prof. Poussin also would subscribe to this view if it be taken as the Mahāyānic conception of Nirvāṇa, for according to him, the Hīnayānic Nirvāṇa is something definite and real, a tangible reality. Prof. Stcherbatsky rises above all hesitations and asserts that the Hīnayānic Nirvāṇa is eternal death, while the Mahāyānic Nirvāṇa is eternal life, and that the latter is the same as the Monism, or Advaita Brahman of the Vedāntists. Though he may be partial to Vasubandhu and Nāgārjuna, he cannot he justified in ignoring and explaining away the passages of the Nikāyas, which interpret Nirvāṇa differently from Vasubandhu. The opinion of Prof. Poussin that "there is a great deal of Mādhyamika philosophy in the Pāli canon", and the reference of Prof. Keith to passages or suttas of the Nikāyas is indicative of the reasonableness of holding such an opinion, appears startling to Prof. Stcherbatsky, and against them he holds without mentioning any authority or citing any passage, that "it is quite impossible to maintain that Hīnayāna is an advaita system" and that it is going too far to see a "fullyfledged Prajñāpāramitā" in the Majjhima Nikāya.

1. Ibid., p. 61.
2. Ibid., p. 63.
3. Dr. F. Otto Schrader in his article on Nirvāṇa in the J. P. T. S. (1904-5) favours the metaphysical conception of the Absolute as the real interpretation of Nirvāṇa of the early Buddhists.
4. E. R. E., sv. Nirvāṇa. Prof. Poussin has also traced Vijñānavāda ideas in the Anguttara; see his Nirvāṇa, p. 65:
5. Con. of N., p. 42 fn.
Now that we have stated the views of the latest exponents of the Buddhist conception of Nirvāṇa, we shall proceed to examine some of them in the light of evidences yielded by the Pāli works.

Is saṃjñāvedayitanirodha a foretaste of Nirvāṇa?

It is, however, striking that both Profs. Stcherbatsky and Poussin have tried to form an idea of Nirvāṇa on the basis of the quiescent state attained by a yogin at the highest altitude of his meditation. Both agree that it is quiscence which is aimed at by all saints, including the arhats. To Prof. Stcherbatsky, Nirvāṇa is the highest form of quiescence imaginable, and hence it is a condition where there is no vestige of consciousness—an absolute annihilation of life,¹ while to Prof. Poussin, it is a condition where the mind (citta) does not function, but the body is pervaded by an extremely pleasant feeling; the mind, being inactive, does not enjoy the pleasure.

Prof. Poussin formed his impression mainly from the utterances of perfected saints in the Udāna and the Thera- and Theri-gāthā. His conception of Hinayānic Nirvāṇa appears to my mind to be the magnified form of the pleasant sensation felt by saints in the second and third trances. The Nikāyas often speak of the pleasant sensation in the second and third trances as similar to that of a person when his body is besmeared with fine powder by an expert bath attendant; but they do not speak about the sensation felt by a saint while in Nirvāṇa. Prof. Poussin is justified in regarding the highest meditation of Saṃjñāvedita- (or vedayita-) nirodha as a foretaste of Nirvāṇa in this world, but his view that the body of the saint is pervaded by blissful sensation is unwarranted.² The Pāli texts are quite clear about their definition of this highest meditation. In the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta,³ Buddha entered into meditation before attaining

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1. *Con. of N.*, p. 28.
parinirvāṇa and rose from the lowest to the highest samādhi, the Saṁñāvedayitaniruddha, when Ānanda, imperfect as he was, took him to be dead (parinibbuta). This is the highest meditation, to which an adept can reach. The condition of a person in this meditation is almost the same as that of a dead man. The Saṁyutta Nikāya explains the differences thus: There is a complete cessation of the activities in a dead man as well as in person in the highest samādhi,—i.e., of the (i) physical activities (kāyasankhāra), e.g., inhalation and exhalation, (ii) vocal activities (vacisaṅkhāra), e.g., reflection and deliberation (vitakka-vicārā), and (iii) mental activities (cittasaṅkhāra), e.g. ideation and feeling (saṁñā ca vedanā ca). The life (āyu) of the men engaged in meditation is not exhausted as also his internal heat (uṣma), and his organs of sense remain in a placid condition, while in a deceased person there is no life (āyu) and no internal heat (uṣma) and his sense-organs are defunct. In the Saṁñāvedayitaniruddha, a saint cannot at will rise from it. Before entering into the samādhi, he fixes the time-limit after which he would revert to the ordinary state of consciousness and he does so at the fixed moment. This meditation in which the mind, the body, and the power of speech completely cease to function may be likened to the condition of deep sleep (sūpti) of a man. It is similar to the Upaniṣadic conception of “deep-sleep consciousness” in which there is no consciousness either of the objective world or of the self. The Pāli texts nowhere mention a blissful sensation enjoyed by the body apart from the mind. The feeling of ease enjoyed by an ascetic in the highest trance is generated within the body, and not by any contact with an external material thing. The verses in the

5. There are passages in the Nikāyas, in which it is said that vimokkhe kāyena phassitvā viharati (Āṅguttara, II, 90). The Vimokkhas do not refer to Nibbāna but to the eight meditations (Dīgha, III, pp. 261-2) or to the three Samādhis called Animmīta, Appanihiṭa, and Suññata vimokkhas (Vis. M., p. 658). These refer only to experiences of meditating saints felt within themselves and not by coming into contact with something external.

Thera- and Theri-gāthā and the passages in the Mahāparinibbāna sutta describing the last trance of Buddha only express the ecstasy experienced by a perfected saint when he is in the highest trance. It is really the foretaste of what he is going to experience permanently. At the Arhat stage, i.e., on the attainment of the anupādhisesa-nibbānadhatu, he is assured of the fact that the supreme bliss in the inexpressible form of existence is going to be permanently his after the dissolution of his physical body, or in other words, he is going to be established in the Anupādhisesa-nibbānadhatu permanently. The close relation between the meditation of Saññāvedayitanirodha and Nibbāna will be apparent from the verses of the Udāna describing the parinibbāna of Dabba Mallaputta:

\[ \text{Abhedi kayo nirodhi saññā vedanā} \ \text{pi `ti dahamsu} \ \text{sabbā}, \]

\[ \text{vupasaminsu sañkhārā viññānam} \ \text{attham agamā ti.} \]

[The body is disintegrated, perception stops, all sensations are burnt away, the (three) activities cease and the (constituted) consciousness disappears.]

The Saññāvedayitanirodha, therefore, is very similar to parinibbāna. The Majjhima Nikāya adds that a perfect saint not only attains it but also destroys his āsavas (impurities) by knowledge and thus goes beyond the clutches of Mara. Hence, the Saññāvedayitanirodha of a saint is tantamount to a foretaste of Nibbāna only when it is accompanied by the other necessary conditions, viz., destruction of āsavas, insight into the truth and so forth.

**Is Nirvāṇa eternal death?**

Prof. Stcherbatsky thinks that Nirvāṇa, being allied to Saṃjñāvedayitanirodha may be regarded as a state without a vestige of consciousness. In the account of Buddha’s parinirvāṇa, Buddha enters into the Saṃjñāvedayitanirodha but he does not stay there permanently. He comes down to the lowest and then rises again to attain parinirvāṇa in the fourth dhyāna. If Nirvāṇa had been a permanent form of Saṃjñā-

2. Digha, II, p. 156.
vedayitanirodha, then Buddha would have remained there and attained mahāparinirvāṇa.

To prove his contention that Nirvāṇa is eternal death, Prof. Stcherbatsky takes support from another statement in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta commented upon in the Mādhyamika-Vṛtti. The passage is:

Pradyotasy' eva nirvānaṁ vimokṣas taṁya cetasaḥ.

He attributes to the Vaibhāṣikas the comment, which follows this passage in the Vṛtti. The Vaibhāṣikas, as is supposed by him, assert in refuting the abhāva theory of the Sautrāntikas that there is something 'in which desire is extinct', and that it is not merely 'extinct desire' as the Sautrāntikas think. In the Sanskrit text there is no word or hint about the extinction of consciousness. All that is said is about tṛṣṇā. Prof. Stcherbatsky, however, in his translation says that every desire (also consciousness) is extinct (at final Nirvāṇa). Probably his addition “and consciousness” in the line was suggested by the line that follows, viz., yasm in sati cetaso vimokṣa bhavati. He translates cetaso vimokṣaḥ as “consciousness is quite extinct.” It is difficult to accept his English rendering and it is not at all clear why he should prefer “consciousness” to “mind” as the English equivalent of cetas. The Pāli version of the line, Pajjotass' eva nibbānaṁ vimokkha cetaso ahū ti was uttered by Anuruddha to describe Buddha’s Nirvāṇa. Buddhagośa in commenting upon this passage says that vimokkho means the removal of all screens hindering vision, and that the extinction of the flame indicates the state of non-manifestation. Prof. Stcherbatsky may have other reasons for such opinion, but it is difficult to agree with him in regard to the fact that the early Buddhists generally, including the Theravādins, regarded Nirvāṇa as an inanimate reality. In the Kathāvatthu and the Dhammasaṅgāni,

1. M. Vr., p. 525.
2. Con. of N., p. 191.
3. Nirvāṇa as Kṣayamātra is discusse in the Vis. M., p. 508; see infra.
Nibbāna has been qualified as *acetasika*, the English rendering of which, according to Mrs. Rhys Davids, should be "not a property of the mind", or according to Prof. Poussin, "where mind does not function any more."¹ Here *acetasika* does not mean inanimate substance, but it is a state where the individual *citta* ( = manovijñāna) or the *abhisamkhāraravinñāna* of Bhuddaghosa² ceases to exist; hence Nirvāṇa is not eternal death.

Prof. Stcherbatsky, in interpreting Nirvāṇa as an eternal state of death, has attached too much importance to the influence of Sāṃkhyya on Buddhism.³ He almost identifies the Vaibhāṣikas with the Sāṃkhyya School excepting for the conception of Puruṣa in the latter.⁴ He says that Nirvāṇa is a lifeless reality corresponding to the undifferentiated matter (*Prakṛti*)⁵ of Sāṃkhyya.⁶ The position of Prof. Stcherbatsky reduces to this, that the phenomenal world issued out of Nirvāṇa to return to it again by the removal of *Avidyā* (ignorance), and that Nirvāṇa is the same as the five skandhas in their original undifferentiated state. This is not supported by the canonical as well as the non-canonical texts. The Sarvāstivādins in enumerating the various 'elements' mention Nirvāṇa as an Asamkṣrta-dhātu existing side by side with the elements constituting a being. The Theravadins also hold that the five khandhas⁷ are nothing but masses of five kinds of elements, out of which a being is constituted through Avidyā. Both the Sarvāstivādins and the Theravadins are emphatic in their statement that a being once constituted out of the seventy-two

1. Also "Unmental, automatic" see *Points of the Controversy*, pp. 57ff., 249.
2. See ante. Prof. Stcherbatsky himself writes elsewhere (*Central Con. of B.*, p. 15) that *citta* = manovijñāna.
7. Nowhere in the Buddhist texts, any statement is made that the five khandhas were originally in an undifferentiated state. All that they say is that the material elements of all beings of all times of the Kāmadhātu and Rūpadhātu are collectively called Rūpakkhandha, so also Vedanā, Saññā, Sañkhāra, and Viññāṇa of all beings taken together are called Vedanākkhandha, Saññākkhandha, Sañkhārakkhandha and Viññāṇakkhandha. *Vis. M.*, pp. 443, 452.
elements or five khandhas passes through innumerable existences until by the removal of Avidyā, he enters into the Āsāṃskṛtadhātu or Nirvāṇa, which is an element existing by itself. According to the Sāṁkhya School of Philosophy, the mokṣa (emancipation) of a being consists in his realisation of the fact that Puruṣa and Prakṛti remain ever apart (viveka-khyāti) and not by a being passing from the constituted to the unconstituted state. In Sāṁkhya, the emancipated being is one of the innumerable Puruṣas while in Buddhism he is after death indistinguishable from Nirvāṇa. The agreement between Sāṁkhya and early Buddhism lies in the fact that the undifferentiated matter (Prakṛti)¹ of Sāṁkhya corresponds in its differentiated form to the five khandhas and not to Nirvāṇa as inferred by Prof. Stcherbatsky. If an analogy for Nirvāṇa be sought for in Sāṁkhya, we may say that it could have been found in Puruṣa if the innumerable Puruṣas were one Āsāṃskṛtadhātu.

Is Nirvāṇadhātu a vastu?

On the basis of the Visuddhimagga and the Abhidharmakośa, Prof. La Vallée Poussin remarks that Nirvāṇa is a vastu² (material substance), a reality, which the body touches when in the highest trance (saṁjñāvedayita-nirodha), while Prof. Stcherbatsky, in consonance with his interpretation of Nirvāṇa says that it is a “reality (dharma or vastu) in the sense of a materialistic lifeless reality” similar to the Prakṛti of Sāṁkhya. The inclusion of Nibbāna in Āsāṅkhata-dhātu along with Ākāśa and the comparison drawn between Ākāśa and Nibbāna makes us think that Nibbāna is a substance (vastu, dhātu)

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¹ Buddhaghosa refers to Pakati-Purisa but does not compare them with the Buddhist khandhas. See Vis. M., pp. 518, 525.

² See P. T. S. Dictionary, p. 176 sv. dhātu-nibbāna. Drs. Rhys Davids and Stede have drawn attention to the fact that dhātu in connection with Nibbāna or Amata does not convey the sense of any thing. It is only a state—the state of Nibbāna, for which they coined the word “Nibbāna-dom or Nibbāna-hood”. On the various meanings of Vastu, see Kosā, II, p. 285.
similar to Ākāsa. But the expression ‘dhātu’ is used in the Buddhist works in senses as varied as some of the other terms like dhamma, khandha, or saṃkhāra; so it is not safe to interpret the dhātu of Nibbāna-dhātu as a vastu or dravya (thing). As for the reason of the Buddhist writers for selecting Ākāsa as an object of comparison with Nibbāna, it may be said that it was done only because many aspects of Ākāsa were identical with those of Nibbāna, but it does not follow that because Ākāsa is a dhātu, Nibbāna is also a dhātu. Like Ākāsa, Nibbāna is inexpressible; it is beyond empirical determination but not a material substance. In the Buddhist works, the term ‘Nibbāna-dhātu’ has been used in such a way that one is likely to take it for a substance like Ākāsa or Samudda. In the Mahāniddesa, a large number of bhikkhus is described as attaining Nibbāna without residue (anupādisesa-nibbāndhātu) but causing no perceptible increase or decrease in the ‘Nibbānadhātu’. The Milindapañha compares Nibbāna to Ākāsa or Samudda, implying thereby that it exists but its form, location, age, or measure cannot be ascertained. It is like space (Ākāsa) without origin, life or death, rise or fall. It is uncovered and supportless and is infinite. Just as birds fly about in the Ākāsa or animals float about in the sea so also the perfect (Ariyas) move about in the Nibbāna-dhātu. It is like fire without a continued objective existence. Just as fire remains latent unless and until two pieces of wood are rubbed to make

1. The conception of Ākāsa as made by the Sarvāstivādins may be similar to that of the Sāṃkhya. Dr. B. N. Seal thinks that “Ākāsa corresponds in some respects to the ether of the physicists and in other, to what may be called proto-atom.” See Ray’s Hindu Chemistry, p. 88.

The Vaiśeṣikas define Ākāsa as “a simple, continuous, infinite substance and is the substratum of sound.” See Prof. Radhakrishnan, Ind. Phil., II, pp. 192-3.


3. Mil., p. 320: Yathā Mahārāja ākāsa na jāyat na jīyat na mīyat na cāvatī na uppaṇjati duppasahō acorāharaṇo anissitu vihagamano nirārasaṇo ananto evam eva kho mahārāja nibbānam na jāyat...ariyagamanam...anantam.
it patent, so Nibbāṇa, which is without any continued objective existence, is called forth into being when the necessary conditions are put together. The *Kathāvatthu*,\(^1\) in connection with the discussion of 'Amatadhātū' maintains the same position. It shows that the Theravadins declined to agree with the Pubbaseliyas, who held that Nirvāṇa (*Amata*) is a material object. This inference of the Pubbaseliyas was based, as pointed out in the text, on the well-known passage of the *Majjhima Nikāya*.\(^2\)

\[ \begin{align*}
Nibbānam nibbānato saññānāti, nibbānam nibbānato saññatāvā nibbānam maññāti, nibbānasmiṁ maññāti, nibbānato maññāti, nibbānam me ti maññāti, nibbānam abhinandati ti.
\end{align*} \]

[He knows Nibbāṇa as (an object) nibbāna; having so known, he thinks of it; thinks (that he) is in it or away from it; that it is his and that it is worth praising].\(^3\)

Buddhaghoṣa, in commenting upon this discussion, says that the opinion of the Pubbaseliyas is due to the drawing of a careless inference and that the passage cited above refers to earthly Nirvāṇa and not to the real Nirvāṇa and hence it is not conclusive. Buddhaghoṣa’s view may not be acceptable to all but it makes it quite clear that according to the Theravadins, Nirvāṇa\(^4\) though denoted by Amata, must not be taken as a *dravya* (thing), though it may serve, as an *ārammaṇa* (basis) for meditations.\(^5\)

**Re’sume’ : Early Conception of Nirvāṇa**

The results of our examination of the expositions of Nirvāṇa in Hinayāna and Mahāyāna works, and of the discussions of same by modern scholars, may be summarised thus:

1. *Ku.,* ix. 2.
3. For a comment on this passage, see *Keith, B. Phil.*, p. 49; La Vallée Poussin, *Nirvāṇa,* pp. 126, 127. See ante.

   The sense of the passage is that a person, who has not truly realised Nibbāṇa may labour under the delusion that Nibbāna is an object, which he has known, and with which he stands in some relation, namely, that he has entered into it or that he is away from it, or that Nibbāna is his or that Nibbāna is an object to be praised.

The texts of the early Buddhists present a threefold conception of Nirvana, viz., ethical, psychical, and metaphysical:

(i) Ethical. The ethical conception of Nirvana has received the largest amount of attention in the Pali texts as well as in the writings of modern scholars. The Nikayas abound in terms and passages expressive of the ethical conception of Nirvana so much so that Dr. Stede wrote as late as 1923 that "Nibbana is purely and solely an ethical state to be reached in this birth by ethical practices, contemplation, and insight. It is therefore not transcendental".1 This opinion is not supported by facts. Throughout the Nikayas, Nibbana is described as the destruction (khaya) of attachment (rāga), hatred (dosa), and delusion (moha), of desire (tāṇhā), impressions (saṅkhāra), and firm grasp of wrong views (upādāna), of impurities (āsava) and afflictions (kilesa), and of desire for existence (bhava), birth (jāti), old age, death (jarāmarāṇa), and thus of misery (dukkha). In describing the positive aspect of Nibbana, the Nikayas state that it is a condition which is very happy (accanta sukha), imperishable (accuta), steady (acala, dhira), tranquil (santa) and free from fear (akutobhaya). It is the state of the highest bliss (amata). The ethical conception of Nirvana appealed so much to the Buddhist authors that they wrote literary pieces of great poetical excellence in order to pay glowing tributes to the attainment of same.

(ii) Psychical. Many scholars have dealt with the psychical aspect of Nirvana but without laying sufficient emphasis upon its significance. This aspect of Nibbana is generally brought out in those passages of the Nikayas, which treat of the Jhānas (contemplation). The object of Jhānas is to bring the mind into such a state that it will be above worldly pleasure and pain. It can be effected by dissociating the mind completely from all worldly matters. This is achieved by means of the trances, the highest of which is the Saññāvedayitanirodha. From the foregoing discussion about the highest trance, it is evident that Nibbana is psychically Saññāvedayitanirodha.

1. See P. T. S. Dict., sv. Nibbana. The part of the Dictionary, containing the article on Nibbana was published after the death of Dr. Rhys Davids, i.e. by Dr. Stede.
provided that the adept complies with the other necessary conditions of Arhathood. In course of our exposition of the various dhātus, it has been shown that an adept in the first Jhāna rises mentally to the same level as that of the denizens of the Rūpabrahmaloka, and gradually proceeding higher and higher, develops a mental state corresponding to that of the beings of the Nevasaṅnantasaṅñaṭayaṭana—the highest plane of existence in the three worlds. He acquires the five transcendental powers (abhiññā), viz., performing supernatural feats (iddhividdha) such as visiting the Brahmaloka; acquiring divine ear (dibbasota) and divine vision (dibbacakkhu), knowing others’ thoughts (paracittavijñānana), and remembering former existences (pubbenivāsānussati). According to the Buddhist conception, an adept, who is capable of rising up as high as the eighth trance (nevasaṅnantasaṅñaṭayaṭana), is as powerful as the gods of the highest Arūpabrahmaloka. The stage of Nibbāna being still higher, he has to rise further in trance and attain the Saṅnāvedayitanirodha, where his mind stops functioning, and hence there is no perception or sensation. He is now fit to stay in the Apariyāpannadhātu or Lokuttaradhātu. While in this trance, he has a foretaste of Nibbāna, which is going to be his permanently. He acquires the sixth abhiññā, viz., knowledge of the destruction of his impurities (āsavakhayakāρanaṅgā)¹ and of the consequent attainment of emancipation. His mental faculties then become so very clear² that he understands with a moment’s thought all that is happening around him. He is now possessed of full illumination, i.e., he is enlightened.

(iii) Metaphysical. The metaphysical aspect of Nibbāna presents the greatest difficulties to the students of Buddhism and has been the source of many controversies. There is no end of metaphorical terms and passages in the Nikāyas to describe Nibbāna admitting of a metaphysical interpretation. The

notable passage of the *Itivuttaka*: Atthi, bhikkhave, abhūtam akatam asañkhataṃ shows that the early Buddhists conceived of Nibbāna not as annihilation but as something positive, which is, however infinite and indescribable like Akāsa. It is called a dhātu (realm) beyond the three dhātus, — the Apariyāpanna or Lokuttara-dhātu. It is a state to be realised (sārchipatthabba) within one’s own self (paccaUvīdābbo viññāhi). It is homogeneous (ekarasa) and in it there is no individuality. It is like the disappearance of flame in the fathomless state of existence in the infinite.

The few passages of the *Digha* and *Majjhima Nikāyas*, in which Nibbāna has been equated to infinite consciousness (ananta-viññāna) do not, however, find support in other portions of the same works, which throw light on the conception of Nibbāna. All that can be said in the circumstances is that these passages were later interpolations made at a time when the *Samyutta Nikāya* was being compiled. The account of the death of Vakkali with apatiṣṭhitva-viññāṇa and not paṭīsandhi-viññāṇa hints that the constituted viññāṇa of an Arhat passes away and mixes up indistinguishably with an ever existing infinite consciousness. This seems to be an anticipation of the Viññānavāda school of philosophy, but we cannot deny the existence of a trend of thought like this among the early Buddhists. The more accurate conception of Nibbāna would certainly be that it is a state beyond the domain of word and thought and possible of realisation only within one’s own self.

The Pāli Nikāyas, as already pointed out, are a mosaic composed of materials of various times and regions: hence these yield divergent opinions regarding the conception of Nibbāna. But the one presented above is supported by most of the suttas of the Nikāyas and can be treated as the earliest. We shall now pass on to some of the later Buddhist works and ascertain from them how far the early conception of Nibbāna was retained in later times and what changes, if any, were introduced.

2. *Ku.,* p. 124; see also *Mīl.*, p. 316.
Before we deal with the *Visuddhimagga*, we may well examine the few remarks scattered here and there in the *Kathavatthu* regarding the conception of Nibbāna. While discussing the existence of puggala, the *Kathavatthu* makes a remark showing that it conceived Nibbāna as a real and eternal state. It states that if puggala (*soul*) be taken as not disintegrating with the disintegration of khandhas, this will entail sassatavāda, for the soul becomes eternally existent like Nibbāna. Buddhaghoṣa in commenting upon this states: \( \text{Yathā hi nibbānaṁ na upajjati na bhijjati evaṁ hi puggalo} \) (just as Nibbāna does neither originate nor decay so would be the soul). Thus it is seen that the *Kathavatthu*, supported by Buddhaghoṣa, takes Nibbāna as an eternal state without origin and decay, and does not consider a parinibbuta puggala as sassata. In other connections too, the *Kathavatthu* remarks that Nibbāna is eternal and unchangeable (*nibbānaṁ dhwāṁ sassatam avipariṭṭhammaṁ*). It also says that Nibbāna unlike *ñāṇa* (*knowledge*) exists by itself like rūpa or cakkhu and does not require any ārammaṇa (*basis*) to arise. Unlike *sila* (*morality*), *phassa* (*contact*) and *vedanā* (*feeling*), it is acetasika (*not a property of the mind*) and is unconnected with mind (*citta-vippayutta*). It is asaṅkhata (*unconstituted*) because it possesses the three signs, *viz.*, no origination (*upādā*),

1. Though according to the orthodox tradition, it is canonical, it may also be treated as non-canonical as it was composed after the canon had been closed. For the present purpose, we leave out of account the various aspects (*guna* or *ākāra*) of Nibbāna. It has been dealt with by Prof. Poussin in his *Nirvāṇa*, pp. 158 ff.

2. *Kv., I. i. 170* (p. 34): *Khandhesu bhijjāmaṇesu no ce bhijjati puggalo, puggalo sassato hoti nibbāna-samasamā*.


5. *Kv. I. 6* (p. 121); see also the note of the commentator in the *Points of the Controversy*, p. 63 fn.


no destruction (vayo) and no change (na ṭhitānam aṁnāthatattam paṁṇāyati). The Kathāvatthu thus conceived Nibbāna as existing eternally without origin, decay and change, and is beyond all description.

The Visuddhimagga on Nirvāṇa

In the Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa retains the conception found in the Kathāvatthu and selects only those passages from the Nikāyas, which lend support to his view. In describing its guṇas, he comments on a passage of the Āṅguttara Nikāya (ii. 34) where Nibbāna is described as suppressing pride, removing lust, destroying ālaya (of the five kāmaguṇas), and arresting the cycle of existence in the three worlds. While commenting on the etymology of the word Nibbāna, he says that it is the going out of the ‘vana’ which is a synonym of taṅhā and is so called because it acts as a hindrance to the four kinds of birth (yonis), five forms of existence (gatis), seven viññāna existences (i.e., the planes of existence above the Arūpa worlds) and nine sattāvāsas (abodes of sentient beings). This shows only the aspect of quietude (upasama) of Nibbāna. He then takes up the well-known passage of the Samyutta Nikāya (iv. 362, 369 ff.) to show that Nibbāna is truth, transcendent, difficult to be seen, without decay, eternal, indescribable, immortal, happy, peaceful, wonderful, healthy, pure and is an island of refuge. It appears from the selection of passages made by Buddhaghosa that he is a supporter of the view that Nibbāna is eternal and that it is a lokottara state beyond the Kāma, Rūpa and Arūpa dhātus.

Buddhaghosa’s conception of Nibbāna is well brought out also in his arguments against the Sautrāntika view of the non-existence (abhā). He starts with the asser-

1. Ibid., p. 60. cf. Dh. S. 1416: Nibbānam na vattabbam uppannan ti pi anuppannan ti; see also 1534, 1535.
3. Ibid.
4. Also dealt with by Poussin in his Nirvāṇa, pp. 153, 154.
5. Cf. Dh. S. 1447; Lank., i., p. 157 see ante.
tion that Nibbāna brings peace of mind (sānti) and has the
taste of imperishableness (accutī) and solace (assāsakaraṇa), and
brings one to a state of mind, which is inexpressible (nippa-
pancu), and in which differentiations disappear (animitta). He
then takes up the view of his opponents, evidently the
Sautrāntikas, that Nibbāna does not exist like the horn of hare because of its non-perceptibility (anupalabbhāniyato), and
meets it by saying that Nibbāna does exist and is realisable if
the right path be followed—the realisation being similar to the
cognizance of others' thoughts in the transcendental plane
(lokuttara-citta)\(^1\) by the power of knowing the thoughts of others
(cetopariyāyānāna).\(^2\) One is not justified in saying that a thing
does not exist because it cannot be perceived by ordinary men.
He states further in support of his contention that if the
existence of Nibbāna be denied, the practices of Sammādīṭṭhi,
etc., become fruitless (vañjhābhāvo āpajjati). To this the
opponent answers: The practices are not really fruitless since
they lead to the realisation of abhāva (i.e., Nibbāna as total
absence of every thing).

Buddhaghoṣa: If Nibbāna be merely abhāva, then the
absence (abhāva) of past and future would also be
Nibbāna, but it is surely not.

Opponent: The absence of the present might be Nibbāna.

Buddhaghoṣa: The absence of the present (vattamāna) is
not possible, for it is self-contradictory, because it must
be either past or future. Besides, it would also be in-
correct to say that the absence of the present is Nibbāna,
for in the present life at a certain moment (vattamānak-
khandha-nissita-maggakkhanē)\(^3\) one obtains the sopādisesa-
nibbānadhatu (i.e., Nibbāna with corporal residue).

Opponent: Would it not be equally incorrect to say that at
that moment there was the non-presence of kilesas
(impurities) ?

1. See Shwe Zan Aung's *Comp. of Phil.*, p. 12: transcendental con-
sciousness beyond Kāma, Rūpa and Arūpa dhātus.
2. It is one of the Abhinnās possessed by Arhats, see *Vis. M.*, p. 431.
3. For Maggakkhanē see *Pāṭis.*, *M.*, I. pp. 69f; *Vis. M.* pp. 681, 682.
For Phalakkhaṇa see *Vis. M.* p. 680.
Buddhaghoṣa: To deny the non-presence of kilesas would be to deny the efficacy of the Ariyamagga, and that is impossible.

This reply of Buddhaghoṣa did not, it seems, convince his opponent, who passed on to the next argument as to whether the khaya, *i.e.*, destruction of attachment (*rāgakkhaya*), etc. should be taken as Nibbāna.¹ Buddhaghoṣa answered in the negative, saying that in that case arhathood would also be mere extinction. Besides to take Nibbāna as *khaya* (destruction) of something would make Nibbāna impermanent, constituted, and disconnected with *sammāvāyāma*, etc. To this the opponent replied: It would not be wrong to say that because a thing after its decay has no more origination, it has attained Nibbāna.

Buddhaghoṣa: Decay of this sort does not enter into the question; even if it be so considered, it would not support the contention of the opponent, for it is the ariyamagga which produces (lit. turns into) the state of Nibbāna (*bhāva*), and it is the ariyamagga which destroys evil and prevents its reappearance, because it is the stage (*upanissayatta*) for final destruction without the possibility of further origination (*anuppattinirodhasaṅkhatassa khayassa*); that of which it forms the basis (*upansisaya*) is destroyed by conduct.

The opponent then took up the third argument enquiring why Nibbāna had not been given a description (*sarūpen' eva kasmā na vuttan ti ce?*).

Buddhaghoṣa: Because it is exceedingly subtle; so extremely subtle, indeed, that Buddha even once thought of not preaching it at all; it can be seen by *ariyacakkhu* only (*i.e.*, realisable by Arhats only). Being associated with the magga, it is extraordinary (*asādhārana*), and its beginning being absent, it is devoid of origin.

Opponent: It is not without origin because it originated out of the magga.

¹ Cf. *M. Vr.* p.525: Sautrāntikas say: *Nanu ca yo'sya nandirāgasahagatāyās tṛṣṇāyāh ksayo virāgo nirodho nirvāṇam ityuktam.*
Buddhaghośa: It was not originated by the magga; it can be attained only by following the magga; hence it is originless, and consequently decayless and deathless: being without origin, decay and death, it is eternal (nicca).

A fourth argument was put forward by the opponent, which is as follows:

Opponent: Would it not be objectionable to regard Nibbāna as eternal like the āṇu (atom) ?

Buddhaghośa: No. Nibbāna has no hetu (cause) as āṇus have; so it cannot be compared to āṇu.

Opponent: Is Nibbāna eternal on account of its eternal nature (i.e., does any quality of eternalness adhere to Nibbāna)?

Buddhaghośa: That cannot be, in view of the fact that the āṇu, etc., are not realised (asiddhāta) by the magga.

Buddhaghośa in conclusion said that for the reasons he had put forward Nibbāna is eternal and, being devoid of the nature of form, is formless (arūpa). There is only one Nibbāna, and not different Nibbānas for different Buddhas. He then showed that it is called sopādisesa-nibbāna when there remains a corporal residue (upādisesa), though a complete destruction of impurities has been effected by meditation (bhāvanā). It is called nirupādisesa-nibbāna1 on the disappearance of upādisesa, which happens on account of the absence of any kind of manifestation after the last thought of kammaphala. This is due to the stopping and uprooting of samudaya (causes of origin). In short, it cannot be said that Nibbāna does not exist in view of the fact that it is attainable by means of special knowledge obtained by unflagging zeal; that its existence is indicated by the words of the omniscient Buddha; and lastly that it exists in reality (paramatthena sabhāvato) is indicated by the words: Atthi bhikkhave ajātam abhūtam akatam asaṅkhatham (Itiv., p. 37; Ud. p. 80).

The Paramatthamaṇḍūsā,2 in commenting upon this portion of Visuddhimagga, argues in its own way for the existence of

1. For sopādisesa and nirupādisesa nibbāna, see also M. Vr., p. 519.
Nibbāna. It starts by saying that Buddha can never utter an untruth; so when he says *atthi bhikkhave ajātam* etc. it has to be admitted that the unconstituted dhātu, Nibbāna, in the highest sense, does exist. It cannot be *abhava* (absence of anything) because of the fact that Buddha described Nibbāna as deep, immeasurable, difficult to be understood, etc. These can be said only of an existent state or object, and not of anything non-existent. Anything non-existent must in every way be non-existent. The following question may, however, arise as to the nature of abhava of kilesas, to which attention is drawn by the Theravādins as an aspect of Nibbāna: Whether the abhava of kilesas existing in beings is one or many. If the abhava be one, then it should be effected by one path (*magga*) and there is no need of many maggas (evidently referring to the four maggas: *sotapatti sakadāgamī*, *anāgamī*, and *arahatta*), and all beings should attain Nibbāna at the same time. This objection is answered thus: If the abhava be taken as one, then it is the abhava of kilesas which is effected by the realisation of Nibbāna. It is in fact not an effect of magga, it is a thing to be envisaged. The opponent may say that there is no need of maggas, as it is not necessary to give up the kilesas, and there being no question of giving up kilesas and putting an end to dukkha, what is the use of the realisation (*sacchikiriyā*) of kilesabhava. The objection is answered thus: Each magga has some definite function to perform. The sotāpattimagga removes the first three samyojanas, the sakadāgamimagga reduces rāga, doṣa and moha to their minimum, while the anāgamimagga eradicates them, and lastly the arahatta puts an end to all samyojanas. Abhāva is really one, and should not be inferred that there are many abhavas because many kinds of kilesas are eradicated, *i.e.*, it does not follow that because there are sakkāyadiṭṭhi-abhāva, rāga-abhāva and moha-abhāva, there are so many abhavas. Abhāva is really one and does not vary according to the nature of the object, of which, there is abhāva; so the abhavas are not to be regarded as five, because the five samyojanas are removed. It is only the common usage of the term that implies the existence of many abhavas. The state of abhāva (absence of anything) cannot but be one, so Nibbāna is not many but one. The
\textit{Tikā} concludes its argument by saying that the \textit{abhāva} is effected by \textit{maggas}, each \textit{magga} producing its own effect, and that \textit{abhāva} is not to be envisaged (\textit{na sacchikātabbo}), while \textit{Nībbāna} is to be envisaged; hence, the \textit{abhāva} of \textit{kilesas} is not identical with \textit{Nībbāna}.

**The Abhidharmakośa on Nirvāṇa**

In the \textit{Abhidharmakośa}, Vasubandhu expatiates on the \textit{Vaibhāṣika} conception of \textit{Nirvāṇa}. He first asserts that \textit{Nirvāṇa} is one of the \textit{Asaṃskṛtas} (unconstituted), and as against the objection of the \textit{Sautrāntikas} that it might be a result produced by the \textit{mārga}, he says that the \textit{mārga} leads to the attainment or possession of \textit{Visaṃyoga} (disconnection) or \textit{Nirvāṇa} and that it is self-existent and not the fruit of \textit{mārgas}.\textsuperscript{1} In answering to the question of the \textit{Sautrāntikas} as to the nature of the \textit{dharma} called \textit{Visaṃyoga} or \textit{Pratisaṃkhya-nirodha}, the \textit{Vaibhāṣikas} state that it is the \textit{dharma} nature, which is real and inexpressible; only the \textit{Āryas} realise it inwardly and individually. It is only possible to indicate its general characteristics, when the \textit{Pratisaṃkhya-nirodha} is said to be an \textit{entity} (\textit{dravya}), real, good, eternal, and distinct from others, it is called the \textit{Visaṃyoga}.

The \textit{Sautrāntikas} in their zeal to establish that \textit{Nirvāṇa} is \textit{abhāva} (absence of passions, etc.) argue that the \textit{Asaṃskṛtas} (the unconstituted) are not real like the entities \textit{rupa} (form), \textit{vedanā} (feeling), etc. They cite the instance of \textit{Ākāśa}, which is, according to the \textit{Sarvāstivādins}, an \textit{Asaṃskṛta-dhātu}, and point out that \textit{Ākāśa} (space) is nothing but the absence of something tangible, or in other words, of any resisting substance. Just as a man in darkness says it is \textit{ākāśa} (vacuity or space) when he is not cognisant of the existence of anything tangible or resistible, so also the \textit{Ākāśa} of the \textit{Sarvāstivādins} should be understood. Analogically they assert that the second \textit{Asaṃskṛta-dhātu} of the \textit{Sarvāstivādins}, namely, the \textit{Pratisaṃkhya-nirodha}, is really the destruction of \textit{anuṣayās} (desires) and

\textsuperscript{1} See \textit{Kośa}, ii 55. Cf. \textit{Vis. M.} p. 508 dealt with before for a similar argument against the \textit{Sautrāntikas}.\textsuperscript{2}
existence already produced, and the non-origination of any
further anusayas; and as this is achieved by means of know-
ledge (pratisamkhya), it is called Pratisamkhya-nirodha. The
third Asaṃskṛtadhātu, the Apratisamkhya-nirodha, is the
absence or non-origination of dharmas on account of the
complete absence of causes,¹ independent of the force of know-
ledge (apratisamkhya), e.g., when death before its time inter-
rupts the existence, it is said that there has been Apratisamkhya-
nirodha of dharmas which would have been born in course of
this existence, if the existence had continued.²

In this connection the Sautrāntikas mention the opinion of
Sthavira Śrīlābha, also a Sautrāntika teacher, who interpreted
the pratisamkhya-nirodha as the future non-origin of passions
due to knowledge (prajñā), and the apratisamkhya-nirodha as
the future non-origin of duḥkha, i.e., of existence due to the
disappearance of passions and not directly due to knowledge.
The former, it is said, refers to sopādiśeṣa and the latter to
anupādiśeṣa-nirvāṇadhātu.³ The Sautrāntikas did not approve
of the distinction made by Śrīlābha between Pratisamkhya and
Apratisamkhya. According to them, the future non-origin
of duḥkha implies pratisamkhya; so, in fact, apratisamkhya-
nirodha is included in the pratisamkhya-nirodha.

The Sautrāntikas considered also the opinion of another
school, supposed to be the Mahāsaṅghikas according to the
Japanese editor of the Kosa. The Mahāsaṅghikas define
apratisamkhya-nirodha as the posterior non-existence (paścād
abhāva) of dharmas already born by virtue of their spontaneous
destruction. In this definition, apratisamkhya-nirodha is not

¹. Yamakami Sogen prefers “condition” (pratyaya) to causes. See his
Systems etc., p. 164. He explains Apratisamkhya-nirodha (p. 167) as the
“non-consciousness of dharmas or things which would have forced their
way into our consciousness but for the engrossment of our attention by
something else. Apratisamkhya-nirodha, accordingly, is a thing of daily
occurrence in everybody’s life.”


³. Cf. Vis. M., dealt with above. See Prof. La Vallée Poussin’s article
on the two Nirvāṇadhātus according to the Vibhāṣā in I. H. Q., vol. vi,
pp. 39-45.
eternal in view of the fact that it does not arise as long as the anusayas do not perish.

The object of the Sautrāntikas is to show through these definitions that the pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha implies an antecedent, viz., pratisaṃkhyā and hence it cannot be eternal (niṭya), because, if the antecedent be wanting, the consequence also becomes wanting. The Sarvāstivādins met this by arguing that the Sautrāntikas were not entitled to say that pratisaṃkhyā is anterior and the non-origin of unborn dharmas posterior. The fact is, as the Sarvāstivādins thought, that the non-originated always exist by themselves; so when the pratisaṃkhyā is lacking, the dharmas are born; if and when pratisaṃkhyā arises, the dharmas are not born absolutely. The efficacy (sāmarthya) of pratisaṃkhyā in regard to the non-origin of dharmas is shown thus:

(i) before pratisaṃkhyā there is no obstacle in the way of the origin of dharmas; and

(ii) after pratisaṃkhyā, i.e. pratisaṃkhyā being given, the dharmas, the origin of which has not been stopped previously (akṛtotpattipratibandha), are not born.

(1) Then as against the view of the Sautrāntikas that Nirvāṇa is simply non-production (anuttāda) of dharmas, the Sarvāstivādins cite a sūtra from the Saṃyukta Āgama (26.2), in which it is stated that the practice and culture of the five faculties, faith etc., have for their result the abandonment of duḥkha, past, present, and future. In fact, this abandonment (prahāna) refers to nothing else other than Nirvāṇa and is solely of a future dharma and not of a past or present dharma. The Sautrāntikas cannot accept it and interpret this passage somewhat differently, saying that the “abandonment” refers to the abandoning of passions (kleśas) relating to duḥkha past or present, and citing some other passages from the Saṃyukta Āgama in support of their contention. They argue that the passions, past and present, produce in us some germs to originate future passions; when these germs are destroyed, the passions, past and present, are abandoned. It is with reference to this fact that one says that the action (karma) and
the result (*phala*) have been destroyed. Therefore by the abandonment of a future duḥkha or future passion, one understands that the duḥkha or passion will not be born any more owing to the absence of germs.

(2) The Sarvāstivādins then take up a second argument, found also in the *Visuddhimagga*,¹ which enquires why it has been stated in the *Sāmyuktāgama* (31·12) that “of all dharmas constituted or unconstituted, *virāga* (detachment) is the best”. If a dharma be non-existing, how can a statement like the above be made? The Sautrāntikas explain this by asserting that they admit its existence, as they admit that of a sound which has no existence before it is produced and after it has died away. The quotation praising “*virāga*” may well refer to a non-existent unconditioned thing, the absolute non-existence of everything evil.

(3) The third argument of the Sarvāstivādins is that if the Pratisāmkhyā-nirodha or Nirvāṇa be non-existent, why is it mentioned as one of the Truths. The Sautrāntikas answer that truth (*satya*) is taken in the sense of “not-inexact” (*aviparita*). The Āryas realize what exists and what does not exist in a “not-inexact” manner; in that which is suffering (*duḥkha*) they see only duḥkha: in the non-existence of duḥkha, they realize the fact of the non existence of same. Really there is no contradiction in taking the “non-existence of duḥkha” or the pratisāmkhyā-nirodha as a Truth. And this non-existence is the third Truth, because the Āryas see and proclaim it immediately after the second.

(4) The Sarvāstivādins then have recourse to the fourth argument that if the asaṃskṛtas be non-existent, how is it that knowledge has non-existent things as its basis (*ārammanā*). The Sautrāntikas dismiss this objection by remarking that they find in it nothing against their theory, and say that they will explain it in connection with the discussion of the past and the future.²

(5) The fifth argument of the Sarvāstivādins relates to the nature of the consequence found by the Sautrāntikas in the maintenance of their theory that the unconditioned really exists.

2. For which see *Kośa*, v. 25.
The Sautrāntikas point out the unreasonableness of regarding the existence of a non-existent thing as real. In fact, they say that the unconditioned can neither be apprehended by the senses (pratyakṣa) like rūpa (form) vedanā (feeling), etc., nor can they be known by inference (anumāna) from their activities, i.e., through the organs of sense.

(6) In the sixth argument, the Sautrāntikas become the questioners and inquire how, if Nirodha be a thing in itself, a genitive construction like ‘duḥkhasya nirodhaḥ’ can be justified. The Sautrāntikas understand by Nirodha (destruction of a thing) the “non-existence of a thing”, so also by the “destruction of duḥkha” they understand the “non-existence of duḥkha”. They do not admit the existence of any relation of cause and effect between two things existing by themselves. To this the Sarvāstivādins reply, that, according to them, destruction is a thing in itself. Nevertheless one can specify the relation between “destruction” and the “thing destroyed”, for, according to them, nirodha with reference to a thing indicates “obtaining possession” (pṛāpti) of the “destruction” at the moment when one is dispossessed of the thing. The Sautrāntikas would however inquire, what is that which determines or specifies the taking of possession of the “destruction”.

(7) The seventh argument of the Sarvāstivādins is: if Nirvāṇa be non-existence, if it be only abhava, what is that thing which is obtained by a bhikṣu in this life, the Sautrāntikas explain by saying that a bhikṣu in Nirvāṇa attains a stage (āśraya) in which neither passion (kleśa) nor a new existence is possible.

(8) In the eighth argument the Sautrāntikas cite a passage from the Sanyukta Āgama (13.5) where Nirvāṇa is described as a disappearance (vyantibhāva), a decay (ksaya), a destruction (nirōdha), an appeasement (vyūpasama) of duḥkha, and as a non-reproducer (apratisandhi) of duḥkha, and infer therefrom that Nirvāṇa is abhāvamātra. The Sarvāstivādins do not accept this interpretation, stating that the passage refers to Nirvāṇa as a thing in itself, in which there is no appearance (aprādurbhāva) of duḥkha. The Sautrāntikas do not agree with the Sarvāstivādins regarding the force of the locative case used in the passage.
The ninth argument put forward by the Sautrāntikas is that the simile of the flame used in the famous line, *Pajjotas' eva nibbānam vimokkho cetaso ahu* (as the nirvāṇa of the flame, so is also the deliverance of thought), suggests only the passing away (*atyaya*) of the flame, and not a thing existing by itself.

The tenth and the last argument advanced by the Sautrāntikas is that the Abhidharma, on which the Vaibhāṣikas rely most, contains the statement: “What are the *avastuka* dharmas? These are the Asamkr̥tas”. In this, the term “avastuka” signifies to the Sautrāntikas “unreal”, without true nature, but it is differently interpreted by the Vaibhāṣikas. According to them the term “vastu” is employed in five different senses, viz., (i) *svabhāva vastu* (a thing in itself), (ii) *ālambana vastu* (object of knowledge), (iii) *samyojanīya* (cause of attachment), (iv) *hetu* (cause), and (v) *parigraha* (act of appropriation). In the present passage, vastu has been used in the sense of hetu; here “avastuka” signifies “that which has no cause”. The unconditioned, although real, being always devoid of any activity, has neither any cause which produces them nor any fruit produced by them.

**Kathāvatthu, Visuddhimagga and Abhidharmakośa Analysed**

It is now proposed to consider the expositions of Nirvāṇa as found in the *Kathāvatthu, Visuddhimagga* and *Abhidharmakośa*. The last two also present a fairly good view of the Sautrāntika standpoint. These may be analysed thus:

1. As against the Sautrāntika view that Nirvāṇa is unreal, that it is merely *abhava* (absence) of kileśas, mere destruction of rāga, etc., all the texts mentioned above maintain that Nirvāṇa has real existence, their grounds are that:

   (i) It is realisable if the right path be followed (*Vm.*); it is realised by the Āryas (*A.* and *Vm.*);

   (ii) The arhats realize it in this life. It is known as the attainment of sopādiśeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu (*A.* and *Vm.*);

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1. See above for a discussion of this passage.
2. *A.* = *Abhidharmakośa*; *Vm.* = *Visuddhimagga*; and *K.* = *Kathāvatthu*.
(iii) The existence of Nirvāṇa has been described by Buddha in statements like \textit{atthi bhikkhave ajātam abhūtam}, etc., (\textit{Vm.}), or, with reference to its subtlety or depth or excellence in statements like \textit{duddasam, duranubodham}, etc.” (\textit{Vm. tiūkā}), “virāga is the best of all dharmaś” (\textit{A.}) or by mentioning it as one of the Four Truths (\textit{A.}) or the ārammaṇa (\textit{basis}) of knowledge (\textit{Vm., K.} and \textit{A.}).

(2) As against the Sautrāntika view that Nirvāṇa, being only abhāva, cannot be eternal, existing by itself like rūpa (form) or ānu (atom), or that it cannot be asaṃskṛta since it is the result of magga, these texts maintain that:

(i) Nirvāṇa is eternal, exists by itself like rūpa or ānu\textsuperscript{1} (\textit{Vm.} and \textit{A.}): does not require any ārammaṇa (\textit{basis}) like jñāna for its origin (\textit{Vm.} and \textit{K.}), and is unconnected with citta (\textit{acetasika, cittavippayutta}) (\textit{Vm., K.} and \textit{A.}), but it should be distinguished from rūpa and ānu by the fact that it is un-caused (\textit{Vm.} and \textit{A.}) and requires the practice of magga for its realisation (\textit{Vm.});

(ii) Nirvāṇa is eternal but not the parinibbuta puggala, \textit{i.e.}, individuality ceases in Nirvāṇa (\textit{K.}): and that Nirvāṇa is one and not different for different Buddhas (\textit{Vm.});\textsuperscript{2}

(iii) Nirvāṇa is asaṃskṛta as it has no origin, no decay, and no change (\textit{Vm.} and \textit{A.});

(iv) The aryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga leads only to the cessation of kleśas: nirvāṇa is not produced by mārga, but exists by itself eternally (\textit{Vm.} and \textit{A.}).

(3) The Sautrāntikas understand the comparison of Akaśa and Nirvāṇa in the sense that as aKaśa is really the absence or non-cognition of any resistible thing so Nirvāṇa is also the absolute absence of kleśas. The texts comment on it as follows:

Nirvāṇa is infinite, immeasurable and inexpressible like aKaśa (\textit{Vm., K.} and \textit{A.}): it has a positive existence, but the kleśas work as an āvārana (screen) to the vision of beings, and so when the mārga removes the kleśas it is visualised (\textit{A.}). The attain-

2. Cf. Dharmakāya of the Mahāyānists; see ante.
ment of Nirvāṇa means the possession of the *Visanyoga* (disconnection) or Nirvāṇa (*A*).

(4) To the question why if Nirvāṇa exists, Buddha did not define its nature (*svarūpa*), the texts answer that it is very subtle (*Vm.* and *A*), so much so that even Buddha at first hesitated to preach it (*Vm.*).

(5) Buddhaghoṣa inclines towards the view that Nirvāṇa is inexpressible, indistinguishable, eternal and blissful. In the sopādisēṣanirvāṇa, the Arhat obtains inwardly a vision of the same and actually gets it when he enters ito nirupādiśeṣanirvāṇa.

(6) Vasubandhu emphasises the fact that Nirvāṇa is still a dhātu, a *dravya* (a thing-in-itself) but endowed with all the qualities mentioned above. The atoms or ions composing a being are continually changing, and ultimately, by the force of mārga, which he has been following, the individual reaches the immaculate state and becomes indistinguishable from the eternal and immaculate elements called Nirvāṇa-dhātu. Professor Poussin, on the basis of the available descriptions of this Nirvāṇa-dhātu, prefers to find in it a perfectly blissful and eternal life while Professor Stcherbatsky, following the strict logic of the atomic theory, concludes that the Nirvāṇa-dhātu is “eternal death”, or the Sāṅkhya’s non-differentiated matter.

As to the difference of opinion between Buddhaghoṣa and Vasubandhu, it should be observed that Buddhaghoṣa is untrammelled by the atomic theory, the consistency of which has all along been maintained by Vasubandhu in his arguments. Buddhaghoṣa states unequivocally that Nirvāṇa transcends every conceivable form of existence (beyond all sattāvāsas or viññāṇaṭṭhitis), and is an infinite and inconceivable state. This looks very much like the metaphysical conception of the Vedāntic Brahman, though not strictly so, as has been pointed out by Profs. Poussin and Belvalkar. But it is clearly not advaya brahman, for it involves the conception

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of innumerable beings having separate existences of their own and only losing their identity when they are parinibbutapuggalas.

**THE PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀS ON NIRVĀṆA**

The conception of Nirvāṇa assumed a totally different form in the Mahāyānaic works. It has been observed that the Saddharma Pundarika understands by Nirvāṇa the realisation of the sameness of all dharmas. The sameness (samatā), as explained in the Prajñāpāramitās and the Sūtraśāṅkara, means, from the standpoint of the highest reality (paramārthaḥ), the non-distinguishability between any two things and the impossibility of particularizing a thing. The Prajñāpāramitās develop this idea of sameness a little further and show that everything perceived or known in this world is really an illusion (māyā) to the unenlightened mind. So when any one speaks of Nirvāṇa or the attainment of Nirvāṇa, he imagines, because of imperfect vision, the existence of a man and his nirvāṇa, and thinks that the man after practising the disciplinary rules attains the ultimate state called Nirvāṇa.¹ In reality, all these are merely his fancies (parikalpanā). One of the similes to show this unreality runs thus: Suppose a magician (māyākāra) or his disciple, expert in performing magical feats, creates the five kinds of enjoyable things (pañca-kāmagūḍhi) and shows himself as enjoying these things.² Does he, in fact, enjoy them? So also a Bodhisattva or Buddha speaks of the so-called worldly pleasures (kāmagūḍhi). A Bodhisattva practises, skandhas (e.g. śīla, samādhi, etc.), the eightfold path, etc. These, in fact, do not exist at all;³ they are mere names invented to denote things, the existence of which is conceived by the unenlightened, e.g., something which has no real existence is called a sattva (being) or rūpa (form),⁴ but sattva or rūpa is only a form, a mere

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1. Pañca. (A.S.B.Ms.), leaf 329b: A bodhisattva does not seek Nirvāṇa because he “sāṃsāram saṁsārato na vikalpayati nirvāṇam nirvāṇato na vikalpayati”.

2. Śata., p 117.


4. See Śata., pp. 325ff, for sattva may be put a man, a doer, a form, a bodhisattva, etc.
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designation. That which is a designation has no origin or decay; it is used only as a symbol; its interior, or exterior, or both cannot be perceived. The Prajñāpāramitās carry it further by stating that even the designation (nāmadheya) must not be taken as having any form of existence.¹ There being no such thing as entrance (āya) and exit (vyaya) of anything whatsoever, not excluding sarvadharmatathatā or Buddha, it should not be said that there is an Arhat or Buddha,² or any kind of relation between them. If Buddha creates some mīyāpurusas (illusory men) and makes them pass through all the stages of sanctification and attain omniscience, no one inquires about the existence of the māyāpurusas, their practices or attainments.³ Similarly we should not trouble ourselves with the definition of either a monk or his nirvāṇa. On ultimate analysis a monk and nirvāṇa do not exist; they are hallucinations, and both being unreal (śunya), the monk and nirvāṇa are the same in character. So we should remove all misconceptions about the world and make the realisation of advayam advaidhikāram (non-duality) of everything whatsoever as our aim.⁴

NĀGĀRJUNA ON NIRVĀṆA

Nāgārjuna also supports this conception but his arguments are those of an expert logician or philosopher. He takes into account the views of the Hinayanists, mainly of the Sarvāstivādins and shows the weak bases of their views. The Hinayanists, he says, speak of two kinds of Nirvāṇa, sopādiśeṣa and nirupādiśeṣa, and think that Nirvāṇa is the nirodha (extinction) of klesas (defiling elements) and skandhas (constituents) existing in a being. They wonder how the Mahāyānists can conceive Nirvāṇa if they think that everything is unreal (śunya) without origin and decay, what is it then, from which Nirvāṇa confers release. Nāgārjuna answers: If klesas (defiling elements) and

¹. Śata., p. 522: Nāmadheyaṁ na sthitāṁ na viśītāṁ nādhīṣṭhitāṁ. Tat kasya hetoḥ? Avidyamānatvāt tasya nāmadheyasya.
². Śata., p. 552.
³. Śata., pp. 886ff.
⁴. Ibid., p. 825: Sarvākārajñatā advayā advaidhikārā sarvadharmā, bhava-svabhāvatāṁ upādāya.
skandhas (constituents) be elements existing by themselves, how can they be destroyed? The Śūnyatāvādins do not seek a Nirvāṇa where there is an end of kleṣas and skandhas. Their Nirvāṇa is

_Aprahīṇam asamprāptam anucchinnam aśāśvatam_,
_Aniruddham anutpannam etan nirvāṇam ucyate._

(Nirvāṇa is that which is neither discarded nor attained; it is neither a thing destroyed nor a thing eternal; it is neither suppressed nor does it arise). Candrakirti, in commenting upon this verse, says that it is not to be eradicated like rāga (passion) etc. nor to be attained like the fruits of a saintly life (e.g., srotāpatti, sakrāgamā, etc.). It is not eternal like aśūnya (real elements). It is by its nature without origin and decay, and its laksāṇa (characteristic) is that it does not admit of any description. In such an indescribable thing, how can an imagination (kalpanā) of the existence of kleṣas and skandhas, and their eradication through Nirvāṇa find a place? So long as those activities of our imagination continue to exist, there can be no Nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is realised only when all prapañcas, i.e., attempts at particularization or definition cease. To the argument of the Sarvāstivādins that even admitting the non-existence of kleṣas and skandhas at the stage where Nirvāṇa is reached, it may be that they exist in saṁsāra, i.e., before the attainment of Nirvāṇa,—the Mahāyānists give the forcible reply that there is not the slightest difference between Nirvāṇa and Saṁsāra. So, in fact, Nirvāṇa requires no process of eradication. Nirvāṇa is really the complete disappearance (ksaya) of all figments of the imagination. The kleṣas, skandhas, etc., the disappearance of

1. The arguments of Nāgārjuna are found in the _Mādyamika Vṛtti_, Ch. XXV translated by Professor Stcherbatsky as an Appendix to his _Con of_.

2. Prof. Stcherbatsky suggests in the footnote that Aśūnya=Nirvāṇa of the Hinayānists=Pradhāna of Saṁkhya.

3. Prof. Stcherbatsky translates 'prapañca' by plurality and then sometimes even stretches this sense of the word.
which is generally supposed to be necessary in Nirvāṇa,¹ have, according to the Mādhyamikas, no real existence whatsoever. Those who cannot get rid of the conception of “I-ness” or “Mine-ness” usually assume the existence of non-existent things. The sufferings of those, who are in a stage, in which they recognize the existence and non-existence of things, will never end. Candrakīrti includes in the category of such sufferers the schools of Kaṇḍāda, Kapila, etc., and also the Vaibhāṣikas, who believe in the existence of real entities: he also includes the Atheists (Nāstikas²) who deny their existence, the Sautrāntikas who deny the existence of the past, the future and the citta-viprayuktas³ but admit that of all else, and the Yogācāras who do not believe in the existence of parikalpita (imaginary) things but admit the reality of the parinispāna (the ultimate)—the pure consciousness (vijñaptimātratā).⁴ Nāgārjuna says that Nirvāṇa does not consist in the eradication or destruction of anything. It is really the avoidance of all imagination (kalpanā), of eradication, destruction, etc. Just as a man imagines that he has taken poison and faints, though in fact, the poison has not entered into his stomach, so also a being in this world, not knowing really what the ego is, conceives of “I-ness” and “Mine-ness” and suffers on that account. Nirvāṇa is beyond the limits of existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva). A being fancies that something exists and that Nirvāṇa is the end of it, while, in fact, that something does not exist and therefore there can be neither its continuance nor extinction. Nirvāṇa really consists in the avoidance of the conception that something exists.⁵

According to Nāgārjuna, there are some (referring to the Vaibhāṣikas, etc.) who contend that Nirvāṇa does exist, for it works as a bar to the current of passions (kleśas), deeds (karmas) and births (janmas) like a dam arresting the course of a stream, and that a thing which is non-existent cannot be an

². Prof. Stcherbatsky prefers to call the Nāstikas, Materialists.
⁴. M. Vṛ., p. 445. In the enumeration of schools it will be observed that the Sthārviravādins have been omitted, as also the Vedāntists.
⁵. Cf. the Prajñāpāramitā view, ante.
effective barrier like a dam. In reply to this, it is argued (by the Sautrāntikas) that Nirvāṇa has been defined as the effacement (kṣaya) of desires together with pleasures (nandi) and passion (rāga), so what is mere extinction cannot have any existence. It is like the extinction of the flame of a lamp. This argument does not convince those who conceive Nirvāṇa as a real object, for, according to them, the extinction of desires happens in the Dharma called Nirvāṇa.1

Nāgārjuna refutes the opinion that Nirvāṇa is a bhāva (real thing) on the following grounds:

(i) that a really existent entity like vijñāna (consciousness) must suffer decay and death which Nirvāṇa cannot, and therefore that which has no decay and death cannot be said to have any form of existence;

(ii) that an existent entity like vijñāna is necessarily constituted (saṁskṛta) but Nirvāṇa is unconstituted (asaṁskṛta) and hence cannot have existence;

(iii) that an existent entity requires for its origin a causal, substratum (svakāraṇasāmagri), but Nirvāṇa does not require any, for it must be without a substratum (anupādāna).

As against the opinion that Nirvāṇa is merely abhāva (non-existence), an opinion held by the Sautrāntikas, Nāgārjuna adduces the following reasons:

(i) Nirvāṇa is not what is said to be the absence of defiling element (kleśa), birth (janma), etc., for, that would make transitoriness (anityatā) of kleśa, janma, etc. the same as Nirvāṇa. Transitoriness is the absence of kleśa and janma and nothing else, and so if Nirvāṇa be the absence of kleśa and janma then it must be the same as transitoriness of kleśa and janma, and in that case no exertion would be required to attain Nirvāṇa—which is not admitted.

(ii) If Nirvāṇa be abhāva (non-existence), how can it be spoken of as being without any substratum and without any reference to a bhāva (existent thing) a? For no question of substratum (upādāna) can arise in regard to a non-existent thing. Against this may be raised the objection that the son of a barren woman or the horn of a hare is also said to be an

1. This controversy is given also in the Kośa, see ante.
abhāva (absence) without any positive counterpart. Nāgārjuna meets this by saying that abhāva (non-existence) implies a change (anyathābhāva) undergone by a thing which is existent, while the son of a barren woman or the horn of a hare is only imagination (kalpanā) without implying the existence of any object. As there can be no abhāva (absence) without a positive counterpart, so Nirvāṇa is not abhāva.

Nāgārjuna now proceeds to state his conception of Nirvāṇa, which is neither bhāva nor abhāva. He says that coming and going, birth and death, are regarded sometimes as existing relatively, either antithetically like long and short, or as cause and effect like the lamp and its light, or the seed and its sprout. In both cases, they are shown to be a complex of causes and conditions. Everything whatsoever must therefore have a cause and a condition, but Nirvāṇa, in which birth and death have ceased, is uncaused and unconditioned and hence not produced (apravṛtti). Existence or non-existence cannot be predicated of what is not produced; so Nirvāṇa is neither existence nor non-existence. Those (i.e., the Sarvāstivādins and the Sthaviras) who believe in the transmigration of constituents (sāṃskāras) state that the group of constituents has for origin and decay a causal basis. When there is no causal basis, the group is no longer produced (apravartamāna). Then it is called Nirvāṇa. Those (i.e., the Saṃmitīyas), who believe in the transmigration of pudgala (personality), say that permanence (nityatva) or impermanence (anītyatva) cannot be predicated of personality. Its coming and going happen through its corresponding upādāna (substratum) and are dependent on it. When the substratum of this personality ceases to exist, then it is called Nirvāṇa. Nāgārjuna contends that the presence (bhāva) and absence (abhāva) of the mere non-appearance (apravṛttimātrakam) of constituents (sāṃskāras) or the personality (pudgala) cannot be conceived; similarly the existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva) of Nirvāṇa cannot be affirmed. In support of his contention he quotes the saying of Buddha that desire for both existence (bhāva) and non-existence (vibhāva) should be given up, and points out that Buddha did not say that desire for

1. M. Vr., Ch. XV, 5, p. 267.
Nirvāṇa should be given up. If Nirvāṇa has the nature of existence (bhāvarūpa) or the nature of non-existence (abhāvarūpa), then, according to Buddha, it must be given up; so existence and non-existence cannot be predicated of Nirvāṇa.

There are again some (i.e., the Vaibhāṣikas) who contend that Nirvāṇa is both existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva). It is abhāva because in it there is absence of passion, birth, etc. It is bhāva because it exists by itself. Nāgārjuna refutes this on four grounds, saying that Nirvāṇa cannot be both bhāva and abhāva, for, in that case,

(i) Mokṣa (deliverance) would be bhāva and abhāva, and this would mean that the presence of samskāras as well as their extinction represent deliverance (mokṣa). But the former cannot be mokṣa, and therefore Nirvāṇa is not both bhāva and abhāva.

(ii) Nirvāṇa would be a dependent existence, for both bhāva and abhāva exist or arise through cause and condition. But as it is not so dependent, it is without any substratum.

(iii) Nirvāṇa would be caused and conditioned (samskṛta), for bhāva and abhāva cannot but be uncaused and unconditioned.

(iv) In Nirvāṇa, both bhāva and abhāva would exist together but this is impossible, for light and darkness cannot be simultaneously present at the same place. Hence Nirvāṇa cannot be both bhāva and abhāva.

Lastly, Nāgārjuna takes up the question whether Nirvāṇa is the negation of both bhāva and abhāva and shows that it cannot be so by two arguments:

(i) If bhāva and abhāva could have been realized, the negation of them would have been conceived as Nirvāṇa but as what is really bhāva and abhāva is not known, it is inconsistent to describe Nirvāṇa by negation.

(ii) If it be imagined that Nirvāṇa is neither not-bhāva nor not-abhāva, it is impossible to ascertain the knower of such Nirvāṇa. If it be admitted that beings in the phenomenal world cognize it, it may be asked whether they cognize it empirically by vijñāna (consciousness) or metaphysically by jñāna (knowledge). Vijnāna (empirical consciousness) needs nimitta (signs) for cognition but Nirvāṇa is animitta (signless).
Jñāna (transcendental knowledge) has śūnyatā (essencelessness) as its basis. It is originless (anātṛṭda) and formless (arūpa). How then with the help of this knowledge, which is indefinable, and escapes every attempt at clear expression, can it be cognized definitely that Nirvāṇa is neither not-bhāva nor not-abhāva? What cannot be cognized or understood (lit. grasped) cannot be said to have existence.

Nāgārjuna then points out that the fourteen problems, which Buddha did not think worth answering (avyikrtam), prove only the non-existence of things in reality and the identity of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa.

If everything be non-existent, some may question, why it is said that Buddha preached his dharma, and for whose benefit he preached it. Nāgārjuna answers this question by saying that the Mādhyamikas define Nirvāṇa as the cessation (upāśama), and of not being in process (apravṛtti) of prapañca (expressibility) and nimitta (signs) and as a state, the nature of which is upaśānta (quiet) and śva (peaceful). When Buddha is in Nirvāṇa (a state as described above), how can he be expected to have preached doctrines to men and gods? In the Tathāgataguhya-sūtra it is said that not a single word was uttered by Buddha between the attainment of bodhi and mahāparinirvāṇa, but people, according to their individual tendencies and aims of life, conceived Buddha as giving discourses.

CONCLUSION OF THE PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀS AND MADHYAMAKAKĀRIKĀ

Nāgārjuna, we see, leads us through a maze of arguments to the same conclusion that the Prajñāpāramitās have reached by every possible negation. Candrākirti quotes a stanza from the

2. M. Vr., p. 538:
   Prapañcaupaśāma = vācām apravṛttiḥ Śiva = cittasya apravṛttiḥ
   " = kleśānām apravṛttiḥ " = janmanaapravṛttiḥ
   " = kleśaprahāpena " = nirvaṇaśvadānāpahāpena
   = jñeyānupalabdhyā = jñānānapalabdhyā.
3. M. Vr., p. 539: Avāca’nakṣarāḥ sarvasaṇyāḥ śaṁtādinirmatāḥ,
   Ya evam jñānī dharmāṃ kumāro buddhāḥ sa ucyate.
   Cf. Lankā, p. 194: Uktam deśaṁāpāthe mayānyaiś ca buddha-bodhisattvair	natha ikam apyaksaram tathāgataḥ nodāharanti na pratāharanti.
Prajñāpāramitā1 itself in support of Nāgārjuna’s contention that Nirvāṇa or the Truth is the inexpressible absolute and is different from the Tathata or Tathāgata, descriptions of which are to be found in Mahāyānic works. The stanza runs thus:

\[
\text{Tathāgato hi pratibimbabhubhūtāḥ}
\]
\[
\text{kuśalasya dharmasya anāsravasya,}
\]
\[
\text{Naivātra tathātā na tathāgato 'sti}
\]
\[
\text{bimbaṁ ca saṃdrśyati sarvaloke.}^2
\]

[Tathāgata is an image of good and pure dharma, there is (in reality) no Tathata or Tathāgata; only images are visible in all the worlds.]

In connection with the discussion on the existence and non-existence of saṃskāras, Nāgārjuna likewise points out that if Tathatā be equated with tathābhāvo ’vikāritvaṁ sadaiva sthāyitā (sameness, changelessness and ever-existence), as is done by the Yogācārins, then he would also assert that Tathatā is non-existent. By all these negations Nāgārjuna only tries to show that the difference between the Mādhyamikas and the Yogācārins3 consists in the fact that the former, unlike the latter, do not enter into the question of existence and non-existence of the Reality. Candrakīrti, however, apprehends that such a denial of the existence of Buddha or Tathāgata might lead people to the belief that Nāgārjuna preached pure and simple negativism; so he says, “we do not assert the non-existence (nāstitva) in every way of the inexpressible Tathāgata, for in that case we should be guilty of apavāda (denial)”.4 The Mādhyamikas assert that the Reality is beyond determination, i.e., statements like śūnya, aśūnya, both śūnya and aśūnya or not both śūnya and aśūnya cannot be made about it. These statements are used in the texts for the sake of prajñāpti (communication). We

2. Ibid., p. 265.
3. Ibid., p. 275; Madhyamakadarśana evāstitva-nāstitva-dvaya-darśanasya-prasaṅgo na Viśnunāvādīdarśanādiśviti viññeyam.
4. M. Vr., p. 443: Na ca vyaṁ sarvathaiva nisprapañcānām tathāgatānām nāstitvam brumo yad asmākam tad apavādakṛto dosaḥ syāt.
should bear in mind that whenever Nāgārjuna negates the existence of Tathatā or Tathāgata or any other synonym of it, he attributes to it the sense commonly accepted by the imperfect bodhisattvas or the Yogācārins. So, in fact, Nāgārjuna does not teach pure and simple negativism. But it should be remembered that there were among the followers of Nāgārjuna some who interpreted Nāgārjuna’s principle as absolute nihilism and we may regard Bhāvaviveka as a prominent exponent of this view. But from this fact it does not follow that Nāgārjuna himself or his followers in general denied a supreme and ineffable reality, Tathatā or Śūnyatā and at least such negativism is not supported by the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra of Nāgārjuna. The object of the Prajñāpāramitās as well as of the Madhyamakakārikā is to establish a Unity corresponding to the Vedāntic Absolute. The most characteristic mark, however, of the Vedāntic Absolute is that it is of the nature of pure intelligence (cit) and bliss (ānanda). In the Unity of Nāgārjuna, bliss at least is totally absent. Śānta and śiva are the two terms which find place in Nāgārjuna’s conception of the Reality; hence it would be assuming too much to find in his conception a full-fledged Vedāntic Brahman—an all-pervading ‘I’ which Buddha categorically denies.1 According to Dr. Das Gupta, it approaches more to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of mukti, i.e., a state entirely devoid of quality of any sort, either abstract or attributive, in which “the self remains in its own purity, unassociated with pleasure, pain, knowledge, willingness, etc.”2 The Madhyamika conception, Reality or Nirvāṇa may well, therefore, be said to have a resemblance to the impersonal aspect of the Vedāntic Brahman but not to its other aspects.3

1. Cf. Beal, Catena etc., pp. 175ff (from Chinese sources); Laṅkā, p. 78 in connection with Tathāgatagarbha: Reischauer, Studies in Japanese Buddhism (1925), p. 63: “Nothing is more striking than the similarities between the Vedānta philosophy and the speculations of Mahāyāna Buddhism; the one is as characteristically metaphysical in its mould as the other”.
3. Cf. Dr. Barnett’s remarks in his Intro. to the Path of Light, pp. 29-30: “The Vedāntic metaphysicians could find no term to predicate of Brahman, the absolute, transcendental Reality but ‘nay, nay’ ! And it is rather in this sense that we should interpret the negations of the Mahāyāna philosophers”.
We conclude our examination of Nirvāṇa by ascertaining what the *Lāṅkāvatāra*, an authoritative and early text of the Yogācārins, says about it. At the outset it may be said that the Yogācārins agreed with the Mādhyamikas so far as the unreality of the things of this world and the nonduality (*advaya*) of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is concerned. The Mādhyamikas were not prepared to establish any relation between the phenomenal world and the absolute except by remarking that from time immemorial beings have been subject to delusion, rendering them unable to realise the Truth unless and until they become Buddhas, after going through the processes prescribed in Mahāyāna works. The Yogācārins differed from the Mādhyamikas in attempting to find a relation between the absolute and the individual, and in doing so they asserted that there exists only citta (cittamātra) or vijñāna (vijñānamātra). This citta or vijñāna, better known as Ālayavijñāna (*store of consciousness, the substratum of saṃsāra*), though originally pure, becomes polluted by delusions and dichotomizes itself into ‘me’ and ‘not-me’, subject and object, former becoming mind (*manas*) and the latter the external world. So, according to the Yogācārins, Nirvāṇa consists in the ceasing of the mind to dichotomize and in realising that there exists only citta and that the phenomenal world is only a delusion of the citta. *The Lāṅkāvatāra* says that Nirvāṇa consists in the removal of the imagining intellect (*vikalpa*- *manovijñānasya vyāvṛtti nirvāṇam ily ucyate*), the source of seven vijñānas and that it is not any one of the following four as conceived by the heretics:

(i) absence of any real existence (*bhāva-svabhāvabhāva*);
(ii) absence of the various forms of existence (*lakṣaṇa-vicitrabhāvabhāva*);
(iii) realisation of the absence of the existence of one’s own signs (*sva-lakṣaṇabhāvabhāvabhāvabodha*);

1. Cf. e.g. *Lāṅkā*, p. 76; *M. Vṛ.*, p. 537.
2. For criticism of this, see *M. Vṛ.*, pp. 274ff.
According to the *Lankāvatāra*, Nirvāṇa is the transformation of viññānas, mind, etc. It is devoid of the mental distinctions of existence and non-existence, and of eternal and non-eternal. It is not eternal, because it has no distinct generic characteristics, and it is not non-eternal because it can be realized by saints (āryas). It resembles neither death nor destruction.

The *Lankāvatāra* then proceeds to elucidate its position by enumerating the different conceptions of Nirvāṇa current among the non-Yogācārins, and remarks in a general way that all these conceptions are defective, because they fall under either of the two extremes of 'is' and 'is not'. The conception of Nirvāṇa, mentioned last among the non-Yogācāra conceptions, however, appears to be Mahāyānic. It runs thus: There are some who declare that Nirvāṇa is the removal of citta, manas and manovijñāna by passing from one bhūmi to another till the attainment of the Tathāgatabhūmi, and practice of the samāchi of Māyā, etc., appertaining there to by (i) realising that everything is a fancy of one's own mind, (ii) not occupying oneself with the existence and non-existence of external things, (iii) ascertaining the true nature (yathābhūta) of things, (iv) non-perceiving subject and object without being deluded by the two extremes which follow from one's own thought-constructions, (v) realising the ineffectiveness of having recourse to proofs, (vi) knowing that the truth is a matter only of self-realisation, (vii) comprehending two nairātmyas, and (viii) removing the two kinds of kleśas (intellectual and habitual) and the two screens (āvaraṇas: kleśa and jñeya). The various conceptions which non-Buddhists hold in regard to Nirvāṇa are their imaginations. *Mokṣa* (emancipation) and *mokṣopāya* (means of emancipati), about which they speak, do not really exist but the teachers have *vikalpa* (thought-construction) about

1. *Lankā.,* p. 157: The Śrāvakas are referred to as svasāmānya-lakṣaṇa-patti tāsayābhinivistāḥ.
them and think of the action and the actor, existence (sat) and non-existence (asat), and busy themselves in jalpa (useless talks) and prapañca (diffuse talks). Just as forms in a mirror are seen but do not exist there, so also in the mirror of vāsanā foolish people see the citta as twofold (dvidhā). Not knowing cittadṛṣṭya (citta-image) truly, the ignorant forms vikalpas of the seen and the seer, whereas in fact there is only one citta, devoid of laksya and laksana (percipient and percept). The Laṅkāvatāra then goes into details of this exposition, asserting that the Tathāgata or Buddha is beyond predications and cannot be said to be made (kṛtaka) or unmade (akṛtaka), cause or effect, for such predication would be doubly faulty. If the Tathāgata be kṛtaka, he would be anitya and identical with all actions, which are by nature impermanent, and if he be akṛtaka, he would be non-existent, and the merits so far collected by him become useless, and he becomes non-existent as a sky-flower. So the Tathāgata should be regarded as beyond four-fold limitations and hence beyond proofs, and is only to be realised within one’s own self. When Buddha speaks about things as nirātma, he refers to phenomenal things and not to the Tathāgata. A Tathāgata is neither the same nor different from the skandhas; hence he is neither nitya nor anitya. Similarly he is not the same nor different from mokṣa. In this way, if no statement can be made about the Tathāgata, and if he is beyond proofs, he turns into a word without any origin and destruction and can be equated with ākāśa, having nothing to rest upon (nirālamba) and beyond prapanca. Though the Tathāgata is called Anutpāda-anirodha, it must not be supposed that ‘Tathāgata’ means only absence (abhāva) of something; this Anutpāda-anirodha is really the name of the Manomaya-dharmakāya (= Svamabhogakāya) and is not in fact the Reality, the real Tathāgata (= Dharmakāya).

1. Vāsanā = knowledge derived from memory = present consciousness of past perceptions, or an impression remaining unconsciously in the mind forms past good or evil actions and hence producing pleasure and pain (saṁskāra).

2. Laṅkā., p. 182.
3. Alabdhātmakāh = na laksanataḥ kalpyāḥ, see Laṅkā., p. 19.
5. Laṅkā., p. 151.
6. See ante.
Points of Agreement and Difference re. Nirvāṇa in Hīnayānic and Mahāyānic Works

Without going into the discussion on the conception of Nirvāṇa, which Buddha had in his mind, and which is to be found in the Piṭakas — a topic ably discussed in many works, the latest of which is Professor La Vallée Poussin’s Nirvāṇa — we shall compare here the conceptions as found in the Kathāvatthu, Visuddhimagga and Abhidharmakośa on the one hand, and the Prajñāpāramitā, Mādhyamika Vṛtti, and Lankāvatāra on the other.

All these texts agree in regard to the following points:

(i) Nirvāṇa is inexpressible (niśprapañca); it is unconstituted, and has no origin, no decay and no change.

(ii) It is to be realised only within one’s own self — the pratyātmavedya of the Yogācārins and the paccattām vedittabbam (viññūhi) of the Hīnayānists.

(iii) It is not abhīva (absence of anything) as maintained by the Sautrāntikas.

(iv) It is one and the same for all Buddhas, past, present and future.

(v) Mārga leads to Nirvāṇa.

(vi) Individuality ceases in Nirvāṇa.

(vii) The Hīnayānists, in agreement with the Mahāyānists, hold that Buddhas possess extraordinary powers and knowledge, far superior to the Arhats. But they do not consider that the Nirvāṇa attained by Buddha is different from that attained by the Arhats.¹ They thus object to the assertion of the Mahāyānists that the Nirvāṇa of the Arhats is a lower and not a perfect state.

(viii) Vinikti (freedom) from kleṣas (afflictions) as an aspect of Nirvāṇa is the same for Arhats and Buddhas.²

The points of difference regarding the conception of Nirvāṇa as found in the works mentioned above are:

1. Jāt., I, Dipaṅkara Buddha is said to have attained anupādisesa-nibbānadhātu.
2. Sūtrā., p. 36.
(i) The K., V. and A. mention that Nirvāṇa is existing, eternal (nitya), blissful (sukha) and pure (suci). The Yogācārins subscribe to this statement when they identify Apratiṣṭhita Nirvāṇa with Dharmakāya. Strictly speaking both the Mādhyamikas and Yogācārins do not predicate of Nirvāṇa anything like eternal or non-eternal (nitya or anitya), blissful or without bliss (sukha or asukha), pure or impure (suci or asuci), for Nirvāṇa to them is beyond all predication and hence cannot be stated as nitya, anitya and so forth.

The Mahāyānists following the warning of Buddha against the two extremes of sāśvata and uccheda decline to apply the predications to everything, including Nirvāṇa, but the K. and V. state that Buddha’s warning refers only to the conception of soul, and not to Nirvāṇa.

(ii) The K., V. and A. consider that Nirvāṇa is a thing to be acquired (prāptam) while the M. and L. consider it to be unobtainable (asamprāptam).

(iii) The K. and V. maintain that Nirvāṇa forms an ārammaṇa (basis) for meditation and knowledge of monks. The M. and L. do not distinguish between Nirvāṇa and the monk, knowable and the knower, object and subject.

(iv) The K., V. and A. define Nirvāṇa as a lokottara (transcendental) state, and as really the highest possible state conceivable by them.

The L. and M. recognise a state higher than lokottara (L. names it lokottaratama) and identify it with Nirvāṇa, remarking that in this state sarvajñatā (omniscience) is obtained, a state unattainable by the Hinayānists.

The Yogācārins are of the opinion that the Hinayānists attain only Vimuttikāya or Mokṣa, while the Mahāyānists attain Dharmakāya and Sarvajñatva. The Hinayānists subscribe to this view, for, according to them, Buddha is far

1. K. stands for Kathavatthu; V. for Visuddhinagga and A. for Abhidharma-kosa.
superior in knowledge and powers to an Arhat and is omni-
scient while an Arhat is not.

(v) The Hīnayānists know only two forms of Nirvāṇa, 
sopādiśeṣa and nirupādiśeṣa, or pratisamkhya and apratisam-
khya. The Yogācārins add to them Prakṛti-suddha nirvāṇa¹ and 
Apratisīṭhita nirvāṇa.²

(vi) The Mādhyamikas consider that Nirvāṇa is the im-
personal absolute immanent in nature, and the only reality, every-
thing else being mere thought-construction. It appears like 
the Absolute of the Vedānta, but lacks the cit (consciousness) 
and ānanda (bliss) of the latter.

From this it follows that there is the dharma-samatā or the 
sameness of things, even of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra. These are 
related to each other as the sea and the waves.

(vii) The Mādhyamikas hold with the Yogācārins that Nirvāṇa 
is adśaya (non-dual), i.e., in it there is no duality of subject,

2. The Apratisīṭhita Nirvāṇa is the state of one who after obtaining 
sopādiśesa-nibbānadadhātu, develops maitri, benevolence or charity for the 
suffering millions and chooses not to be let himself automatically pass, as he 
would otherwise, to anupādiśesa-nibbānadadhātu [Cf. Paśca. (A.S.B. ms.) 
leaf 157a : Śrāvakā nirupādiśesanirvāṇadhātau pratisīṭhitāḥ]. He is then said 
to be possessed of Nirvāṇa tinged with charity or benevolence. The Sūtra-
lakāra (pp. 126-7) puts it very clearly: The Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, 
being devoid of love, fix their minds on Nirvāṇa, consisting in the cessation 
of all misery. The Bodhisattvas, however, being full of compassion, do not 
like to fix their minds on Nirvāṇa: hence they are said to be in the Aprati-
sīṭhita Nirvāṇa. It will be noted that the Arhats are not entitled to seek the 
Apratisīṭhita Nirvāṇa: they pass directly from sopādiśesa to nirupādiśesa-
nirvāṇadhātu. The Apratisīṭhita Nirvāṇa can be obtained by Buddhas only, 
and hence it is a state superior to that of the Arhats. The Viśnu-piśācamātraśa 
adds that Buddhas in the Apratisīṭhita Nirvāṇa rise above the idea of Saṃsāra and 
Nirvāṇa (cf. Sūtra-lakāra, p. 36); hence Śākyamuni was not really influenced 
by love or charity after the attainment of Nirvāṇa. The Hinayānists con-
ceive him as one without love (cf. Mūlindapaṇḍa, p. 160; viṣayatma tathāgatassa 
peyam viṣayatma sineho), though in fact, they repeatedly mention that he preach-
ed the Truth out of compassion for the innumerable suffering beings 
(lokāmukhyāyā bahujanahasya sukhāya). Compassion presupposes the existence 
of love, which may be, and in fact in the case of Buddha (but not of Bodhi-
sattvas) was purely unselfish and, as the Mahāyānists say, devoid of kleśa. 
For a detailed treatment of the Apratisīṭhita Nirvāṇa see Masuda, Die indivi-
dualistische Idealismus der Yogācāra Schule, pp. 49f.; Stcherbatsky, Con of N., pp. 
185, 215-6; Lévi, Mahāyāna Sūtra-lakāra, ii, pp. 21, 27; Keith, B. Phil., pp. 
557-8; Bodhic., p. 75; Viśnu-piśācamātraśa, x, pp. 99 (ed. of Saeki Kiokuga).

and object or positive and negative; and that all worldly things are mere illusions.

(viii) The Mahāyānisth conceives two 'screens' called klesā-varaṇa and jñeyāvaraṇa1 which operate as hindrances to the attainment of Nirvāṇa. They hold that the Hinayānists can get rid of only the klesā-varaṇa, while they themselves get rid of both.

CONCLUSION

The agreement and disagreement in the accounts of Nirvāṇa, as noticed above, point to the following conclusions:

The Hinayānic Nirvāṇa i.e., the Nirvāṇa as described in the literature of the Theravāda school, clearly refers to a Unity eternally existing beyond the three worlds (Kāma, Rūpa and Arūpa dhātus). It is infinite, inexpressible, unborn, and undecaying. It is homogeneous (ekarasa) and knows no individuality. In it, all discriminations or dichotomy cease. Many of the aspects of Ākāśa (space) and the ocean bear comparison with those of Nirvāṇa.

Every being is a conglomeration of elements, which can be classified under five heads: rūpa, vedanā, saññā, sañkhārā and viññāṇa; hence one being is not essentially different from another, an ordinary man is not different from a perfected saint. But if the nature and proportion of each of the five constituents existing in an individual be taken into account, then one being is different from another, an ordinary man is different from a perfected saint. It is in this way that the Buddhist saying n'eva so na ca añño (neither the same nor different) is explained.

The combination of elements is the outcome of Karma (past deeds) and is happening every moment (kṣaṇika), implying that the disintegration of elements always precedes it. The elements in a combined state pass as an individual, and from time immemorial he labours under the misconception of a self and of things relating to a self. His vision being distorted or obscured by ignorance of the truth he cannot perceive the momentary combination and disintegration of elements. On the other hand, he is subject to an inclination for them. A perfect man with his

1. For details, see ante. Also Laṅkā, pp. 97, 241.
vision cleared by the Buddhistic practices and culture realises
the real state of things, viz., that an individual consists of the
five elements and does not possess a permanent and unchanging
entity called soul.

The elements, combined under the force of karma, pass as an
individual, who becomes deluded by misconceptions. He weaves
a net of fancies around himself and believes that he is related
in some way or other to things or individuals. Because of such
illusions he experiences endless sufferings, or according to the
Mahāyānists, thinks of himself as suffering, on account of his
supposed separation from people or things near and dear to
him, or through supposed disorders or derangements of his
mental and physical system.

It is for these deluded so-called individuals that Buddhism
prescribes the eightfold path. By following it an individual
ultimately realises the transitoriness of things, to which he has
hitherto attributed some form of existence, and finds that the
elements, by which he thought himself constituted, are ulti­
mately not constituents peculiar to him but common to all
other so-called beings. He is then said to have attained Nirvāṇa,
_i.e._, a mental state in which he can no longer distinguish him­
self as an individual different from the infinite elements consti­
tuting the universe. In other words, all individuality ends in it.
In that state of Nirvāṇa Gautama Buddha is not different from
Śāriputra—all are one and the same.

The Mahāyānic conception of Nirvāṇa is completely different
from the Hinayānic. The fundamental point of difference is
that the Mahāyānists deny the existence of elements al­
together. They do not know of any other reality but the truth,
the Dharmakāya or Dharmadhātu. Many of the aspects of
their conception are brought out by the various terms used in
Mahāyānic works. For instance, when Nirvāṇa is equated with
śūnyatā, the implication is that all things which are ordinarily
supposed to exist are really non-existent just as the mirage has
no substantiality whatsoever, _e.g._, the prthivī-dhātu is void
(śūnyya) of real origination, destruction, or existence in reality.¹
When it is equated with Tathatā or Dharmatā, the implication

¹. Śīkṣā, p. 246.
is that all things of this world are essentially of the same nature, void of any name or substratum. It is that which is neither existence nor non-existence. Śūnyatā represents the negative and Tathatā the positive aspects of the Truth. When it is called bhūtakoti (true limit), it is implied that on analysis of dharmas, which are false designations, one arrives finally at the Reality, beyond which it is impossible to pass and which alone is Truth. Some of the other expressions which are often used as synonyms of Nirvāṇa are avitathatā (not untruth); ananyatathatā (unique); aviparyāsalatathatā (irreversible); paramārtha (the highest truth), tattva (the essence); acintyadhātu (incomprehensible substance), dharmaḍhātu (totality of things), dharmaṇstäti (substratum of things), supraśānta (perfectly calm, unruffled by origination or destruction); advaya and advaidhikāra (non-separable and non-divisible).

The Mahāyānists hold that all beings other than Buddhas are under delusions, the nature of which varies according to their spiritual advancement. An ordinary man is as much under a delusion that he has a son or property as the Hinayānic saints, the Arhats think that they have attained Nirvāṇa, a state of perfect rest and happiness, and have gone beyond the three worlds. The contention of the Mahāyānists is that the only reality is Nirvāṇa or Dharmaḍhātu, everything else being a delusion of the mind. The moment an individual realises that he is the Reality, that Saṁsāra is identical with Nirvāṇa, he becomes perfect, i.e., a Buddha. One must eradicate from his mind the conception not only of his own individuality but also of the substantiality of anything whatsoever perceived or cognized by him. When a being attains a state of mind, in which he cannot distinguish himself from any other thing of the world or from the Absolute, he is said to attain Nirvāṇa in the Mahāyānic sense.

3. Cf. *Samyutta*, II, pp. 25ff; *iti kho, bhikkhave, yā tatra “tathatā avitathatā anāññatathatā” idapaccayatā, ayaṁ vaccaṭi. bhikkhave, paṭiccasamuppādo ti. For explanation of the words in quotes, see *Vis. M.*, p. 518.
CHAPTER VII
CONCEPTION OF THE TRUTH

An important point of difference between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna pointed out by the Saddharma-Pundarika is that, according to the former, a being, by comprehending the Āryasatyas including the Pratītyasamutpāda, attains Nirvāṇa i.e., he passes from saṃsāra to nirvāṇa, from a laukika to lokottara state; while, according to the latter, a being, by comprehending the fact that there is no difference between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, that the world has only a relative existence (pratītyasamutpanna) and that it is unreal but appears real to a deluded mind, realises the true Nirvāṇa, which is nothing but the Śūnyatā or Tathatā, the absolute principle underlying the universe. The conceptions of the Reality being so wide apart, the Hinayānists and the Mahāyānists look upon everything including the Buddhistic practices from two quite different angles of vision. To the Hinayānists, the Āryasatyas and the pratītyasamutpāda are real and hence belong to the domain of the highest truth (paramattha and not sammuti), while to the Mahāyānists, they are unreal and belong to the domain of convention (samvrti or parikalpita-paratantra). The Mahāyānists, however, could not do away with the four truths and the formula of the chain of causation, for, they held that beings, deluded as they are, should at the beginning try to comprehend the Pudgala-śūnyatā through them. In conformance with their conception of the Reality, the Mahāyānists said that Buddha had two forms of teaching, conventional and transcendental, and that whatever he said about the Āryasatyas or Pratītyasamutpāda were conventional, his real teaching being Śūnyatā or Tathatā, which could not be imparted by one to another and could be realised only within one's own self. Before we enter into the discussion about his two forms of teaching, let us see what the Āryasatyas and the Pratītyasamutpāda are.

THE ĀRYASATYAS

The Āryasatyas, as commonly known, are dukkha (misery), samudaya (origin of misery), nirodha (cessation of misery) and
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magga (means of the cessation of misery). The underlying teaching of these four truths is that they are to be treated as formulae for application to everything perceived. That these four truths constitute merely a formula and not a doctrine has been brought out very clearly in many Buddhist texts. In the Majjhima Nikāya\(^1\) while giving an exposition of what the right view (Sammādiṭṭhi) is, according to the Buddhists, Sāriputta takes up, for instance, āhāra (food), dukkha (misery), jarāmarana (old age and death), taṇhā (desire), nāma-rūpa (name and form) and avijja (ignorance) and applies to each of them the fourfold formula, examining it in this way: Take up for consideration a material or an immaterial thing. Ascertain its origin. Inquire how it decays. In pursuance of this method Sāriputta defines Sammādiṭṭhi through āhāra thus: One who knows āhāra (food) āhārasamudaya (how food originates), āhāraniruddha (how food decays) and āhāraniruddhagāminpaṭipada (the way in which the decay of food happens) possesses Sammādiṭṭhi. The first truth relates to Āhāra which, in the Buddhist philosophy, is of four kinds.\(^2\) The second truth is āhārasamudaya, i.e., āhāra comes into existence on account of taṇhā. The third truth is āhāraniruddha, i.e., the ceasing of āhāra when the taṇhā is extinct. The fourth truth is the way in which āhāra ceases; it happens by the practice of the eightfold path, viz., sammādiṭṭhi, saṅkappa vācā, etc. One who knows correctly these truths gets rid of hatred and attachment, rises above the belief in a self, drives out ignorance, and attains freedom from misery. So, we see that in these four truths there is nothing particularly Buddhism. They are found in the Brahmanical systems of philosophy as well.\(^3\) For instance, the Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali (II, 15), says:

> Yathā cikitsāśāstraṁ caturvyūhaṁ, rogo rogahetur ārogyam bhaiṣajyam iti, evam idam api śāstraṁ catur vyūham eva tad yathā saṃsāraḥ saṃsārahetu mokṣo moksopāya iti.

2. Dīgha, III, pp. 228-276; Dhs. 71-3; Vis. M., p. 341.
3. Prof. Stcherbatsky remarks: "These four topics—the four noble truths as the term has been very inadequately translated and represented as a fundamental principle of Buddhism—contain in reality no doctrine at all." Con of N., p. 55.
(Just as the science of medicine has four sections, dealing with the diagnosis, cause and cure of disease, and their remedies, so also this science of spiritual healing has four sections dealing with an examination of the nature of the things of the world, the cause of their origin, their removal, and the factors that bring about the removal).

The Abhidharmakośa also follows up this interpretation by coalescing the four truths into two, viz., cause and effect, saṃsāra (worldly life) and nirvāṇa (cessation), duḥkha and samudaya relate to saṃsāra, while nirodha and mārga to Nirvāṇa. Saṃsāra (worldly life) is the effect while samudaya is its cause; so also nirvāṇa (cessation) is the effect while mārga is its cause.¹

This position of the Hinayāṇists in regard to the Āryasatyas is logical; for their cardinal teaching is that a being suffers life wrongly, assuming the existence of a self, and thus conceiving himself as a separate entity, standing in some form of relation to every other being or thing of the world, to which again he ascribes an individuality similar to his own. The chief aim of Hinayāṇa teaching is to expel from one's mind all ideas of individuality, whether of himself or of any other being or thing of the world, and this can only be effected by an examination of the things of the world under the four aspects mentioned above. Scrutinizing everything in this way, a being gets rid of his wrong assumption and sees things as they really are. This is called saṃmāḍiṭṭhi (right view) or vijjā (true knowledge). Once this is reached he can be said to have attained freedom from misery, or Nirvāṇa.

**THE PRATITYASAMUTPĀDA**

Of the four truths,² the second and the third comprise the pratityasamutpāda. The chief object of this formula of causation is to establish that things of this world have only a dependent origination and hence are impermanent and productive of sufferings, and that there is nothing except Nirvāṇa and Ākāśa that does not depend upon cause and condition. This formula

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1. Kośa, VI. 4; see also Sogen, *Syr. of B. Thought*, pp. 69 ff : Sūtrā., pp. 137-8; it supports the interpretation of the Kośa, see infra.

2. See ante.
of causal law has been utilised by the Hīnayānists to show that all constituted things have a preceding cause and condition as such they are without any substantiality, while it has been used by the Mahāyānists to establish that the world, being relatively existent, is unreal like the objects seen in a dream. The formula explains the fixed, unchangeable, and this-conditioned (idappaccayata) nature of things; hence it is a key to the eternal truth. The moment a being realises in his life the truth of this formula he sees the Reality. We find for this reason that the Buddhist texts identify the formula with Buddha and Dhamma.¹

It was this solution of the problem of life and the world that appealed to Sāriputta and proved a fruitful source for Nāgārjuna’s speculation.²

Many scholars, who have dealt with this formula, have attempted to elicit from it Buddha’s theory of the origin of a being and some of them have actually drawn parallels between the links of the formula and the causal series of the Śāṅkhya.³

It is noteworthy that such attempts were also made in Buddhaghoṣa’s time. Buddhaghoṣa has, however, pointed out that avijjā, the first link of the chain, must not be regarded similar to pakati (Prakṛti) of the Pakatīvādins (Śāṅkhya) because avijjā is neither uncaused (akāraṇam) nor is it the primary cause (mūla-kāraṇam) of the world. It owes its origin to asavas (impurities). The reason adduced by Buddhaghoṣa for its being made the first link in the chain is that Buddha used ‘avijjā’ or ‘bhavataṇhā’ for commencing (sisabhāvām) his discourses on topics which by their nature are without any beginning or end (vaṭṭakathā or anamatagga).⁴ It is apparent from Buddhaghoṣa’s remark that avijjā needs not necessarily be the first link in the chain of causation but that it is one of the terms found suitable by the author of the formula to begin the chain. It could as well be

1. See, ante.
2. Nāgārjuna devoted his first chapter to the explanation of only this aspect of the law of causation.
3. See Kern, Manual etc., p. 46f.; for other refs., see Poussin, Théorie des douze causes, p. vii, fn. 2.
commenced with bhavataṁhā.¹ In the *Samyutta Nikāya*,² the formula starts with āhāra as the first link. Hence, it is apparent that the Praṇītysamutpāda is not meant to be an explanation of the origin of the worldly beings but just a chain of instances to illustrate the law of *idappaccayatā* (this-conditioned nature, i.e., dependent origination) of things. Those scholars, who expected to find in it a key to the origin of the worldly beings, have been disappointed and have condemned it as illogical and incongruous. The author of the formula could not anticipate that his arrangement of the illustrations in a series would give rise to confusion. That the chain was not meant to demonstrate a line of evolution is also apparent from the last two links, viz., jāti and jarāmarāṇa, as the former cannot be the cause of the latter. The underlying idea is that if there be jāti, it is inevitably followed by jarāmarāṇa. The author of the formula wanted us to take up any two links and realise from them the idappaccayatā or the relative nature of worldly things. We may therefore say that the twelve-linked Partityasamutpāda like the Āryasatyas is more a general principle than a doctrine peculiar to Buddhism, though undoubtedly, it owes its enunciation to the ancient Buddhist savants. It cannot be stated how far Buddha was responsible for the selection of the links though it was perhaps to his penetrating eyes that the relative existence of all worldly things became apparent for the first time.

As the links of the formula have been explained by Profs. La Vallée Poussin, Keith, Oldenberg and others, we shall give here only a brief exposition of them.³

The formula runs as follows⁴: (1) avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā,⁵

5. In the *Samyutta* (II, pp. 101-3) avijjā is replaced by āhāra on any such other thing that gives rise to viññāna.
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The first link, avijja, usually refers to the deluded state of mind which debar a being from taking a true view of worldly things, e.g., mistaking impermanent things as permanent, misery as happiness, a being without a permanent self as possessed of a self and so forth.2 The second link in the chain is saṅkhāra (impressions or thought-constructions—cetanā)—concerning merit (puñña), demerit (apañña), and qualities that are neither merit nor demerit (aneñja).3 This is followed by the third link viññāṇa, i.e., perceptions through the six organs of sense. Concomitantly (sahaja) with viññāṇa arise the four composites (khandhas) and form a complete being (namarūpa) in the foetus.5 With its growth the namarūpa (body) requires the six organs of sense for doing its functions, and these organs in their turn produce six forms of contact (phassa).6

The nature of the contact produces its corresponding feeling (vedanā) and the feeling in its turn gives rise to desire (taṇhā). Taṇhā leads to upādāna (grasping) of kāma (desire for objects

1. Dīgha (II, p. 56) omits the first two links and begins its formula thus:—Namarūpāpaccayā viññāṇam, viññāṇapaccayā namarūpa, i.e. viññāṇa and nāma-rūpa are made interdependent. Sālistambasūtra (p. 82) says that they are sahaja (concomitant).
2. Sālistambasūtra, p. 79: see also Vis. M., p. 526.
3. Sālistambasūtra, p. 82; to these three, the Vibhaṅga (p. 135) and Visuddhimagga (p. 530) add three others, viz., kāyasankhāro, vacīs. and cīttas. The Sālistambasūtra explains in another place (p. 79) that rága, dveṣa and moha in regard to worldly things arising through avidyā are called saṁskāras.
4. Sālistambasūtra, p. 82; Vis. M., (p. 546) says that puññābhisaṅkhāro produces twenty-one kinds of viññāṇa, apuññābhi7 seven, and āneñjābhi7 four.
5. In the Dīgha (II, p. 63) and Sālistambasūtra (p. 82) viññāṇa and nāma-rūpa are shown as resting upon each other, i.e., one cannot remain without the other.
of pleasure), diṭṭhi (wrong views like sassata, asassata, etc.), silabbata (religious practices like gosila and govata) and attavāda (belief in a self). This upādāna, which may also be defined as a strong taṇhā, produces a keen desire in a being for future existence in one of the three worlds, and for this he performs kamma through words, mind and body. According to his kamma he is re-born in one of the various spheres of existence and becomes in due course old and passes away.

Reasons Adduced by the Mahāyānists for Including the Truth and the Causal Law in Their Doctrines

The Mahāyānists highly appreciated the teaching conveyed by the formula of causation but were not interested in the significance of its links as their cardinal tenet was dharmasūnyatā or non-existence of everything worldly. Similarly for the āryasatyas they appreciated the method of analysis of all worldly things as suggested by the satyas but these in their view have existence similar to the objects seen in a dream or a mirage. Thus, if, everything be non-existent, the examination of a non-existent thing is absurd; hence the Mahāyānists should by reasons justify the inclusion of Āryasatyas and the Pratītyasamutpāda in their doctrines. Nagarjuna and Śāntideva, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu therefore have shown by forcible and illuminating arguments, that they were justified in including the Truths and the twelve-linked Law of Causation in their doctrines.

Nāgārjuna Summarises the Position of the Hīnayānists

Nāgārjuna has dealt with the truths incidentally in his examination of Pratyaya, Karmaphala, Ātman, etc., and at length in his treatment of the Āryasatyas. He first summarises the argument of his opponents thus: If everything be non-existent (śūnya), there cannot arise any question about the origin and decay of a thing,—in this case, duḥkha (misery). The five constituents of beings, which come into existence through pre-existent cause and condition, are called duḥkha, because they produce-

1. M. Vt., chs. I, XVII, XVIII.
2. Ibid., ch. XXVI.
suffering, being subject to change and transformation. That these constituents are a source of suffering realised by the Āryas (i.e., Arhats) only, and not by the common people, for the latter labour under the four misconceptions (viparyāsas)\(^1\) of considering impure things as pure, impermanent as permanent, unhappy as happy, and egoless having ego. The common people are like the sick, to whom sweet things appear bitter. A person who is not yet an arhat (anārya) does not know that the five upādānakandhas are a source of suffering. It is for this reason that the Truth (satyas) are called truths for the perfect (āryas) only. If everything be śunya (non-existent), there cannot be Āryasatya called duḥkha and consequently there can be no samudaya (origin), nirodha (destruction), or mārga (means of destruction of suffering). If the four Āryasatyas do not exist, there cannot exist true knowledge, exertion, or realisation, the four fruits of sanctification or their enjoyer, the Saṅgha, Dharma, or even Buddha. The assertion of Śūnyatā (non-existence of everything) goes against the existence of the three ratnas, in fact, of all things, good or bad.

Nāgārjuna's Arguments to Meet the Above Charges

Nāgārjuna pities his opponents for their inability to grasp the true sense of śūnyatā, of the object of establishing śūnyatā, and for their false imagination. The object of teaching śūnyatā, he says, is to bring about a complete cessation of all prapañca (i.e., looking upon unity as manifold). The view held by his opponents that mokṣa (emancipation) is attained by the destruction of action (karma) and passion (kleśa) is incorrect. It is a known fact that ordinarily persons are ignorant of the real state of things. They conceive rūpa (form), etc. and allow passion, hatred and delusion to come into existence. From this statement as also from Śūtras, it is evident that sa'kalpa (imagination) is the source of all these, from which it follows that karma and

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\(^1\) Bodhiec., p. 375; M. Vr., pp. 464 and 607 referring to Netti, p. 114 and Index: Sīkṣā, p. 198; Aṅguttarā, II, p. 52; Pātañjala-Yogasūtra, II, 5; Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha (ed. of Mm. Vasudeva Abhayankar), p. 361; see also, infra.
kleśa are only products of imagination and have no real existence. Their origin is due to the prapañca (thought-creation), which takes hold of the mind of a worldly being, who from time immemorial is used to a variety of actions and things such as gain and loss, happiness and misery, action and the actor, known and the knower, and so forth. All these worldly thought-creations cease to exist when a person realises the non-existence of the things which are commonly supposed to have real existence. Just as a person does not form any idea (prapañca) about the 'beauty of a barren woman's daughter' and consequently does not weave a net of fancies (kalpanā) around her so also a Mahāyānist is not troubled with the conception of "I" and "Mine" the roots of a belief in self satkāyadrṣṭi, nor is he troubled by any cause for the origin of passions. If a person realises that passions (kleśas) do not originate, he cannot have any idea of good or bad action and consequently of birth, old age, disease and death. Therefore the Yogins (ascetics) established in śūnyatā do not conceive of any real skandha, dhātu, āyatana, etc. and consequently they have no prapañca, vikalpa, satkāya-dṛṣṭi, kleśa, karma or mṛtyu. Thus the realisation of śūnyatā brings about the complete cessation of all prapañcas, and so it is said that the realisation of śūnyatā is the same as the realisation of Nirvāṇa.\(^1\)

**Śūnyatā is Neither Nāstitva Nor Abhāva**

Having dealt with the object of the teaching of śūnyatā, Nāgārjuna proceeds to an exposition of śūnyatā by stating its essentials (laksānas), which are as follows:\(^2\)

(i) It is aparāpratīyaya, i.e., it cannot be imparted by one to another.\(^3\) One is to realise the Truth within himself pratītma-vedya), and not to understand it by listening to the instruction of the Āryas (the Perfect), who can speak of the Truth only through superimposition (samāropā).

3. Prof. Stcherbatsky (*Con. of Ni.*, p. 41) translates it as "uncognisable from without" but the commentary of Candrakīrti does not seem to warrant the rendering.
(ii) It is śānta i.e., it has the nature of cessation,\(^1\) it is undisturbed by origination or destruction.

(iii) It is prapañcābhira prapañcitam, i.e., it is inexpressible.\(^2\) The first prapañca is taken as a synonym of speech (vāk),\(^3\) i.e., the sense of śūnyatā is not utterable by words.

(iv) It is nirvikalpa or unrealisable in concepts. Vikalpa is thought-construction; so śūnyatā is beyond (lit. devoid of) thought-construction. And lastly,

(v) It is anānārtha i.e., devoid of different meanings.

Thus, he points out that śūnyatā is not to be taken in the sense of nāstitva (nihilism) or abhāva (absence of something) as wrongly supposed by the Hinayānists. He continues his exposition of śūnyatā by equating it with the pratītyasamutpāda, saying yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṁ taṁ pracaksmahe, sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā.

(We say that dependent origination is śūnyatā. It is in that sense that the path is middle.) All phenomenal things are relatively existent, e.g., sprout and seed, vijñānas with reference to cause and condition; hence, Nāgārjuna says that things which are only relatively existent, have in reality no origination, and the fact of this non-origination in reality is śūnyatā. So it is asserted by the Teacher in the Anavataptahrādroṣaṅkramaṇasūtra\(^4\) that whatever is said to have come into existence through cause and condition (i.e. relatively) is really unborn; it cannot have real origination; and whatever is subject to cause and condition is śūnya. The statement made in the Lankāvatāra and elsewhere that all dharmas are śūnya (non-existent) refers to the non-origination of things in reality. It is in

1. See M. Vṛ., p. 160 where it is shown why śūññatam is taken in the sense of svabhāva-virahitam. The point is that anything having real existence cannot be subject to the causal law; so whatever is subject to causal law has no real existence like the seed and the sprout. Hence, both of them can be described as śānta or svabhāvavirahita. Prof. Stcherbatsky (op. cit.) uses the word “quiescent” for śānta.
2. Prof. Stcherbatsky (op. cit.) translates it as “undifferentiated words.”
4. M. Vṛ., p. 239.
this sense that the connotation of śūnyatā has come into existence. Hence, it is said that śūnyatā, which bears the sign of non-origination in reality, is the middle path. That which is really non-originated can neither be said to exist nor to vanish; hence, it is neither existent nor non-existent, and as such it is the Middle path, which keeps clear of the two extremes.¹

We may consider this topic in another way. There is nothing which originates without cause and condition and therefore there is nothing which can be called aśūnya (non-relative). It is said in the Śatakā and elsewhere that nothing is ever produced without cause and condition, or, in other words, there is nothing eternal. The ignorant only conceives of eternity, etc. in regard to Ākāśa. The wise knows that all things are caused and conditioned, and they never fall into the delusion of either of the two extremes. If it be admitted as is done by some of the Hīnayānists,² that things (i.e., the elements that constitute a being) are uncaused and unconditioned, then the four Āryasatyas are contradicted, for how can there be duḥkha, the first truth, if things come into existence without cause and condition (apratitya) ?

Buddha’s Teachings were Delivered in Two Ways:

Nāgārjuna, thus establishing that śūnyatā is neither nāstitva nor abhāva but a word signifying the relative existence of things, says that the Hīnayānists, too much engrossed in the studies of texts alone, have misunderstood the sense of śūnyatā and do not understand that the Teacher delivered his teachings in two ways, viz., conventional and real, or empirical and transcendental. So it is said by Nāgārjuna:

dve satye samuṇḍṛitya Buddhānāṁ dharmadeśanā, lokasaṃvṛtisatyam ca satyaṁ ca paramārthataḥ.³

   na saṁ nāsan na sadasan na aśpyubhayātmakam,
   catuṣkoṭivinjumuktaṁ tattvaṁ mādhyamikā viduḥ.
2. Referring evidently to the Sarvāstivādins.
3. M. Vr., p. 402; Bodhic., p. 361. The two kinds of Truth have been dealt with in the Madhyamakavātāra (Chs. V, VI); see Le Musée, 1907, N.S., vol. VIII for summary of Ch. V.
(The teaching of Buddhas are based on two kinds of truth: the truth of the world, and the truth in the highest sense).

(a) Saṃvṛti

Nāgārjuna as well as Śāntideva point out that the words in common usage, e.g., skandha, ātman, loka, etc., being enveloped (saṃvṛti) on all sides are called conventional. The expression Saṃvṛti has three different senses, which are as follows:

1. Saṃvṛti is the same as ignorance on account of its completely enveloping the reality, or, in other words, it is identical with ignorance (avidyā). In elucidation of this, Prajñākaramati, the commentator of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, says that ignorance superimposes a form on a non-existent object and thus creates an absolute in the correct view of the reality. In support of his statement he quotes from the Śālistambasūtra a stanza, in which it is stated that ignorance (avidyā) is nothing but the non-realisation (apratiṣṭhā) of the truth, and faith in falsehood.

2. Saṃvṛti implies a thing which depends on another for existence, i.e., subject to cause and condition, for a really self-existent thing cannot have origin and decay, or any kind of transformation; so whatever is caused and conditioned is saṃvṛta (phenomenal).

3. Saṃvṛti refers to signs or words current in the world, i.e., accepted by the generality of the people and based on direct perception. Śāntideva desires to point out that rūpa (form), śabda (sound), etc. should not be supposed to be really existing on account of being directly perceived by all in the same way. Their existence is substantiated by proofs, which are valid from the worldly, and not from the transcendental, standpoint. If all that is perceived by the senses be true, then

1. Bodhi., p. 352, Saṃvṛityate aviryate yathābhūtapañjānām svabhāvāvaraṇād avṛtta (= abhūta) prakāśanāc cānayo ‘yaḥ saṃvṛtih. Avidyāmohapi vipāyāsa iti paryāyaḥ. It is called saṃvṛti because it envelops the real knowledge and also because it helps to uncover that which is, as a matter of course, enveloped. It is synonymous with ignorance, delusion, or misconception. For Paramārtha being the same as Nirvāṇa, see infra.

2. Bodhi., p. 352; pratītyasamutpānam vasturūpam saṃvṛtir ucyate.

3. Ibid., pp. 374-5: pratyakṣam api rūpādi prasiddhyā na paramārthataḥ.
a fool knows the truth, and there is no need of exerting for
the acquisition of the truth. In support of his statement, he
cites the illustration that the body of a woman, though impure
in the highest sense, is regarded as a fact cannot be established
merely by experience.

It may be argued that as the expressions like dhātu, āyatana,
etc. occur in the scriptures, they are real, and besides had they
been non-existent, the Teacher would not have referred to them
as momentary, subject to decay, etc. Śāntideva explains this
away by saying that the Teacher used them only as artifices to
lead men, having minds engrossed in thinking of an object as
existent, to the conception of śūnyatā, i.e., things as really non-
existent. Whatever Buddha said about skandha, dhātu, āyatana
or their transitoriness is conventional and not real; hence the
existence of dhātus and āyatanas in reality are not established.
If it be held that every object of experience is unreal, how can
we account for the experience of kṣanikatva (transitoriness) of
pudgala by the yogins (ascetics), who have perfected themselves
in the meditation of pudgalanairātmya (essencelessness) of consti-
tuted things? Śāntideva’s answer is very simple. He said
that even the experiences of yogins are not above saṃvṛti, for saṃvṛti includes everything that falls within the scope of
buddhi (intelligence), and the reality lies beyond it. The ex-
perience of the yogins that a woman’s body is impure contra-
dicts the experience of an ordinary man, who considers it to be
pure. Thus it is proved that the scriptural authority does not
establish the reality of skandha, dhātu, āyatana, etc.

Two Kinds of Saṃvṛti-satyas

All that has been said above applies to loka-saṃvṛti only, i.e.,
truths valid in the world of convention, which are accepted as
such by the generality of the people. There is however another
kind of the so-called truth, which should be distinguished as
Alokasaṃvṛti; i.e., truths not accepted by the generality of the
people. The experiences of a man with diseased eyes or defective
organs of sense are peculiar to the man and are not true for all.
Such experiences should be called Alokasaṃvṛti (conventional
truths but not general).
Sāntideva calls these two kinds of conventional truths Tathya-saṃvṛti and Mithyā-saṃvṛti, and distinguishes them thus: The Tathya-saṃvṛti (phenomenal truth) refers to things which originate out of a cause (kiñcit pratityajātam) and are perceived in the same way by all persons with unimpaired organs of sense, e.g., the colour blue, etc. The Mithyā-saṃvṛti refers to those things or statements which are accepted only by individuals and not universally, though they may have originated through cause and condition, i.e., they are like things perceived by a person with a defective organ of sense.

(b) Paramārtha-satya

The truth of the Āryas who see things as they really are is quite different from the two so-called truths mentioned above. Nāgārjuna says that this truth, Paramārtha-satya, is identical with Nirvāṇa. It does not admit of any distinction as subject and object. It is un-originating and undecaying, and as such it is not an object to be grasped by the mind. It is indeterminable by speech and unknowable by knowledge. Hence the highest truth is inexpressible and can be realised only within one’s own self. It cannot form the subject-matter or instruction, and hence it cannot be imparted by one to another. Sāntideva explains the truth (tattva or paramārtha-satya) as beyond the range of buddhi (intelligence or perception) while that which comes within the range of buddhi is conventional (saṃvṛti). According to him, the truth is attainable by giving up all things which act as hindrances to knowledge, viz., impressions (vāsanā), connection (anusandhi) and passion (kleśa) through comprehension of the real nature of things. It is therefore the same as the non-existence of all dharmas and as such it may be taken as a

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2. See ante. Saṃvṛti is identified with avidyā and buddhi. See Bodhic., pp. 352, 366, also Stcherbatsky, op. cit., p. 194 n.
synonym of śūnyatā (essencelessness), tathatā (thatness), bhūtakoṭi (true limit), and dharmadhiatu (totality of things). All that is caused and conditional is not really existent, because everything undergoes change with time, while in a really existent thing no change is possible; neither can the fact of coming and going be attributed to it. Things that are supposed to have existence are like an illusion or an echo, because they arise through cause and condition, and disappear when the cause and condition cease. So, in reality, there can be no origination through cause and condition because real origination does not depend upon and is not subject to something else. All things arise subject to some preceding causes and conditions; hence they are really non-existent. How, then, can an existent thing be expected to arise out of them? Can anybody ascertain whence the illusory things produced by cause come and where they go? In this connection Śānti-deva comments elaborately on the famous stanza of Nāgārjuna:

na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyaṁ nāpyahetutah,
utpannā jātāvidyante bhūtāh kvacana kacana.¹

(Nowhere and never does a really existent thing originate out of a self or non-self or both self and non-self or without any cause).

The aim of Śāntideva as also of other writers on Mahāyāna is to assert that the real truth (paramārthasatya) is that things of this world have no more existence than the magical figures created by a magician. As these figures and their movements are taken as real by the ordinary people while the magician himself does not concern himself about their reality, so also in this world, the viparyastas i.e., those whose vision is obscured and subject to error run after, or weave their thoughts around, the various phenomenal things, while he who knows the highest reality, does not pay heed to him. In short, the Paramārtha-satya is nothing but the realisation of the dream-like things or

¹. Bodh., p. 357; M. Vr., p. 12.
CONCEPTION OF THE TRUTH

If Paramārthasatya be of an inexpressible nature and Saṁvṛtisatya be non-existing like an illusion or echo as urged by Nāgārjuna and Śāntideva, a Hinayānīst may enquire about the necessity of preaching on the topics like skandha, dhātu, āyatana, āryasatya, pratītyasamutpāda etc., which are conventionally true and not true in the highest sense (atattva). The reply is

vyavahāram anāśrito paramārtho na deṣyate,
paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇam nādhigamyate.2

(The highest truth cannot be imparted without having recourse to the conventional truths; and Nirvāṇa cannot be attained without the realisation of the highest truth). In other words, the highest truth cannot be brought home directly to a mind, which normally does not rise above the conventional distinction of subject and object, knower and known; hence it must be imparted through conventional truths, and unless it is so imparted one cannot be expected to extricate himself from the worldly limitations and arrive at Nirvāṇa. It is for this reason that the Mahāyānists cannot dispense with saṁvṛta topic like dhātu, āyatana, āryasatya and pratītyasamutpāda; they are like vessels to the seeker of water.

The other reason3 for which the Mahāyānists cannot dispense with saṁvṛta topics is that the Paramārthasatya cannot be explained to another by signs or predicates, but yet it has to be explained. So the only alternative is to explain it by the

1. Bodhic., pp. 368, 379. The Satyasiddhi school introduced the two kinds of truth. Vyavahārasatya and Paramārthasatya into the Buddhist metaphysics. In the Akṣayamatīnirdesāsūtra these two truths form the principal subject of discussion (Vaidya, Catuhśatikā, p. 19). In the Mahāyāna literature there are other expressions bearing the same sense as Paramārtha and Saṁvṛti, e.g., Nitārtha and Neyārtha, see M. Vṛ., p. 41; V. Sastri, I.H.Q., iv, 2 on Sandhyā-bhāṣā; M. Vṛ., pp. 41; Sūtrā., p. 57.

2. M. Vṛ., p. 494; Bodhic., p. 365; see also p. 372; Upāyabhistam vyavahārasatyaṁ upāyabhistam paramārthasatyam (also in the Madhyamakāvatāra, vi, 10). Pañca. (A.S.B. ms.) leaf 56a : Na ca Subhūte sanskṛtyatyātrekena sanskṛtyam śakyam prajñāpayitum.

negation of samvṛta matters. As it is agocara (beyond the cognizance of buddhi—intellection), avisaya (beyond the scope of knowledge), sarvaprapaṇcavinirmukta (beyond the possibility of detailed descriptions), kalpanāsamatikrānta (beyond every possible form of imagination, e.g., existence or non-existence, true or untrue, eternal or non-eternal, permanent or impermanent, happy or unhappy, pure or impure, and so forth), the only way to explain it to the people is through common place terms and illustrations. A person with diseased eyes sees a net of hair; he is corrected by another whose eyes are healthy, the latter negating the afflicted man’s statement that there (really) is a net of hair. The man with healthy eyes does not indicate by such a negation that he is either denying or affirming something. Similarly, persons with right vision, obstructed by ignorance conceive of the existence of skandha, dhatu, āyatana, etc., which are in reality non-existent phenomenal forms. Buddhas like the persons with healthy eyes know this, and they cannot help saying that there are in reality no skandhas, dhatus, āyatanas but thereby they neither deny nor affirm their existence. Therefore the highest truth cannot be preached without the help of the conventional truths. So it is said:

anakṣarasasya dharmasya śrutīḥ kā deśanā ca kā, 
śrīyate desyate cārthaḥ samāropād anaksaraḥ.2

[How can there be hearing and preaching of dharma, which is un-utterable (lit. cannot be articulated): it is by the superimposition of ideas on the reality which is inexpressible that the latter can be preached or heard].

If it be established that all mundane things are really non-existent, there is a probability of the Paramarthasatya (the highest truth) being conceived as nihilism. Nāgārjuna sounds a note of warning against such a conception by saying that śūnyatā should not be identified with the extinction of a thing which existed before. The question of extinction or nihilism does not arise, because the existence of something preceding is

1. Ibid., pp. 366-7. These terms can be easily multiplied.
2. Bodhic., p. 365; M. Vr., p. 264, xv. 2; cf. Laṅkā., p. 194.
not admitted. Neither should it be regarded as something existing by having recourse to superimpositions. Those, who do not realise the real distinction between these two kinds of truth, fall into the error of either conceiving śūnyaṭā as the nonexistence of sanskāras (constituents of a being) or assuming the existence of something as the basis of śūnyaṭā. Both are wrong views, and people of limited knowledge misunderstand śūnyaṭā as the one or the other. The distinction was, in fact, so very subtle that even Buddha hesitated to preach the truth at first.¹

The Hīnayaṇists Mistake Śūnyaṭā as Abhāva

In concluding his argument, Nāgārjuna says that the Hīnayaṇists, by attributing the sense of abhāva (absence or nonexistence) after assuming the existence of something to śūnyaṭā, fall into error and fail to understand the standpoint of the Mahāyānists. The Mahāyānic conception of śūnyaṭā i.e., that everything is non-existent fits in correctly with all dhammas and all statements; it is when śūnyaṭā is seen in this light that one can perceive the reasonableness of the formulae of Causal Law and the Four Truths, the fruits of sanctification, saṅgha, dharma, Buddha, things worldly and transcendental, deeds right and wrong; a good or bad condition and other conventional matters. Nāgārjuna, having stated his position, attacks the Hīnayaṇists for their inability to comprehend the correct sense of the Causal Law. He says that just as a rider while riding may forget his horse and revile another for stealing it, so also the Hīnayaṇists, because of their distracted mind, fail to grasp the truth that śūnyaṭā is the true sense and the chief characteristic of the Causal Law, and attack the Mahāyānists, the Śūnayaṇavādins, for misinterpreting it.

The Position of the Hīnayaṇists with regard to the Truths and the Causal Law is Untenable

Nāgārjuna now proceeds to assail the position of his opponents. He says that those, who admit the reality of uncon-
stituted things, cannot logically support the Āryasatyas and the Pratityasamutpāda.

It should be remembered that the Hīnayānists apply the Causal Law to constituted things only. Nāgarjuna attempts to make the position of the Hīnayānists untenable by asserting that the Law should be universally applicable, and that there cannot be anything in the world which was excepted by Buddha as beyond its range. He argues that if things exist by themselves, they are not subject to causes and conditions, and such being the case, there is no need to draw distinctions of external and internal, no need of causes and conditions, or the doer and the doing of an action. In short, the Hīnayānic theory contradicts the origin and decay as well as the fruits of sanctification. Hence, the position of the Hīnayānists that things exist by themselves is untenable. It also contradicts the words of Buddha, who said on many occasions: apratityasamutpanno dharma kacca na vidyate (there never exists anything which originated without cause and condition). This statement of Buddha, however, fits in with the definition of śūnyatā as given by the Mahāyānists.

If all things be existent, (aśūnya) and if it originates without cause and condition, there cannot be anything impermanent, and consequently there is no duḥkha.

Again, if duḥkha be taken as something existing, then the truths of samudaya and nirodha (origin and decay) of misery, and mārga (the eight-fold path leading to the decay of misery) are meaningless. Nāgarjuna thus pays back the Hīnayānists in their own coin.

Then, with reference to the parijñāna (detailed knowledge) of the Hīnayānists, Nāgarjuna shows that if it is not logical to maintain that duḥkha, assuming it to be an existent thing, was unknown before, and that it is known subsequently because existent things remain always in the same condition (svabhāvah samavasthitah) and never undergo any change. If an existent thing be not subject to change, it cannot be maintained that duḥkha, which was unknowable at first, was known later on. From this it follows that there is no duḥkha-parijñāna (knowledge of suffering). Consequently, prahāṇa (abandonment), sāksātkarana (realisation), and bhāvanā (meditation) are meaningless.
As it is unreasonable to claim knowledge of duḥkha, which was formerly by nature unknowable, it is wrong to assume the existence of the fruit of Srotāpatti, which did not exist before but was realised later on; and so with the other fruits of sanctification. The same reasoning—that which was by nature unattainable cannot be attained later on—is applied to show that there can be no one who enjoys these fruits, and consequently no Saṅgha. If there be no Āryasatyas, there cannot be Dharma, and in the absence of Dharma and Saṅgha, there cannot be a Buddha. If it be assumed that Buddha and Bodhi exist by themselves, then one remains without any reference to the other. If Buddhahood be taken as already existing, a person, who by nature is a non-Buddha, can never attain Bodhi, however much he may practise the Bodhisattva duties, because a non-Buddha cannot be expected to change.

**Mahāyānic Definition of Āryasatyas**

Nāgārjuna’s point is that if a thing exists by itself then it is absurd to speak of it as created, having a creator, and so forth. Just as nobody speaks of uncovering the sky because the open sky exists by itself, so also nobody should say that a thing, existing by itself, has been made or attained. In fact, the theory of *pratītyasamutpanna* (one existing with reference to another, i.e. relatively) must be admitted, as otherwise even the expressions of everyday usage such as—go, do, cook, read, etc., become meaningless. If the world is supposed to exist by itself, the world would be unoriginating, undecaying and unchangeable as the self-existent is changeless. The world, according to the Āsūnyavādins (i.e., the Realists who do not admit sūnyatā), would have no concern with the Causal Law and be beyond the possibility of discovery. Had the world been so, says the *Pitāputra-samāgama-sūtra*, it would not have been dealt with by Buddha, and the Teacher would have, as the *Hastikaksya-sūtra* says, gone there with all disciples.

Nāgārjuna concludes by saying that he who realises Pratītyasamutpāda can rightly know the four truths and quotes a passage from the *Māṇjuśrīparipṛcchā*, dealing with the Mahāyānic view of the four truths. It runs as follows: he who realises
that no dharmas have originated, has known duḥkha; he who realises the non-existence of all dharmas has suppressed the source (samudaya) of misery; he who realises that all dharmas are completely extinct (parinirvṛta) has comprehended the truth of nirodha (cessation), and he who realises the means by which the absence of all things is known, he is said to have practised the path (mārga). This has been developed thus in Dhyāna-muṣṭi-sūtra. Unable to comprehend the four truths properly on account of being troubled by the four viparyāsas (misconceptions),¹ sentient beings cannot go beyond the world of transmigration. They conceive ātman (self) and ātmeya (things relating to a self) and thus have karmabhīṣaṅskāra (actions).² Not knowing that all things are completely extinct (parinirvṛta) they imagine the existence of themselves and others, and become engrossed therein to the extent of having affection, infatuation and ultimately delusion. They now perform actions, physically, and mentally and after making some superimpositions of existence on non-existing things, they think that they are subject to affection, infatuation, and delusion. In order to get rid of them, they take initiation into the doctrines of Buddha, observe the precepts and hope to pass beyond the world and attain Nirvāṇa. They imagine that some things are good and some bad; some are to be rejected, some to be realised; that duḥkha is to be known, the samudaya of duḥkha to be given up, the nirodha of duḥkha to be realised, and the mārga to be practised. They also imagine that all constituted things are impermanent and endeavour to pass beyond them. Thus they attain a mental state full of disgust (or contempt) for constituted things, having animitta (absence of sign or cause) as its preceding condition. They think that they have thus known, duḥkha, i.e., the transitoriness of constituted things, become terrified by them, and shun their causes. Having imagined something as source (samudaya) of duḥkha, they conceive nirodha of duḥkha and decide to follow the path (mārga) to attain it.

1. See ante.
They retire to a secluded place with a mind full of disgust and attain quietude (śamatā). Their minds are no longer moved by worldly things and they think that they have done all that is to be done, they are freed from all sufferings and have become arhats. But after death they find themselves reborn among the gods and in their minds exist doubts about Buddha and his knowledge. When they die again, they pass to hell because they doubted the existence of the Tathāgata after forming some misconceptions about all dharmas, which are unoriginated. The four truths are therefore to be seen in the light of the Mañjuśrisūtra as pointed out above.

The Prajñāpāramitā on the Āryasatyas

The new point of view from which the Āryasatyas are looked at by Nāgārjuna’s school appear in the Prajñāpāramitās in connection with the attempt to explain the conception of śūnyatā. The Pañcaviniśat-sāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā defines the Āryasatyas thus:¹

What is duḥkhasatyāvavāda? A Bodhisattva while practising the prajñāpāramitā should not consider himself to be attached or unattached (yukta or ayukta) to any one of the five skandhas, or to any organs of sense, or to their āyatanas or to the vijñāna produced by the objects, or to any of the organs of sense with their respective objects, or to any of the four truths, twelve links of the chain of causation, eighteen kinds of śūnyatā and so forth. He should not look upon anything as rūpa, vedana, etc., as connected or unconnected. This is called, according to the Prajñāpāramitā, a sermon on the first truth, Duḥkha. The underlying idea is that if a Bodhisattva thinks as connected or unconnected with anything, which, according to the Prajñā-pāramitā, is non-existent or has only a conventional existence, then the Bodhisattva is subject to duḥkha (suffering); even if a Bodhisattva consider himself as having realised the truths or the causal law or śūnyatā, he would be subject to duḥkha; though, according to the Hinayānists, the Bodhisattva thereby attains sukha or nirvāṇa.

What is samudayasatyāvavāda? A Bodhisattva while practising

1. Pañca., pp. 43f.
prajñāpāramitā does not consider whether rūpa or any other skandha is subject to origination or destruction (upādadharmīn or nirodadharmīn), or to contamination or purification (saṃkleśadharmīn or vyāvadānadharmīn). He knows that rūpa does not convert (samañivasaratī) into vedāna, or vedāna into samañāna, and so forth; a dharma, in fact, on account of its nature being unreal (prakṛtisūnyatā), cannot be converted into another dharma. Neither that which is sūnyatā (non-existence) of rūpa is rūpa, nor does the sūnyatā of rūpa take a rūpa (form); therefore sūnyatā is neither different from, nor identical with, rūpa, and in this way the other skandhas are treated. This is called the sermon on samudaya. The object of this discourse is to establish that the so-called things of the world have really no existence and hence there can be no origination, transformation, or destruction, and so a Bodhisattva should remain unconcerned with the conception of samudaya of things.

What is nirodhasatyavāvāda? A Bodhisattva is to know that sūnyatā has no origin, decay, contamination, purification, decrease, increase, past, present or future. In it, therefore, there can be no rūpa, vedāna, etc., no duḥkha, samudaya, etc., not even srotāpanna, sākṛtāgami or Buddha. This is called nirodhasatyavāvāda. This statement is meant to convey that nirodha is nothing but the realisation of the real nature of sūnyatā.

Arguing in this way, the Prajñāpāramitā shows that the truth is sūnyatā, i.e., the non-existence of the so-called things of the world, and this may be called the third truth, nirodha, while duḥkha consists in thinking oneself as related in some way or other to the conventional things, and samudaya in believing that the origination of things does really happen. As the mārga has no place in this interpretation of the āryasatyas, and so, the Prajñāpāramitā omits it.

Misconception of the Arhats

Nāgārjuna, as we have seen, establishes by quotations from the Mahāyānic texts that Hinayānic Arhats labour under misconceptions. Of the four common misconceptions (viparyāsas), they are not free from the fourth, viz., seeing ego in egoless things,
thinking non-existence of things as existent. But this statement, of Nāgārjuna or of the Mahāyānic texts with reference to the Hinayānists has in view the egolessness of things generally (dharmasānyatā) and not merely of constituted things with which the Hinayānists are concerned. Nāgārjuna ends his discourse by asserting that the truth is that all things are like echo, mirage, or images seen in dreams. When one realises this, he has neither love nor hatred for any being and with a mind like the sky, he does not know of any distinctions as Buddha, Dharma, or Saṅgha and does not have doubts regarding anything. Being without doubt and without attachment, he attains parinirvāṇa without upādāna.

Śāntideva also reasons in this way and says that a person’s avidyā, the source of delusion, which comes about on account of the attribution of existence (sat) to non-existent things (asat), or ego (ātmā) to egoless things (anātmā), ceases to exist when he realises truly (paramārtha) that things have only a dream-like or echolike existence. On the cessation of avidyā, the other links of the chain of causation get no opportunity to arise and hence the person obtains Nirodha.

The Mahāyānists thus relegate the four Truths and the Causal Law to the domain of matters conventional and not real, and assert that they are necessary in the doctrines of Mahāyāna inasmuch as they serve as a means for the guidance of living beings, who, as individuals in this world cannot but have their vision distorted or screened by ignorance.

3. Śāntideva speaks of the chain of causation as consisting of three parts, viz.,
   (i) kleśakāṇḍa—avidyā, trṣṇā and upādāna;
   (ii) karmakāṇḍa—saṃskāra and bhava; and
   (iii) duḥkhakāṇḍa—all the remaining links of the chain. For such divisions, see also Gokhale, Pratityasamutpādasūtra of Ullāṅgha.
4. The commentator of Bodhic. (p. 362), in order to show that the four Āryasatyas are really two, says that duḥkha, samudaya, and mārga should be classified under saṃvṛti, and nirodha under paramārtha.
Nāgārjuna and Sāntideva explain the position of the Mādhyamikas with regard to the Four Truths and the Causal Law as shown above.

Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and other writers on the Yogācāra system deal with this topic incidentally. Asaṅga, for instance, refers to the four truths, saying that the first two relate to the origin of the world or the happening of repeated births and the cause thereof, while the second two relate to the disappearance of things and the causes thereof. The first two need suppression while the second two need realisation. In connection with the fourteen ways of practising the smṛtyupasthānas (power of recollection) by Bodhisattvas, it is pointed out that one can enter, and also make others enter into the four truths by means of the smṛtyupasthānas. Other Yogācāra writings, viz., the Siddhi and the Laṅkāvalāra, do not specifically refer to the four truths but they deal with the doctrines of the Hīnayānists for the sake of comparison and contrast. For instance, they speak of the Hīnayānists as those who maintain the overt sense of Buddha’s teachings and not their deeper meaning; being satisfied only with ascertaining the generic characteristics of things but never questioning about their essential unreality.

They labour under the misconception (parikalpanā) of taking the three worlds as real, of postulating distinctions as subject and object, of assuming the existence of skandhas (constituents of beings), dhātus (organs of sense), āyatana (spheres of the

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1. Śutrā, pp. 137-8, 149-51.
2. Laṅkā, p. 14 : yathāruttārthabhīhinivīṣṭā. For a description of the rutārthagrāhi, see Laṅkā, pp. 154f., 160f., 197, 227. Laṅkā, (p. 77) states, "sūtrāntāḥ sarvasattvaśayadeśanārthavyabhinirvāraṇāṁ na sā tattvapratisarvasatītvyavāya- deśanaśa-vyabhibhiro yāvasthānākathā (the discourses are not faithful expositions of the truth because they were preached according to the mental tendencies of beings). For a remark like this, see M. Vṛ., dealt with before; Śutrā, p. 51; alpaśrutatvāni niḥarthasūtrāntaśrārayaṇāt.
3. Laṅkā, pp. 51, 71, 63; Yaḥ skandhadhātvāyatana-svasamānyalakṣaṇa, pariṣṭhānādhigame dṛṣṭamānte růmāṇcitatanur bhavati. Laksanaparicayajñāne cāṣya buddhīḥ praskandati na pratītyasamutpādāvinirbhāgalakṣaṇaparicayē.
organs of sense), citta (mind), hetupratyaya (cause and condition), kriyāyoga (action), utpāda (origin), sthiti (continuance), bhaṅga (dissolution), etc. The Laṅkāvatāra, speaking of Partityasamutpāda, states that it is by comprehending that things originate through cause and condition that one can get rid of the misconception of taking non-existent things as existent, and of assuming gradual or simultaneous origin of things. Then it explains as usual that the dependent origination happens in two ways, externally and internally, e.g., an earthen pot, butter, sprout, etc., originate through an external cause (hetu) and condition (pratyaya), while ignorance (avidyā), desire (trṣṇā), action (karma), etc. originate through an internal cause and condition. The remarks of the Yogācāra writers indicate that the four truths and the causal law of the Hīnayānists belong to the domain of imagination (parikalpanā) and not to that of reality.

**The Yogācāras have Three Truths for Two of the Mādhyamikas**

It should be remembered that though the Yogācārins are sharply criticised by the Mādhyamikas for their conception of the eighth consciousness called Ālaya-vijñāna (store-consciousness), both these schools of thought agree in holding that all things (dharmas) are non-existent, and are without origin and decay, and that the highest truth is unutterable (anakṣara), is identical with thatness and unchangeableness, possesses the signs of anāyūha and niryūha (non-taking and non-rejecting) and is beyond every possible means of determination. Passages

1. Laṅkā, pp. 42, 43, 225.
2. Ibid., pp. 82-3, 84, 140.
3. For six kinds of hetu, see Laṅkā, p. 83.
4. M. Vr., p. 523.
5. Trīṃśikā, p. 41: sarvadharma niḥsvabhāvā anutpānne aniruddhā iti nir-dityante.
6. Buddhās are silent (mauna) and never preach a word. Laṅkā, pp. 16, 17, 144, 194.
like this can be multiplied from the Yogācāra works to show that their conception of the Reality, apart from Ālayavijñāna, is the same as that of the Mādhyamikas. They also hold with the Mādhyamikas that from time immemorial, the mind has been under the delusion of imputing existence (sat) to non-existent things (asat), and that the Hinayānists were not able to rid their minds completely of the four viparyāsas (misconceptions) inasmuch as they meditated on Pudgalanimitta (individuality as basis) only and not on sarvadharmanimitta (all things whatsoever as basis) and conceived of Nirvāṇa as something existent, full of peace and beyond misery. Their conception is that the highest truth, which they usually call Pariniṣpanna for the Paramārtha of the Mādhyamikas, is the realisation of the fact that all dharmas perceptible to our mind have no more existence than the images seen in a dream or the reflection of the moon in water.

From time immemorial, however, our minds are so deluded that we cannot help perceiving in the images or reflection something existent, or in other words, with our common knowledge we cannot rise above parikalpanā (imaginary existence), the samvyṛti of the Mādhyamikas and others. The Yogācāras add a rider to the parikalpanā, saying that it depends for origination on something else, and hence it is always paratantra, the pratityasamutpanna of the Mādhyamikas and others. It is not necessary that the basis of a parikalpanā needs be anything existent or real, e.g., a person may be frightened by an echo. In short, Prikalpīta and Paratantra relate to worldly matters only, to the anitya, anatman and duḥkha of the Hinayānists, while, pariniṣpanna relates to Nirvāṇa, Śānta, i.e., where all kleśas and vikalpas cease.

Asaṅga brings out the relation of the three forms of truth thus: The highest truth (paramārtha or pariniṣpanna) is non-

1. M. Vr., Ch. XXIV quoting Dhyāyatamuṣṭisūtra.
3. Laṅkā., p. 72.
4. Śūrā., p. 149; cf. M. Vr., Ch. XVIII.
duality, which is shown in five ways. Two of these are that it is non-existing under the aspect of Parikalpita and Paratantra and not non-existing under the aspect of Pariniṣpanna. It is not the same, because the Parikalpita and Paratantra are not the same as Pariniṣpanna. It is not different, because the former two are not different from the latter.1 In another connection Asaṅga says that a Bodhisattva can be truly called a śūnyajñā (one who knows the real nature of non-existence) when he understands it under three aspects, viz., first that the non-existence means the absence of signs which are commonly attributed to an imaginary object (parikalpita), secondly, that the non-existence is the absence of any particular form of existence that one imagines it to be (paratantra), and thirdly, that which is by nature non-existent (pariniṣpanna).2 The Vijñaptimātraśiddhi3 elucidates this point by saying that the nature of non-existence is of three kinds, viz., (i) laksanā-niḥsvabhāvatā (non-existence of the signs commonly attributed to a thing and hence of the thing itself, i.e., parikalpita), (ii) utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā (non-existence of a thing when considered from the standpoint of its origin, i.e., paratantra); and (iii) paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā (non-existence of a thing in the highest sense, i.e., pariniṣpanna).

A. Parikalpita

Sthiramati, in commenting on the Siddhi, says that the first category, Parikalpita, refers to the non-existence of things by their characteristics or signs. A thing cannot be conceived to exist unless it is accompanied by some characteristics, the sign or form is attributed to a feeling. Endless things, which people imagine, not excluding the dharmas attributed to a Buddha, have existence only in one's imagination; hence they are parikalpita, i.e., have nothing corresponding to them in reality. The Laṅkāvatāra4 says that the parikalpita existence is inferred

1. Sūtrā, p. 22 : na saṣa na cāsaṣa na tathā na cāṇyathā, etc.
2. Ibid., pp. 94-5.
4. Laṅkā., p. 67.
from signs\(^1\) \((nīmitta)\) and explains it thus: All dependently originating things are known by their \(nīmitta\) (signs) and \(lakṣaṇa\) (characteristics).\(^2\) Now, things having \(nīmitta\) and \(lakṣaṇa\) are of two kinds. Things known by \(nīmitta\) only refer to things generally, internal and external, while things known by \(nīmitta\)-\(lakṣaṇa\) refer to the knowledge of generic characteristics of things both internal and external.\(^3\) Asaṅga\(^4\) distinguishes parikalpita into three kinds: \(vīz., (i)\) the basis \((nīmitta\ or \ālambana)\) of one’s thought-constructions, \(ii)\) the unconscious impression \((vāsanā)\) left by them upon one’s mind, and \(iii)\) the denominations \((arthakhyāti)\) following the impressions are taken as real.

\section*{B. Paratantra}

The second category, \textit{Paratantra}, refers to the imaginary existence pointed out above regarded from the aspect of its origin, \textit{i.e.}, all objects or feelings, which have existence only in imagination, and depend for origination on something else \((\textit{paratantra})\). Things, as they appear, are not the same as their origin or source; so it is said that the unreality of things is perceptible when they are viewed from the standpoint of their origin. Though the things, good, bad and indeterminate, or the three worlds \((dhātu)\) or the mind and its various functions have only imaginary existence, they arise, however, from causes and conditions, \textit{i.e.}, they depend for origin on others, and hence cannot be said to exist really, because a real thing remains

\begin{enumerate}
\item Prof. Levi translates \textit{nīmitta} by ‘signs of connotation’.
\item \textit{Laṅkā.}, pp. 224-6: five natures of existent things: \(i)\) nāma, \(ii)\) \textit{nīmitta}, \(iii)\) vikalpa, \(iv)\) samyagjñāna and \(v)\) tathātā.
\item Nāma-saṃjñā, saṃketa. Ignorant persons, deluded by various signs \((lakṣaṇa)\) become attached to things as self or mine, and thus weave a net of thought-constructions around themselves.
\item \textit{Nīmitta}—the reflection \((ābhāsa)\) of eye-consciousness known as form; so also the reflections of ear-consciousness, nose-c., tongue-c., body-c., mind-c, known as sound, smell, taste, touch and things are called \textit{nīmitta}.
\item \textit{Nīmitta} is more or less a sign impressed upon consciousness and \textit{lakṣaṇa} is definition, or features constituting a definition.
\end{enumerate}

\(^1\) \textit{Laṅkā.}, pp. 67, 150, 163.
\(^2\) \textit{Sūtrā.}, p. 64.
always the same and does not depend on cause and condition. The Laṅkāvataṭāra puts it very briefly thus: that which proceeds from a basis is dependently originated or paratantra (yadāśrayā-lambanāti pravartate tat paratantraḥ). Asaṅga analyses the paratantra in this way; the mark of being paratantra is the false thought-construction (abhūtaparikalpāt) about the subject (grāhaka) and its object (grāhya).¹

C. Parinipāpanna

The third category, Parinipāpanna, refers to the Paramārtha² (the highest truth) or Tathatā (Thatness). Like ākāśa (space) it is homogenous (lit. has one taste—ekaraśa), pure and changeless. The Parinipāpanna-svabhāva (absolute reality) is called Paramārtha, because it is the highest aspect in which all dependently originated things are to be looked upon. In this sense, it can be called also dharmatā (the nature of things) or in other words, it is the absolute, immanent in the phenomenal world. The Siddhi points out that the parinipāpanna (the Absolute) is so called because it is absolutely changeless. If it be compared with the Paratantra, it may be said to be that paratantra, which is always and ever completely devoid of the differentiation as subject and object, which are nothing but mere play of imagination, and hence, absolutely non-existing. Thus, it follows that the parinipāpanna is the same as the paratantra minus the parikalpita.³

1. Sūtrā., p. 65:
   grāhaka=manas, 5 vijñānas and vikalpa;
   grāhya=padabhāsa, arthabhāsa and dehabhāsa.
2. For seven different kinds of Paramārtha, see Laṅkā, p. 39;¹
3. This exposition is based on the Siddhi, pp. 39-42. Masuda has utilised the Chinese version of this treatise, for which see his Der individualistische etc. pp. 40-43. For general discussion, see La Vallée Poussin, E.R.E., s.v. Philosophy (Buddhist); L.D. Barnett, Path of Light (Wisdom of the East Series), p. 102; Keith. B. Phil., pp. 235-236; Sogen, Systems etc., pp. 145, 146; Stcherbatsky, Con. of N., p. 33.
Two truths in Hinayana

It is clear from the summarised discussions that the Paramarthas of the Madhyamikas and the Parinipanna of the Yogacaras indicate the Truth as conceived by them. Accepting that the Truth as the only reality, they relegate everything else to the domain of unreality calling them conventional, samvriti or parikalpita, with the reservation that the conventional things appear and disappear subject to causes and conditions, or in other words, they conform to the law of causation, the Pratityasamutpada of the Buddhists in general, and the Paratantra of the Yogacaras.

The Hinayanas utilise these expressions just as much as the Mahayanas and they also call their Truth the only reality, Paramattha, everything else being conventional (Sammuti), their truth, in one word, being anatta, non-existence of any substantiality in the so-called things of the world, with the corollary that everything being anatta is impermanent (anicca) and unhappy (dukkha). Buddhaghosa draws the distinction, saying that Buddhas use two kinds of speech, conventional and real. The expressions, satta (being), puggala (person), deva (god), etc., are conventional, while those like anicca (impermanence), dukkha (misery), anattā (essencelessness), khandha (aggregate), dhātu (organs of sense), āyatana (objects of sense), satipatthana (practices of self-possession) and sammāppadhāna (right exertion) were used in their true sense. Nagasena explains that when Buddha said “I shall lead the sangha, it is dependent on me,” he used the expression “I” and “me” in the conventional and not in the real sense. Ledi Sadnwe explains sammuti-saccas as those statements which are true in popular usage and are opposed to “inconsistency, and untruthfulness in speech” while paramattha-saccas are those which are established by the nature of the things and do not depend on opinion or usage. As an example, he points out that when it is said “there is a soul,” it

CONCEPTION OF THE TRUTH

is conventionally true but ultimately false,¹ for the real ultimate truth is that "there is no personal entity." The latter is true in all circumstances and conditions, and does not depend for its validity on usage or popular opinion. The contention of the Hinayānists is that a name is usually given to constitute things; that name is conventional, e.g., when the wheels, frame, and other parts of a chariot are fitted up in a particular order all the things taken together go by the name of a chariot. The term 'chariot' therefore depends on convention. If the constituted thing, e.g., the chariot is divided into various parts, it is no longer called a chariot when it is so divided. From this, it follows that the things, at which one ultimately arrives after repeated analysis, are the only real entities. These never undergo changes and bear the same name at all times and places and under all conditions. So, according to the Hinayānists, all the various ultimate elements, which constitute a being or thing, are real, and when reference is made to them, they may be called ultimate truth or paramattha-sacca; hence the dhātus or āyatanas, satipaṭṭhānas or sammappadhānas are expressions used in the ultimate sense.

The Kośa² explains the two truths in a slightly different manner. It says that the things like a jug and cloths, after they are destroyed, do no longer bear the same name; also things like water and fire when examined analytically dissolve into some elements and are no longer called water or fire. Hence the things, which on analysis are found to be changing, are given names by convention. Such expressions, which convey ideas temporarily and not permanently, are called Saṃvṛtisatyas. The Paramārthasatyas are those expressions, which convey ideas, which remain unchanged whether the things are dissolved, analysed are not, e.g., rūpa; one may reduce the rūpa into atoms or withdraw from it taste and other qualities, the

1. Cf. Stcherbatsky, Central Conception of Buddhism: “Buddhism never denied the existence of a personality, or a soul, in the empirical sense; it only maintained that it was no ultimate reality.”
2. See also Prof. Poussin’s article in the J.A., 1902, p. 250; Points of Controversy, pp. 63 fn., 180.
idea of the real nature of rūpa persists. In the same way one speaks of feeling (vedanā); therefore such expressions are Paramārthasatyas (ultimate truths).

But these ultimate truths of the Hīnayānists, we have seen, are relegated by the Mahāyānists to the domain of convention. Hence, what are real according to the Hīnayānists, namely, the Āryasatyas and the Pratītyasamutpāda, are unreal and matters of convention according to the Mahāyānists.1

1. Cf. the present writer's Early Monastic Buddhism (1960) Ch. XI.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCEPTION OF THE ABSOLUTE

Tathatā (Suchness)

The most authoritative text for the conception of the Absolute is the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, which deals with the diverse aspects of the Absolute and devotes one chapter (XVI) exclusively to the exposition of the conception of Tathatā.

The next authoritative text is Aśvaghoṣa’s *Mahāyāna Śraddhotpāda-sūtra* (The Awakening of Faith). The Sanskrit original of this text is lost. It was rendered into Chinese by Paramārtha in 554 A.D. and Śīkṣānanda in 706 A.D. Mrs. Beatrice Suzuki rendered it from Chinese into English and it happens to be our only source.

Aśvaghoṣa hailed from a Brāhmaṇa family of Eastern India about 400 years after Buddha’s mahāparinirvāṇa and was perhaps a contemporary of Emperor Kaśyapa. After he retired from worldly life, he refuted many views of the heretical teachers and composed the *Mahālankāra-sūtra*.

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that in Pāli texts as well as in the *Mahāvastu*¹ the term Tathatā has been equated to Tathātāvam or Tathattam meaning sameness; it has been applied for the deeper aspect of Nibbāna.

Tathatā the highest Truth or the Reality, according to Aśvaghoṣa, corresponds to the conception of Śūnyatā (Voidness) of the Mādhyamikas and Vijñaptimātratā (pure consciousness) of the Vijñānavādins (Yogācārās).

The main difference between Tathatā and Śūnyatā or Vijñaptimātratā is that the Tathatā has two aspects, viz., conditioned and unconditioned to be explained hereafter.

Aśvaghoṣa does not deny the reality of the empirical existence of the perceiving egos and the perceived objects but

¹ *Mahāvastu*, III, 397. See Also *Dīgha*, I. 175; *Sāṃyutta*, II. 199 *Milinda*, 255; *Visuddhimagga*, 214.
he denies their ontological reality. When ignorance (avidyā) is destroyed by enlightenment, the mind realises its identity with the Absolute, Suchness or the Infinite and apparently thereby vanishes multiplicity of subjects and objects.

Tathatā is the ultimate supreme reality, the Absolute. It is beyond empiricism and phenomenalism.

Tathatā has two aspects: Conditioned and Unconditioned. The conditioned suchness is applicable to the existence of beings subject to birth and death. It does not decrease in common beings nor does it increase in Bodhisattvas, who have perfected themselves in amity (maitri) and compassion (karunā) as well as in wisdom (prajñā).

Tathatā is also known as Bhūta-tathatā (perfect knowledge) and Samsāra (round of rebirths). The former is One Reality and the latter appears as many. The former is the Absolute. It has neither existence nor non-existence nor both nor neither. It is transcendent and transcends the conditioned or relative sphere. It is immanent in the phenomenal sphere. It is the Dharma-dhātu (the great comprehensive whole).

Tathatā harmonizes all contradictions, and directs the course of events in the world. It may be equated to Nirvāṇa, which is peaceful and blissful. It is also the Bodhi (perfect wisdom) and is the sum-total of all roots of meritorious activities (kuśala-mūlas). It is in Bodhi-citta (Enlightenment-consciousness). It is the Paramārtha-satya (the highest truth). It is also the Tathāgata-garbha (the womb of all Tathāgatas); in it Tathāgata is conceived, nourished and matured. It is the same as Ālaya-vijñāna, when it is fully purified of habit-energy or impregnation (vāsanā) and evil tendencies (dauśthulya).

The conditioned Suchness is manifested in the empirical sphere. It is relative, phenomenal and dualistic of subjects and objects, and is comprehended by a discriminative intellect. It should always be remembered that Suchness, whether conditioned or unconditioned remains unchanged. It is absolute sameness (samatā) in all phenomena. It is uncreated and eternal. It can only be comprehended by the highest wisdom (prajñā-pāramitā). The conditioned suchness as distinct from the unconditioned suchness is on account of Nescience (Āvidyā) or Ignorance. From the Absolute, under the influence of
Ignorance, there is the production of the self as a perceiver of the external world, which exists for him only and is subject to births and deaths, which means misery.

All worldly individuals are not condemned for ever to suffer from non-enlightenment, for Suchness does not remain absolutely apart from empirical existence. The relation between it and Ignorance is that of mutual perfuming or fumigation or impregnation (vāsanā).

Ignorance affects Suchness and produces those impressions (smṛti), which persist and maintain in Ignorance in beings, creating an eternal world and various modes of individuations, leading to misery.

Suchness also affects ignorance and induces in the mind of the ignorant a disgust for repeated births and deaths and the consequential misery and suffering, and develops in the mind of the ignorant person a strong desire for release from repeated births and deaths.

An illustration may be given to the above-mentioned facts by comparing the calm sea and its waves. The calm sea is the reality while its waves are caused by strong wind of ignorance. The waves do not occur when the wind of ignorance ceases. Similarly Tathātā, i.e., the sea of consciousness can regain the normal calm state if ignorance is counteracted and destroyed. It can be done by removing the cover or obscuration of physical, vocal and mental impurities (kleśāvarāṇa) and intellectual blemishes (jñeyāvarāṇa).

The Hinayānic Arhats or Pratyekabuddhas achieve only removal of kleśas while the Mahāyānists, i.e., the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, who have perfected themselves in wisdom (prajñāpāramitā) get rid of jñeyāvarāṇa.

Conditioned Suchness, as has been stated above, perfumes or impregnates a strong desire (vāsanā) to attain emancipation from sufferings on account of repeated births and deaths. It should be noted that the intellectual development varies from individual to individual, and so also their spiritual development in spite of the efforts of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, the highest embodiment of Suchness, who on account of their amity
Maitri (karuna) exert to train them up in their spiritual progress.\(^1\)

Samsara (existence in this world) is an intricate succession of momentary things (kshanika), i.e., Dharmata, which has not any raison d'etre, i.e., which does not exist by themselves. Just as a monk suffering from ophthalmia sees hairs in his alms-bowl, which do not exist, while a healthy monk does not see them. In the same way a saint, who is free from illusion, i.e., free from nescience (avidya) does not see the dharmas, which constitute the Samsara.

An attempt is now being made to cite passages from the Asta-sahasrik Prajnaparamita and a few other texts in support of what has been stated so far. At the outset it should be pointed out that Asvaghosa's conception of Tathata or the highest truth has two aspects: Conditioned and Unconditioned. The former perfumes or impregnates an ignorant person to seek release from ignorance and consequential repeated births and deaths, while the latter represents the highest truth (paramartha satya). In the original texts like the Prajnaparamita, from which passages are now being cited in support of Tathata refer only to the Unconditioned.

In texts like the Prajnaparamita, beings and objects by causes and conditions are ephemeral, hence non-existent in reality. These are compared to magical figures produced by a magician, echoes, or scenes seen in a dream. The real nature of things (bhuta-tathata) is Tathata=Tathatva (thatness) or the Truth (tattva). The synonyms of Tathata are Sarvadharmapalambha (all dharmas are inconceivable), Apratihata-laksana (unobstructed), signless Apratimalaksana (incomparable), Akasasamata (similar to the sky).

A few passages are now being cited in support of what has been stated above:

Ye Bodhisattva prajnaparamitayam caratah sarvadharmam anutpattikaityadhimun Canti, na ca tavadanutpattikaprat-

Trans. Those Bodhisattvas, who have been perfecting themselves in wisdom and firmly believed that all dharmas are unoriginated, i. e., (quiet, tranquil, i. e., undisturbed by origin and decay) they eschew the stages of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas and seek only to attain the state of Buddha, they will be foretold by Buddhas about their attainment of Samyak Sambuddhahood. After emancipation they take their stand on Suchness and while thus standing they preach the doctrine of omniscience in detail.

Ya ca tathāgata-tathā
yā ca sarvadharma-tathā,
Tathātā advayādvaiddhiṅkarā
dvayaḥ tathātā.

Trans. Suchness of the Tathāgata and suchness of all dharmas are one and the same and non-dual.

Ya tathāgata-tathātā, nātita, na anāgata,
na prayutpannā

Trans. Suchness of Tathāgatas is neither past, nor future nor present, likewise the Suchness is the Suchness of all dharmas.
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